

School of Theology at Claremont



1001 1314401



The Library  
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY  
AT CLAREMONT

WEST FOOTHILL AT COLLEGE AVENUE  
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA













*Stone House  
Isouing*

THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION  
IN ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,  
With the Outline of a System.

PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

|                     |                          |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| LONDON, . . . . .   | HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. |
| DUBLIN, . . . . .   | GEO. HERBERT.            |
| NEW YORK, . . . . . | SCRIBNER AND WELFORD.    |

#### PUBLISHERS' NOTICE.

*It has been thought desirable to publish at once this volume, which comprises the "History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion from the Reformation to Kant," and which is complete in itself. As will be seen from Professor Flint's Preface, a considerable time elapsed between the publication of the first volume and the completing volume of the work in the German original, but the translation of the latter is proceeding, and will be published in a few months.*

HISTORY  
OF THE  
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION  
*FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT.*

BL  
51  
P8

BY  
BERNHARD PÜNJER, 1850-1885.

Translated from the German

BY  
W. HASTIE, B.D.

With a Preface

BY  
ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D.,  
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

EDINBURGH:  
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.  
1887.

Theology Library  
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY  
AT CLAREMONT  
California

Leviore gustus in philosophia movere fortasse ad atheismum,  
sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere.

BACO VERULAMUS.



## PREFACE.

---

THIS preface will very probably seem unnecessary. The merits of Dr. Pünjer's work are so great and obvious, that they can hardly fail to be recognised by all who become acquainted with it. I should gladly have left it to speak for itself; but, after having represented to the publishers and translator the desirability of making it accessible to English readers, I have not felt free to decline their request to write a few lines of introduction to it in its new form.

When Dr. Pünjer died, about two years ago, he was only in the thirty-fifth year of his age. It is not surprising, therefore, that his name should be almost unknown in this country beyond the circle of professional theologians. But a brief sketch of his life may be, on this account, all the more appropriate and welcome. I derive the materials for it from the necrological notice written by Dr. Lipsius, and published in the fourth volume of the *Theologischer Jahresbericht*.

George Christian Bernhard Pünjer was born on the 7th of June 1850, at Fredericksgabekoog, in Holstein. In that obscure and uninteresting region his father was a school-master, and there the boy grew up and was educated until qualified to enter a gymnasium, when he was sent to Meldorf, doubtless, in part at least, on account of its nearness. During 1870 and the two following years he studied theology at the Universities of Jena, Erlangen, Zürich, Kiel, and again Jena. He thus heard many of the most distinguished theological teachers of Germany. The two who exercised most influence on the formation of his religious convictions were Biedermann of Zürich and Lipsius of Jena,—the former long the ablest exponent of Hegelianism in the sphere of Dogmatics,

and the latter an equally talented worker in the same department, who from Neo-Kantian principles has arrived at very similar conclusions. Pünjer implicitly accepted neither the speculative standpoint of the one nor the subjective standpoint of the other, but he was in essential agreement with them as to results.

In 1874 he took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The subject of his dissertation was "Die Religionslehre Kants," and thus by his earliest publication he entered on what was to be the chief field of his labours during the rest of his life. It was the origin of the work now translated. He had resolved to devote himself to the cultivation and teaching of theology, and in Germany every man of sufficient learning and talent who forms such a resolution has an opportunity afforded him of trying to carry it into execution; he has simply to show evidence of competency, and go to work. Accordingly, in the summer of 1875, Pünjer qualified as a *Docent* of the Theological Faculty of Jena. The treatise which he submitted, [and which was published the following year,—*De Michaelis Serveti doctrina commentatio dogmatico-historica*,—consists of a careful account of the whole doctrinal system of Servetus, a reasoned estimate thereof, and an indication of how it was related to certain forms of orthodox and heretical teaching.

While a student, consumption had laid its hold on our author; now on the threshold of his public career he was prostrated by typhus. He recovered, and for nine years it seemed as if the fever had expelled the constitutional malady. He was able about Easter in 1876 to begin his lectures, and until a few weeks before his death he only once required to be absent from his class-room. He lectured on almost all parts of Systematic Theology, on some periods of Church History, and on the Philosophy of Religion, which exercised more and more attraction on him. In 1880 appeared the first volume—that now published in English—of his *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion*. It was at once recognised in Germany to be a work of exceptional and

permanent value. In the same year its author became a professor extraordinarius. In 1881 he founded the well-known and highly useful *Theologischer Jahresbericht*. He was a leading contributor to the first four volumes, reviewing in each the works which had appeared during the past year on the History of Religions, the Philosophy of Religion, Apologetics, Polemics, Encyclopædia, Church Unions, and Missions. At the same time he not only lectured assiduously, but wrote largely in theological journals, in encyclopædias, etc. In fact, he must have laboured to an extent which was excessive and imprudent in a man of unsound physical constitution. A German privat-dōcent or professor extraordinarius, however, must study to live as well as live to study, and generally finds it very difficult to solve the two problems combined. In 1883, Professor Pünjer published the last volume of his *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion*; and in the same year he received the diploma of an honorary doctorship from the University of Heidelberg. Only a short period more of life had been allotted him. Early in 1885 disease of the lungs again made its presence known, and it finished its fatal work on the 13th of May 1885.

The life of Pünjer was short, and poor in outward success or honour; a life of self-denial, and of toil which had no reward save the consciousness of being the faithful performance of useful work. He died before he had even attained an ordinary professorship, and before he had shown to the world the full measure of his powers. Yet his life was far from futile or unfruitful. On the contrary, it may justly be regarded as a fine example of the kind of life which has made the theology, the philosophy, and scholarship of Germany the admiration of the world; and it produced, notwithstanding its brevity, much good work which will long bear witness to its worth.

It was our author's intention to follow up his *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion* with a volume setting forth his own view on the chief questions with which a religious

philosophy should deal. Death prevented him from accomplishing his purpose; but he had so far proceeded with the task that a *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie* could be edited from his MSS., and this was done by Dr. Lipsius in 1886. It would be unjust to take this work as a criterion of its author's constructive ability. It is not what we would have been entitled to expect from him if his life had been prolonged. But, although inadequately developed, it is judicious and instructive so far as it goes, and clearly and even popularly written; and as it forms the natural conclusion of the History, it is hoped that it will be a welcome addition to the next volume of this translation.

A few remarks may now be made on the work here presented. It merely professes to be a History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion. It does not profess to be a Universal History of the Philosophy of Religion. There have been Hindu, Jewish, and Mohammedan Philosophies of Religion. A good account of these would be of interest and value, but we can have no right to complain of not finding it in this work, since Pünjer warns us by his very title that he will confine his researches within the area of Christendom. On the other hand, his book is not merely a History of the  
 ✓ Philosophy of the Christian Religion—a History of the Philosophy of Christianity. Köppen, Weisse, and others have published what they designated Philosophies of Christianity. Pünjer was entitled, in conformity with his purpose and plan, to give an account of such works, if of sufficient importance; but they had no exclusive, or even special, claim to his notice. He aimed at being the historian, not merely of the Philosophy of Christianity, but of the Philosophy of Religion, so far as it had sprung up on a Christian soil and under Christian influences. The title of his work served to indicate his intention, and was thus far justified. Otherwise, however, it can hardly be deemed appropriate. Spinoza, the English deists, Diderot, and Voltaire, for example, cannot with propriety be held to have been Christian philosophers. They certainly made no claim to be so considered. Further,



although it is easy enough to understand how in a sense there may be a philosophy of Christianity, it is difficult to conceive of a distinctively Christian philosophy of religion, notwithstanding that many have professed to propound a philosophy entitled to be so called. Is such a philosophy anything else than the true philosophy of religion, or, more simply and quite as accurately, the philosophy of religion? If not, how is it a distinctive philosophy? If yes, must it not be something less or other than true? Indeed, there are no traces either in the *Geschichte* or *Grundriss* that Dr. Pünjer supposed that there was any exclusively and specifically Christian philosophy of religion. Hence the title of his work, although it served one important purpose, would seem to have been by no means a just expression even of his own thought.

Due attention should be given to this other fact. The book is merely a history of philosophico-religious theories, not a history and criticism of these theories. For this limitation there is in the present day no need of apology. The historian of ideas is no more bound to constitute himself the judge of their truth or falsity, than the historian of events is bound to pronounce on their wisdom or folly, rightness or wrongness. The sole duty of the historian, alike of ideas and events, is to give us a complete history of them—such a history as will of itself imply the true judgment of them. It may sometimes be desirable to add critical reflections to the history, but it ought to be clearly recognised that these are not the history, and should not be substituted for it; that, on the contrary, the space allotted to them is space deducted from the history; and that indulgence in them is even very apt to be detrimental to the truthfulness of the historical representation. The characters and functions of the historian and the critic are so different, that when an attempt is made to act as both, the critic is not unlikely to discredit and injure the historian. The best historians of philosophy and theology have now, accordingly, come to dispense with philosophical and theological criticism, and to confine themselves to historical narration and exposition. Their motto is, as was that of

Pünjer, "Darstellung, nicht Beurtheilung." He scarcely needed, therefore, to give any reason for his procedure in the above respect. But he gave two, and one of them has afforded to his reviewers the chief matter for criticism which they have found in his book. To the first, namely, that a continuous criticism of the theories which he expounded would have greatly increased the size but comparatively little the value of his work, nothing, of course, could be objected. But the second—that he did not feel free to assume the office of critic and judge, seeing that he could not claim to be himself in possession of a complete system of religious philosophy, and wished to come to history, not to impose his doctrine upon it, but to learn from it—was a positive temptation to superficial critics to endeavour to show their superiority to this, perhaps, too modest author. Hence such critics have naturally spent, in the assertion and defence of the thesis, that whoever ventures to write a history of the philosophy of religion should have a complete philosophy of religion of his own, the strength which they should have given to the study of the history submitted to them. Pünjer's confession, that he set to work on his History before he had such a philosophy, has been characterized by them as naive. In reality, the naivete is their own. Although Pünjer began his History before he deemed himself to have thought out a complete philosophy of religion, he did not begin it until he had attained a wide knowledge of the phenomena of religion, and of all the special sciences which deal with these phenomena. Further, before he began to write he had come to the conclusion that by the philosophy of religion, the history of which he undertook to trace, could only properly be meant the thorough or scientific comprehension and elucidation of all the phenomena of religion. Such being the case, why should he need, when he had any hypothesis, doctrine, or philosophy of religion before him, to judge it by an hypothesis, doctrine, or philosophy of his own? Why should he not judge it directly by the laws of reason on the one hand, and by the phenomena which it professes to explain on the other?

The principles of logic and the facts of experience are, in reality, the only proper criteria either of our own theories of religion or of those of others. To judge of other men's theories by our own is an altogether illegitimate procedure. It is akin to, and inevitably leads to, judging of facts by theories, instead of testing theories by facts.

The merits of Pünjer's history are not difficult to discover; on the contrary, they are of the kind which, as the French say, *sautent aux yeux*. The language is almost everywhere as plain and easy to apprehend as, considering the nature of the matter conveyed, it could be made. The style is simple, natural, and direct; the only sort of style appropriate to the subject. The amount of information imparted is most extensive, and strictly relevant. Nowhere else will a student get nearly so much knowledge as to what has been thought and written, within the area of Christendom, on the philosophy of religion. He must be an excessively learned man in that department who has nothing to learn from this book. As regards the prime quality of historical truthfulness, accuracy in reporting and reproducing what has happened or been held, it may safely, I believe, be accepted as unimpeachable. What Pünjer says was maintained by any one, the reader may feel assured was maintained by him, and substantially as affirmed. The work is also characterized by an almost perfect impartiality. With the exception of the harsh estimate of Modern Methodism given on p. 283, scarcely a trace of prejudice is anywhere to be detected in it. A great many theories are set forth in it of which its author must have wholly disapproved, but the delineation of them is not thereby affected, not coloured or distorted, or even any the less carefully executed. Closely connected with this characteristic of the work is, to adopt a convenient German term, its objectivity. The historian here never obtrudes himself between us and the history. He has effaced himself before his subject, in order that it alone may be seen, and precisely as it is. His personal feelings and convictions, his subjective peculiarities and predilections, are kept in abeyance,

and his mind is made to serve as a pure and uncoloured medium for the transmission or reflection of the objective reality, matter, or contents of the history. This self-abnegation is the supreme virtue of the historian, as without the objectivity only to be obtained by it there can be no true history, but merely some more or less plausible semblance of it. If devoid of this virtue, a great man may possibly write a great book on history, but not a great or even a good history. Dr. Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology* is a very suggestive and valuable theological work, but it has far too much of Dr. Dorner's own individuality in it to be a trustworthy history. The realm of historical truth, like the kingdom of heaven, can only be entered through self-renunciation. And such renunciation deserves all the more to be commended because it is so apt to be unappreciated. The more a work of history is soaked in, and saturated with, the subjectivity of its author, and consequently the less truly historical it is, the more popular it often is. History means "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," and that has little charm for vulgar minds.

The criticisms which may most fairly be made on the present work seem to me to be the following. First, The chronology, the order of succession, of the theories described is not always so carefully attended to as history requires. Patritius, for example, should have been treated of before Campanella, and Ramus before Taurellus. Paracelsus should have been dealt with immediately after Cusanus. His significance is only truly seen when his doctrines are regarded as springing from sources anterior to the Reformation. It is quite erroneous to place English Deism before Cartesianism. Blount should not be made to follow Hobbes and precede Locke, but to follow Locke and precede Toland, or rather Tindal, who is also wrongly located. More and Cudworth should have been treated of before Locke.

Secondly, The method of exposition adopted by Pünjer sometimes fails. Whenever he treats of a system at any considerable length, he endeavours to give a careful summary



of what is essential in it, so far as professedly relevant to religion. In most cases this leads to a satisfactory result; but not in all. There are systems which it is useless to attempt to summarize. That of Jacob Böhme is an instance. With laborious conscientiousness our author has striven to give a complete account of it. Will the ordinary reader find the account even intelligible? I shall leave it to himself to answer. I venture, however, to think that he would have had more reason to be grateful to Dr. Pünjer had he, so to speak, melted the system down in the crucible of his own mind, extracted the precious ore, presented that only in his book, and left the residue or slack to kindly oblivion.

Thirdly, The work of Dr. Pünjer is lacking in recognition of religious speculation outside of Germany. In fact, there is no recognition in it at all of recent English, French, or Italian religious philosophy. This criticism applies, of course, only to the second, and otherwise the most interesting and valuable volume of the work. So long as the scholars of France, Italy, and England leave the composition of histories of philosophy in general, and in its departments, almost entirely to Germans, they must expect to see the philosophical movements in their own countries largely ignored.

Notwithstanding the above and such other objections as may fairly apply to Dr. Pünjer's work, it is one of great value, and indispensable to the student of theology and philosophy. The only other history of the philosophy of religion which is of any worth is that contained in Dr. Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion on the basis of History*, and which has now been made accessible to English readers in the excellent translation of Prof. Alexander Stewart and the Rev. Allan Menzies. It is a work of distinguished ability, and will be found a valuable supplement to that of Pünjer, owing to its vigorous criticism of the principal modern German systems of religious philosophy. It has, however, neither the same fulness nor objectivity as Pünjer's treatise, and cannot properly serve as a substitute for it. The whole field of history, for example, covered by the present volume is but

slightly touched by Pfeiderer. Those who read the one work will be the more likely, and the better prepared, to read the other. The translators of both have rendered a manifest service to the cause of religious enlightenment and science. There need be no fear that the circulation of either work will injure that of the other.

It will not be expected that I should enter on any discussion of the nature, limits, methods, or problems of the Philosophy of Religion. I cannot, however, too earnestly commend the study of it to our younger theologians. It is the all-inclusive theological science,—at once the foundation, the vital breath, the goal and crown of every theological discipline. All the special theological sciences are worth just what they contribute to it, or, in other words, to the complete comprehension of religion. If theology is to make real progress among us, old dogmatic methods of inquiry and proof must be abandoned for such as are truly philosophical, and the old theological system give place to another, larger and richer, and organized by a truly philosophical spirit. For the modern theologian, the study of the Philosophy of Religion is an incumbent duty, an urgent necessity. The Philosophy of Religion deals with all the root-questions of theology; and we can as justly apply to theology as to any other kind of science the dictum and illustration of Bacon—"If you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything that you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mould about the roots, that must work it."

The translation will, I have no doubt, be found well executed. It is the work of a thoroughly competent scholar, whose knowledge of the systems and literature of religious philosophy is unequalled by any one known to me.

R. FLINT.

# CONTENTS.



## INTRODUCTION.

### DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT, AND SURVEY TO THE REFORMATION.

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION DEFINED AND JUSTIFIED, . . . . . | 1    |
| II. THE ANCIENT CHURCH, . . . . .   | 6    |
| The Apologists, . . . . .   | 7    |
| Minucius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius, . . . . .                           | 9    |
| Gnosticism, . . . . .   | 10   |
| The Ecclesiastical Gnosis. Clement and Origen, . . . . .                      | 13   |
| Neo-Platonism. Ammonius Sakkas. Plotinus. Porphyry, . . . . .                 | 15   |
| Dionysius Areopagitica, . . . . .   | 17   |
| Maximus Confessor. Synesius, . . . . .  | 18   |
| Joannes Philoponus. John of Damascus, . . . . .                               | 19   |
| The Latin Church, . . . . .   | 20   |
| Augustine, . . . . .  | 21   |
| Boethius. Cassiodorus. Isidore of Seville, . . . . .                          | 22   |
| III. THE MIDDLE AGES—   |      |
| The Movement of the Middle Ages generally, . . . . .                          | 23   |
| Scholasticism, . . . . .  | 25   |
| The Intellectual Enlightenment and the Religious Opposition, . . . . .        | 26   |
| Joannes Scotus Erigena, . . . . .   | 26   |
| Realism and Nominalism. Roscellinus, . . . . .                                | 28   |
| Anselm, . . . . .   | 29   |
| Universals, . . . . .   | 31   |
| Albertus Magnus, . . . . .  | 32   |
| Thomas Aquinas, . . . . .   | 32   |
| Duns Scotus, . . . . .  | 33   |
| Raymundus Lullus, . . . . .   | 34   |
| William of Occam, . . . . .   | 34   |
| Peter D'Ailly. John Gerson. Raymond of Sabunde, . . . . .                     | 35   |
| Berengar of Tours, . . . . .  | 36   |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Abelard, . . . . .  | 36   |
| Averroës, . . . . .   | 39   |
| Simon of Tournay. John of Brescain, . . . . .                               | 40   |
| Roger Bacon. De tribus Impostoribus, . . . . .                              | 41   |
| William of Auvergne, . . . . .  | 42   |
| Mysticism (Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventura, etc.), . . . . .              | 42   |
| Amalrich of Bena, . . . . .   | 43   |
| David of Dinant. Joachim of Floris, . . . . .                               | 44   |
| Beghins and Beghards, . . . . .   | 45   |
| Meister Eckhart. (Tauler, Suso, and the <i>German Theology</i> ), . . . . . | 45   |

## IV. TRANSITION TO THE REFORMATION—

|  |    |
|--|----|
| The Humanists, . . . . .                                       | 49 |
| Pomponatius, . . . . .   | 50 |
| Georgius Gemisthus Pletho, . . . . .                           | 52 |
| Marsilius Ficinus, . . . . .                                   | 53 |
| Pico of Mirandola, . . . . .                                   | 55 |
| Justus Lipsius. Montaigne. (Charron, Sanchez), . . . . .       | 56 |
| Mutianus. John Reuchlin, . . . . .                             | 57 |
| Erasmus. Ulrich von Hutten, . . . . .                          | 58 |
| Enlightenment and Mysticism, . . . . .                         | 59 |
| Petrus Waldus. John Huss. John Wickliffe, . . . . .            | 60 |
| Thomas à Kempis. John Wessel, . . . . .                        | 60 |
| Division of the Subject from the Reformation Period, . . . . . | 61 |

## BOOK I.

HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION FROM THE  
REFORMATION TO KANT.

## SECTION FIRST.—THE BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.

|                                      |     |
|--------------------------------------|-----|
| I. Nicolaus Cusanus, . . . . .       | 66  |
| II. Telesius and Cardanus, . . . . . | 89  |
| III. Giordano Bruno, . . . . .       | 93  |
| IV. Thomas Campanella, . . . . .     | 101 |
| V. Nicolaus Taurellus, . . . . .     | 113 |
| VI. Petrus Ramus, . . . . .          | 118 |

## SECTION SECOND.—THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| I. Martin Luther, . . . . .                                   | 125 |
| II. Melancthon, . . . . .                                     | 131 |
| III. Osiander, Illyricus, and Orthodox Lutheranism, . . . . . | 137 |
| IV. Ulrich Zwingli, . . . . .                                 | 145 |
| V. John Calvin, . . . . .                                     | 155 |
| VI. Protestant Controversies. Vedelius and Musaeus, . . . . . | 158 |

## SECTION THIRD.—THE CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. Aristotelianism and Ramism, . . . . .      | 168  |
| II. The Daniel Hofmann Controversy, . . . . . | 178  |

SECTION FOURTH.—THE OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN  
PROTESTANTISM.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| I. The Purely Intellectual Opposition. Socinianism, . . . . .                             | 193 |
| II. The Anabaptists. Joris. Niclas. Independentism. Quakers, . . . . .                    | 207 |
| III. The Mystics. Servetus. Paracelsus. Carlstadt. Münzer. Frank. Schwenkfeldt, . . . . . | 217 |
| IV. Valentin Weigel, . . . . .  | 231 |
| V. Jacob Böhme, . . . . .   | 243 |
| Swedenborgianism, . . . . .   | 265 |
| Irvingism (Edward Irving), . . . . .  | 267 |
| VI. The Practical Opposition. Pietism, . . . . .  | 268 |
| Zinzendorf and the Moravians, . . . . .   | 280 |
| Methodism, . . . . .  | 282 |

## SECTION FIFTH.—THE ENGLISH DEISM.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| The English Reformation. The Levellers, . . . . . | 285 |
| Lord Bacon, . . . . .                             | 286 |
| Newton. Boyle, . . . . .                          | 288 |
| The general character of Deism, . . . . .         | 289 |
| The Three Periods of English Deism, . . . . .     | 289 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| I. The Beginnings of English Deism—  |     |
| Lord Herbert of Cherbury, . . . . .  | 292 |
| Sir Thomas Browne, . . . . .   | 300 |
| Thomas Hobbes, . . . . .   | 302 |
| Charles Blount, . . . . .  | 314 |
| II. The Full Development of Deism—   |     |
| John Locke, . . . . .  | 315 |
| John Toland, . . . . .   | 321 |
| Anthony Collins, . . . . .   | 329 |
| Earl of Shaftesbury, . . . . .   | 330 |
| Matthew Tindal, . . . . .  | 338 |
| Thomas Chubb, . . . . .  | 342 |
| Thomas Morgan, . . . . .   | 345 |
| III. Special Controversies and the Apologetic Works—                                 |     |
| 1. The Controversy on Immortality; Dodwell, . . . . .                                | 351 |
| 2. The Controversy on Prophecy; Whiston, Collins, Bullock, Sykes, Jeffery, . . . . . | 352 |
| 3. The Debate on Miracles; Woolston, Peter Annet, . . . . .                          | 353 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 4. The Apologists—Henry More, . . . . . | 354  |
| Cudworth, . . . . .                     | 355  |
| Bentley, Ibbot, Gibson, . . . . .       | 356  |
| John Conybeare, . . . . .               | 357  |
| Bishop Butler, . . . . .                | 358  |
| IV. David Hume, . . . . .               | 359  |

## SECTION SIXTH.—DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| I. Descartes, . . . . .                             | 389 |
| II. Opponents and Adherents of Descartes, . . . . . | 392 |
| Christoph Wittich, . . . . .                        | 397 |
| Heidanus, Deurhoff, F. A. Lampe, . . . . .          | 398 |
| A. van Dale, Balthasar Bekker, . . . . .            | 399 |
| Hermann Alexander Röell, . . . . .                  | 401 |
| Geulinx, . . . . .                                  | 402 |
| Malebranche, . . . . .                              | 404 |
| III. Spinoza, . . . . .                             | 407 |
| IV. Opponents and Adherents of Spinoza—             |     |
| Rappoltus, Blyenburg, . . . . .                     | 434 |
| Cuffelarius, Musæus, Kortholt, . . . . .            | 435 |
| Richard Simon, Jacob Verschoor, . . . . .           | 436 |
| Matthias Knutzen, . . . . .                         | 437 |
| Stosch (Stossius), . . . . .                        | 439 |
| Edelmann, . . . . .                                 | 439 |

## SECTION SEVENTH.—THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| I. Scepticism—Pierre Bayle, . . . . .     | 446 |
| Le Vayer, Huët, Saint Evremont, . . . . . | 447 |
| II. Deism—Maupertuis, . . . . .           | 453 |
| Voltaire, . . . . .                       | 454 |
| III. Materialism and Sensationalism—      |     |
| Condillac, . . . . .                      | 460 |
| De la Mettrie, . . . . .                  | 461 |
| Helvetius, Diderot, . . . . .             | 462 |
| D'Holbach, . . . . .                      | 463 |
| IV. The Opposition of Religious Feeling—  |     |
| Rousseau, . . . . .                       | 468 |

## SECTION EIGHTH.—LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| General Character and Relations of the <i>Aufklärung</i> (Enlightenment), . . . . . | 476 |
| I. The Doctrines of Leibniz, . . . . .  | 480 |
| II. Wolff and the Popular Philosophy—   |     |
| Wolff's Philosophy, . . . . .   | 515 |
| The Popular Philosophy, . . . . .   | 524 |
| Grotius, Pufendorff, . . . . .  | 525 |
| Christian Thomasius, . . . . .  | 526 |
| Relation of the Wolffian Philosophy to Theology, . . . . .                          | 528 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Canz, Reinbeck, Köthen, Carpov, . . . . .                 | 530  |
| Reusch, . . . . .   | 531  |
| Darjes, Ribow, Schubert, Kappelier, . . . . .             | 532  |
| III. The <i>Aufklärung</i> and its Chief Representatives— |      |
| Sulzer, Nicolai, Basedow, . . . . .                       | 536  |
| Moses Mendelssohn, . . . . .                              | 537  |
| The Physico-theologies ; Brockes, . . . . .               | 539  |
| J. J. Spalding, W. A. Teller, . . . . .                   | 541  |
| Sack, F. W. Jerusalem, . . . . .                          | 542  |
| J. L. Schmidt and the Wertheim Bible, . . . . .           | 543  |
| J. H. Schulz, . . . . .                                   | 544  |
| Andreas Riem, G. Schade, . . . . .                        | 545  |
| Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, . . . . .                          | 546  |
| Reimarus, . . . . .                                       | 550  |

## SECTION NINTH.—THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.

## The Historico-critical Movement—

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Wettstein, Griesbach, Eichhorn, Michaelis, . . . . . | 559 |
| Ernesti, Semler, . . . . .                           | 560 |
| Gellert, Klopstock, . . . . .                        | 562 |
| Matthias Claudius, Teerstegen, Lavater, . . . . .    | 563 |

## The Chief Representatives of the New Movement—

|                        |     |
|------------------------|-----|
| I. Lessing, . . . . .  | 564 |
| II. Herder, . . . . .  | 585 |
| III. Hamann, . . . . . | 607 |
| IV. Jacobi, . . . . .  | 621 |





# INTRODUCTION.

## DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT, AND SURVEY TO THE REFORMATION.



### I.

#### THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION DEFINED AND JUSTIFIED.

WHOEVER undertakes to write the History of a Science is confronted at the outset with the great difficulty of having to define correctly the matter that has to be dealt with. The conception of a science is that about which there is most dispute, and in the setting forth of which there is the greatest diversity of procedure. Should, then, the expounder of a science pass silently over all those views of it which he does not recognise as correct? This is impossible. Moreover, a comprehensive and systematic treatment of any subject in a scientific way is only attained after a long period of prior effort. May, then, the *historical* treatment of a science leave all the beginnings and all the early imperfect attempts in the way of scientific explanation of its subject-matter unnoticed? Certainly not. Were any one, for example, to undertake to write a History of Ethics, he could neither leave out of view all those precepts of action that were not yet brought into the form of a strictly completed system, nor could he omit any of those systems which based the Science of Ethics upon other definitions than the one which he himself held to be correct. The historian of a science must not merely review all the expositions of his science actually presented in history, but he must also draw

into the sphere of his exposition much that is only significant as preparatory effort, as weak and unsuccessful attempts towards the later form of the science.

What, and how much, should a History of the Philosophy of Religion contain? In point of fact the question is still discussed as to whether the Philosophy of Religion should merely give a phenomenology of the religious consciousness, or should also enter into the domain of metaphysics, or in addition should also apply to its own use the results of the history of Religion. The History of the subject ought properly to take all these relations into account. But if it were to confine itself to an exposition of the complete systems of the Philosophy of Religion, it could hardly begin with anything before Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, or, at most, with Kant's *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*, and not earlier. Such a limitation would withdraw from it all the philosophical speculations about Religion which lie at the basis alike of the philosophical systems and the expositions of the Christian faith. This would certainly be circumscribing our subject too narrowly. Hence it is necessary to adopt a wider standpoint, and we must be guided to it by the proper conception of the Philosophy of Religion, if we are to avoid running off into other subjects. At first there appears to be a contradiction involved in such combinations as, "Philosophy of Religion," "Philosophy of Right," "Philosophy of Nature," and similar terms. For the characteristic of Philosophy is that it occupies itself with the universal in contrast to the particular details of the several sciences, a distinction which holds whether Philosophy is defined to be the universal all-embracing science as distinguished from the special sciences, or as the science of the principles of Being as well as of Knowing. These two sides of Philosophy, when deeply apprehended, agree with each other, and the nature of the Philosophy of Religion may be determined by reference to them. It considers Religion in connection with all the other manifestations of the spiritual life of man as well as with all the other forms of existence, because it is the application of

thought to the scientific and rational comprehension of Religion. Its aim is not merely to obtain empirical knowledge of the forms which religion has assumed in doctrine, practice, and cultus at different times and among different people; it aims at comprehending what and why religion is, and how it is connected with the nature of man and his position in the universe as well as its relation to the being and working of God. And thus it has also to take into account how and wherefore it has assumed a certain form at any particular time among a particular people, and similar questions. The task of the Philosophy of Religion is the thoughtful, rational consideration of religion. The term "Religion" indicates first of all a something objective,—the sum of the theoretical and practical propositions concerning God, His relation to the world, and our own action, which are accepted as valid in a particular community. These propositions claim to be divine truth; and, in the case of a right relation on the part of the individual to the objective religion of his Church, they correspond to the inner experience of his consciousness so completely that it is only a late and far advanced development of independent thinking that induces the attempt to consider them objectively and without prepossession, with the view of incorporating the religion which they represent, along with other objects of knowledge, in the form of an all-embracing theory of the universe. As regards the Christian religion, it is manifest that it could only enter of its own accord into such a universal system, when philosophical thinking had acquired such strength among the Christian peoples that it no longer shrank from boldly attempting to conceive the whole of being in a speculative way. This highest stage in the application of thought to Religion is, however, prepared for in various ways. If the adherents of a religion try to refute the doubts which arise here and there regarding it, or strive to make what is first presented from without as a doctrine and tenet a possession of their own heart and a subject of personal conviction, they must then advance to the consideration of it in thought. And any one

who might undertake the task of defending the truth of his religion from attack, or of making it known to the followers of another creed, could not always stop at an appeal to its divine origin, but must often try to show that its doctrines recommend themselves to the rational thinking of men as truth. Again, the examination of Religion as an objective fact must always return to the subjective side, and this must lead a step farther. If the modification of the human self-consciousness, which we call Religion, precedes the establishment of doctrines and observances as binding upon the agent, we must already recognise in this fact an activity of thought. As regards the result of this thinking, the contemporary philosophical speculation is of importance to it as well as the special character which the religion in question bears in itself in the self-consciousness of the individual, and which therefore asserts its influence upon his reflection. Further, the learned cultivation of Theology likewise proceeds under the influence of the position assigned to Philosophy, as a universal organon of knowledge. All these are relations of thought to Religion, which, although not yet constituting a Philosophy of Religion, assuredly prepare for such a Philosophy. A History of the Philosophy of Religion will, therefore, necessarily have to take them all into account. And if it should appear at the first glance as if we were giving much which should have a place only in a History of Theology, or even in a History of Philosophy, a more careful examination will make it plain to every one that it really belongs to our subject. For it will be seen that all this contains the beginnings of what appears afterwards only in more scientific form as the Philosophy of Religion; and although there may always be dispute about individual details, yet it will be evident from the whole that these historical facts ought not to be passed over in silence.

This position may seem the reverse of justifying our intention to begin in the exposition of the subject with the Reformation. This limitation of our task, however, is not to be understood as meaning that the movement of thought

which comes in time to a complete Philosophy of Religion only began at that date. But every historian has the right to limit the subject of his exposition at pleasure, and the Reformation, in point of fact, indicates such a powerful turning-point in the history of the Christian life, that an examination of the most real efforts to apprehend religion by thought may very properly commence from it. Nevertheless, in order to escape from objection to this limitation, we shall give at least a brief sketch of the earlier attempts of the kind.

But can the Philosophy of Religion, and consequently a History of it, be justified at all? This has been often contested by those who see in Religion something that is absolutely transcendent; but certainly their view is erroneous. The very question as to whether Religion is essentially supernatural, or whether it has grown into existence out of the connections of human nature and of things generally, requires fundamental investigation and philosophical examination, in order that a decision of it in the one sense, rather than in the other, may not be arbitrarily and groundlessly assumed. It is a fact—and it is well for us that it is so—that the vitality of the religious life does not depend upon the extent of the philosophical insight into the essence and nature of Religion. Indeed, many feel no need whatever to apply their thought so as to examine the doctrine of the Church, which is accepted by them as objective truth, nor to analyse the inner life which the presence of God makes known to them in their own hearts. For such men a Philosophy of Religion is not required. On the other hand, those who are so far dominated by the interest of scientific knowledge that they can rest in nothing so long as they do not comprehend it, desire a Philosophy of Religion. For how could they exclude from their striving after a conception of all things by thought, that religion which is the most important interest of all? In the present age, however, it is especially the interest that is concentrated in Apologetics which demands a Philosophy of Religion. There is a double current pressing strong upon the Church of Christ at present, in the practical rejection of

religion by the uneducated masses, and in the theoretical antagonism to theology of anti-religious science. The masses cannot be got hold of by learned explanations, and therefore, on this side, the remedy must come from active, helpful, edifying love; and if the ecclesiastical parties could but resolve to join hands here like brethren, instead of wrangling with each other in dogmatic rancour, it would be better for our Church. The practical rejection of religion is, however, not entirely independent of the theoretical antagonism. Yet gradually, although slowly, do the results of scientific inquiry become a common possession of the people with all that is beneficial in these results. Indirectly, therefore, it is practically conducive to the furtherance of religious life, when the justification and explanation of Religion are theoretically established over against the attacks of science. And to do this is the task of the Philosophy of Religion.

If, then, the Philosophy of Religion can assert its right to be, a History of it is not at all superfluous. Any one who undertakes to deal with a problem for the solution of which the greatest minds have put forth their best powers for centuries, will do well before beginning his own effort to take a survey of what has already been attempted. The past will furnish him with much instructive guidance from many instances as to which path will lead astray, and as to which will offer a prospect of reaching true and permanent results.

## II.

### THE ANCIENT CHURCH.

Christianity is the Religion of the redemption and reconciliation with God received through Jesus of Nazareth. The consciousness of redemption and reconciliation obtained through Jesus was the new life which took root in the believing followers of Jesus, and it formed their subjective religion. It then became an indispensable task for Christians to exhibit this consciousness objectively in theoretical



expressions, relating primarily to the Person and the Work of Christ, and to the nature of God and man and their mutual relations. This process of giving objectivity to the religious consciousness, and thus constructing dogmas, attached itself at first to the Old Testament form of the Messias. Then came next the immanent dialectical impulse which, affected but to a small degree by the changing philosophical currents outside the Church, and starting from the consciousness of the redemption received in Christ, came to rest solely in the system of the doctrines of the Church, when they had been developed on all sides and carried out logically into authoritative dogmas. Redemption through Christ, the God-man, is the centre of the Christian dogmas, and what they essentially contained. At the same time, the consciousness of the self-felt truth of these dogmas was so strong that the conflict of dogmatic theology with philosophy and reason did not disturb in the least the faith of those who held them.

The need of a justification of Christianity before human Reason took form at first in the early *Apologetics* of the Church. In relation to the Jews, it was sufficient to show that Jesus of Nazareth was, in fact, the Messias promised in the Old Testament, but in relation to the heathen the Apologists had to take their stand on the common ground of natural Reason. It may be asked in what then did the Apologists consider the essence of Christianity to consist? According to their view, it consists in the knowledge of the one true God and in rightly serving Him. That God is one only and not many; that He is a Spirit, infinite, self-sufficient, exalted above everything finite and imperishable; that He is not a product of human art, nor mortal, nor in need of anything; that the true worship or service of God consists in devout sentiments of the heart and in moral purity of life, and not in cruel displays, nor in abominable lusts, nor vain sacrifices,—these are the doctrines which we find as the centre and sum of the whole Christian faith in all the Apologists of the second Century. It is a meagre creed, indeed, when compared with the later developments of the



Christian dogmas. Their Christology is put on a parallel with heathen myths in order to make it acceptable. The work of Christ retreats into the background, and it consists less in redemption and reconciliation with God than in the fact that Christ brought us the knowledge of the one true God, and taught us how He would be honoured. This knowledge is sometimes represented as the pure and only true original religion which existed in Paradise before the Fall. Having been lost by sin, this religion was entirely unknown to the heathen, and among the Jews it was corrupted by much that was alien to it. Through Christ it was first fully and completely restored again.

The second point worthy of consideration in the Apologists is the arguments by which they seek to convince their opponents of the truth of Christianity and of the untruth of heathenism. The judgment pronounced by them on the pagan philosophy is different according to their individual tendencies. Tatian, with all the incisiveness of his passionate nature, objects to the heathen philosophers, that the one was the opponent of the other, that instead of the oneness of truth, there prevailed among them but the strife and the diversity of error, and that their knowledge was but vain boasting and illusion. Tertullian exclaims: "What have Athens and Jerusalem, what have the Academy and the Church, what have the heretics and the Christians in common with one another?" Philosophy stamps arbitrary forms upon things, identifies them at one time and then separates them at another, judges the uncertain by the certain, refers to examples as if everything were to be made an object of comparison, and so on. The Lord Himself has called the wisdom of the world foolishness, and, to the shame of philosophy, has chosen what is foolish in the eyes of the world. Justin Martyr, on the other hand, as the Apologist in the mantle of the philosopher, along with similar judgments, pronounces others that are entirely different, such as that Christianity is nothing absolutely new, but that it goes back beyond Judaism to the original religion. Its truth consists in the fact that in

it the Logos comes fully and wholly into active reality. The very same Logos, however, has already been operative in the pre-Christian world and led it to a certain knowledge of the truth. He who lived with the Logos was a Christian even though living as a heathen or a Jew ; and such were Socrates, Heraclitus, Abraham, Elias, and others. *Athenagoras* refers the truth in the possession of the philosophers to an affinity on their part with the Spirit of God. Still more common is the view that they had borrowed the best of their wisdom from the Old Testament.

The utterances of heathen poets and philosophers regarding the unity of God were willingly used, and they were zealously gathered in order to prove the truth of Christianity. Rational principles were continually brought into the field against pagan polytheism. Thus it was declared that what the heathen said regarding their gods was entirely unworthy and contradictory in itself ; that the mythologies contained the most ludicrous and unworthy and even immoral things concerning the life of the gods and their relation to one another ; that the gods of the heathen were defective, and had wants, and could not live without the sacrifices and gifts of men ; nay more, that they were nothing else than works of human contrivance, and that they were therefore utterly unworthy of reverence. *Athenagoras* even tries to prove that the existence of two gods is contrary to reason ; for if there were two gods, they must either be in the same place or in different places, and either alternative is impossible. *Tertullian* appeals to the universal consciousness with which, as with a dower, God has vouchsafed to adorn the soul. In the same consciousness the soul realizes certain truths, as that there exists a good, just, all-knowing, and all-powerful God, to find whom it aspires towards heaven ; *anima naturaliter Christiana*. The teaching of Scripture is only a further addition to the consciousness of God that springs from the contemplation of the world.

*Minucius Felix*, *Arnobius*, and *Lactantius* deserve to be specially mentioned here. They have not inappropriately been designated " Christian popular philosophers." *Lactantius*

already reflects so much upon the nature of Religion that he even searches after the etymology of the word, and in an often quoted passage he derives *religio* not from *religere*, with Cicero, but from *religare*. Religion is thus represented as a connection with God on the two sides of knowledge and of worship. Minucius takes up the sceptical questionings as to whether there is a God, and as to whether there is a Providence; and he already answers them with a rational proof of the unity and existence of God. If we consider the wise order of the universe, as in the change of the seasons, the fertilization of Egypt by the Nile, and such like, we must, he says, reason to a Lord and Governor as if from the appearance of a well-ordered house. There is only one such Lord; for the history of the nations already teaches that a plurality of governors is pernicious, and besides our immediate consciousness knows only of one God. These three Christian writers agree in their apprehension of Christianity. As a religion it consists in the knowledge of the true God and in the observance of the right worship of God. In both relations Christianity is the true religion. The heathen worship images, works of human art, and lower celestial powers; it is only the Christians who know the one Supreme God. The heathen seek to serve their gods by sacrifices and outpourings of blood, by obscene plays and spectacles; the Christians alone perform the true worship in devout sentiment and moral purity of conduct. This true religion can only be obtained by revelation, and the merit of Christ just consists in the fact that He has taught us the true religion.

In the earliest times of the Christian Church there sprang up a movement which is rightly designated as the first attempt to work out a Christian Philosophy of Religion. It took form at first in the Church, but was afterwards expelled from it as heretical. It was what is now known as *Gnosticism*.

In the New Testament the striving after a deeper comprehension of the religious faith already makes itself manifest. Paul and Peter both speak of the *Gnosis* as a special gift of God. Nor did the heretical Gnosis arise by merely bringing

heathen, and particularly Oriental, religions into Christianity; rather did it stand entirely on Christian ground. All the representatives of this movement hold it as an indubitable fact that Christianity is the highest and most perfect of all religions, and that all philosophical speculation and representation of the world, as well as all religious history, only serve to prove this significance of Christianity. The heretical Gnostics certainly liberate themselves from the authority of the Church, partly by declaring that mere faith is insufficient for salvation, and partly by interpreting the New Testament according to arbitrary allegories, mutilating it by the excision of alleged falsifications, and putting a secret tradition beside it as a source of knowledge of at least equal value. Gnosticism, according to its general character, is speculation; and, in particular, it is a speculation which specially refers to religion. Of the historical religions, consideration is given to Heathenism, Judaism, and Christianity. They are put in relation to different powers of the universal process of the world. Christianity is referred to the Supreme God; Judaism, to the Creator of the world; Heathenism, to matter. They indicate likewise different periods in the divine process of creation, the chief turning-points of which are formed by the entering of God into matter, and His return from it again. The redemption through Christ, as the fundamental dogma of Christianity, forms the centre of the Gnostic speculations. This redemption, however, is not conceived merely from the ethico-religious point of view, as the redemption of men from sin and the reconciliation of sinners with God, but it is regarded as a cosmical process, bringing back to God, as the Infinite, the finite world, which hath arisen from God, and become estranged from Him. Hence all the metaphysical questions regarding the relation of God to the world, the nature and origin of evil, and the divine government of the course of the world in history, fall within the range of the Gnostic systems.

Taken apart from the fantastic and mythological dress in which they are presented, we may attempt to exhibit briefly the common leading thoughts of the various and different

Gnostic systems as follows:—The primal divine Being is conceived in the greatest possible abstraction and as infinite. God appears not merely as absolutely spiritual and immaterial, infinite and transcendent, and therefore as incomprehensible by us, but likewise as unfathomable in His essence and without determination. With this conception of God there is necessarily involved the utmost separation of Him from the world. This separation shows itself primarily in the fact that the Creator of the world is distinguished from the Supreme God. The Creator of the world is represented at one time as a lower, but not hostile power, serving the Supreme Deity, and while not knowing God, yet fulfilling His will. At another time the creative Power is represented as the principle that is consciously hostile to God, because it is evil in itself. The Supreme God thus appears as the God of Christianity, and the Creator of the world as the God of Judaism; and this is the ground of the more or less direct antagonism of the two religions. Further, matter, as the substratum of the creation, is removed to the utmost possible degree from God. It appears either as existing from eternity along with God, in complete independence, and as decidedly opposed to Him; or it is represented as having issued from Him by emanation, but after its emanation as forthwith opposing itself independently to God. In both cases matter is the ground of evil and of badness. In order to fill up the gulf fixed between God and the world, a series of Æons was made to proceed from God, which, according to their distance from this primal source of all being, share to different degrees in the divine perfection. These Æons are represented in some systems as means of the divine self-revelation, and in others more as the means of establishing a connection between God and the world. There are not wanting points of attachment in the world for this connection, although the world, on account of its origin from matter, is essentially hylic or material, and is consequently morally bad; yet it is not entirely wanting in germs and traces of the Pneumatic or Spiritual, and consequently of moral goodness, this element of



goodness being referred to the fall of one of the Æons into matter, or to the command of the Supreme God to create the world. Some systems further derive from the Creator of the world a third element, which is the Psychical, and to it they assign an intermediate position. As is the case with the world, so does Man likewise appear as bipartite, being hylic and pneumatic; or as tripartite, being hylic, psychic, and pneumatic. The final goal of the whole process of the world is, that the Pneumatic becomes separated out from its unnatural conjunction with the Hylic, and is again received into the Absolute. The communication of the true knowledge of God as the revelation of the hitherto unknown True God, was generally regarded as the means of realizing this redemption. Christ appears in all the systems as the bearer of this new revelation. He is an Æon sent from the Supreme God; it is He who has made known to the world the Supreme God and His kingdom of Æons; and in doing so He used the man Jesus as His medium. Christ and the religion founded by Him, or the knowledge of the Supreme God which He brought with Him, thus form the turning-point in the process of the world's history; and this history, since the founding of His religion, leads no longer away from God, but back to Him again. These systems, as the earliest products of the Christian Philosophy of Religion, certainly deserve to be noted, and it must be recognised that the strenuous mental activity exhibited in them endeavoured to solve the most difficult questions. The fantastic mythologies in which the unbridled phantasy clothed these attempts prevented their attaining any permanent result.

The heretical Gnosis was combated from two sides. An empirical and realistic method contested the extravagant speculations of the Gnostics by appealing to the doctrine established by the authority of the Church, to the clear and simple word of Scripture, and to the episcopal tradition. A speculative method, again, sought to overthrow the opponent with his own weapons, and to oppose an *ecclesiastical Gnosis* to the heretical systems. This method had its seat in

Alexandria, and its chief representatives in Clement and Origen.

The speculative method of the Church is essentially different from the heretical Gnosis which it combats. In the first place, the historical element of religion retreats entirely into the background. This was quite natural, for Christianity is no longer regarded as the highest stage of a development equally embracing all the religions; it is the absolute standard or norm of Religion. The doctrine of Christianity is the truth; the doctrine of the Church is the highest authority. Hence mere faith is sufficient for the attainment of salvation, and therefore this Gnosis extends no farther than the objectively established doctrine of the Church. Origen accordingly subjects his own speculations expressly to the ecclesiastical confession, and will only apply them to those doctrines which have not yet been precisely determined by the Church. And while his allegorical interpretation of Scripture finds occasion for many divergent opinions in doctrine, his asserted agreement with it on the whole is really a fact.

Two points deserve to be here specially considered in connection with the ecclesiastical form of the movement—first, the judgment pronounced regarding the pagan philosophy and its relation to Christianity; and secondly, the positions taken up concerning the relation between Faith and Knowledge. Christianity itself appears as a mode of knowing, or as a possession of the truth, and so far it is put on the same line with philosophy. The only question remaining in reference to this point can only be as to what kind of knowing comes nearest the truth, so as to deserve the preference; or, as it is put, what knowledge has the greatest share in “the One Truth which is geometrical truth in geometry, musical truth in music, and is Hellenic truth in what is true in philosophy”? The answer to this question is undecided and different. At one time Philosophy and Christianity are represented as entirely equal in worth. Thus it is said, as we obtain harmony from the different strings of the lyre, mathematical

magnitudes from straight and curved lines, and such like, so from a combination of all the Oriental and Hellenic systems with Christianity we get the one complete truth. Again, the prerogative of Christianity is indubitably maintained when Clement says that philosophy has the truth, but the several systems tear the one truth asunder, as the Bacchæ did the limbs of Pentheus, while they yet assert that they possess the whole truth; Christianity, on the other hand, possesses the truth full and entire. The distinction between them is still more accentuated. Thus Philosophy is likened to the ray of the sunbeam that falls through a glass filled with water; Christianity is like the unbroken ray; both come from God, but Philosophy only comes indirectly, whereas Christianity comes directly from Him.

Clement, to whom Origen attaches himself throughout, expresses himself regarding the relation between faith and knowledge in terms that are still variously interpreted. In our opinion the arrangement of his principal writings, as well as the clearest of his expressions, admit only of this being his view, that the Christian passes through four stages. The Knowing, which forms the starting-point, is a mere external acquaintance with the Gospel and the doctrine of the Church. This information is next followed by Faith, which is the acceptance of this external knowledge, and the holding of it as true mainly upon the authority of the Church and without a rational comprehension of what is believed. The third stage is the pure Moral Life, as a consequence of this belief. The goal of the development is reached in the Gnosis or perfect knowledge of the truth. This final knowing is primarily a rational understanding of the subject-matter of the belief. It is then, further, the knowledge of all divine and human things that flows from this rational understanding of the object of faith. And it is completed in the immediate vision of God (*θεωρία*) by the morally renewed man.

About the middle of the third Century the heathen world braced itself up once more for a grand achievement. From all the systems of the early ages the truth which they were



supposed to contain was gathered, and this was brought into the service of the Christian idea of redemption. Thus arose *Neo-Platonism*. This twofold relation is its special characteristic. Redemption and reconciliation with God had become an actual reality in Christianity, and was participated in by every believer. The effort exhibited the longing to escape from the nothingness of finite sinful existence, and to find the highest happiness in perfect union with God. This longing was the psychological root of Neo-Platonism. Its aim was to still this feeling by the aid of human wisdom; and as it wanted the power to produce anything new, it contented itself by borrowing eclectically suitable thoughts from earlier systems, and especially from Platonism, which it professed to restore in its purity. Prepared by Ammonius Sakkas (c. 200), Neo-Platonism was developed by Plotinus (205-270) on all sides to a complete and closed system. All existence is referred, not to two principles, but only to one. God, or the primal Essence, is the simple unity that lies above all multiplicity. As such, God is without thought, because thinking requires plurality; and without will, because willing presupposes duality. God is the absolutely transcendent One, exalted above everything, above consciousness and unconsciousness, above rest and motion, above life and being. Hence God is entirely unattainable in our knowledge. Thinking must here abandon itself and become Not-thinking, if it is to apprehend God in blessed vision, and unite itself with Him. But at the same time God is the original source and ground of all things; finite things arise out of Him by emanation of what is absolutely simple unfolding itself into an ever-advancing series of finite things, that are always the more imperfect the farther they are removed from God. In all things, therefore, there is only one divine power and essence, but in different degrees of perfection, so that every higher existence embraces the lower with itself. Finite things long for a return to their origin, and this is especially true of the human soul, which, banished into this earthly life as a punishment for former sin, strives to soar aloft to its higher home. There are two ways of attaining to this

goal: moral action and rational knowledge. Moral action consists above all in the combating of the sensuous impulses, and therefore in the strictest asceticism. Rational knowledge is the pure thinking of Ideas, as it is by the *νοῦς*, its higher part, that the soul participates in the pure Ideas. The highest goal is immediate intuition of the primal divine Being. This is the true philosophy, the perfection of the spirit, and likewise the highest happiness. By such intuition the soul becomes completely one with the primal Being, and sinks in ecstasy into deity.

Porphyry (233–304), the learned editor and commentator of Plotinus, brings Neo-Platonism into a still closer relation to Religion. Religion and worship minister to the union of the soul with God, and even in heathen doctrines and usages he seeks to find a higher truth by spiritual interpretations. Jamblichus († 303), a Syrian influenced by the Oriental religions, turned himself still more to mythology, and came by the personification of conceptions to a world of gods arranged according to the system of triads. The liberation of the soul is no longer man's own work, but is accomplished by the aid of higher beings. The door was thus thrown open for the entrance of all mantic and magic arts, for astrology and mere mystic play with numbers. Neo-Platonism was thus lowered to the level of theurgy by Jamblichus, and still more by Proclus (412–85), until it became connected with every conceivable superstition.

Neo-Platonism exerted a far-reaching influence even upon Christianity. This appears most directly and most undisguisedly in the mysticism of Dionysius Areopagita. He determines the idea of God in a twofold manner. On the one side God lies above all determinate individual existence; He is therefore without name, for He is the infinite, mysterious, supernal God; He is supra-divine, supra-perfect, supra-inexpressible, supra-incognizable. On the other hand, God is the all-nameable, and as such the starting-point and original source of all things. All finite existence arises through a gradual emanation and communication of God; and therefore God is

the only true Being in all existence. But the farther things are removed from God, so much the more imperfectly do they image forth the primal One ; and hence evil is not a positive thing, but only a defect. The first eradiation of the divine is the heavenly Hierarchy, which consists of three stages, each of three orders. To it corresponds the order that exists among men in the three classes of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and their parallel in three classes of the people. This hierarchical order merely serves the end of attaining reunion with God. The goal of an immediate union with God is not reached by moral conduct, nor even by objective knowledge ; but in immediate contemplation, which presupposes entire renunciation of individual thinking and acting. This union can be participated in at every stage only by the mediation of the next higher stage. The communication involved is secret, and known only to the initiated, according to the habit of the ancient mysteries, and it appears to run out into empty formulæ and allegorical interpretations of the ecclesiastical symbols. Belief and knowledge, theology and philosophy, are identical as regards their aim and substance. Faith is an immediate certainty of the reality of the supersensible ; knowing is a certainty of the same reality mediated by conceptions ; the highest object of both is God. Maximus Confessor, a follower of Dionysius, represents the closer attachment of this school to the doctrine of the Church. He strikes out the offensive doctrine of emanation and refers the union with God, not to the activity of the Church in liturgical formulæ and symbolical practices, but to the moral action and the pure knowledge of the individual. How circumspect the Church was in its relation to Neo-Platonism, is shown particularly by the case of Synesius. Called to the Bishopric of Ptolemais (409), this scholar of Hypatia declared quite openly in what points he deviated from the doctrine of the Church. "Never shall I be able to believe," he says, "that the soul is later in its origin than the body, or that the world and its separate parts perish together ; and in the doctrine of the resurrection, which I regard as a sacred allegory, I differ

entirely from the opinions of the multitude." He declares quite generally that light and truth, the eye and the people, have a certain resemblance. "For as the eye cannot bear too strong a light without being injured, and as darkness is more wholesome to those who have diseased eyes, so do I maintain that falsehood is advantageous to the multitude, whereas the truth is hurtful to those who are not able to turn their mind directly to the clearness of things. Should I therefore accept the episcopal dignity, I must be allowed to hold by my previous convictions and to philosophize within, while I outwardly expound fables to the people."

In this form the alliance with Neo-Platonism greatly damaged the Church, and it therefore came soon to an end. Already, as at all times, the practical ecclesiastical direction, and not the speculative tendency, had gained the position of chief influence upon the formation of the Church. Its home was at Antioch, and it was based upon historical and philological exegesis. In 529 a decree of the Emperor Justinian inhibited the Neo-Platonic philosophy on account of its opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrines. And now Aristotle obtained always more authority in the Greek Church. This was quite natural, for as soon as the ecclesiastical dogmas were developed on all sides, Philosophy was no longer required for the determination of their actual contents, but was only needed for the formal and external elaboration of what was already established. For this purpose Aristotle, the founder of formal Logic, was best fitted to furnish the aid required.

The first important Aristotelian was Joannes Philoponus (c. 550). He was led, by applying the Aristotelian conception of *οὐσία* to theology and Christology, into the heresies of tritheism and monophysitism. In the dogmatic compilation of Joannes Damascenus († c. 754) the appreciation of Aristotle is much more external. Nor does his *Source of Knowledge* (*πηγὴ γνώσεως*) really present anything new. The third part is theologically the most important (*ἐκθεσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*). It contains no special investigations nor any new speculations about the doctrines of the Church, but

only brings together what distinguished teachers of the Church before him had taught. But even as a collection of what was necessary and indispensable, as a summary of the principal points in the doctrines already established by the Church, the work obtained afterwards a wide influence when originating power had decayed. This dogmatic compendium is preceded by a condemnation of 103 heresies, and under the *κεφάλαια* there is also presented a survey of formal logic drawn partly from Aristotle and partly from Porphyry. In the fact that logic is almost the only part of philosophy that is taken into account, it is implied that philosophy has not assigned to it the position of an independent source of knowledge within theology, but that its function is that of an *Organon* by which the theological knowledge otherwise established is to be brought into a right form. Indeed, he says expressly that as every artist uses an instrument, so theology, the queen of the sciences, has her handmaid. As physical and ethical knowledge have no value in themselves, so logic is only of importance in that it gives order to what is certain of itself in the divine revelation. With the dogmatic theology of John of Damascus the logic and ontology of Aristotle came afterwards to the West; and they came in this relation of express subserviency to the theology of the Church.

The Roman people were never inclined to speculation. In consequence they have neither produced independent results in philosophy, nor have they even accomplished anything noteworthy in their eclectic elaboration of Greek thoughts. The Roman Church shows a similar aversion to speculation, and accordingly it turns to the practical questions and problems of life. The teachers of the Greek Church apprehend Christianity as a new kind of knowledge, as a deeper knowledge of the truth. The Latin Fathers regard it as a new power of life, as the transforming energy of the truly moral spirit. The Greek thinkers dispute about questions of doctrine, the Latin Churchmen contend about questions of ecclesiastical discipline and constitution. The Greeks develop



the speculative doctrines of the Trinity and Christology; the Latins unfold the practical doctrines of Anthropology. The Greeks sketch, at least partly, most comprehensive speculative systems; the Latins hold to the letter of what has been delivered to them as the already established doctrine of the Church. The only theologian of the Western Church in whom are found at least the beginnings of a philosophical consideration of his faith is Augustine (354-430).

In the philosophical relation Augustine attaches himself essentially to Plato, or rather to Neo-Platonism. The way in which he establishes the certainty of our knowledge in opposition to the scepticism of the Academics reminds one of modern thoughts. The necessity of certain knowledge is deduced from our desire of happiness; for mere striving after truth would leave us unsatisfied. The same position is shown by reference to our consciousness. We only know certainly that we think; and whoever is certain even that he doubts, can no longer doubt that he lives, remembers, perceives, wills, thinks, judges, and knows. In the self-consciousness the point is therefore found which no scepticism can shake. From this self-certainty of the rational mind an advance is then made to wider cognitions. The mind reflects upon itself, and thus it distinguishes the external senses, the internal sense, and the reason. To this ascending process on the subjective side there corresponds a series of gradations on the objective side, in the mere existence of bodies, the life which embraces the lower sphere of the plant along with the higher of the animal, and the rational self-conscious mind. It is true that we can only believe that bodies exist; but this faith is absolutely necessary, and without it we would fall into worse error. Continued self-contemplation shows to us likewise that our own mind is not the highest. The human spirit is changeable, and therefore it must rise to something eternal and unchangeable which is higher than itself. Higher truths present themselves to it as its highest rules. It finds the highest rules of knowledge in ideas, the highest rules of beauty in ideals, and the highest rules of goodness in moral

laws; and these are more perfect than the human mind, because man judges by them and does not set himself up to judge upon them. These rational truths are identified with the Logos, or even with God Himself. "If there is anything more exalted than truth, it is God; and if there be nothing more exalted, then truth itself is God." So far, then, philosophy, and especially the Platonic philosophy, is capable of leading to God as the highest of all beings. From this point of view Augustine can even say that theology and philosophy in their perfection are identical, because both have to do with the knowledge of God, the highest truth and the highest life. But, on the other hand, he declares that philosophy is incapable of attaining the highest knowledge, for she belongs at the same time to the "city of the devil," which, on account of the confusion prevailing in it, is called Babel. From the insufficiency of philosophy is deduced the necessity of the divine revelation which is to be accepted in faith. Faith is thinking with assent. Upon faith all the relations of human society rest; and it is especially necessary in relation to divine things which cannot be seen. Everywhere authority precedes reason, and faith precedes insight; but at the same time authority rests upon reason, in so far as one authority is preferred on rational grounds to another. Religion thus begins with faith, that is, with recognising and submitting to the authority of the Church; but we ought to exert all our powers in order to advance from faith to rational insight. Apart from his peculiar anti-Pelagian views about sin and grace, the system of Augustine bears a Neo-Platonic character throughout, and it was especially through it that Neo-Platonism was introduced into the theology of the Middle Ages.

After Augustine, the Roman Church has no very distinguished theologians to show. In the following age a wide influence was exercised by Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidorus of Seville, and they were the means on the Western side of introducing Aristotle into the Mediæval theology. Isidore († 636) is the Latin parallel to John of Damascus. His *Sententiarum Libri Tres* formed a text-book of dogmatics and

morals which was afterwards much used; it contains hardly anything of his own, but only puts together the most important utterances of the earlier Fathers about Christian faith and practice. Boethius (470-520), although himself a Neo-Platonist, has deserved especial credit by his translations of the logical writings of Aristotle and Porphyry. These widely-spread translations were for a long time the only means through which the Christian Church of the Middle Ages obtained its knowledge of Aristotle, and they laid the foundations of his influence. Cassiodorus (c. 479-575), in like manner, only aimed at collecting what was most needed out of the investigations of earlier times. His treatise, *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Literarum*, which is based especially upon Boethius, was adopted almost universally as a text-book for centuries, and it considerably furthered the spread of the Aristotelian philosophy. By these men the philosophy of Aristotle was thus carried down to the Middle Ages.

### III.

#### THE MIDDLE AGES.

The development of the Christian Church and doctrine has not advanced in an uninterrupted course nor in a straight line. In its own sphere it was also deeply affected by the violent influences which began to break in upon the Roman Empire hardly a century after its emperors had adopted the new faith. Like an all-destroying storm, the migrating hordes swept over the Empire. The imperial government of the world was broken to pieces, and new nations, mostly of Germanic origin, divided the inheritance. In the exuberant vitality of natural power they subdued the seats of the ancient culture. Then there arose a spiritual conflict with that culture to which they had themselves in turn to yield. As settlers in the Roman Empire, the new peoples had already received the elements of a higher civilisation, and even the germs of the Christian faith. This process of reception



continued to go on slowly but incessantly. The hordes that were victorious in the field of battle went for their religion and spiritual culture into the school of the conquered nations, and became like them the recipients of its spiritual life. The Eastern half of the empire, with its capital, Byzantium, held out somewhat longer than the Roman West, and even braced itself in the sixth Century after severe overthrow yet again for powerful deeds. But with the founding of Islam (*c.* 622) there arose a new religious power hostile to the Christians, and full of blind fanaticism. It sought to spread the sway of the prophet by war and the sword. Thus the Eastern Empire, and Christianity along with it, lost one province after another. In the East the position of things was otherwise than in the West. The hostile power that prevailed in the former was not merely national, but was essentially religious; and hence the Christian faith and Christian culture were not adopted by the conquerors, but violently suppressed. It was with difficulty that the Christians here and there even maintained their existence. A free development under Mohammedan oppression was not to be thought of. The north of Africa and Spain, the south of Italy, and Byzantium itself fell, at least for a time, into the hands of the Arabs; and in consequence the Germanic nations became almost the only representatives of the Christian life and civilisation.

This revolution has to be carefully considered if we would understand the spiritual life of the Middle Ages. In the case of the Germanic nations all science was historically connected in the closest way with their religion. It is no wonder, then, that for centuries the unity of this connection continued the indubitable principle of their spiritual life. Besides, the general state of civilisation among the Germanic peoples must be noted. It was on the whole remarkably scanty; it had not a trace of science and culture, or of real knowledge, secular or theological, empirical or speculative. Christianity had taken its rise among a more highly cultivated people, and it had been brought into objective forms under the influence of the highly advanced civilisation of the Greek

and the Roman world. It was only by a strong sensualization of its spiritual contents that Christianity could be brought near enough to the uncultured German races for them to be able to receive it. And how often was the adoption of it but a merely external and sometimes even a violently compelled self-subjection under the formulæ and practices of the Church! History has indeed furnished us from this example with a magnificent proof of the educative value of outward order; but the inevitable consequence was, at least at first, an unconditional belief on authority, and an accepting of religion by the command of external power without inner understanding of it. Slowly, however, and gradually, the advancing culture of the nations emancipated itself from authority, till they began to try to comprehend what they had hitherto only believed. Then there could for a time be nothing more thought of but how to prove what was believed as infallibly certain. The idea of impartial criticism could not yet be entertained. Further, the fact has to be taken into consideration that religion did not present itself to the Germans as a new power of life. Only after it had worked for a considerable period in the life of these barbarous peoples could the creative and morally vitalizing power of Christianity be recognised. But at first the new religion appeared as a new doctrine, as a kind of knowledge, as incontestably certain truth.

All these conditions taken together determined an inseparable unity of theology and philosophy, and a merely subservient relation of the latter to the former. This constitutes the character of that spiritual tendency in which the distinguishing peculiarity of the Middle Ages is so frequently seen, and which is still designated Scholasticism. In it likewise is found the origin of two distinct currents which, along with Scholasticism, move the life of that period. Opposition was raised from two sides against the mingling of theology and philosophy. As soon as thought acquired independent strength, it could recognise no authority over itself without examining it; and the religious life, as soon as it stirred with power of its own, could not respect the formulated propositions

Reaction

of the dogmatic theology as a restricting limit, nor could it let the spirit be quenched by the letter. The former tendency constituted *the intellectual Enlightenment*, the latter *the religious Opposition* of the time. This opposition either broke through all the established rules of doctrine and practice in the form of a wild Fanaticism, or shot forth splendid blossoms in the efflorescences of a profound Mysticism.

The name "Scholastics," *doctores scholastici*, assigned at first to the teachers of the *septem Artes liberales*, was afterwards applied to all those who were engaged in the schools with the cultivation of science, and especially of philosophy. The expression Scholasticism thus came to be limited to that method of the Mediæval Philosophy which put philosophy altogether into the service of the established dogmas of the Church. Starting from the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctrine and the essential unity of philosophy and dogmatic theology, the Scholastics employed philosophy in part as an Organon for the formal construction of the absolutely true theology, and in part they sought to adapt it to theology by the accommodation of any existing divergences between them.

Joannes Scotus Erigena (c. 810–877) comes before what is properly designated Scholasticism. He made the works of Dionysius the Areopagite accessible to the West by his translation of them into Latin, and he also drew the chief principles of his system from them. He therefore represents Neo-Platonic ideas, although many Aristotelian conceptions are adopted by him, and he attempts to approach the doctrine of the Church. Notwithstanding this, the Church afterwards condemned his doctrine as heretical (1050 and 1225). In his work, *De divisione Naturæ*, Erigena divides all existing things into four classes: (1) the Nature which creates and is not created; (2) the Nature which is created and creates; (3) the Nature which is created and does not create; and (4) the Nature which neither creates nor is created. The uncreated creative Being is God, and to Him alone real existence belongs. God is exalted above all existence. No predicate can be applied to Him, not even the designation

*essentia*, when strictly taken, for God is super-essential. On another side God is the source and foundation of all being and essence, so that He is the substance of all finite things; God is the beginning, middle, and end of all things; yea, God and Nature are one. The Trinity can only be maintained when interpreted as follows. God is one essence in three substances; as being He is the Father, as wisdom the Son, as life the Holy Ghost.—The eternal archetypes of things constitute the created Nature, which is again itself creative. Those eternal archetypes are Ideas contained in the divine wisdom or the Son. They are actualized by the Spirit in finite things, which are all self-manifestations of God.—The Nature which neither creates nor is created is identical with the first nature, which is God, but not as being itself the ground, but as constituting the final end of all things. All physical and all intellectual Nature returns ultimately to God in order to enjoy eternal rest in Him.

Under reference to the authority of Augustine, Scotus Erigena asserts the identity of the true philosophy and the true religion. "What else then is philosophy but an exposition of the rules of the true religion? Hence it follows that true philosophy is true religion, and conversely true religion is true philosophy." Our philosophical investigations cannot therefore come into conflict with our belief in the revealed truth. In general it is true that reason has the pre-eminence, if authority comes into antagonism with it. "Authority flows from true reason, but never reason from authority. All authority which is not justified by true reason appears to be weak, whereas reason does not need the support of authority if it is supported by its own powers." In particular, however, it is said that "nothing agrees more with the true reason than the authority of the holy Fathers." The true authority can never come into contradiction with reason, because they both flow from the same source, which is the divine wisdom. The true authority is the truth found by reason, and it has been handed down to us in writing from the Fathers.

Scotus Erigena, however, is a solitary gleaming light, a meteor which passes over the midnight sky, to vanish immediately again without leaving a trace behind. The tenth Century is notorious for its spiritual barbarism, and for its utter want of science, but it is the age in which there flourished crass superstition and belief in external thaumaturgy. It was only, towards the end of the century that an estimable scholar appeared in Gerbert, who is known as Pope Sylvester II. († 1003); but he was likewise alone without worthy associates or scholars. It was not till afterwards that the Scholasticism grew up which can be pointed to as achieving anything. At first its only productions were in theology and logic, after acquaintance with Aristotle had increased. It falls into essentially distinct periods. Up to the middle of the twelfth Century the writings of Aristotle were known only in the Latin renderings of Marcius Capella, Boethius, and Cassiodorus; and these renderings were so incomplete, that of the logical writings even the two *Analytics* and the *Topics* were unknown. Plato again was known only from the writings of the Church Fathers, with the exception of a part of the *Timæus*.

The chief problem and impelling power of this first period of Scholasticism (up to the middle of the twelfth Century), lay in the controversy between Realism and Nominalism concerning the meaning of Universals (*universalia*). In this controversy the question is also discussed as to whether Aristotle or Plato is to be recognised as the highest authority. The close relation of this question to theology is apparent, and it becomes manifest in the history of the time. Roscellinus, a canon at Compiègne, was accused of tritheism on account of his application of the Nominalist doctrine to the dogma of the Trinity. The "person" is in his view the *substantia rationalis*, and in application to God this notion can signify nothing else. The three persons are eternal, and therefore there are three eternal persons. There are accordingly three separate persons, although they are one in will and power. In 1092, Roscellinus was compelled to recant at the Synod



of Soissons, but he continued to hold his views, and certainly in the *bona fide* belief that they were not contrary to the doctrine of the Church. This incident decidedly contributed to the result that in the next age Nominalism numbered but few adherents, and most of them kept their views secret; for complete subordination was made incumbent upon all who were inclined to the freer cultivation of philosophy. As Petrus Damiani (c. 1050) expresses it: "Quæ tamen artis humanæ peritia si quando tractandis sacris eloquio adhibetur, non debet jus magisterii sibimet arroganter arripere sed velut ancilla dominæ quodam famulatus obsequio subservire ne si præcedit oberret."

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) exercised important influence upon the formation of the ecclesiastical doctrine. In his work, *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm develops the theory of satisfaction which was afterwards universally received, and he develops it purely out of principles of reason without the aid of revelation. He also gives a twofold argument for the existence of God. In his *Monologium* he develops the Cosmological Argument by rising from the particular to the universal in closest attachment to the realistic doctrine represented by him. Universals have not merely an existence immanent in individuals, but an existence that is independent of the individual things. All relative goods presuppose an absolute good, and the *Summum bonum* is God. Every existing being presupposes an absolute Being through which it is; but that absolute Being is itself through itself, and this is God. The series in the scale of beings cannot go on without end; there must be a being above which there is no other, and this highest Being is God.—The Trinity is also construed merely from principles of reason. God has created all things out of nothing. Things were eternally present in God's understanding, and these archetypical forms are the inner Word of God, just as thoughts are the inner word in man. The speaker and the word spoken by him are two, and yet in their essence they are one. Hence with this self-duplication there must again be connected a reconciliation and a

reunion, and this is the Holy Ghost. In his *Proslogium*, Anselm develops the Ontological Argument which seeks to deduce the existence of God from the mere conception of God. By God we understand the greatest thought which the mind can think. "Credimus te (*i.e.* Deum), esse bonum quo majus bonum cogitari nequit." This thought is in our intellect. It is even in the intellect of the fool who says, in his heart, there is no God. For when he hears the word "God," he also understands by it the greatest object that can be thought. This greatest object of thought cannot be in the intellect only; for in that case something greater might be thought as that which was both in the intellect and in the outer sphere of reality. The weakness of this argument is at once quite correctly pointed out by Anselm's contemporary, Gaunilo, in his treatise, *Pro insipiente*, when he says that Anselm confounds the "*in intellectu esse*" and "*intelligere aliquid esse.*" The real being of an object must first be established if we are to infer its predicates from its essence. By the same manner of reasoning, the existence of a perfect island might just as rightly be asserted. At the same time Anselm is a decided representative of the unconditional subordination of philosophy to theology. Knowledge rests upon faith; and it is not to be said conversely that faith rests upon previous knowledge. "*Credo ut intelligam,*" not "*intelligo ut credam.*" It is true that knowledge appears as higher than belief, and that it is a duty to advance to knowledge. We receive the mysteries of Christianity into ourselves at first by faith, but it is culpable negligence if we do not strive afterwards to understand what is believed. Yet it is not the free examination of the contents of faith that is thereby meant; faith has an eternal fixedness, and it can neither be shaken nor can it gain a higher steadfastness by our examination. If we are not able to attain to insight, we ought not to reject what is believed, but must bow under the higher truth. "Christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere."

Scholasticism underwent an important revolution in the

twelfth Century when the Logic of Aristotle, as well as his Metaphysics and Physics, became known in the Greek language. The West learned of them at first through Arabian and Jewish translations and renderings, and thereafter the original Greek texts were brought from Constantinople to the West and translated into Latin. This new knowledge seemed, however, to be dangerous to the doctrine of the Church; at least it gave occasion to the movement of the Amalrichians, and in a Synod held at Paris in 1209 the writings of Aristotle were forbidden, and excommunication was threatened against any one who might copy, read, or even possess them. In 1225 this decree was so far modified that only the use of the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Physics was forbidden, while the employment of the Logic or Organon was allowed. In 1231 a dispensation of Pope Gregory IX. determined that those books which treated of the Natural Philosophy of Aristotle should remain excluded from the schools until they were purged from all suspicion of containing errors. At last, in 1254, the free use of the metaphysical and physical writings of Aristotle was also allowed. This change of opinion in favour of Aristotle was founded upon the conviction that dangerous pantheistic views sprang from Platonizing modifications of Aristotle, whereas the genuine Aristotle was thoroughly free from danger and purely theistic. Aristotle thus gradually gained unlimited authority in the Church. It was usual to represent him as the "*precursor Christi in naturalibus*," and to put him on a parallel with John the Baptist as the "*precursor Christi in gratuitis*." Aristotle was in a manner regarded as the unconditional rule of truth, and his sole supremacy in the Church continued undisputed for several centuries. And under these circumstances some of the doctrines of Aristotle, such as those concerning the soul and the eternity of the world, which were contrary to the ecclesiastical dogmas, were silently accommodated to the higher doctrinal truth of the Church.

During this second period of scholasticism and on to the restoration of Nominalism by William of Occam, the con-



troversy about Universals fell almost entirely into the background. There prevailed an essential agreement thus far that Universals have a threefold being, (1) *before* things, in so far as the universal conceptions are in God as typical ideas and are thought by Him; (2) *in* things, in so far as individuals have only being and subsistence through their participation in the Universal; and (3) *after* things, in so far as we by the abstractions of our thought form universal conceptions that embrace many particulars. In respect to our present subject the distinction of Natural and Revealed Theology is especially noteworthy in this period of scholasticism. The irrefragable truth of the established doctrine of the Church and the mere subservient relation of philosophy to it, was accepted by all the scholastics at this time, and was in no way called in question by them. But certain subjects were kept separate from the ecclesiastical doctrine, and these were regarded as capable of being attained by philosophy through the natural insight of reason and from knowledge of Nature; and they could therefore be materially demonstrated. All the other subjects were excluded from such rational proof. It was necessary to accept them upon the basis of divine revelation, and in relation to them merely a formal use of reason was allowed.

Albertus Magnus, the *Doctor universalis* (1193-1280), aims at excluding the specific doctrines of the Christian Revelation from the sphere of what is knowable by reason. "Ex lumine quidem connaturali non elevatur ad scientiam Trinitatis et Incarnationis et Resurrectionis." The human soul, according to his view, can only know that of which it has the principles in itself. Now as the soul finds itself to be a simple substance, it cannot think the Deity as tri-personal, since it is not raised to this point of view by a special gift of grace and illumination from above.

Thomas Aquinas, the *Doctor angelicus* (1225-74), was the head and most brilliant representative of scholasticism, and he is still regarded as a high authority in the Catholic Church. He represents in like manner a precise demarcation of the limits of Natural Theology as distinguished from Divine

Revelation. As regards the doctrine of God, by our natural reason, and in particular by proofs *à posteriori*, we can attain to the knowledge of what relates to the unity of the divine nature. The uninterrupted chain of causes and effects in the world necessarily presupposes the existence of God as a first mover and a first cause. The order in the world enables us to infer an intelligent orderer. The contingent existence of the world points to a necessary being, and the degrees of difference in the perfection of finite things points to a most perfect and most real Being. God is the absolutely simple form; He is pure actuality, *actus purus*. We cannot know the Trinity by mere reason, but only with the aid of divine revelation. Neither can the natural reason know of itself the doctrines of the creation in time, of original sin, of the incarnation of the Logos, of the sacraments, of purgatory, of the resurrection of the body, of the judgment of the world, and the twofold final state. In regard to these doctrines, reason may indeed refute the objections of opponents, and point out certain analogies or establish some grounds of probability, but it cannot prove them to be true from its own principles. The acceptance of these doctrines rests upon the recognition of Revelation, and this is not founded upon the principles of reason, but partly upon an internal invitation of God (*interior instinctus Dei invitantis*) and partly upon miracles. And because these doctrines of faith are not demonstrable, the believing acceptance of them is meritorious, since it is in fact a proof of trusting in the divine authority. Hence faith is primarily a thing of the will and not of the intellect. But as Nature is the preliminary stage of grace, so in like manner these truths as knowable by the natural reason are the *pre-ambula fidei*. These may certainly be proved by *rationes demonstrativæ*; but because many men are incapable of grasping this demonstration, revelation has also brought them by its supernatural communication to men.

Joannes Duns Scotus (1274–1308), the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas, occupies essentially the same standpoint in reference to this distinction between Natural and Revealed Theology.

The distinction was combated from two sides: first, from the assumption that all the propositions of theology may be demonstrated; and, secondly, on the ground of the opposite view, that all theological propositions are indemonstrable.

Raymundus Lullus (1234-1315), the inventor of the "Great Art," undertakes to demonstrate the Catholic doctrines merely with the aid of scientific dialectics as propositions of the highest rationality. Reason is not twofold, but only one; hence there is also only one rational science. All the dogmas of the Catholic Church are purely intelligible propositions which can be proved by demonstration. The truths of revelation are not supra-rational; for how near does this lie to regarding the supra-rational as irrational! The method of demonstration, however, which Lullus applied to the conversion of unbelievers and the convincing of doubters, appears to have had little success. And he himself, along with this purely rational demonstration, refers to the special evidence of the immediate apprehension of religion.

William of Occam, the *Doctor invincibilis s. Venerabilis inceptor* († 1347), was the renovator of Nominalism. Only individuals, as individual things, have meaning. Universals as common conceptions are only abstractions made by our own understanding from these individual things (*conceptus mentis significantes univoce plura singularia*). Therewith the way was paved for the empirical method of thought through observation of individual things and the derivation of universal principles from inductive experience. And thereby the approach to a Rational Theology was at the same time closed; for such a theology would only be possible on the ground that God, like every other individual being, could be intuitively known. All knowledge which transcends experience is thus to be assigned to faith. To faith also belong the precepts of morality; for, in virtue of his unlimited freedom, God could also sanction other precepts as good and just. To this sphere also belong all the principles of faith, and even the existence of God cannot be proved either *à priori* or *à posteriori*.

Nominalism gained a wide influence, and the extent of it

was shown by the controversy that now arose in almost all the Universities between the *Antiqui* and the *Moderni*. Of the latter we may here mention Peter D'Ailly (1350-1425), who prepared the way for scepticism by the Nominalist assertion that our own existence only, and not that of external objects, is certain. John Gerson (1363-1429) may be likewise mentioned as having been led by Nominalism to Mysticism. According to his view, it is not worldly science and human philosophy that lead to the truth, but it is receiving the revelation of God in a contrite and believing heart. Gabriel Biel († 1495) was also distinguished for his clear exposition of Nominalism. The Nominalistic separation of Theology and Philosophy comes most decidedly to expression in Robert Holkot († 1349) and in Raymund of Sabundi (c. 1430). In the first book of Holkot's *Determinationes quarundam questionum* (the authorship of which, however, is doubted), the fifth question treated of is the Trinity, and the common distinction between a *logica fidei* and a *logica naturalis* is asserted. The Aristotelian logic is to be called formal, not in the sense that it is valid and authoritative "in omni materia," but only as being such "quæ per naturalem inquisitionem in rebus a nobis sensibilibiter nobis non capit instantiam." A *logica singularis* is valid in theology, for in reference to the Trinity the principle applies "aliquam rem esse unam et tres," and in Christology "oportet concedi contradictoria cum specificatione diversarum naturarum," a principle which the philosophers did not even know. Raymund in his *Theologia naturalis* puts natural theology by the side of revealed theology. The latter rests upon immediate revelation presented in Scripture, and it contains certain doctrines only thus attainable; the former draws merely from the book of Nature by means of our natural knowledge, and it therefore lies nearer to us. Ascending through the four stages of "Being," "Life," "Sensation," and "Reason," and supported upon external experience or observation of Nature, but still more upon internal experience or the facts of our own consciousness, Raymund advances proofs for the existence and the triunity of God, as well as for the

immortality of the soul. The goal of his theology is the complete union of the loving soul with God; and it betrays the influence of mysticism.

Along with Scholasticism we early find traces of a purely *intellectual Enlightenment*. One of its earliest representatives appears in Berengar of Tours († 1088). With regard to Scripture, Berengar turns himself zealously against the theologians of the letter, who have not the spirit that maketh alive, nor any idea of a scientific method of interpretation. They turn the Scriptures into a book of fables; for literally and verbally understood it contains a sensuous and utterly untenable notion of God, with innumerable impossibilities and absurdities. Tradition is uncertain, for unbounded abuse is too often carried on in its name. Nor is the majority of a Synod the right tribunal for finding the truth, since majorities and truth fly asunder, while error and the majority are wont to combine. Were all the decrees of Synods true, we would have a truth that contradicted itself; and as the later decrees revoke the earlier ones opposed to them, we would thus have a changing truth. Both of these positions are equally absurd. Authority and truth are seldom identical, but are mostly opposed to one another, and the authority is to be overturned by the truth. Truth is to be sought for in reason; it is grounded in the natural organization of human nature, which makes us capable of finding the truth. Hence anything that is "contrary to truth" is the same as being "contrary to reason," or "contrary to rational principles" and "contrary to conscience." "But nobody can be contrary to truth, contrary to reason, and contrary to conscience."—The efforts of Berengar appear to have had some success; and even Anselm repeatedly laments about unbelievers who would not accommodate themselves to the faith unless they were convinced by rational grounds, about people who were bold enough to raise objections against the ecclesiastical dogmas, and believers who were at least unsettled by such objections.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) was the most important representative of this intellectual method and tendency. How



little he regards the tradition of the Church is shown by his bold attack upon it in the treatise, *Sic et Non*. His fundamental principle is that insight must give a foundation to faith, for without insight faith is not certain of its truth. Authority may suffice so long as reason has not yet attained to full self-knowledge, but now it is no longer tradition, but criticism or doubt that is the way to truth. Reason is earlier than any tradition; it is the principle of unity amid the divisions of authority; it gives what is necessary in distinction from the contingency of special revelations. Reason alone has the right to supreme decision even in matters of religion. Every alleged divine revelation must be known as true before it can be held to be divine. Along with these decidedly rationalistic expressions, there are found, however, also others, which declare, on the contrary, that Reason is inadequate or incongruent to divine things. In any case, the free exercise of Reason is only for the few who have attained the maturity of reason, and not for the great mass of the immature in thought.

Abelard also turns his attention to the religions that are outside of Christianity. The heathen philosophy and poetry is equally with the Old Testament a vehicle of divine revelation before Christ. Even Prophets and Apostles have borrowed much from the works of the Hellenic wisdom. It is true that the doctrines of the pagan thinkers and poets are referred again to the natural consciousness of God, while the doctrines of the Old and New Testament are attributed to immediate divine inspiration; but this difference of their origin does not cause them to be reckoned as of different value. The distinction consists properly in this, that what only a few specially gifted individuals obtained insight into in the ancient times was made universally known by Christianity. The most important thinkers among the Greeks and Romans were precursors of the gospel; they were genuine thinkers before Christ; but what only a few knew then has now become manifest to the whole people without exception. This progress, however, is accompanied by a regress that runs parallel to it; for morality stood higher in the ancient times than it does

under Christianity. The historical Religions have nothing peculiar in them, nor anything essentially new. Christianity is as old as the world. It is only the name that is new, along with its wide diffusion among all peoples and nations. —If the heathen Wisdom and the Christian Religion are essentially one, it immediately follows that they are to be referred to the same source, which is the natural human reason. This is done by Abelard in his *Dialogue between a Christian, a Jew, and a Philosopher*. The Moral Law is unchangeable in all men, and therefore belongs to universal human nature; it is therefore older than all that is called Supernatural Revelation; it is the sufficient rule of action, and it extends to all natural religion. Hence it cannot be abrogated by any authority, but is itself the supporting basis of all that gives itself out as revelation. The Old Testament confirms this in recording of Abel, Enoch, Abraham, and others, who did not know the Mosaic Law, that they lived so as to please God. The Mosaic Law contains, besides genuine moral precepts that are inseparable from human nature, others that were given only from regard to temporal relations, and they are therefore changeable. These two elements stand side by side without inner connection, and yet the whole Law claims to be divinely revealed. Jesus brought nothing new, but only restored the original truth. He was not the founder of a new religion, but the restorer of the pure Moral Law. The Sermon on the Mount contains the original doctrine of Jesus; it is essentially the renovation and deepening of the eternal law of morality under continual reference to blessedness as the highest good bestowed by God. The claim of Philosophy to form a similar connection with virtue and morality, and therefore to be completely identical with Christianity, is objected to because Christianity as a historical reality stands on higher ground. But the mode of proof leaves the reader in doubt as to whether this is the author's true opinion. The philosopher is astonished that Scripture proofs are brought forward against him, and the Christian confesses openly that he has not presented them as his own opinion, but only as expressing the



faith of the Elders ; for himself he is at one with the philosopher in not founding upon authority, but upon reason.

There were not wanting followers of Abelard's teaching ; and other events of the time gave further occasion for the formation of a critical attitude of mind towards the Christian Religion. The unfortunate issue of the Crusades, that had been undertaken from a holy enthusiasm for the honour of God, could not but shake the faith of a people accustomed to see the judgment of God in success. Besides, the Crusades led to a closer acquaintance with other religions and those who professed them, and this necessarily gave rise to a more unprejudiced comparison of them. The contemporary moral corruption of the Church also aroused the opposition of the *Cathari*, and it could only be suppressed in streams of blood. Moreover, Philosophy became alienated from Religion by the wide-spreading influence of the Arabians, and especially of Averroës.

Averroës or Ibnroshd (1126-98) represented a mode of interpreting Aristotle which appeared to be particularly dangerous to religion from its denial of personal individuality. The intellect is represented as a substance completely different from the soul, and there is only one intellect in all men. We continue, indeed, to exist after death, but not as individual substances ; we continue only as a constituent of the universal understanding that is common to the whole human race.—It is true that Averroës seeks to avoid antagonism to religion by representing religion as containing the same truth as philosophy, but only in the form of figurative representations. All religions are true in so far as they contain incitements to the moral life ; nay more, they are equally true in so far as they contain these incitements in the highest degree that is possible for those who receive them. All religions, again, are false, and even equally false ; for along with the rational they also contain the irrational, and they present superstition side by side with morality. They are products of natural history and of the natural human reason, which, by its very idea of a supernatural revelation, shows how insufficient thought of

itself is. The ignorant multitude accept the precepts of religion according to the letter; the philosophers and all who have knowledge pass by allegorical interpretation beyond what is positive and understood as a fact of the spiritual life, to what is the purely philosophical substance of the religion. Hence there are many truths which hold in theology but not in philosophy.

It was mainly in the University of Paris that Averroism found its adherents and zealous representatives. It was there that Simon of Tournay (c. 1200) first spoke forth his view of *The Three Impostors* (Moses, Christ, and Muhamed). For his proud audacity in venturing by his rational principles and dialectical argumentations to weaken the Christian religion even more than he had hitherto strengthened it, he is said to have been punished by a sudden loss of speech. The Averroistic distinction of a theological and a philosophical truth found a point of attachment in the scholastic distinction of natural and revealed theology. For this latter view also recognises a twofold truth, one flowing from Natural Reason, and the other from Supernatural Revelation. This was not far from the view that turned the supra-rational into the irrational, and the two truths hitherto proceeding side by side into the opposites of each other. Already in 1240 a series of propositions which were partly Averroistic had been condemned at Paris as antagonistic to the Christian faith; and twelve other propositions were set up against them as forming a rule of faith and doctrine. In 1247, John of Brescain sought to escape the accusation of heresy by alleging that he had not established his propositions theologically, but philosophically. This excuse was not accepted, and the rigid observance of the limits laid down by the Faculty between Theologians and Artists was made a duty in the University of Paris. This was without success, for, in 1270 and 1276, the Archbishop of Paris again finds occasion to proceed against the University. Not less than 219 propositions are cited, regarding which it was asserted that they were true in philosophy, but were not in accordance with the theological

faith. Among these were the following: "God is not triune; God cannot beget one similar to Himself; a future resurrection is not to be admitted; there is only one intellect numerically; the world is eternal; there are fables and false statements in the Christian religion just as in the other religions." It is not probable that these philosophers actually included themselves among the number of believers, or that they felt in themselves any breach between faith and knowledge. Probably they employed this distinction only in order to bring forward in a disguised form all possible objections against religion, and to show that they were at least philosophically tenable.

The freedom of rational thinking in opposition to theology was thus expressed in principle. We then find it brought into application by Roger Bacon (1214-94). This, however, is not done from any wish to attack or reform theology on the ground of the natural knowledge of reason. In Theology, according to Roger Bacon's view, faith stands first, experience second, and understanding third. It is not Philosophy but Theology that is supreme, for all the wisdom that is useful for man is contained in the Scriptures. But, at the same time, Roger Bacon aimed at the knowledge of Nature, and held that this was to be attained by empirical inquiry, by exact observation, and by careful experience, Nature being to him the only authority, induction the only method, and experiment the only means of proof. Thus the world is viewed as a relatively independent whole, as a certain quantum determined by immanent laws, and not changeable at every moment by the interference of uncalculable powers. This was a view which still lay far from the ideas of that age, and it necessarily led to further consequences.

We will merely allude to the purely intellectual and often directly anti-religious tendency of the time of Frederick II. This tendency is sufficiently illustrated by the work entitled *De Tribus Impositoribus*. Comparison of the different religions was then the order of the day. It sometimes led to the rejection of all religion, and at other times to separation of

the universal moral precepts of religion as what is essential to it from its peculiar positive determination as something incidental to it. In William of Auvergne († 1249) we find a view which has even been attributed to more recent times as their own peculiar discovery. It was already indicated by some of the Fathers of the ancient Church, and was applied at least to the Old and New Testament. The view referred to is the idea that the historical revelation is nothing but *a divine education of the human race*. According to William of Auvergne, the Old Testament was given as a book of elements to the Jewish people, that is, to the human race in its childhood. The Jewish people being incapable of attaining to deeper insight and to philosophical knowledge, were to be trained only to moral obedience and to learned knowledge. Hence all the commandments were given as positive injunctions of God; and, on account of the sensuous nature of the people, they were corroborated by promises and threatenings. The people were, however, destined to attain gradually to insight through the continuous divine guidance. Christianity is the higher Revelation. It agrees partly with the Moral Law of the Old Testament, and, like it, with the natural moral law; and it is also partly a fulfilment of what was prophetically announced, as well as a rejection of what was only ritualistic. Mohamedanism is represented as an exception from this development; it is even a retrogression as compared with the Old Testament.

The *Religious Opposition* referred to made itself felt as soon as the new religion laid hold of men as a new power with inner irresistible energy. It was then felt that religion is much too rich to be confined to the narrow formulæ of a dogmatic system. When such internal experience becomes immediately represented in objective doctrinal expressions, it produces the forms of *Mysticism*. In religion man feels himself one with his God. When this immediate feeling of unity with God is made a principle of knowledge, we obtain the expression of the essential unity of the soul with God in reason and will. This principle is the centre of all Mysticism,

whether it leads in a more spiritual way to the appeal to immediate revelation, or, adopting a more rational method, sees in knowledge the means of attaining to complete union with God.

The first beginnings of a mystical movement, after the time of Scotus Erigena, show themselves in the twelfth Century. They are connected with the names of Hildegard of Bingen († 1197) and Elizabeth of Schonau († 1165). Among the celebrated teachers of the Church who belong to this school may be mentioned Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153), Hugo of St. Victor († 1141), Richard of St. Victor († 1173), Bonaventura († 1274). Others were excluded from the Church as heretics because their fanatical views went too far. Among these was Amalrich of Bena (1203). Of his doctrine only three propositions have been transmitted to us with certainty: (1) God is all; (2) every Christian must believe that he is a member of Christ, and this faith is as necessary to blessedness as the faith in the birth and death of the Redeemer; (3) no sin is imputed to those who walk in love. In these propositions there is already clearly enough expressed the Pantheism and the spiritualistic rendering of Christology, along with the historical denial of its facts, and that moral libertinism, which the later followers of Amalrich brought more clearly into view. These "Amalricans," as they were called, adopted, perhaps only as an external frame for holding their representations, the theory of three ages of the world propounded by Joachim of Floris († 1202). This theory held that the indwelling of God in Abraham was the Age of the Father, the indwelling of God in Mary was the Age of the Son, and the indwelling of God in the Amalricans was the Age of the Holy Spirit. By this Holy Spirit they can hardly have understood the natural Reason, but rather the immediate influences of the divine Spirit. They reject the sacraments and all external actions, because the Spirit works inwardly. The stirrings of fleshly desire within them are not sin, because the Spirit of God has become flesh in them. Hence they proclaimed and practised free love.



At the Synod of Paris in 1209, the doctrines of Amalrich and the writings of David of Dinant were condemned. Of the latter we know but little. He was accused of having taught that the *materia prima*, or the substratum of all corporeal things, the *voûs* or the principle of all individual souls, and God or the source of the heavenly Essences, were one and the same, because they are indistinguishable in being. The "Ortliberians" were closely related to the Amalricans. They held that the external orders of the Church are of no value, and that the rejection of them when conjoined with rigid asceticism leads to the highest perfection, and even to the reception of immediate divine revelation. Thereby man is raised to God; nay more, by a process of deification he attains, as his highest goal, complete oneness with God.—Joachim of Floris († 1202) represents the same tendency. Founding upon special revelations of the divine Spirit, he wished to carry back the priests to an apostolical abnegation of the world, and by a rigid monastic life in place of fleshly externalization to attain to the true inward spiritualization, and thus to bring about a new period of the Church. Joachim gained adherents particularly among the Franciscans, who were already strongly characterized by a tendency to fanaticism derived from their founder. The outlines of Joachim's *Eternal Gospel* may be summarized as follows. The history of the Christian Church runs through three great periods: the Age of the Father, extending from the creation of the world to John the Baptist; the Age of the Son, from the incarnation of Christ to the year 1260; and the Age of the Holy Spirit, which was regarded as beginning with that year. This last period is prepared by a boundless increase of abominations in the Church and life, as well as by the appearance of the Antichrist, who is more or less distinctly indicated as Frederick II. The characteristic of this new Age is to be derived from the contemplative life in which, with the right understanding of Scripture, the whole of previous history will come to appear in its true light.—These views were very widely spread by the *Brethren and Sisters of the Free Spirit*, or

the *Beghins* and *Beghards*, after the middle of the thirteenth Century. They likewise boasted of immediate revelations; and they regarded themselves, in virtue of these revelations, as above the external institutions of the Church in doctrine and practice. They professed to realize God in their immediate experience, and therefore did not need religious instruction from others. They did not even require the precepts of Christ, for what the Spirit said to them was truth. On the basis of these views, the Church with its external orders was violently attacked. It was declared to be a sin to confess to the priest. Masses, confessionals, confirmation, ecclesiastical fasts and festivals, the worship of saints, and all such institutions are to be rejected. There is no sin for one who is united with God; for nothing is sinful which is not reckoned to be such.

From this fanatico-spiritualistic tendency we must carefully distinguish that sober and profound mysticism which culminated in the Middle Ages in Meister Eckhart (1260-1328). He leans, indeed, everywhere on the doctrines of earlier thinkers, but, with bold originality and peculiar power, he knows how to breathe new life and his own spirit into the elements derived from others. Eckhart seeks to comprehend the essence of God as a process in which beginning, middle, and end pass eternally into one another. The common principle to which everything must be referred is the Essence of being. It is the Primality which contains all things; it is God in His essence as the Deity. This essentiality constitutes a beginning in God Himself; it is, however, not a beginning in time, but a beginning that does not begin, as the distinction of the Divine Persons is present from the first in the singleness of an unmodified being. The primal essence, or the Deity, is therefore the all-potent possibility of all things. The simple distinctionless Being which contains the ground of all existence is Nature; it is the first externalization or objectivation of the essence, but it is not really a mode of being different from the Essence; it is the essence as form and image. The Essence is also called "Father," and Nature is called "Word;" but as



the impersonal Word. The Deity becomes Person or God by the union of Essence and Nature. This sudden starting into self is cognition, and this cognition is the birth of thought. God's thought of Himself constitutes the Person of the Son. Father and Son now know each other as articulated and completed unity; and in this knowledge the Essence apprehends itself in a new form as personal Commonwill or as Holy Spirit. This Commonwill is the Being of the Deity satisfied in itself; it is the love of the Father and the Son. This process of self-revelation is an act that eternally renews itself, and only on this ground is God the Living God. For life is a circling movement in which the end continually returns into the beginning, and the beginning continually resolves itself in the end.

Finite things are in the Deity, and so far they have essence, but all essence is grounded in God. This does not assert the eternity of things, nor even the eternity of the determinate ideas of individual things, but only that the Deity, as the original ground of all being, also contains the possibility of all things in Himself. Creation, like all revelation, is the work of the tri-personal God. The Father in looking upon the Son begets and brings forth the creaturely forms or the world of Ideas, and after it the world of manifestation, both out of nothing. As regards the order of the world, all life, according to Eckhart, passes in gradual transition and enfeeblement from the higher Essences to the lower. This transition takes place in such a way that the higher member of the series, with its essentiality, is continually in the lower member, and the lower has at the same time its proper home and resting-place in the higher. Hence the higher, by its influence, illumines and strengthens the lower, and the lower again longs to rest in the higher. The end of Creation is that the gracious God may communicate Himself in the Creation, and in the highest measure to man, as the image of the Trinity. Every creature must be subservient and minister, in order that man may reach his goal; and, at the same time, it is man who, as the higher unity of the lower creation, brings it back to God.

In order that men may be again united with God, a Man must appear with this unity; and the Man who so appears is Christ. Eckhart, however, lays little importance upon the historical person of Christ, or upon His death; he sees therein only an example of what ought to happen with us all upon the way of deification. "God has become man that I might become God; God has died that I might die to all the world and to all created things." This unification with God is the highest aim of our striving, but it is by no means the annihilation of the individuality. Neither does the thinking of the divine Person become the thinking of the man, nor is the thinking human personality made to vanish by the union with God, nor is there required any regression of the human life into mere passivity. It is only the mode of cognition that becomes other than it was; it is then no longer a sensuous mode of knowledge, but it becomes mediated by the nature of God. Hence even our personality shall not be annulled. But, as in sensuous cognition we pass so much into one with the object cognized that, as Eckhart expresses it, the wood that is seen is our eye, and our eye is the wood, so in this union with God our personality is restored to its true personality by becoming active in and with the personal God.

Eckhart founded a school with many adherents. Its chief representatives were Joannes Tauler († 1360), Heinrich Suso († 1365), and the author of the old work called the *German Theology*.

#### IV.

#### TRANSITION TO THE REFORMATION.

With the Middle Ages new nations appeared on the stage of history. The Church, the only spiritual power which was saved from the terrible catastrophe of that age, undertook their education, and every impartial student must testify that it achieved a great result. But as the individual outgrows the instruction of his teacher, and as he ought to be led by it to

recognise the truth afterwards by his own judgment, and to choose the right, so it is likewise with the nations. In the course of centuries the Germanic peoples had come to maturity under the guidance of the Church, and now their independence began to show itself. Hitherto the only spiritual interest that had received effective care and furtherance was that of religion, but now the spirit of the time demanded also the active and thoroughly independent cultivation of the secular sciences. Hitherto the Church had presented itself in the sphere of religion as the Divine Institution through whose mediation alone the individual could approach his God; but now the religious subject claimed to be able even without this intervention to obtain peace with God, and he becomes zealous against the unbounded secularization that professed to be divine. The liberation of the mind and the self-activity of the individual indicate the fundamental tendency of the powerful revolution which was effected in the fifteenth and sixteenth Centuries, and which separates the Modern world from the Middle Ages. We call it the Reformation, borrowing the name from its transformation of the religious and ecclesiastical relations; but no side of life remained unaffected by it. An important change came over the social relations with the rise of the influential class of burghers, to whom commerce and trade brought prosperity, while their dwelling together in cities made them secure. Numerous inventions, such as gunpowder, the mariner's compass, and the art of printing, aroused the mind of the age, and enlarged the circle of vision. The discovery of distant continents and of the ocean routes to the East Indies and America, turned the attention to distant lands and to entirely strange relations undreamed of before. The science of Copernicus and Kepler compelled men to think of the earth as no longer the centre of the Universe, but as a planet circling around the Sun along with other planets; and this thought, in consequence, completely transformed their whole view of the world. Far-reaching results were to follow from the revival of the classical studies. The Middle Ages had known but a few fragments of the rich treasures of the

Greek mind, and, moreover, most of them had been only accessible in the Latin translations of ecclesiastical writers. But when, in the fourteenth Century, the danger that threatened Constantinople made a reconciliation with Rome appear desirable, and above all, when, after the fall of the city in 1453, many Greek scholars found a refuge in Italy, the Hellenic antiquity seemed to arise into new life. It was an entirely new world which thus appeared upon the stage, a world that had existed without the knowledge of Christianity, and yet with a greatness of its own that commanded respect. Italy was seized first by this spirit; and fertilized by that Hellenism which had just been discovered again, the Italian poetry attained its highest bloom in Dante, Petrarca, and Boccaccio. The liberal patronage of the highly cultured Medicis made Florence long the centre of all the scientific strivings of the time. The less deeply the Christian religion had struck its roots in many of the minds of the age, so much the greater was the temptation for them to turn with the renovation of the Hellenic spirit to a revival of paganism. How frequently this occurred is shown by the general lamentation that the "Humanists" showed themselves particularly indifferent or even hostile to religion. And even where men held fast outwardly to the ecclesiastical forms, yet the inner estrangement came to light in the decay of the moral life and in the more confidential utterances about religion. This was, for instance, the attitude of the Popes of that age. In such circles even the view of religion expounded by Macchiavelli (1469-1527) found an echo. He takes good care not to attack decidedly the Church and her doctrine; he is even firmly convinced of the high value of religion for the wellbeing of the people. But he regards it merely from this point of view, as an extremely useful means of keeping the multitude in check; and hence, being only too often invented by prudent statesmen, it is worthless for all who see through this deception. Thomas Campanella complains in bitter words about the wide spread of this view of the nature of Religion.

Philosophical inquiry was also influenced by the Human-

Averroës  
Alexandrist

istic movement. The long supremacy of Aristotle, which had lasted for centuries, was shaken. The attempt was naturally first made to purify and animate the dry formalism of the Aristotelian logic by combining it with rhetoric, and by introducing examples from the writings of the ancients. This effort is represented by Laurentius Valla (1407-1457), well known as the first scientific opponent of the Constantinian donation, and by Rudolph Agricola (1442-1485), and Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540), all precursors of Peter Ramus (†1572). The authority of Aristotle, however, was far more endangered by a controversy about the interpretation of him. Hitherto Averroës had been accepted as the only safe guide in the explanation of the great Greek thinker; he was regarded as "the Commentator" *par excellence*, and Aristotelism was nothing but Averroism. There was still no lack of representatives of Averroës, the most important of whom were Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople (†1461), George of Trapezunt (1396-1486). In the school of Padua, the Averroistic doctrine held its ground till the middle of the seventeenth Century. To the Humanists, however, Averroës appeared as barbarous, and, in so far as they kept to Aristotle, they chose for themselves at least one other leader, the ancient commentator Alexander Aphrodisiensis. The Church assumed the same attitude to both parties, for they both denied the immortality of the soul, and it was of the utmost indifference to her that the Averroëists founded this denial on the unity of the intellect in all men, while the Alexandrists founded it on the natural mortality of the individual soul. The Lateran Council of the 19th December 1512 condemned both views.

Petrus Pomponatius (1462-1525), a teacher of philosophy and a physician at Bologna, was the chief representative of the Alexandrists. He expounded his views regarding Immortality in the work, *De Immortalitate Animæ*, 1516. He held that what thinks and feels in man is necessarily one and the same, because in one subject there cannot exist several substantial forms. Thinking and willing appear as immaterial



and immortal, and the lower powers of vegetation and sensation as material and perishing. Hence it is doubtful whether we should say that the soul is essentially mortal and only relatively immortal, or that it is essentially immortal and only relatively mortal. The former expression, however, is more correct, because even knowing and willing are dependent throughout on material impressions and corporeal organs. The idea of immortality has been excogitated by prudent politicians in order to give an impulse to those who can only be induced to do good by the prospect of eternal reward; that he who is really virtuous will, even though believing in the mortality of the soul, do what is good for its own sake. The treatise, *De Incantationibus s. de Naturalium Effectuum admirandorum Causis*, investigates the wonderful processes in Nature, and declaims against the view that these are to be referred to the operation of spirits, angels, and demons, for everything happens from natural causes. Among these natural causes the stars take the first place, and they exercise a far-reaching influence upon men and their fates. Even the imagination of the credulous is taken into account in the explanation of cures and such like. His work, *De Libertate*, seeks to combine the Stoical view of the world as a regulated and all-comprehending cosmos with the Christian idea of the Creator; and this leads to the rejection of the freedom of the human will. In all these three writings Pomponatius comes to assertions which are contrary to the doctrine of the Church. Nevertheless he wished to subject his own doctrines to those of the Church, according to the principle, "I believe as a Christian what I cannot believe as a philosopher." He is therefore a representative of the theory of "the double truth," although it was expressly condemned by the Lateran Council of the 19th December 1512 in the words, "As what is true can never contradict what is true, we determine that every proposition which is contrary to the truth of the revealed faith is entirely false." Pomponatius tries to find a deeper foundation for the assertion of a double truth. Reason, he says, is twofold; there is an intellectual reason and a practical

reason. Philosophy rests upon the speculative reason and investigates natural truths; theology rests upon the practical reason and regulates life and morals. The former is most unequally distributed; the latter is the common inheritance of all men.

Besides the Church, there was another spiritual power by which both the Aristotelian Schools were equally detested as irreligious. This was the newly-revived Platonism of the time. The first impulse to the revival of the Platonic doctrine was given by Georgius Gemistus Pletho (1355-1452). He came from Constantinople on the occasion of the treaties of union at the Council of Ferrara-Florence, and he remained many years in Italy. His exposition of Plato was, however, accompanied with an obscure intermixture of Neo-Platonic thoughts. In one of his writings he accentuates the distinction between Aristotle and Plato, and impugns the former in the most important points. In the "*Nómoι*," which have come down to us only in fragments, he seeks, on the basis of the Platonic wisdom, to bring about a reform of the whole religious, political, and moral life. Happiness is the common aim of all men; it is only the means applied to attain it that are different. True happiness consists in the full satisfaction of our whole nature; and it therefore rests chiefly upon a knowledge of man and of the universe. The world points to a First Cause which, while an absolute identity, contains everything in itself in unity, and produces everything out of itself. This cause is described as the good, and it is the first stage of existence. The second stage is formed by the gods of the second order, that are generated immediately by God as an image like to Himself, and they are comprehended in Poseidon, the cause of all forms. Among them are distinguished the genuine and the bastard sons of Zeus. The former, as the Olympians, beget the immortal beings, or gods of the third order, divided into the stars and demons; the latter, as the Titans, with the assistance of the planets, beget the mortal beings. Man is the centre between the mortal and the immortal beings, for his spirit is derived from the



Olympians and his body from the Titans. The highest virtue is religion, for by it we enter into fellowship with the higher gods. The struggle thus inaugurated between Aristotelianism and Platonism was continued by his follower Bessarion (1389–1472), Patriarch of Constantinople, well known for his inclination towards a union with Rome. He points out that Plato was more akin to Christianity than Aristotle, and was therefore indispensable as auxiliary to Apologetics. He also lays the foundation of a more impartial and purely historical study of the two philosophers.

Marsilius Ficinus (1433–1499) obtained great influence by his translations of the writings of Plato and Plotinus. At his instigation Cosmo de Medici founded the Platonic Academy at Florence. His own views were chiefly expounded in his treatise, *De Religione Christiana*, and his *Theologia Platonica de Immortalitate Animorum*, l. xviii. The latter work begins with the following argument: "Were man not immortal, he would be the most unhappy of all beings, for in this world he leads the most unhappy life on account of the unrest of his soul, the weakness of his body, and his many wants. It is impossible that man, who is raised nearest to the Deity by religion, should fall below all other creatures in respect of happiness. Hence we must ascribe to him immortality." This indirect argument is accompanied by a direct proof. Ascending from the lower to the higher, Marsilius traverses the whole series of existences: *Corpus, qualitas, anima, angelus, Deus*. Body is without motion, and merely passive. Form or quality is active indeed, but along with matter it is divisible. The Soul is always the same, only it is variously active in time. Angels are likewise taken out of time, and do not strive after perfection, because they have already complete reality. God is the highest being; He is unity, truth, and goodness in one. There is only one God, and He is of infinite power. He is eternal and omnipresent, and as such He moves and preserves all things. By his own nature God is Knowing and Willing. He knows everything in Himself, as the original source of all life, and the arche-

typal form of all things; for things are nothing else than expressed thoughts of God. His Will is at once free and necessary; free, in so far as no higher power commands Him; and necessary, in so far as the sufficient ground for all action lies in His own essence. In the succession of the five stages mentioned above, all being proceeds from God. The soul forms "the mean," and it is therefore the connecting member between the higher and the lower stages of being. There are three kinds of rational souls: the soul of the world, the souls of the spheres, and the souls of animated beings. Three principles govern the world. From God comes the Unity in all plurality; from the Spirit, comes the Order of all fulness and variety; and from the world-soul comes Motion. The souls of the spheres move each its sphere in its own circle, and they also exercise an important influence upon earthly things. All finite things, even earth and water, are ensouled; for they contribute to the generation of beings with souls. All souls are immortal, because they move themselves, and have a substantial existence, and are connected with the divine, and are indivisible, and so on. The human soul is indivisible and divine; it is all-present in every part of the body; it is independent of matter, and is only dependent on God. It is an error to suppose that there is one common soul in all men, rather has every man his own particular individual soul. The Soul rises through the four stages of Sense, Imagination, Phantasy, and Intellect to true insight. It is nourished, not by earthly matter, but by the truth, and finds itself always the more, the more it separates itself from the body and everything material. The striving of the soul is after union with God, but this goal will only be completely attained in the world beyond.—Two wings carry the soul towards union with God; they are Knowledge and Action. The former carries it by the way of philosophy; the latter by the way of religion, and they stand in the closest relation to each other. Religion is entirely peculiar to man. All the other endowments which distinguish man are found likewise among the lower animals, but not this relation to the divine.

To man, on the other hand, religion is as natural as neighing is to the horse, or barking to the dog; for it springs "*a Deo atque humana speciei communi natura.*" Hence all nations have religion, the worship of God, and belief in an eternal life. The essence of religion consists in the union of the soul with God; it rests upon the essential affinity of the Soul and God, and it strives everywhere to unite with itself what has affinity to it. As only an eye that is full of light sees light, and only the ear that is filled with air hears sound, so it is only the soul that is filled with God that can rise to God, and it can rise to God just so far as it is illuminated by divine light and kindled by divine warmth. The Christian Religion is the most perfect religion. In Christ the eternal Word became man, and this was entirely in conformity with the nature of God, on account of the most inward relationship between God and man. The end of the incarnation was that man might be again raised to God by the Word of God. Christ worked by His teaching and His virtuous example. His vicarious sufferings are not exactly denied, but they are pressed completely into the background.

Of the representatives of the reviving Platonism, the best known is John Pico of Mirandola (1463–1494). In addition to the Platonic doctrine, he sought to turn to account the Jewish Kabbala, a philosophical literature of doubtful origin and mysterious contents. Philosophy has the same goal as theology; and this is the highest good in perfect communion with God. The writings of Moses are the source of all wisdom, for all the philosophers have drawn their knowledge from them. The most correct and valuable interpretation of these writings is contained in the Kabbala. In order to be able to make a really fruitful use of these authorities, we need immediate illumination by the Holy Spirit. In the substance of his doctrines, Pico moves throughout in the well-known lines of Neo-Platonism. The idea of God is defined on two sides. In Himself God is determined as the absolutely simple and infinitely perfect Being, elevated above everything that is finite and inexpressible, because He is

unthinkable. In relation to things, God is represented as the real immediate essence of all that exists, as the cause of all things, and as the fulness of all being. Over against God stands matter, as the formative object of the divine operations; according to the measure of its resistance, the everywhere equal power of God works out in it a graded series of finite beings. These fall into three Worlds, with nine orders in each. In the angelic World, God Himself forms the centre; in the heavenly world, the centre is the tenth heaven, the Empyrean; in the earthly world, the central point is the first matter. Man as the microcosm forms the central member between the upper and the lower world; and to the three worlds correspond the three parts of His being, the rational soul, the spirit, and the body. By a free decision of will at the Fall, man turned himself away from God; by the redemption, he was to be led back to Him again. Complete union with God is the goal towards which man, in his desire after happiness, strives. The way to it is shown by philosophy as well as by theology; it leads, through purification from the influence of sense and through the immediate illumination of knowledge, to perfection, which, however, is only to be really attained in the other life.

Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) is named as the renovator of Stoicism, but we do not find that his efforts had much success. On the other hand, the renewal of scepticism by Montaigne (1532-1592) had considerable influence. According to Montaigne, philosophy seeks true science and certainty. The dogmatic philosophy asserts that it has reached this goal; the Academics are satisfied with probability instead of truth; the Sceptics or Pyrrhonians refrain from pronouncing judgment. The last view is the only tenable one. All our knowledge rests upon the senses; but the senses are unreliable; and accordingly there at once arises a conflict about sense-perception. The number of the senses is limited, and hence the possibility that things possess qualities which necessarily remain hidden from us. Again, the senses perceive only their own modifications, and hence the un-

certainty as to whether the things themselves are not perhaps quite different from their appearances. Our knowledge of God is still more uncertain. We know God only according to our limited power of apprehension. The infinite power, beauty, and goodness of God, however, bear no comparison with such insignificant beings as we are. Our practical judgments are just as uncertain. In nothing do we find satisfaction, but we long continually for more splendid things, which, however, could satisfy us just as little. In the estimate of things the same difference of opinion prevails as in regard to moral precepts. The voice of conscience is also dependent on custom, education, and other influences. We must accordingly renounce all inquiry of our own; and hence we can obtain the truth only by a believing acceptance of the divine revelation.—These thoughts were entirely borrowed from the ancient Sceptics; and neither Charron († 1603) nor Sanches († 1632), who followed in the same track, passed beyond them.

Humanism spread from Italy into Germany. We find its indifference to what is positive in the Christian religion in the confidential utterances of Mutianus (1472–1526). The religion of Christ, he says, did not begin merely with His incarnation, but it existed from eternity, like the generation of Christ from the Father. For the true Christ, the proper Son of God, as Paul says, is nothing else than the Wisdom of God, which was not communicated only to the Jews in the narrow region of Syria, but also to the Greeks, Romans, and Germans, in spite of the difference of their religious practices. There is only one God, and one Goddess, but many forms and names. This, however, is not to be proclaimed openly, but must be veiled in science like the Eleusinian mysteries; for, in matters of religion, we must use the covering of fables and enigmas. Acute as are the judgments which Mutian expresses in his letters on the Biblical Scriptures, and all the external ecclesiastical institutions, he yet takes care not to shake the opinions of the multitude, for without them everything would sink into chaos. John Reuchlin (1455–1522), well known from his controversy with the Dominicans of Cologne,



furthered the study of the classical antiquity by the production of a Latin dictionary and a Greek grammar. Stimulated by Pico of Mirandola, he applied himself to the mysteries of the Kabbala, and by his Hebrew grammar (1506) he introduced the study of the Hebrew language into German science. Erasmus of Rotterdam (1467–1536), by his edition of the Greek New Testament, as well as by a series of fearless attacks upon the worldly spirit of the Church, contributed powerfully to bring about the Reformation. But when the Church was threatened with being driven from her position as the sole mediator of salvation, he turned away from the spirit which he had himself conjured up. The Humanistic culture entered into the immediate service of the Reformation only in Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523).

It is but a superficial view that could lead any one to derive the reformation of the Church from the Humanistic movement. Their mutual furtherance of each other must indeed be recognised. But it is just as unmistakeable that they were two entirely independent fruits of the same revolution whose general character consisted in the free unfolding of the spirit that had now ripened to independence. The Church aimed at being the medium of salvation to the individual believers as the institution appointed by God Himself for this end. But from the world, which it was instituted to rule and to transform into a kingdom of God, the Church once and again received corrupting elements into herself, so that her divine form became marred, and the vicar of Christ was perverted into Antichrist. Gregory VII., along with the complete subjection of all worldly powers and strivings, had likewise aimed at a lasting purification of the Church. The monastic orders, and especially the Dominicans and Franciscans, sought with noble zeal and transitory success to stem the increasing tide of worldliness. It was all in vain. In the fourteenth and fifteenth Centuries the Church presents such a picture of corruption that anything more repulsive can hardly be conceived. The Popes, by their moral licentiousness and frivolous unbelief, almost rivalled their most



notorious predecessors of earlier centuries. The Papacy could not but lose its respect when, by the exile to Avignon, it had been subordinated in an ignoble way to French influence, and entangled in external controversies by a schism of thirty years. The priests sank into ignorance and debauchery. The whole activity of the Church was turned into a system for extorting as much money as possible by the sale of ecclesiastical offices, the granting of numerous dispensations of various kinds, and above all by the shameless sale of indulgences. Thus the salvation of the soul was bought and sold, and in consequence the mass of the people sank the deeper into boundless ignorance and unbridled immorality, while the public worship, in consequence of the excessive adoration of images and relics, as well as the complete exclusion from it of the vernacular tongue, sank into mere lip-service.

Under such circumstances opposition could not fail to come. But the opposition of the intellectual thinking in the form of Enlightenment, and that of the immediate religious life in the form of Mysticism, although strong enough to overthrow the Church of the time, were incapable of creating a new ecclesiastical community. The reformation of the Church could therefore only proceed from an opposition of a different kind. This began to work towards the end of the Middle Ages, and it likewise showed a twofold aspect. At one in zeal against the intolerable worldliness of the papal Church, the two tendencies diverged upon the question as to what new institution was to be put in its place. The one form of opposition wished to maintain the divine intermediation of the Church as the sole dispenser of salvation to the individual; but, while leaving the papacy and the hierarchy as a divine order untouched, it aimed only at removing undeniable abuses in detail. The other form of opposition impugned directly the position of the Church and the hierarchy. The Church was not the divine mediator of salvation, but the communion of those who, in virtue of their personal faith, had become participators of salvation on the ground of their personal relation to God. The hierarchy was declared to rest merely

upon human ordinances, and it may perhaps have still to be recognised from this point of view. The source of religious truth is not the tradition of the Church, but the word of Scripture alone. The ground of salvation is not found in external works, but in internal living faith. The former mode of effort long laboured in vain, trying to effect a "reform in the Head and the members," and it at least in part reached its goal in the purification of Catholicism from its worst outgrowths at the Council of Trent (1545-1563) by way of a reaction from the formation of independent Protestant Churches. The other effort attained its goal only at the price of a schism which, at the first, had not been even thought of. In the Waldensian valleys of the south of France and north of Italy, Petrus Waldus had as early as 1160 been zealous against the abuses of the Church; and on the ground of Scripture he had demanded holiness of sentiment and life. In England, John Wicliffe (1324-1384) had preached the Scripture as the only source of truth, Christ as the sole mediator between God and man, His death as the only ground of the forgiveness of sin, faith as the only means of appropriating forgiveness, the Church as the communion of the saints, and our salvation as dependent solely on the divine decree. In Bohemia, John Huss (1369-1416), aroused by Wicliffe, gained numerous adherents to his views of reform. In the Netherlands, the *Brethren of the Common Life* sought, in all stillness, to bring about a renovation of the religious life. From their midst came forth Thomas à Kempis († 1471), who by his *Imitation of Christ* has worked, as few have done, to establish a pure Christianity in the soul within. John Wessel (1419-1492) belonged to the same circle. Well acquainted with all the science of his age, he came nearest to Luther in his decided accentuation of the Scriptures as the only source of divine knowledge, and of faith as the only condition of justification. This movement, however, only attained to the power of permanently transforming the Church when Luther and Zwingli appeared.

We have thus reached the grand revolution of the religious,

ecclesiastical, and even of the whole spiritual life which we call the Reformation. As our historical exposition is to begin in detail from this point, it only remains for us to close our introduction<sup>1</sup> by a glance over the division and arrangement which may be best given to our material.

And, in the first place, it may be remarked that we have almost completely to look away from the Catholic Church. In the Council of Trent the position of that Church was so based upon the principle of authority, that no room remained for that freedom of thought which the Philosophy of Religion from its essential nature cannot dispense with. The few isolated attempts which have been made within the Roman Church in this direction, have only resulted from the influence of certain philosophical systems that grew up on Protestant soil, and they have therefore to be discussed in connection with these systems. Even the Mysticism in the Catholic Church since the Reformation has been far more inclined to quietism than to speculation.

The progress of philosophy which has taken place has been made entirely within the range of Protestantism, and that progress has been not a little influenced by its liberation of the individual. The appearance of Kant forms such a decisive turning-point in philosophy, that it is antecedently probable that the Philosophy of Religion before and after Kant will show an entirely different character. The following exposition will confirm this and justify it, so that we will consider the period before Kant in the first Book, and Kant and the period after him in the second. The Period before Kant may be again divided into two periods. The question regarding revelation, so important in relation to the application of

<sup>1</sup> This introductory survey of the history of the subject in the Ancient Church and the Middle Ages does not claim to present anything new, and it rests only in part, at least as regards the Middle Ages, on special knowledge of the sources. Along with a number of other works, the following may be referred to:—Huber, *Die Philosophie der Kirchenväter*, München 1859. H. Reuter, *Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, 2 Bde. Berlin 1875–7. W. Gass, *Genadius u. Pletho*, 1844. F. Schultze, *Georgios Gemistos Plethon*, 1874. G. Draydorff, *Das System des Johannes Pico*, 1858. D. F. Strauss, *Ulrich von Hutten*, 1 Bd. 1858.

thought to religion, is not closely examined by the early Protestant Church. But this question is taken up afterwards, and then developments become possible, such as the English Deism, the French Materialism, the Philosophy of Des Cartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, the movement of the German Enlightenment, and the superseding of it by Lessing and Herder, Hamann and Jacobi. In the first centuries of the Protestant Church we likewise find attempts at independent speculation; but springing mostly up within the Catholic Church they gain little influence. Besides these, we have to consider the character of the doctrine of the Protestant Church, the manifold oppositions directed against the Church, and the scholastic cultivation of philosophy. The contents of the several Sections in our History of the Period before Kant are thus briefly indicated.

## BOOK I.

---

HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION  
FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT.





## SECTION FIRST.

### THE BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENT SPECULATION.

THE introductory survey has already shown us Philosophy in a state of profound fermentation. The authority of Aristotle, after having ruled all science for centuries, was now accepted only by a small band of followers. At the same time almost all the systems of the ancients were renewed, and even the mysterious wisdom of the Kabbala found enthusiastic disciples. None of these attempts exhibits much that is new or independent, and not one of them gained lasting recognition. More importance must undoubtedly be attached to a series of productions which we must now consider. At their head stand the works of Nicolaus Cusanus, the learned Bishop of Brixen. Although belonging to the fifteenth century, he comes under our consideration more properly in this period, because he undoubtedly formed a turning-point in the philosophical inquiry of that time. Writing in obscure and difficult language, and full of new verbal forms and bold constructions, he puts forth laborious efforts to embody his thoughts in words. In his matter, Cusanus unites in himself, as in a focus, the thoughts of the Mediæval Scholasticism in their fruit, and the problems of Modern Speculation in their germ.—Metaphysical thought receives a new impulse from Nicolaus, and the Platonic element exerts an important influence on speculation. On the other hand, Telesius and Cardanus founded a distinctive philosophy of Nature. It is true that this Natural Philosophy, in default of exact individual observation, still operates with certain universal principles, but it at least directs attention to the processes in Nature, and thus gives a new direction to thought. The influence both of the metaphysics of Cusanus and of the natural

philosophy of Telesius, is shown in the writings of Giordano Bruno, Thomas Campanella, Franciscus Patricius, and Julius Cæsar Vanini. All these men worked in Italy (Cusanus also living latterly at Rome), and Italy was most powerfully affected by the new scientific movement. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to say anything definite about the extent to which their views were spread; I cannot even find evidence in detail for the natural conjecture that this philosophical movement was essentially connected with the strivings after religious reform.<sup>1</sup> — An isolated position is held by Peter Ramus and also by Nicolaus Taurellus, the former working at Paris, the latter at Altorf. The two are at one in carrying on a violent opposition to Aristotle, but Ramus aims at vitalizing the purely formal and schematic Dialectics of the time by connecting them with Rhetoric, while Taurellus aims at making Philosophy the servant of Theology, as, like the Law, it inclines us to the believing acceptance of the Gospel. Ramus alone gained numerous adherents and lasting influence.

## I.

### NICOLAUS CUSANUS (1401–1464).

Nicolaus Chrypffs or Krebs was born in the first year of the fifteenth century at Kues (Cusa), a village on the Moselle. His life began amid rustic surroundings, and almost in circumstances of poverty. His brilliant spiritual gifts, however, made him rise rapidly into high position in the service of the Church. At the Council of Basle, he already attempts, by his "*concordantia catholica*," to co-operate in the generally desired "reform of Head and members," not merely of the

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately the historians of Philosophy have hitherto greatly neglected this movement, and we have as yet no adequate representation of the lives and doctrines of these men. We may refer to Rixner and Siber's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Physiologie*, 7 Hefte, Sulzbach 1819–26, but their exposition is quite insufficient. M. Carrière's *Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit*, 1847, in spite of great excellences, is unreliable, as the author too frequently introduces his own Hegelian philosophy into the earlier systems.

Church, but likewise also of the Empire, entirely after the idea of Gerson. Afterwards joining the party of Eugenius IV., Nicolaus took part in the embassy to Constantinople, which introduced the negotiations about union. We next find him in his priestly office at Coblenz, where he performed distinguished service, especially as a preacher. In 1448, having been made a Cardinal, he completed the revision and reorganization of the monasteries of Germany; and in 1450 he received the Bishopric of Brixen. After having devoted himself in this office, with rare zeal, to the practical improvement of the relations of the Church, he spent the last years of his life in Rome. But although thus busily occupied with the affairs of the Empire and the Church, Nicolaus always found time to devote himself to the enjoyment of the work of speculative thought.<sup>1</sup>

Intimately acquainted with the achievements of former thinkers, Nicolaus does not attach himself slavishly to any of them; but freely examining into what may be correct in their productions, he emphatically claims freedom from all authority. In the character of an "*Idiotes*," Nicolaus presents a man of so-called common sense objecting to a "*pedant*" puffed up with book-learning, in these terms: "You are a horse which, although free by nature, is tied to its manger, where it eats nothing but what is put before it. Your mind, tied to authority, is nourished on strange nutriment that is not natural: for, doth not Wisdom cry? and Understanding put forth her voice? She standeth in the top of high places; she crieth at the gates, Unto you, O men, I call; and my voice is to the sons of men! (Prov. viii. 1). We do not attain to knowledge by the books of men, but by the books of God, which He has written with His own finger, and which are found everywhere." In like manner, he says in his Sermons, that in order to

<sup>1</sup> The Basle Edition of the works of Cusa (1565) has numerous misleading errors. The Paris Edition of 1514 is much more correct. Many works have been written on Cusa, and mention may particularly be made of F. A. Scharpf's *Der Cardinal und Bischof Nicolaus von Cusa als Reformator in Kirche, Reich und Philosophie des 15 Jahrhunderts*, Tübingen 1871. But a complete and adequate exposition of his system is still a desideratum.

attain knowledge "we do not need to take books into our hands; their number is without end, and they would lead us only to unbounded vanity. Rather let every one imagine that he is an Adam and alone upon the world, and let him consider only the world in itself."—Cusanus is accustomed to designate philosophy proper as a learned ignorance, *docta ignorantia*. This, however, does not mean a thoroughgoing scepticism and despair of knowledge, but a mode of knowing which is conscious that precise cognition is impossible, and which, on the ground of this principle, seeks to attain an approximative or conjectural knowledge (*de conjecturis*).

We shall consider, in the first place, the metaphysical views of the learned Cardinal, and then his attempts at a historico-psychological explanation of Religion. On the whole, we will find between these two sides of his doctrine a wonderful congruence, although certainly not a complete unity; but who would require from a man of the fifteenth century what is even now hardly ever attained? His metaphysical statements, however, may be grouped most simply in the order which the author himself observes in his *Docta Ignorantia*. We shall therefore consider, first, his doctrine regarding God, in so far as He transcends reason; then his theory of the world, in so far as all that is, is through God; and, lastly, his view of Christ, in so far as He completes the whole system by mediating between God and the world.

1. According to Nicolaus, it is superfluous to prove *the existence of God*. The finite and limited necessarily presupposes something from which it has its beginning and limitation; and thus finite being is only possible if there is a something limiting and grounding it. The mind has absolute certainty of an absolute Unity, because it exists entirely in this Unity, and is active by it. The mind cannot raise a question which does not already presuppose this Unity. The question as to *whether* it is, already presupposes its being. The question as to *what* it is, presupposes its essence. The question as to *why* it is, presupposes it as the ground of all things. And the question as to what is its *goal*, presupposes it as the goal

of all things. What is thus presupposed in all doubt, must be the most certain of all things.—The question regarding the *cognition of God* is not so simply resolved. Various ways lead to it, and yet the reality of it as knowledge is again denied. Finite sensible things are effectuated by God; every effect is to a certain degree like its cause; and hence earthly things are signs and symbols for bringing the inconceivable God nearer to us. This is the basis of his so-called *Symbolical Theology*. Thus the absolute Seeing of God, which is at once universal and particular, is illustrated by a picture whose look is continually directed to the beholder in the same way, whatever position he may take up towards it. The Eternity of God is symbolized by the image of the dial on which all the hours are continually present, and yet each one of them is only indicated at a particular moment of time. The Causality of God in His relation to the creature, is seen by the image of light, which without itself being a colour yet makes all the different colours arise out of itself. Far more striking and appropriate symbols are, however, presented by Mathematics; for while the forms of sense are presented in a state of constant change, the abstract elements of mathematics have great steadfastness and certainty. Hence, after the example of the greatest of the earlier philosophers, Cusanus embodies the theory of numbers in his system. God appears as the absolute Unity, which is at the same time the absolutely greatest and the absolutely least. And still more do geometrical figures serve to make the absolute conceivable, at least approximately. But in this connection, reference is expressly made to the condition that we must transfer the relations of finite figures not merely to infinite relations, but even to the absolutely Infinite itself, which is without figure. Thus God appears under the image of the infinite straight line, of the infinite triangle, of the infinite circle, and of the infinite sphere.—Such a merely symbolical denotation of God is, however, not sufficient for us; the worship of God in spirit and in truth necessarily demands positive expressions regarding God. This *Affirmative Theology* must start from



the contemplation of finite earthly things, and this contemplation is justified inasmuch as the world is the representation and the work of God. Positive names are assigned to God in all His relations to the creatures. He is called "Life" in so far as He is the cause of all life, and "Creator" in so far as He creates all things. But it is an error to hold that the attributes thus attained are real distinctions in God, or to believe that the Divine Nature in itself can be thus determined.—In order that God may not be honoured as a mere creature, our contemplation of Him must necessarily be justified by the *Negative Theology*. God is ineffable, because He is greater than everything which can be named; and hence we think of Him more correctly by the way of exclusion and negation, as Dionysius, Solomon, and all the Philosophers have done. To this Negative Theology, God is nothing but infinity. Yet, according to Cusanus, Infinity is not a negative or entirely empty notion; but because finite being is continually limited and is therefore not-being, negation primarily applies to the finite, as finiteness is not-being, and God as the infinite one, is thus the true, positive, highest Being.—Yet our philosopher will not stop even here, but aims at rising by means of the *Mystical Theology* to a knowledge of the essential nature of God.

We know *the essence of God* only by the help of the idea of *the Coincidence of Opposites* or *Contradictories*. Nicolaus himself confesses that on his return from Greece he received the principle of the coincidence of contradictories like a revelation, through the grace which is from above, from the Father of lights from whom cometh every good and perfect gift. This principle is the key to the solution of all difficult questions, "for the whole striving of our mind must be directed with all earnestness to rise to that simplicity in which contradictories coincide." This principle is diametrically opposed to the principle which the understanding maintains as its highest rule, namely, the Law of Contradiction or the incompatibility of opposites; and whoever adopts this principle as the starting-point of his speculation, enters



thereby into direct antagonism with the scholasticism of the understanding.

God is the infinite being; He is therefore the absolutely greatest being. As the absolutely greatest, He is all that can be; He cannot therefore be less than He is, and He is thus also the absolutely least. In God then the greatest and the least coincide, and God is elevated above all contradictions. Contradictions and opposites occur only in the sphere of the concrete, and not in what is absolutely greatest. This absolute is therefore above all affirmation and negation. All that it is according to our conceptions, such it is even as it is not such; and conversely. It is as the individual in the same way in which it is likewise All; and it is All in the same way that it is nothing of all; and it is *this* in the way that it is also least *this*.—If I say that God is light, this means nothing else than that God is most “light,” even He who is least “light.” Nay more, even the most general expressions, such as “substance” or “being,” are not applicable to God, because they involve a contradiction in the implied ideas of “accident” and “not-being,” which does not pertain to God in the common way, or even does not pertain to Him at all. This is the reason why neither Affirmation nor Negation can reach the essence of God; they both move in the sphere of contradictions and opposites; an affirmation is opposed to a negation, and a negation to an affirmation. The truest conception of God is therefore not such as affirms both contradictories on the ground that even the contradictory coincides in Him, such as that God is being and not-being, or light and darkness; but the real conception is that which rejects both contradictories, at once disjunctively and copulatively. Hence the best answer to the question as to whether God is, is this: that He neither is nor not-is, and that He is not “is and not-is.” But even this is only conjecture.

As the infinite, God is at the same time Unity. The consideration of number leads to this; for in number there is not an absolutely greatest, but there is a least, which is unity. God is thus at once the greatest and the least; He is the

absolute unity. God is likewise threefoldness, and He is therefore triune; He is unity as naturally prior to alterity, equality as prior to inequality, and connection as prior to separation. Equality proceeds out of unity by generation, that is, by a repetition of the same nature. The arising of connection implies procession. The teachers of the Church called this unity the Father, this equality the Son, this connection the Holy Spirit; but like all the names of God, these are also borrowed from human relations. Nor is this the only definition of the divine trinity; it is also represented as follows. As intelligence, God is the subject knowing, the object known, and the process of being known, in one. As love, God is the loving Love, the lovable Love, and the interunion of both. As the Creative Ground of all existence, God is the capability of producing, the capability of becoming, and the capability of having become, in one; or He is the absolute possibility, actuality, and the union of both. The view that the oneness and threefoldness in God is of a mathematical kind, is expressly repudiated; it is a mode of life, and without this triune life in God there is no eternal joy or supreme perfection. As all finite things form a representative image of God, they likewise bear in themselves this threefold oneness representatively. From the Father they have being; from the Son, power; and from the Spirit, activity.

God is thus in His essence the coincidence of all opposites. He is the absolute unity in which the Greatest and Least, Being and Not-being, Past, Present and Future, Being and Becoming entirely coincide. But He is not this as being absolutely void and empty, but as including everything in Himself. In finite things, what constitutes their being bestows upon one thing this being and on another that being; and all this is also in God, only not yet as individualized opposition. God is really all that of which the possibility of being can be expressed; for nothing can be which is not God. God is thus really all that is possible; He is everything *complicite*. All that in any way is or can be, everything that is produced or is still to be produced, is contained in God as

its ground. Substances, qualities, and such like are God in God ; just as when they are unfolded as creatures, they are the world. Hence God is most appropriately designated as "*possest*," that is, as potentiality and being. When God, therefore, in the beginning, wished to reveal the knowledge of Himself, He said : " I am the God who is able to be everything," that is, He is the actuality of all possibility. This name carries us above all the knowledge of the senses, of the understanding and of the reason, to that *mystical intuition* which is the end of all ascending knowledge, and the beginning of all revelation of the unknown God.—At this point we come to the view given by Cusanus of *the finite world and its relation to God* as its absolute archetype and its infinite cause.

2. As infinite cause, God is the ultimate ground and Creator of all finite things. He is the absolute possibility of becoming; nor is He merely this, but He is also the possibility of producing or making to be, which necessarily precedes becoming. He is thus the absolutely active principle. Further, there is no eternal matter out of which the world could be formed. It is true that the world appears to be mixed up of oneness and otherness, or of being and not-being ; and most of the expressions used make the not-being, as hetercity or darkness, appear to be something that exists by itself out of and independent of God. Thus it is said we have to think of the universe and all the worlds as formed from a unity and a hetercity that pass into one another. This unity is represented as an animating and formative light ; the hetercity as a shadow and regression from the first and simplest mode of being, and as material condensation. The universe then appears under the image of two pyramids of light and of darkness blending into one another. Or again, the not-being is represented as without ground in itself, and as having a purely contingent connection with finite things. Creaturely being, says Cusa, has from God its being but not its finiteness. From God the creature has the characteristics of being one, distinct, and yet connected with the universe. But the fact that its unity is found in plurality, its distinctness in con-

fusion, and its connection in disharmony, is not in it from God nor from any other positive cause, but is purely contingent (*contingenter ex contingenti*). Hence the being of finite creatures is utterly inconceivable, although they are regarded as, in a manner, a mixture of absolute necessity and contingency.—It is to be admitted that Nicolaus, in opposition to this, expresses only in an isolated way the thought that even not-being is contained in the infinite possibility, or in the “*possest*,” and that, in God, not-being is all-being. Yet the opinion is decidedly to be rejected which holds that there lies at the ground of finite things any other being than God, whether as active or as passive principle. God is rather the sole ground of all existence, the creator of all finite things, He who has brought them out of nothing into being. To Him are referred the three productive principles of the ancient philosophers, matter, form, and motion. Their eternal matter points to Him as the eternal possibility of making and becoming; their form points to Him as the form of all forms, the nature of all natures; their motion points to Him as the original source of all force, and as at once absolute motion and rest.—Thus it appears that Cusa’s conception of the Creative Cause is strongly influenced by the conception of the archetypal or ideal form.

Nicolaus usually indicates the relation of God to the world by this formula: “the absolute unity is the totality of all things, or their *complicatio*, while the finite creation is the evolution of all things, or their *explicatio*.” This expression, along with some others has brought upon our philosopher the reproach of pantheism, and yet they are only traces of his struggling with language. Looked at more precisely, he has with all decisiveness repudiated all the views which were afterwards branded with this name, such as that which holds that all things are God. He also rejects every form of emanation, whether it is conceived mediately or immediately; and all the attempts which he makes to bring the essentially inconceivable *How* of the origin of the world as near as possible to us, rest upon the fundamental view of a creation. “If you consider things without God, then they are nothing,

as number is nothing without unity ; if you consider God without things, then He is and they are nothing." God is the *complicatio*, the comprehending whole ; the world is the *explicatio*, or the unfolding of all. This is made more distinct by some examples. Thus the point is the unity, as the comprehension or the complication of quantity ; hence there is in the line, the surface, and the solid body nothing but the point. Rest is the conception of motion in its unity, and hence motion is the unfolding of rest. The mathematical symbols particularly illustrate this. As the infinite straight line forms at the same time the curved line, and the circle, and the triangle, and the sphere, so is God the ground and the measure of all things. According to the analogy of the infinite circle, God is in everything as its centre ; He embraces all things as their periphery, and He penetrates all things as their diameter. As centre, He is the beginning of all ; as periphery, He is the end of all ; as diameter, He is the middle of all. As centre, He is the producing cause or creator ; as periphery, He is the final cause or the preserver ; as diameter, He is the forming cause or the governor. Nevertheless, the mode and the manner of this process of embracing things in Himself, and of unfolding things out of Himself, goes beyond our understanding.

As the pure faculty of seeing embraces in itself in undivided unity the acts of seeing here and there, near and far, distinctly and indistinctly, so does God as the coincidence of all opposites, and as the undifferentiated identity of the absolute unity, include all finite being in Himself. In so far as finite things are, they are from God ; they would not be, and could not be, if they did not participate in the divine being. Further, a cause cannot bring forth an effect which is not essentially similar to itself, and the same cause must effect the same thing in everything. Hence Nicolaus can say that God is in the sun, in the moon, and in all things, but not in so far as they are this or that determinate thing, or a particular object distinguished from other objects, but in so far merely as they are, and are all identical with one another. Again, He is not in them as the matter lying at the ground of



all things, nor yet merely as the power working in all things, but as the one being in which all participate, and as the unity which finds itself as such in spite of all plurality and heterogeneity. Hence he can say that God through all is in all, and that all is through all in God, and that all is in all and everything in everything. That is to say, there is only one being, which is God ; this being is in all things, and therefore God is in all things, and they are in God ; and hence all things are one and the same. But they participate in a different way in the one being, and therefore they are thus different.

On this position rests the fact that *the world is an organism*. It is an ordered cosmos. The world consists of many finite things which are wholly different from one another. They differ so much from one another, that there cannot be found two things or motions or such like that are completely identical with one another. Nevertheless they form a unity, since all things participate in one and the same unity, which is God as the sum of all essence ; and they are different only on account of the different degree of their participation therein. Hence results the distinction of substance and accident, and the greater or less value of substances and accidents. But in this diversity there is also harmony and order, for in a continuous series of gradations all finite things range themselves in connection with one another, from the lowest degree of imperfection up to the highest degree of perfection, so that the highest being of the lower order always coincides with the lowest being of the next higher order.

But God *does not enter immediately into finite existence*, nor do finite things immediately participate in God. As in the sphere of numbers unity unfolds itself only by means of the quaternary into numerical fulness, so likewise is it with God. God is the first and the absolute unity. The second unity is the Universe, which is the concrete unity, and only through it is God in things, and do things participate in God. God is the absolutely greatest ; He is the absolute maximum ; and therefore He is negatively infinite, that is, He alone is that which can exist in omnipotent fulness. The universe is



the concretely greatest ; it is a concrete maximum ; and therefore it is privatively infinite, that is, it is without limits, and so it is the greatest possible imitation of God. The universe came into existence by simple emanation of the concrete maximum from the absolute maximum. The universe is likewise a unity, but a concrete unity. It is the Infinite limited, the Simple compounded, the Eternal in succession ; it is necessity limited by possibility. The opposites do not precede it but arise along with it, and they are contained in it undivided and unresolved. The universe is likewise triune, but it is so only in the concrete ; that is, its unity subsists only in trinity, as the whole in its parts. It consists of what is capable of concreteness (*contrahibile*), of what makes concreteness (*contrahens*), and of the connection between them (*nexus*). The Universe, as the second unity, unfolds the first or absolute unity in the concrete form of the decade, that is, in the totality of ten highest Universalities.

Thereby the Universe passes over into the third unity, which is called the Quadrate. Here arise the genera and species which are the ideas of things or the forms of the world of Nature. How these arise through God, the pure Spirit, is illustrated by images, such as the teaching of a scholar by speech, and especially by the making of glass from a glowing mass by means of blowing. The Word of God, by which He creates all things, is the fulness and comprehension of all ideas. As independent existences they are the universals which, according to the order of nature, are before things. They have concrete reality only in things ; and, in so far as we abstract from things in the process of knowledge, they are conceptions of the understanding. The fourth unity, corresponding to the cube, is constituted by individual things. *The four Unities* are God, Reason, Soul, Body. To these four unities correspond *four Modalities of being* : (1) Things as in God in absolute necessity, (2) as in the universe as true images, (3) as in the genera and species as forming the determinate possibility of being this or that in reality, (4) as in finite things by way of pure possibility. Hence arises the

distinction of *the three Worlds*: (1) The highest World with God as its centre, (2) the middle World with reason as its centre, and (3) the lowest World with the understanding as its centre. The sphere of sense is the dense rind stretching around the third world. To it corresponds our *Faculty of Cognition*, which includes the Senses, the Understanding, the Reason, and immediate Intuition. Everything is in the first world, everything is in the second world, and everything is in the third world, but in each world in a particular way. A thing is in the first world in its Truth, in the second world in a more distant Resemblance, in the third world in a most distant shadowy Image. Hence we know everything either divinely, as it is the truth; or rationally, as it is, not the truth indeed, but true; or psychically, as it is probable; or corporeally, when instead of probability it presents confusedness.

3. *God and the World find their reciprocal mediation in the Person of Christ.* In the universe as the concrete unity there are, between the greatest and the least, always greater or less degrees of concrete being, but these are not infinitely many. Hence, in the concrete, there is no ascending to the absolutely greatest, nor descending to the absolutely least. The universe therefore does not reach the highest degree of the absolutely greatest, nor does it exhaust the infinite, absolutely greatest power of God. If we were to think of the greatest as existing concretely and really in a determinate species, it would be in reality all that lies in the whole possibility of that species; it would be really its highest possible perfection. Such a maximum in the concrete would pass beyond the whole nature of the concrete, and be its culmination; it would not be merely and purely concrete, but would be at once God and Creature, absolutely and concretely, in a concreteness which would have no existence of itself unless it rested in the absolute maximum. Such a union would imply that what is thus united in maintaining the character of concreteness, is the concrete and produced perfection of a determinate species; and at the same time, in consequence of the hypostatical union, it is God and all. Such a union would certainly

far transcend our understanding. It is not a unification of contradictories, nor a combination of two things which were formerly separated, nor a combination of parts into a whole, nor a combination of form with matter; but it is more sublime than all thinkable unions. This concrete maximum is to be thought as God, but so that it is at the same time to be regarded as a creature, and to be so regarded as a creature that it is at the same time to be viewed as the creator, being both creature and creator without intermixture or composition. Now it is manifest that that being could first unite with the absolute which has most relationship with the totality of being. This is Man, who, as the connecting member and centre of the lower and the higher nature, and as the microcosm, is the most fitted of all beings for elevation into the absolute unity of God. Man in such elevation would be the Son of God, or the Word through which everything is made; He would be the identity of being itself, without, however, ceasing to be Son of man and man. This Man would be the goal and the end of the creation, being before all things, and He through whom and for whom all things exist. And since, without this union, nothing can attain to higher perfection, it undoubtedly is established as real on rational grounds. The First-born of the creation, who existed before all time and before all things with God, *has appeared in the fulness of time in the person of Jesus.*

In Him we have the completion of all things, redemption and forgiveness of sins. God is all in unity with the greatest humanity in Jesus, without change of His essence in the identity of being. The eternal Father and the Holy Spirit are in Jesus; and everything is in Him as in the Word. The greatest humanity can neither be begotten in the natural way, nor be entirely without participation in the nature of man; and hence it is conceived from the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin. The voluntary and undeserved death of Christ on the cross as the man who alone was free from carnal desires, served as a satisfaction and purification for all the carnal desires of human nature. The perfect humanity in

Christ has accordingly made up and completed the defectiveness of all men. Christ died, yet not so that in the moment of death His soul or body was separated from the divine person; in respect of the centre on which His humanity rested, He remained hypostatically united with the Deity. And thus Christ arose in a true, glorified, unsuffering, moveable, and immortal body, in order that human nature might also rise to eternal life, and that the animal and mortal body might become a spiritual and indestructible body. So Jesus is the mediation between God and man, the centre and at the same time the completion of the whole creation.

Let us now see how, on the basis of these metaphysical conceptions, Nicolaus gave form to his *general view of Religion*. Man, as the connecting link between the purely spiritual and the sensible, is a synthesis of spirit and body, which are connected with one another by the soul. The Spirit is immediately created by God; it is a divine seed implanted in the body; it is a substance to which movement is essential; it is the living image and reflection of God; and hence it is immortal. As our corporeal nature requires material nutriment, so does our spiritual nature require spiritual nutriment. This spiritual nutriment is Truth, which the spirit lays hold of with eagerness. Wisdom is the immortal food which immortally nourishes the spirit. This wisdom shines forth from various relations, and the spirit seeks it chiefly in the knowledge of God. The knowledge of the truth is a relishable spirit-refreshing mode of knowing; it is realized in tasting the divine love; and it is the life and the nourishment of the spirit. The rational motion within us would know the ground of its life, and it finds immortal nourishment in this knowledge by nourishing itself from the supreme source of its being. This occupation of the mind with the spiritual and eternal, this investigation of truth, is the inner essence of religion; and so Cusa identifies those who are contemplative with those who are religious.

Elsewhere, Religion is referred to the human striving after happiness. Every religion, he says, aims at happiness. "In

this there is no deception, because this hope by an inborn desire is common to all ; and consequently religion, which is the fruit of this hope, is in like manner innate in all." The two points of view, however, coincide. The desire of wisdom is the same as the desire of happiness ; for knowledge is happiness, and it is so because it is union with God. God is Reason, as the knowing Reason, the knowable Reason, and the combination of the two ; and hence the created reason can attain in the knowable God to union with Him and so to happiness. In like manner, the created loving Will can realize a union with the God of love, and so realize happiness. It is only because God is lovable and spiritually apprehensible that man can become united with Him. This union, from its inwardness and stedfastness, obtains the name of filiation or sonship. This sonship is the highest happiness and perfection. *The essence of Religion is therefore the knowledge of God and the happiness arising from that knowledge* in union with Him. This contains what is common to all Religions, and at the same time the diversity of their knowledge forms the ground of their diversity as religions.

*The essential agreement of all the Religions* rests on the fact that most of the founders of these religions sought to express the eternal Word in their religious systems ; and thus the several religious systems are so many expressions (*quædam locutiones*) of the Word of God or the eternal Reason. This is the fundamental thought of the remarkable work entitled *De pace sive concordantia fidei dialogus*. Grieved by the horrors which had been practised from religious zeal on the taking of Constantinople, a devout man sees himself raised in the spirit to the heavenly Council, where the departed souls, under the presidency of the Almighty, resolve upon a union of their religions in order that a permanent religious peace may prevail, and this is grounded on the agreement found among them in spite of all their differences. The highest of the Angels, in an address to God, expresses himself as follows : " All that the creature possesses has been given to it by God ; its body formed with so much art as well as the rational



spirit which can rise in knowledge to God and become united with Him in love. A great multitude, however, cannot exist without producing diversity. Besides, only a few have the leisure required for seeking after God by independent inquiry. Hence God sent, at sundry times, various prophets and kings, who instructed the ignorant people and instituted religions. The people honoured their laws as if God Himself had given them; and as they are wont to hold fast by a custom when it has become a second nature, as if it were the truth, there arose disunion between the various religious communities." "It is on account of Thee, whom they alone worship in what they all adore, that this rivalry consists. Each strives, in what he seems to strive after, only to realize the good which is in Thee. Thou, who art the Dispenser of being and life, art therefore He who is sought in the different religions in different ways and designated with different names, because Thy true being is to all unknown and unutterable." It is because there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite that the creature is not capable of knowing God, and only a revelation can bring him to see "that in the diversity of the religious practices there is only One Religion." "If this diversity of practice cannot be done away with, or if it be not advantageous to do so, in as far as the diversity effects a heightening of the honour of God owing to the zeal manifested by the several countries, yet as Thou art One, so may there exist one religion and one worship."

An intelligent representative of every nation is raised to heaven to take part in the Dialogue, and its aim is to reduce all religious differences, in consequence of a universal agreement, to one religion. This aim is more precisely determined as the *reduction of the diversity of the Religions to the one orthodox Faith*. The Word opens the discussion. The dialogue proceeds with a Greek and an Italian; and the one of them says that everything is created in wisdom, and the other that everything is created in the Word. It is then pointed out that they say the same thing; for the Word of the Creator by which He created all things, can only be His



wisdom. To the Arabian interlocutor it is shown that even polytheists and monotheists are fundamentally at one, since even the former assert one deity in which their many gods only participate. The Indian learns that images and statues of gods are in place as illustrative representations of God, but not as objects of worship. The Chaldean, the Jew, the Scythian, and the Gaul accept the Trinity in the form of unity, equality, and connection, as a designation of the creative fertility. Peter then explains the Christological doctrines in dialogue with a Persian, a Syrian, a Spaniard, a Turk, and a German. That the Word has become flesh, that human nature is thus indissolubly attached to the divine nature, and subsists in it alone without either of them being changed, is not incompatible with the unity or the immutability of God. The striving after happiness is common to all religions; and this happiness is constituted by the union of human life with its source, which is the divine immortal life. This striving presupposes that the common human nature has been raised in one person to this union with God, in order that this person may become the medium to all men of the ultimate goal of their longing. The universal belief that some saints at least have reached eternal happiness everywhere, presupposes these positions even among those who deny Christ's death, resurrection, and ascension. While the Jews hope for earthly goods, the Mohammedans for sensuous enjoyments, and the Christians for spiritual bliss, they all agree in wishing a happiness which goes beyond everything that can be described or expressed, because it consists in the fulfilment of every longing, in the enjoyment of the good at its source, and in the attainment of the immortal life.—The more external questions of religious worship and of the Christian life are explained in a discussion between the Tartar, the Armenian, the Bohemian, the Englishman, and Paul. Paul mainly sets up the principle that it is not works but only faith that justifies, and yet that faith without works is dead; he then seeks to establish the Roman conception of the sacraments, and finally counsels his hearers not to let the

unity of the faith be disturbed by the diversity of worship and of ceremonies.—On this basis the union of the religions is concluded in the heaven of reason, and the commission is given to the wise to guide their nations towards the unity of the true worship.

Another work of his, entitled *De Cribratione Alchoran*, breathes the same spirit throughout. Its tendency is “to establish the truth of Christianity even out of the Koran.” By a reference to the most important doctrines of the Christian faith, it is shown that what is true in Islam springs from Christianity, with which it was historically connected through the medium of Nestorianism. To Islam is assigned the task of preparing the Oriental polytheism for Christianity by means of its monotheism, and thus to guide the Oriental peoples to Christ.—In like manner, the essential identity of Judaism and heathenism is asserted. All believe in the one supreme God, and worship Him; but the Jews and Sissennians worship Him in His simplest unity as the source of all things; whereas others, like the heathen, worship Him wherever they perceive the unfolding of His deity, assigning to God various names according to His various relations to the creatures.

But as in the finite world generally *unity passes into plurality, so is it likewise in Religion*. Religion rests upon the knowledge of God, and it is realized in *four stages*. As an object seen in the far distance appears at first merely a thing, and coming nearer it appears as a living being, and then nearer still as a man, and lastly, in close proximity, is recognised as a particular person, so did the truth appear at first in the distance as a form of confused existence in Nature; then it appeared in the Law; and thereafter it appeared in the Son of God. The fourth stage at which we will see and know the truth without mediation, as it is, has yet to come. To these appearances of truth there correspond *as many stages of Religion*; and they all rest upon the working of the Word of God, but upon different modes of its working.

1. *The Religion of Nature* rests upon the knowledge of

God which we can attain by our natural powers. All men fall into the three classes of religious, servile, or ruling men, according as they devote themselves to the investigation of the truth or give themselves up to what is sensuous, or stand between these two. The religious class, again, falls into three distinct divisions. "Some apprehend religion in a lofty and noble way as above all understanding and sense; others draw it into the sphere of the understanding; others, again, bring it down to the sphere of the senses. Accordingly, among all men religion is found in peculiar forms; and hence those who are spiritually freer find the goal of immortality, which religion promises to all men, in the life which in its purity and sublimity transcends everything that the understanding and the sense can grasp. Others draw happiness into the sphere of the understanding, and find their goal in the knowledge and enjoyment of things. Finally, others in the most irrational way seek their happiness in sensuous delights. Thus the unity of the religion of reason is only found in a diverse otherness, and thus does the religious life fluctuate between the spiritual and the temporal." The distinctions of Natural Religion are still further explained. In the northern regions of the earth the spirit is more in a potential condition, and is sunk in sense; the more we advance towards the equator, so much the more freely does the spirit come forth. Hence in India and Egypt we find Religion in a state of pure spirituality; among the Greeks and Romans we find the understanding specially developed; and in the North we find more empirical and mechanical dexterities. In addition to these defects of Natural Religion, the fact has also to be taken into account that the ignorant crowd blindly follow certain teachers, or fall into idolatrous worship by taking the unfolding of the Deity into many forms, not as an image but as the truth.

The Word of God that is inscribed in Nature corresponds to the sense of man, and *cannot make him blessed*. To show this is the object of the *Docta Ignorantia*, and its chief value lies in the proof thereof. All knowing is

described as a comparing by means of a proportion; it is a seeking out of the unknown from its relation to what is already known. Hence a cognition of God is impossible, for there exists no relation between the infinite and the finite. Further cognition continually moves in contradictories, whereas the absolute is the coincidence of all contradictories. In like manner, it is impossible to cognize the finite, partly because nothing can be cognized without its cause, and God is incognizable; and partly because in the finite world no two things coincide with one another, and therefore an exact proportion is nowhere found. To this it has to be added, that in consequence of our descent from Adam, the animal nature in us has so greatly gained the predominance over the spiritual, that we are entirely incapable of reaching beyond the temporal to the eternal. God can therefore be known only by that way which appears to all men, and even to the most learned philosophers, to be wholly inaccessible and impossible. This is only to be attained if we go beyond the highest height of reason to that which is unknown to every reason. The knowledge of God we attain only through Christ. The philosophy of the *Docta Ignorantia*, therefore, refers us to Him. At the same time, however, it shows that God is in truth the goal and end of all our longing. God is such indeed, only in so far as He is infinite and unknowable; for if God did not remain infinite, He would not continue to be the goal of our longing. Thus *Docta Ignorantia* is negatively and positively the way to the acceptance of the perfect knowledge and religion in Christ.

2. This acceptance is prepared for by the Law and the Prophets. The Old Testament contains the same truth as is in Nature and Christ. And hence Nicolaus agrees with Moses, not because he is a Christian and bound to the Law, but because reason forbids us to think otherwise. The truth, however, is in the Old Testament in a peculiar form; it is there in the form of the letter or of the Law which works fear, and thus it corresponds to the understanding. Nor can the Law bring blessedness, for works

cannot justify, because we must justify ourselves by these works.

3. It is therefore only the *Way of Grace*, or the *third* Stage of Religion, which is *Christianity*, that leads to salvation. It corresponds to Reason; and as the senses ought to serve the understanding and the understanding the reason, so should Nature serve the Law and the Law serve Grace. It has already been shown that we have in Christ the perfect knowledge of the absolute God, and why we have such knowledge. The knowledge that is mediated by the revelation in Christ likewise passes through several stages. For all the spheres of knowledge, the principle holds that faith is the beginning of knowing. Certain propositions are everywhere presupposed as axioms which are only apprehended by faith, and out of which the knowledge of the object to be investigated is then developed. Knowledge receives its direction through faith; faith receives its development through knowledge. This holds also of the truth itself, that is, of Christ. By faith in Christ the greatest and deepest mysteries of God become manifest to the childlike and humble heart, because in Him are hid all the treasures of wisdom. The belief in the incarnation of a Word of God forms the beginning. As this sweet faith in Christ expands and unfolds itself, in a gradual process of ascent, it leads us into the truth itself, by which we become the children of God. The starting-point is formed by hearing, which is in a manner a sensuous kind of knowledge; and it may be compared to the knowledge of Christ according to the flesh of which Paul speaks. When we gradually attain to some of the ineradicable traces of His footsteps by hearing the voice of God Himself in His holy organs, we then come to know God more distinctly by manifold principles of the understanding. The believers ascend yet higher to simple rational intuition, by advancing as from sleep to waking, or from hearing to seeing, when they see what cannot be revealed because no ear is able to catch it, nor any voice to convey it. This is the reason why there are so many

errors and irrational conceptions of God. It is because many cannot rise to the highest stage, but stop short upon the lower stages.

The activity of faith consists in the inward union of the believer with Christ. This union is inconceivable and indescribable, but it has its ground and its possibility in the fact that Christ is the most perfect humanity, and therefore all men are in Him and He is in all men. Faith makes the individual like to Christ. He withdraws Himself from the defilement of the flesh, walks with fear in the way of God, and is all spirit. He rises above all that is visible; He has even power over nature, and commands the evil spirits. Perfect faith is vitalized by love. As every living being loves life and every thinker loves thought, so we cannot have faith in Jesus as the immortal life and as the infinite truth without loving Him in the highest. It is love that becomes the animating principle of faith, and bestows upon it real being. A great faith is not even possible without the hope of yet enjoying Jesus Himself. Whosoever does not believe that he will attain the promised eternal life, cannot possibly face death for Christ's sake.

As the diverse finite things, notwithstanding their plurality, are comprehended in the concrete unity of the universe, so Christians, however diverse they may be in faith, have their concrete unity in the Church. The Church is the mystical body of Christ, and it is the medium of the union of the individual with Christ through the Word and the Sacraments.

4. Even the most perfect Christian cherishes hope, as a longing and yet trustful outlook towards a still more perfect state, and thus *Christianity points to a fourth stage of knowledge and religion*. This stage begins when, in complete union with God, we know Him without mediation entirely as He is, wholly enjoy Him without limit, and find in this enjoyment a happiness which will still all our longings for ever. This stage of completion will only be realized in the world beyond the present. It far transcends our common understanding and comprehension as well as all speech and description.



The Bishop of Brixen lived in friendly relations and frequent scientific communication with the Benedictines in the monastery of Tegernsee, and their Prior, Bernhard. Many a message passed hither and thither over the great Brenner highway that lay between them. At one time rare books were sent for from the library of the Bishop, which the monks studied and copied. At another time there passed a friendly letter from the Bishop full of affection, or one was received from the monks bearing their expressions of reverence, and deferential requests for instruction. And, again, the Bishop would transmit the works he had composed, that they might first be submitted to his sympathetic friends; or Bernhard sent those he had written, composed for the elucidation and vindication of the *Docta Ignorantia*. Along with many friendly supporters, the doctrine of Nicolaus also found opponents in Germany, such as Vench in Heidelberg, Gregory of Heimberg, and others. Among his adherents were reckoned some whose names are still known, such as Faber Stapulensis (Jacques Le Fèvre d' Etaples, 1450-1537), Professor of philosophy at Paris, one of the most zealous precursors of the Reformation in France, and Carolus Bovillus (Charles Bouillé, 1470-1553). In Italy, during the lifetime of Nicolaus, his philosophy already found numerous friends and followers.

## II.

### TELESIIUS AND CARDANUS.

Bernardinus Telesius (1508-1588) begins a new movement in philosophy.<sup>1</sup> His method first drew nature into the circle of philosophical speculation, with full consciousness of what was new in this sphere. However imperfect the beginnings of this Natural Philosophy might be, and how-

<sup>1</sup> The principal work of Telesius is his *De rerum natura juxta propria principia*, L. ix., Naples 1586. The accompanying and often very violent polemic against the Physics of Aristotle and the later Peripatetics, which goes through the whole work, fills up the greater part of it.

ever much it was impeded by too close an attachment to ancient philosophers as well as by the want of exact observation, the principle of it at least became clear, and thereby the human mind broke with the past, both in its general attitude and tendency. In the Prooemium of his principal work Telesius expresses himself generally as follows.—The reason why former inquirers have achieved so little is specially due to the fact that they trusted themselves too much, and did not consider things and their powers sufficiently. Entering into a sort of rivalry with God for wisdom, they ventured to investigate the principles and grounds of the world by reason, and assuming that they had found what was really not found, they fashioned a universe for themselves after their own mere opinion. We, on the contrary, he says, have undertaken to consider the world itself and its parts, in their passiveness, their activity, and their working. For these will reveal the essential nature of every separate thing.

In the execution of his work, Telesius certainly is far from actually carrying out this programme. Following the view of Parmenides, he reduces the Universe to three principles: two of them being incorporeal and active, namely, Heat and Cold, and one corporeal and passive, which is Matter. Matter is in itself entirely inactive, inert, and wholly passive, but it can be permeated and formatively modified by Heat and Cold in equal degrees, being expanded by the former and condensed by the latter. Heat and Cold everywhere seek to diffuse themselves, and reciprocally to overcome each other; but as in this they never entirely succeed, they are limited to a determinate place with the Matter that is necessary for their subsistence. The sun is the bearer of heat, the earth is the bearer of cold. From these, as their inexhaustible sources, heat and cold diffuse themselves throughout the universe, and the diversity of things rests upon the diverse ways in which heat and cold are mixed. The principal effect of heat is motion. Those beings that move themselves appear to be animated, and hence the soul, in its ultimate relation, is to be referred to heat. Sensation belongs even to inanimate

beings, because they are mixed of heat and cold. The soul of plants and animals grows from their seed; man, on the other hand, has in addition to this vital corporeal spirit, called the *spiritus nervosus*, a soul immediately created and infused into him by God; and this soul is incorporeal and immortal. Perception and sensation rest upon the expansion and contraction of the vital spirit which dwells in the nerves and in the brain, and is accessible to the influence of air and light. The passions are related to the highest good, which is the self-preservation of the spirit. Whatever subserves this highest good is good, and whatever is contrary to it is bad. On the basis of this principle Telesius gives a somewhat detailed sketch of Ethics. The naturalism of the system, however, is considerably attenuated by the position being expressly emphasized that this whole creation is not the effect of a reasonless contingent cause, but is the work of the will and the wisdom of God who has thus arranged all things.

Those indications of the system may suffice here. The Natural Philosophy of Telesius did not remain without influence. His admirers and patrons induced him to give up his quiet country life at Cosenza and to teach philosophy in Naples. Here there gathered around him a circle of followers some of whom were greatly celebrated, and they formed the Cosentinian Academy, which contributed much to the furtherance of the study of natural science, and to the overthrow of Aristotelianism. The writings of Telesius were put upon the Index Expurgatorius, but with the addition *donec expurgentur*. Among his opponents we may mention Antonius Marta and Andreas Chioccius, and among his scholars, Franciscus Patritius and Thomas Campanella.

Hieronymus Cardanus (1501-1576) deserves to be named along with Telesius as one of the principal founders of Natural Philosophy.<sup>1</sup> He was a man of an extremely restless spirit,

<sup>1</sup> The collected works of Cardan were published by C. Spon at Lyons in 1663, in 10 vols. folio. Reference is made here only to the contents of his two principal writings, *De Subtilitate*, l. xxi. (Lugd. 1552), and his *De Varietate rerum*, 1556.

and of a character that was without stay or steadfastness, thrown hither and thither from one position in life to another, and immoderately addicted to carnal pleasure. In spite of his high endowments and indefatigable industry, Cardan rather led his followers astray in science, like an *ignis fatuus*, than shone as a steadfast light. We may here pass over his astrological dreams, and the principles of his Chiromancy and Alchemy, which were expounded with all earnestness, and in all which Cardan was truly a son of his age. According to Cardan, there lie three principles at the basis of all finite things: Matter, Form, and Soul. Matter is everywhere, but it is nowhere without Form, which first bestows upon it determinate and proper being. Matter and Form are connected by the moving and arranging activity of the Soul. There are three elements: Air, Water, and Earth. The soul, or rather the heavenly heat, with light as its reflection, permeates and connects all things. Hence the universe is a living organism in which every one thing is related to and acts on every other. This vital heat in the universe is in uninterrupted activity; and all origination and destruction of things is in truth nothing else than a changing formation of matter, through the one form-giving heavenly heat.

God is the one eternal Being that has no participation in not-being. He contains all things in Himself, and rules immeasurably and infinitely over everything as the highest power. As the One, God is also the Good. He is the Subject that knows the Object that is known, and the Love which combines these two with each other. As power, knowledge, and love, the one supreme God is, at the same time, a triad. Man, on whose account all finite things were created, stands in the middle between what is heavenly and what is earthly. On this fact it rests that the position of the stars shows his character and his fates. The artistic formation and the ravishing beauty of the body are already wonderful. But what especially distinguishes man is his spirit. It is not corporeal, but is an inner light that illuminates itself; it is simple,

elevated above what is perishable, and immortal. This immortality is conceived as a transmigration of souls, and according as their striving is good, spirits enter into higher or lower forms of life. The essential nature of the spirit consists of thinking. As God is the highest Being and the giver of all good, the knowledge of God is the highest goal, and the true blessedness of life. All cognition rests upon the fact that we become one with the object, and hence the knowledge of God leads also to our becoming one with Him. To know one's self and God in one's self, is the highest happiness and the true wisdom. In this knowledge the human spirit is wedded to the divine; and if we worship God in purity of spirit, we will become purified from all guilt and sin, will be united with Him in eternal rest and joy, and will form a ray of His own light.

### III.

GIORDANO BRUNO<sup>1</sup> (c. 1555–1600).

The Metaphysics of Giordano Bruno rest essentially upon the thoughts of Nicolaus of Cusa. In his Physics he takes into account those of Telesius. His own independence as a thinker comes out especially in his view of the unity of

<sup>1</sup> Bruno was born soon after the middle of the sixteenth Century, at Nola in the kingdom of Naples. While a Dominican he became equally familiar with the philosophers and the poets of antiquity, but owing to the repeated collision of his views with the rules of the Dominican Order, he was forced to leave his country in 1580. Thereafter he led an unsettled life in Switzerland, France, England, and Germany, but everywhere showed himself an enthusiastic teacher of his philosophy. With the certainty of death before him, he returned to his country, was seized at Venice in 1592, and after being confined eight years in prison, he was burned at Rome on the 17th February 1600 as a heretic and apostate. Of a poetic nature and full of lofty enthusiasm, he wrote many works in high soaring verse. Bruno has also shown himself to be an acute observer and a witty but caustic delineator of the weak points of others, in his Comedies and Satires. A large number of his writings are of a mnemotechnic nature, being continuations and improved forms of the Lullian art. For our subject the following writings have to be considered :—"Dialoghi de la Causa, principio et uno," Venet. 1584; "Del' infinito Universo, et de' i mondi," Venet. 1584; "De triplici Minimo et Mensura, etc." 1591; "De Monade, numero et figura, etc." 1591; "De Immenso, etc." 1591.—Carrière's account of Bruno may be specially referred to.

the universe regarded as an all-permeating world-soul. Matter he regards as embraced with Form into a unity in God, who is the self-knowing spirit. Individual things are conceived as individually different monads. The whole of his philosophy is attractive, not only from showing the pure enthusiasm of an elevated surrender of self to the All-One, but from its being full of fruitful thoughts, although many of them are still obscure, and some of them were not clearly developed till a later age.

Bruno determines the relation of philosophy to theology in the usual manner of his time. The dogmas of the Church are recognised as incontrovertible truth, and then they are set aside without further consideration as a sort of *Noli me tangere*. Philosophical investigation is prosecuted with entire freedom from prejudice, as if this were the one way to truth. In many cases this recognition of the ecclesiastical dogma, which is sometimes expressed with great emphasis, may have been only an act of precaution; but it was not so in the case of Bruno, a man who owed the whole uncertainty of his life only to this incautious zeal for the truth, a zeal which afterwards brought him to the stake. According to his view, revelation and natural knowledge cannot contradict each other, for both refer to God as their one common ground. Where a contradiction appears, as in relation to the Copernican theory of the system of the world, Bruno points out that Scripture gives revelations only in reference to morals and the doctrine of salvation, and not in regard to physics, in reference to which it accommodates itself to the ideas of the time. A distinction between revelation and natural knowledge is founded on the fact that God lies far above what is attainable by our rational thinking, the true knowledge of His nature being only attainable by revelation. Entirely in the spirit of Cusa, Bruno also expounds a connected doctrine of God by the way of the negative philosophy, and its result may be thus briefly indicated: God is infinite, and as such He is elevated far above our finite faculty of knowledge. We cannot know God from effects, partly because these are very far removed from Him,



proceeding, as they do, not from His substance, but as it were from His accidents, and partly because we are not able entirely to comprehend even effects. As regards morals and theology it suffices to know God in so far as He reveals Himself, and it is the sign of an unconsecrated spirit and of boundless presumption, to enter upon investigations regarding things which go beyond our reason.

At the same time, however, to strive after the knowledge of God, in so far as Nature itself gives traces of Him or reflects Him, deserves the highest praise. *The conceptions of Cause and Principle subserve this striving.* Whatever is not itself an ultimate Principle and an ultimate Cause, has a principle and a cause. In the sphere of Nature we call the internal ground of a thing a principle, as that which contributes essentially to its production and continues in the product; and we call the external ground of a thing a cause, as that which externally contributes to the production of the thing, but remains outside of the product. We call God the ultimate Principle and ultimate Cause of all things. We accordingly thus designate One Being, viewed, however, in different relations, regarding Him as a principle, in so far as all things yield to Him in nature and dignity according to a determinate series, and regarding Him as a Cause in so far as all things are different from Him, as the effect is different from the effector.

A Cause is either *efficient*, or *formal*, or *final*. The physical universal efficient Cause is the universal Reason; it is the supreme and chief faculty of the World-Soul. The universal Reason is the inmost faculty, and a potential part of the world-soul; it is an identity which fills the whole of things, illuminates the universe, and instructs Nature how to produce her kinds. It brings forth natural things as our reason brings forth conceptions. It is the internal artist that forms matter and shapes it from within. From the seed it develops the stem; from the stem it shoots forth the branches; from the branches it fashions the twigs; and so on. There is therefore a threefold Reason: the divine Reason which is all, the World-soul which makes all, and the Reason of individual things

which becomes all. This World-soul is both internal and external cause; it is an internal cause, as it does not shape matter from without but by inherent energy, and it is an external cause in so far as it has a being entirely distinct from the substance and essentiality of what is produced.

The formal Cause cannot be separated from the End or Final Cause. For whatever is active according to rational laws, works in accordance with an idea of the thing, and this is nothing else than the form of the thing itself that is to be produced. The World-soul must therefore involve all things in itself according to a certain formal conception, as the sculptor has in him the idea of the statue. Hence there are two species of forms, one according to which the efficient cause works, and one which the efficient cause produces in matter. The end which the working cause sets before itself is the perfection of the universe, which consists in this, that all forms receive actual existence in the different parts of matter. And as the efficient or working Cause is universally present in the universe, while it is particularly and specially present in its parts and members, so is it also with its Form and its End. Thus does the world-soul appear as Cause and Principle at once. That it can be both is explained by the example of the helmsman in the ship, and of the soul in the body. In so far as the helmsman is moved at the same time with the ship, he is a part of it; in so far as he steers it, he is an independently active being. In like manner the soul is on the one side wholly in the body, and on another side it is a something separate from the body. So it is with the world-soul; in so far as it animates and shapes, it is the indwelling and formal part of the principle of the world; in so far as it guides and rules, it is the cause of the world. Hence we may think of the world and its members according to the analogy of the lower animals. All finite things are animate; and this holds true not merely of the world as a whole, but of all its parts, and again of their parts. If, then, there is soul found in all things, the soul is manifestly the true reality and the true form of all things. There is one and the same world-soul in all things, but in

proportion to the different receptivity of matter, it brings forth different formations or stages of soul. It is only these formations, which are in a way external forms, that change; whereas the Form itself, or the spiritual substance, is as imperishable as matter is.

“Never doth perish the soul, but rather its earlier dwelling  
Is changed for its new abode, in which it liveth and worketh.  
Everything changes, but nothing perishes ever at all.”

This form is not to be conceived as a mere external qualification of matter, but we must accept two modes of being as Form and Matter. For there must be an ultimate substantial efficient principle in which the active capacity of all things exists; and there must likewise be a substratum in which the passive capacity of all things exists. Form separated from matter is one; it is unchangeable in itself, and it is through its connection with matter that it first passes into plurality and difference. It is the active and determining principle. The passive principle, or matter, is in its essence that which is determined, and it has a capacity for receiving all possible forms into itself.

There is therefore one Reason which gives everything its essence; one soul which forms all things, and fashions them into shape; and one matter out of which everything is made and formed. Matter may be regarded in a twofold way, as *power* and as *substratum*. As power we find it again in a certain way in all things. Bruno, however, takes power in a still higher and more comprehensive sense. Power is regarded either as active in so far as it is efficient, or as passive in so far as it is receptive, and serves as a basis for an operating agent. This passive power or capacity must be predicated of everything to which we attribute being; and the passive capacity completely corresponds to the active power. If, therefore, the power to make, to produce, or to create has always been, so likewise the power to be made, produced, or created has always been; for the one includes the other, and necessarily presupposes it. Hence the passive power belongs in the same measure as the active to the supreme supernatural prin-

ciple. The ultimate principle is all that can be, and it would not be all if it had not power to be all. Reality and power to be, are here one and the same. It is not so, however, with finite things. No one of these is all that it can be; any one of them might as well not be, or as well be something else than it is. It is not so with the universe. It is, indeed, all that it can be, in so far as its species continue the same, and it constitutes the whole of matter. But there remain in it distinctions, determinations, specific differences, and individuals; nor is any one of its parts really what it could be. Hence the universe is only a shadow of the primal reality and of the primal power. Further, the universe is all that it can be, only in an explicated, dispersed, differentiated mode, whereas the highest principle is all that it can be in a single and undifferentiated mode. Death, evil, errors, and defects are not realities and powers, but are deficiencies and impotences; they are in the explicated things, because these are not all that they might be. The first absolute principle is therefore in itself sublimity and greatness, and it is so to such an extent that it is all that it can be. It is the greatest of all and the least of all; it is infinite, indivisible greatness; it is not the greatest, only because it is likewise the least, and it is not the least, only because it is likewise the greatest. The absolute power is what can be everything; it is the power of all powers, the reality of all realities, the life of all lives, the soul of all souls, the substance of all substances. What is otherwise contradictory and opposite, is in this absolute power one and the same; and everything in It is one and the same.<sup>1</sup> This absolute reality, which is identical with absolute possibility, can be conceived by the understanding only by negations; but the Scripture reveals it when it says, "as is His darkness so also is His light" (Ps. cxxxix. 12). Hence the whole universe as regards its substance is one; and if we, in descending to finite things, come upon a twofold substance in the

<sup>1</sup> That Bruno calls this principle "Matter," and "Matter" in this sense "God," must be carefully noted in considering the question as to his Materialism. Bruno knows nothing of "Matter" in the usual meaning of the term.

spiritual and the corporeal, we must, however, refer them both to one essence and one root.

Regarded as a *substratum*, matter is not the mere *prope nihil* of many philosophers, pure naked capacity without reality and without power or energy, as they represent it, but it is like a pregnant female about to discharge and liberate her fruit. It is not to be designated as that in which everything comes to be, but as that out of which every natural species arises.

Unity is thus attained. Being, the One, the Good, the True, are all the same. God is the Being in all that has being, the universal substance by which all things exist, the essentiality of all essences, the internal creative nature of all things. This One does not perish, because all existence is the existence of Itself; it neither decreases nor increases; it is not subject to change; it is neither matter nor form, because it is One and All. The conception of the Infinite resolves all individualities and differences, and all number and quantity, into unity. We are not farther from or nearer to this identity as man than we would be as an ant or as a star. The Infinite is all in all, but not wholly nor in all its modes in any one individual. As the soul is indivisible and is only one essence, yet is all of it present in every part of the body; so, in like manner, the essence of the universe is one in the infinite, and yet is actually present in every individual thing. And now we comprehend the principle of contradictories which Bruno, under reference to Cusa, also seeks to establish by his own arguments. The highest good and the highest perfection rest upon the unity which comprehends all things. The more we know this One, so much more do we know All. "Praised be the gods, praised by all that lives be the Infinite, Simplest, Singlet, Sublimest, and Absolutest, as Cause, Principle, and One."

The All as the unfolding of the Infinitely-One, is likewise infinite. God alone is absolutely infinite, because He excludes every limit from Himself, and each of His attributes is one and indivisible, and because He is all in all the world, and in

each of its parts. The universe, whose parts are finite, is infinite only in so far as it is not limited in space. The development of the One is at the same time differentiation. Of finite things there are not two which are completely like each other ; but because they arise from the One, different things are connected into order and harmony. All that is, is one ; the least is one as an atom or monad ; the greatest is one as comprehending all, or as the monad of monads. The monads have their being from the highest Being or God ; and it holds of the least as well as of the greatest that it is an indivisible one, incapable of increase or diminution ; it is a union of all contradictories. The same infinite essentiality of being enters into every individual, only it is in every one in a different way. In boundless space, the primal fact is the opposition of heat and cold. Heat appears in fire, cold in water ; the former has its seat in the sun, the latter has its seat in the earth. Life proceeds from their mutual permeation.—The earth, like the other planets, rolls in infinite space around the sun, and the sun too sweeps along among the universal cycling movements of the stars.

Man stands in the middle between the Divine and the Earthly. The soul is the formative monad in the body ; around it, as the active centre, all the atoms encamp. In this lies the guarantee of our immortality, which is conceived as a migration of souls into higher or lower forms of existence, according as we have lived well or ill.—Everything strives after the goal of its own nature. Man consists of soul and body, and has therefore the double goal of spiritual and corporeal perfection. The spirit is elevated above the body, and therefore the goal of the spirit is the highest ; it is union with God through knowledge of Him. God as spirit forms Ideas ; the Ideas effectuate things, and our conceptions, obtained from the contemplation of things, are shadows of the Ideas. Knowledge passes through four stages. Starting from Sense-perception, it passes through the Phantasy, and again through the Understanding, till it becomes the knowledge of Reason. Reason rises to unity and recognises one



subject as the root and vital principle of all things. Finally, the intuitive mind attains to the All by one Intuition. We have to raise ourselves to this truth in order to become united with God. God is likewise the good; evil does not pertain to Him, but has its principle in the finite. In the moral life, we therefore also find union with God. Love is inseparably connected with knowledge and action; it lays hold of the will and draws it on towards the divine beauty. By love we are also raised with our thinking and being to God, and are transformed into Him in whom our nature reaches the ground of its existence. Thus does the finite return to the infinite as to its true being, the being from which it starts and into which it is raised again.—On two points Bruno does not give us sufficient explanation. One is that theology has first to bring us the true knowledge of the divine Being, and yet philosophy is made to show us the way to it. The other is that the world-soul as a second unity, is expressly distinguished from God as the first unity; but it is not said how the former proceeds from the latter, and many expressions leave us doubtful as to whether they are meant to be applied to God or the world-soul.

The Church with her strong arm seems to have checked the contemporary influence of the thoughts of Giordano Bruno, but their influence afterwards upon Spinoza, Leibniz, Schelling, and others is obvious in the affinity of their systems to his ideas.

#### THOMAS CAMPANELLA (1568-1639).

Campanella,<sup>1</sup> like Bruno, attaches his doctrines to the Metaphysics of Nicolaus of Cusa and to the Physics of

<sup>1</sup> Campanella was born at Stilo in Calabria. Having early reached maturity, he became a preacher in his sixteenth year. Trained in the philosophy of his age, Campanella became subject to doubt, and was led to give up authority and examine the original and living Nature herself, and in this he specially took Telesius as his guide. In his twenty-second year he already began to write out his views in

Telesius, but in an entirely independent way. Wholly in the spirit of modern speculation, he begins by doubting the trustworthiness of our knowledge, as narrowly limited and as obscured by the medium of the senses. Hence he starts with a penetrating investigation of the faculty of cognition. The soul is corporeal; it is the warm, mobile, nervous spirit. Things work upon this spirit, thereby assimilating it to themselves. The change thus produced remains in the spirit like a scar. The active operation of perception relates to this capacity of being affected, and it forms ideas corresponding to those ideas which lie at the foundation of things as their cause. Further, the principles of knowledge are innate in us.

All finite things are compounds of being and not-being, and more particularly of finite being and infinite not-being. Thus man is man inasmuch as humanness belongs to him, and all other being is regarded as not belonging to him. This not-being viewed absolutely is, however, not real or actual being; but in this way there is only the Being or God. God is absolute. He is the One, the Simple, the Infinite. He is the unity of all being; from His unity no individual determinate being is excluded, and to it no not-being is attributable. To being there belongs three Primalities (primalitates) or primal essentialities: Activity, for everything is because it has power or capacity to be; Wisdom, for everything knows about its being and its preservation; and Love, for everything strives to preserve itself. Power, Wisdom, Love thus form in God a triad in the unity of being. The Not-being consists of the corresponding three principles of powerlessness, ignorance, and hate. As all finite things have their being from God, they participate in these three *Primalitates*; but as they are limited at the same time by not-being, these

retirement at Balbia. From 1599 to 1626 he pined in a prison under an accusation of treason, but was liberated by the intervention of Pope Urban VII. and brought to his Court. From fear of the Spaniards he fled to France, and died in exile at Paris held in high honour. Of his numerous works we have specially to note the following:—*Prodromus Philosophiæ instaurandæ*, 1617; *De sensu rerum et Magia*, 1620; *Realis Philosophiæ epilogisticæ* p. iv. 1623; *Atheismus triumphatus*, 1631; *De Prædestinatione*, etc. 1636; *Universalis Philosophiæ*, L. xviii. 1638. A complete exposition of his doctrines is still awaiting.

primal essentialities are present in them only in a finite way. Power is directed to existence; wisdom to truth. Cognition rests upon the fact that the soul receives its objects into itself, and as it were becomes the objects themselves. All cognition is self-knowledge, and therefore God knows everything, because all existence is contained in His being. Love is directed to the good, which consists primarily in self-preservation; and hence the striving to escape death by the immortality of one's name and the propagation of the species. The true being and life, however, is God; and hence the true and final satisfaction of love, is participation in the Deity. Because all being comes from God, there is actually neither death nor evil. Death is only a transformation of the form of existence; evil is only a defect, because the limit of not being continually makes its appearance as soon as plurality proceeds out of unity. Evils therefore do not exist as such in relation to the whole, but they have existence only in relation to the parts.

The ideas of all things are in God, and by these Ideas all things participate in God. His beholding of these Ideas is also the production of things. God is the Subject that knows, the object that is known, and the act of knowing at once in one. He is in like manner the subject that loves, the object that is loved, and the love, at the same time, in one. From the three "Primalitates" there proceed as many effects in finite things. These effects are Necessity, Fate, and Harmony, to which, as effects of the not-being, there correspond Contingency, Perchance, and Disharmony. In order to form the world, God first created space as an embracing receptacle, put into it the inert, invisible, corporeal mass that is called matter, and superadded to their formation two incorporeal powers as active principles, namely, heat and cold. Heat and cold have their seat respectively in the sun and in the earth; and in conflict with each other, and by varying intermixture, they produce out of matter all finite things. This is only possible if sense and sensation belong to all things. Like individual things, the world as a whole is also animated.

On the basis of these views, Campanella has expressed himself in detail regarding Religion in his *Universalis Philosophia*, as well as in his *Atheismus Triumphatus*. In the former treatise he has discussed Religion in connection with his whole system; in the latter, he has reviewed it with the express intention of showing that the Religion of all men was originally the same, and entirely conformable to Nature, and that it was only split up into a plurality of religions by the jealousy of sophists and the political calculation of those in power.

In all things there is implanted a striving after self-preservation. They find their essentiality actually preserved in the principle that is peculiar to them. All things therefore strive after this; and this striving forms their natural religion, as a return to their proper principle. Hence four kinds of Religion may be distinguished: *Religio naturalis, animalis, rationalis, et supernaturalis*. By Natural Religion all things strive back to their Lord and Creator, and offer to Him praise and worship; as David sings, "The heavens declare the glory of God," etc. Most finite things do not proceed immediately from God, but arise through the medium of other things. Hence it is that they frequently strive, not back to God as the highest principle, but to what lies nearest them, as heat to the sun, and water to the sea. This return forms the religion of all things; as they thus strive again toward their principle, and thereby confess that out of that principle no immortality or permanence can be found for their being. What is called Animal Religion superadds the obedience which the animals exhibit towards higher powers. Thus elephants bow the knee before the moon, and birds sing to the rising sun.

Rational Religion belongs only to beings endowed with reason, and who know and worship the wisdom of God and God Himself. The soul likewise strives after its principle, but it does not, like the most of things, strive after mere finite principles, but after God Himself. Hence the soul alone really attains what it strives after, namely, immortality. This striving is implanted in the soul, after the analogy of all other

things, and therefore religion has not been devised from mere political considerations, as the Macchiavellists, in a foolish and godless way, assert. Religion being the return of the soul to God as its principle, is much rather the "Law of Nature," and on this account it is also one and the same for all men. Notwithstanding the diversity that appears among religions, they are, in truth, essentially identical with one another. This innate Religion is perfect and true. It shows to man the way from the world of alienation back to God. It is likewise of divine origin, for, from the eternal Law—that "Word of God" by which God leads all things to their goal—there flows also the natural law of action, which only becomes a positive law for the several nations by reference to the contingency of their modes of life, and as such it perishes with the nations.

Religion, in its essence, is union of the spirit with God. Hence it has two sides. On the side of action, it is the turning away of the heart from external sinful acts to the internal life, to goodness, to the true service of God. On the side of knowledge, it is insight into divine and human things. It is from the combination of these two that religion attains its highest perfection in the essential union of the spirit with God. Religion is in its essence entirely inward, but this inwardness necessarily demands external exhibition and active manifestation in divine worship. This external activity has, however, no value in itself, but is valuable only when it corresponds throughout to the internal life. External religion is of importance only for the State, which cannot continue to exist without having a religious basis.

We can only love and "strive after" what we know. If we are to love and strive after God in religion, we must therefore know Him. And if all the religions are fundamentally one, the natural knowledge of God that lies at their foundation must also be one. To this innate cognition (*cognitio innata*) there is, however, continually superadded a further acquired cognition (*cognitio illata*), and thus there is a religion also superadded to the natural religion (*religioni*



naturali accedit superaddita). The natural religion is true and perfect, and is the same among all nations and in all times; what is superadded is subject to error, and all the differences and controversies regarding religion are founded upon it. We are not, indeed, able to know God as the First Mover, as Aristotle alleges, but reason is spread throughout the whole world, and it points to a First Reason which is the ground of all things. In like manner the consideration of all forces points to a first Power, and the fulness of the various finite strivings points to a first Love. Thus do we apprehend God, not in the manner of Aristotle, as the soul of the world or as the highest heaven, but as the supreme Being, the Good, the True, the One.

This knowledge of God, however, is limited, for we cannot know precisely what is elevated above us, nor can our actions correspond to this knowledge. This is the ground of the diversity presented by the religions. Every individual honours God just as he knows Him, or as another person represents Him. As most men are prevented by the occupations of daily life, and by their anxiety for the necessities of existence, from seeking the truth for themselves, they are therefore compelled to follow others, such as their fathers or lawgivers and philosophers. The various religions are thus true and good in so far as they rest upon the innate knowledge of God; and they are false, erroneous, and contradictory in so far as our knowledge is defective as being borrowed from sensible objects.

In the very errors and the multiplicity of the religions which all lay claim to the sole exclusive truth, there is implied a necessity that God shall reveal Himself in a special manner. A foundation is thus laid for *Supernatural Religion*. Natural Religion awakens the consciousness that we need help from above in order to return to God as our Principle. Revelation gives us the right knowledge of God. When internal revelation prepares us for its reception, it produces illumination of knowledge, strengthening of power, and sanctification of will. This revelation comes to us through angels and prophets. But as



even their appearance did not keep men from falling into idolatry, God Himself became man, and even suffered death in order to confirm the truth. Regarding the mode and possibility of an immediate revelation as a communication of true knowledge, Campanella does not give us any independent views of his own, but he lays down rules by which we may distinguish a divine revelation from one that might be from the devil. These rules are: 1. The devil continually mixes truth with falsehood; 2. The devil often pursues other ends than the union of the soul with God; 3. The devil appears mostly in a hideous form, or leaves behind him something that is repugnant.

We almost feel ourselves transported into the age of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when we read in Campanella such passages as the following: "Marks by which the metaphysician concludes which religion is from God, and which from the devil;" or when he tries to find out which is the true religion among the many religions "by the common natural reason" (*per rationem communem naturalem*), and proceeds to prove its "rational credibility" (*rationabilis credibilitas*). Of such "marks" (*notæ*) he enumerates ten in the *Philosophia Universalis* and sixteen in the *Atheismus Triumphatus*. The most important of these marks are the following. (1) The moral precepts must correspond to universal nature, and allow no vice that is contrary to natural virtue. (2) The doctrines must be credible, true, and compatible with reason; and, if they go beyond reason, they must not be contradictory or fabulous. The true faith, in fact, is not merely a historical thing, but an internal affection of the mind, and it makes the individual know and will the divine. (3) The fact that prophets have been actually sent from God, must be established by their miracles, prophecies, virtuous life, and stedfast martyrdom. (4) The true religion is spread by miracles and virtue, but not by arms, and to it alone does God give lasting existence. (5) There can only be one divine religion corresponding to human nature and perfecting it; it alone applies to the whole world, and responds to the

various manners of men, and is suitable for all places and times.—By these marks the Christian religion is then compared, in the several points of doctrine and of ritual, with the other religions. And under reference to the distinction between what is contrary to reason and what is above reason, Christianity is shown on all points to be the only true religion. The result comes, in short, to this. There is a Law in the whole world which brings men, in conformity with reason, to the true life. Christianity is in harmony with this Law, and it is therefore the true religion.

#### FRANCISCUS PATRITIUS.

Patritius (1529–1593),<sup>1</sup> in the introduction to his *Panarchia*, attains to the supreme and single principle of all things in two ways. Things are either unmoved or moved; and the latter are either moved by other things or by themselves. Hence there are three kinds of substances: Bodies, Souls, and Spirits. Those souls whose care is the movement of the heavens and the order of the world, participate in reason. This points to another higher Spirit which exists independently of souls. Life precedes this spirit; Essence precedes life; the essentially One precedes essence; Unity precedes the essentially One; and the First-One precedes all (*Unum primum*). Thus we rise to a First-One, which is before and above all things.—Further, what is, is either one in its mode, so that it contains no plurality; or it is a plurality in its mode, so that it con-

<sup>1</sup> Patritius, notwithstanding his unsettled life, of which he only spent the last eighteen years in rest as a teacher of the Platonic Philosophy at Ferrara, was a versatile and prolific writer. By his *Della Historia Diece Dialoghi*, 1560, he acquired a distinguished place among the historians of his time. In his *Discussiones peripateticæ*, in 4 vols. (1571–1581), he gives an investigation, unique for its time, on the Aristotelian Philosophy in its relation to Plato and the older philosophers. Its purpose was to show that all that was false in the system was peculiar to Aristotle, and all that was true in it was borrowed from others. He also translated the Commentary of Joannes Philoponus on Aristotle, and wrote important works on the Military Art and on Poetry. His principal philosophical work is his *Nova de Universis Philosophia*, Ferrara 1591. It is divided into four parts: *Panaugia*, or the Doctrine of Light; *Panarchia*, or Metaphysics; *Panpsychia*, or Psychology; and *Pancosmia*, or Cosmology.

tains nothing simple; or it is at once one and many; or it is neither one nor many. Of these four possibilities one only is thinkable, namely, that individual things are at once one and many. This points to a higher uniting nature, which is neither one nor many, but is absolutely one, and nothing else but one. This one is not a body; it is not nature; it is not the soul; it is not the understanding; it is not life; it is not essence; it is not unity; but it is the One absolutely, which is the principle of all things, and therefore it is likewise the First of all things.

In this First-One there is already contained everything that afterwards comes out of it; and this holds not merely in possibility, but really. However, it is not yet in full unfolded reality, but only as it were in seed (*seminaliter*). By the seminal activity (*actione seminali*) everything proceeds from the One; and, in assuming proper independent form, the One splits up into the plurality of the various genera. The order and harmony in the universe, refer unmistakeably to this unity in plurality. This primal one is the simplest of all things; it is out of all relations of space and of time, of rest and of motion, and even of essence; it can neither be known nor named; it is the first and absolute Good. As numbers arise from numerical unity, so is this One the principle of all things. Hence, in the One, all things are contained in a manner that is unique (*uniter, ἐνιαίως*): and the One is both One-All and All-One at the same time (*unomnia*). This Infinite, this First-One, which is at the same time All-One, we likewise call God.

This unity is, however, at the same time threefold; it is a Triunity or Trinity. The One first of all, in accordance with its unity, lets One arise out of itself; this One is similar to it—nay, they are both essentially the same as one another, and are only distinguished by the eternally processional act of letting go forth and of going forth. The two form an indissoluble communion with each other; they are a Triad, indicated in the ecclesiastical expression of the Trinity as Father, Son, and Spirit, and in the philosophical terminology as All-One, Possibility, and Spirit.

It is by the mediation of this Triad that creation, as the origin of the many things from the All-One, comes to pass. For although all things are in the First-One, and on account of this participation are complete, they do not proceed out of it immediately, but only arise in a certain succession of stages, each with its own degree of perfection. The first thing generated of the All-One is the primary Unity, called by Plato the Idea of the Good, and called by the Church the Son of God. This primary Unity creates with the Father the secondary Unities, or the Ideas which it comprehends in itself; for the Idea of the Good cannot remain unfruitful. By its resemblance to the One it is also a unity, and in its difference from the One it produces plurality. When the primary Unity turns itself in essential love to the Father, there proceeds from the Father the third principle, which is Being, or the Essence in which all essences are contained. To this Unity of essence there are attached the unities of Lives, Spirits, Souls, Natures, Qualities, and Bodies. In nine stages, all being descends, without gap and without leap, from the highest All-One down to the lowest thing. Throughout these stages the primary Unity stands in uninterrupted union with the Plurality, and particularly in the order of pervasion. All higher things are contained in reality in the lower, according to the measure of their capacity; all lower things are contained in the higher, according to the measure of their excellence. The ideas which exist by themselves in the primary Unity are intellectual conceptions in the rational spirit; they are efficient causes in the soul; and they are forms in matter that fill the world.

Patritius also designates the origin of the many things as a creation out of nothing, in as far as no self-subsisting matter lies at their foundation. He thinks of them rather as proceeding out of God, like the word proceeding out of the mouth; and in such a way, that things out of God are no longer quite the same as they were in Him. This process is effected by Light. In so far as God by His infinite power gives power and life to all finite things, He is fire and light. This corporeally incorporeal Light, emanating from God, is always

combined with Heat ; both penetrate the universe of space, and they constitute the properly efficient principle in all things. The third principle, of which the effect is resistance, is Fluidity. It does not interest us here to trace further how, according to Patritius, the universe is constructed out of these principles. It may only be further observed that the return to God is designated as the end and goal of Philosophy ; and that Religion is not specially discussed.

## JULIUS CÆSAR VANINI.

Julius Cæsar Vanini (1585–1619)<sup>1</sup> met the same fate as Giordano Bruno ; he was burned at Toulouse, in February 1619, after having been found guilty of atheism, blasphemy, and other crimes. Vanini, however, is not to be put on a level with Bruno, either as to power of thinking, or moral earnestness, or in holy enthusiasm for his convictions. In the first period of his life, of which the most important monument is the *Amphitheatrum*, he zealously combats the atheists, but moves almost entirely in Cardan's circle of thought. The existence of God, he argues, does not follow, as Aristotle supposes, from the fact that motion requires a First Mover, but from the principle that finite and contingent being incontrovertibly demands an infinite and necessary Being, or that limited being demands an unlimited Being. God alone knows what God is, and, if I knew it, I would be God. All that can be known from His works is that God is the first all-embracing Being, and hence He is the highest good. God is not an essence, but Essentiality. He is not good, but Goodness. He is not wise, but Wisdom. He is all, everywhere, and in all things, but not enclosed by them ; He is above all things, but not excluded from them. He is all, above all, in all, before all, and after all. Everything finite has been created by God. His creating, however, constitutes Cognition, and hence the

<sup>1</sup> Of his writings, see particularly his *Amphitheatrum Æternæ providentiæ divino-magicum*, etc., Lugd. 1615 ; *De admirandis Naturæ Reginæ Deæque mortalium arcanis*, L. iv., Lutet. 1616. Carrière, 495-521.

divine Cognition, or the divine Providence, supports and penetrates all things. This divine Providence is explained in detail, and vindicated against the objections of Diagoras, Protagoras, and Epicurus. The antagonism between divine Providence and the freedom of the human will, is cleared away; and emphasis is laid upon the fact that Providence relates not merely to what is general, but to what is special.—All human cognition rests upon the condition of becoming one with the object known. Knowledge is the life of the Spirit, and the knowledge of the highest truth or God is its goal and blessedness. In this knowledge all men become one with each other, and are, at the same time, united with God.

The chief monument of the later period of his life is the treatise *De admirandis Naturæ Reginæ Deæque mortalium arcanis*, "Of the wonderful secrets of Nature, the Queen and Goddess of mortals." It is clothed in the same literary form, atheists bringing forward their objections and being refuted. But not merely is the view of the world which is now presented fundamentally a very different one, but there is also manifestly far more weight assigned to the objections of the atheists than to the refutations with which they are met, and which are often very weak. Moreover, the tone is so frivolous, cynical, and impure, that there can be no doubt about the true opinion of the author. Matter, we read, is imperishable; it is incapable of increase or diminution, but it continually assumes other forms. The world is eternal, and, at the same time, it possesses in its own continual productivity the principle of its preservation. The soul is the material "spiritus" or nerve spirit. Our condition depends upon our food. All virtues or vices depend upon the good or bad humours of the body.—In the discussion of the religion of the heathen, the assertions of the ancient philosophers are indeed contested, but they are hardly refuted. Such views are brought forward as that Plato identified God and the world. Other philosophers would have us truly honour God only in the law of Nature. Nature herself is God, because she is the principle of motion, and she has written this law in the heart



of the peoples. All other commands and doctrines are mere inventions of princes and priests in order to keep the people more easily in check by the hope of heavenly reward and the fear of punishment in another world. Vanini proceeds to refer miracles and signs to atmospheric phenomena and phantasms of the imagination. The demoniacs were tortured by the bad humours of the body; those who spoke with tongues were seized by accesses of fever; purgatives and cooling remedies put an end to these manifestations. Vanini declines to speak of the immortality of the soul "until I have become an old man, and am rich, and a German." In short, in the Vanini of the later period we have before us a conspicuous representative of that tendency which was estranged by Humanism from all religion; and, notwithstanding his well-known saying that "a straw compelled him to believe in God," the accusation of atheism was not raised against him without some foundation.

## IV.

## NICOLAUS TAURELLUS.

Taurellus (1547-1606)<sup>1</sup> turned also against the authority of Aristotle. He found the impulse and occasion for doing so in the opposition to the theory of the "double truth," which was frequently maintained even in the Protestant Church. He does not wish to be regarded, however, as depreciating Aristotle, only he would not have him regarded as the goal of the course, beyond which no one can go. Philosophy ought to recognise no other authority than the Scriptures, and it has to recognise this authority so unconditionally that whatever deviates from the written Word of God is to be rejected as

<sup>1</sup> F. Xaver Schmid of Schwarzenberg has the merit of having specially drawn attention to the importance of Taurellus, and particularly to his relations to Leibniz in his "*Nicolaus Taurellus, der erste deutsche Philosoph*," Erlangen 1864. Schmid gives details regarding the doctrines, circumstances, and writings of Taurellus. Of these writings the most important are his *Philosophiæ Triumphus, hoc est, Metaphysica Philosophandi Methodus*, etc., 1573; *Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysices ad normam Christianæ Religionis explicatæ, emendatæ et completæ*, Hanov. 1596; *Alpes Cæsæ*, 1597; *De rerum æternitate*, Marpurgi 1604.

error and untruth. In the preface to his *Triumphus Philosophicæ*, Taurellus expressly says it may cause surprise that he has entitled his treatise the *Triumph* of Philosophy, while in it he has attacked the philosophers with all his power. But as nothing is true which stands in contradiction to Scripture, it had pleased him to bring the matter to this issue, that after the errors of philosophy were removed he might show that it had gained the victory, not because it had overcome theology, but because, when conquered, it had subjected itself to the service of theology. Apart from Scripture, philosophy can have no other authority to follow than Reason alone.

But the question arises as to whether Reason is capable of attaining knowledge of the truth. Are not our natural powers so much corrupted by sin that we are completely incapable of attaining to truth by means of them, not to speak of the knowledge of God and divine things? This question was discussed in the age of the Reformation. Taurellus answers it in the first part of his *Triumphus Philosophicæ*, in the section *de viribus humanæ mentis*. He does not specially enter upon an examination of our faculty of knowledge, but he shows by a long explanation in detail that knowledge belongs to the substance of our mind, that sin can only corrupt its accidents, and hence that our natural faculty of knowledge has not suffered by sin, but is still in the same state in which it was before the fall of Adam.—By elucidating these two points, namely, the rejection of all authority and the proof that our natural faculty of knowledge is not corrupted by sin, Taurellus paved the way for the establishment of his main thesis.

*There is no "double" truth* in such a sense that that could be true in philosophy which is false in theology, or conversely. "For as there is only one single principle of things, and only one mind in man by which he is at once philosopher and theologian, so there is likewise in one and the same mind only *one* truth, to which there is nothing opposed but falsehood." There is one mind which knows and believes, and this is the human mind. Theologians have greatly confused the subject by asserting that it is the divine mind which

thinks and believes in us. Knowledge, like faith, belongs to the substance of the human mind. Our mind is not purely passive even in the process of faith as the spontaneous appropriation of the merit of Christ; it is not a mere dead block presented as such for the operation of grace. It is true that we need divine grace in relation to our thinking as well as to our believing, in order that it may remove the obstacles which, in consequence of sin, impede the active exercise of our reason. Nevertheless it is not the mind of God, but the human mind, which thinks and believes. The former is the "causa remotior," the latter the "causa efficiens." There is therefore one Reason whose substance is constituted by thinking and believing, and there is one Grace which supports us in both of these operations. In like manner, there is only one principle of all things, which is at the same time the ground of all knowledge, philosophical as well as theological. Whence, then, could there be a "double" truth?

*The complete subordination of Philosophy to Theology*, involving a merely negative relation of the former to the latter, results from the *principles of knowledge* that come into application in both sciences. Philosophy is the knowledge of divine and human things, obtained through strict reasoning by the faculty of knowledge implanted in us. Theology, on the other hand, rests upon immediate divine revelation. Both Reason and Revelation point back to God as their ultimate principle; but while Reason may err in many ways, Revelation is infallible. Hence Philosophy must subject itself unconditionally to Theology. If a contradiction arises between them, Theology claims unconditional authority, and the assertions of Philosophy must be tested and altered, if need be, in accordance with the positions established by Theology.

But there is also a *positive relation of Philosophy to Theology*. On this side, Philosophy appears as a positive presupposition of Theology. Knowledge is thus regarded as the foundation of faith. Here, likewise, a twofold relation comes into consideration. Philosophical knowledge is not restricted to earthly things, but ascending from effects to their cause, it also

embraces the existence, essence, and working of God. In all these points a true philosophy must harmonize with revelation, and to establish this harmony is the goal aimed at by Taurellus in his reform of Metaphysics.—One object, however, belongs to the sphere of theology alone; it is the divine Will in the operations of grace. If Adam had not sinned, there would have been no need of divine grace, nor would there have been any theology, but only philosophy. When all men have received grace, all knowing will receive its light from this source; and in this third period there will be only theological knowledge and no philosophical knowledge. In the middle period in which we now live, philosophy has the same significance as the preaching of the law; it has to drive us to despair, and thus make us inclined to receive the Gospel and divine grace. It is necessary to look at these two points somewhat more closely.

Philosophy attains to the knowledge of God by means of ontological as well as cosmological considerations. The principles of things must correspond to those of knowledge, because all knowing is innate in us. Hence the highest principles of things are affirmation and negation. Simple affirmation is God; simple negation is pure Nothing, or the first matter of the physicists. The latter necessarily presupposes the former as its cause. All finite things are compounded in certain masses out of affirmation and negation. God is therefore the unlimited single substance in which there is no diversity. Finite things are something in the sense that they are not manifold; but God is all, and it cannot be said that He is not anything. The principle of causality, when applied to this position, gives as the result that God is the principle of Himself, and at the same time the cause of all things. From pure nothing, God created the second matter; and out of it, by means of the forms created from nothing, He shaped individual things. God, however, is not, as regards His substance, the cause of the world, but He is so “per accidens,” and only by His free action. Examination of the world leads to the same positions. Its limitedness proves that it is not eternal.

The fundamental error of Aristotle lies in his holding the eternity of the world. But if God is not the internal or constitutive cause of the world, but its external or efficient cause, the essence of God is different from His causality. Viewed as to His essence, God is substantial; yet He is not an active substance, but is activity and energy itself. This activity does not consist in knowing, but in producing; yet not in the mere accidental producing of the world, but in eternal producing of Himself. Hence God is the highest blessedness, and therefore He is also triune.

The world is not an end in itself, but has been created for man. Man finds his goal, which is happiness, in union with God, and this results from the contemplation of God and the righteousness connected therewith, as well as from the commendation of God. The unity of men, as founded upon their descent from one pair, is subservient to the attainment of this goal. The earth, however, is not to be viewed as a place of happiness or misery, but only of propagation. As soon as the determinate number of men is complete, this world will be annihilated and men transported into another world to enjoy blessedness or to suffer damnation. Since we sin and God is just, eternal damnation awaits us. This knowledge is the fruit of philosophy, and it leads us to despair. We are also driven to the same despair by the divine law which speaks to us in the conscience. This shows the agreement between science and conscience. From this despair there is no other escape than that which is furnished by the Christian religion. Its two main positions are the acknowledgment of our own misery and the promise of divine grace, or the Law and the Gospel. The Law, as expressed in the Ten Commandments, is in accord with the will of God, which is engraven by Nature in all men. As by corporeal relationship with one man we all have become miserable, so shall we all become blessed by spiritual relationship with one man. As by the sin of another we came into a state of wretchedness, so by the merit of another do we attain to a state of blessedness. For Christ, who was begotten by God from the Virgin, and who is there-



fore separated from the sin of Adam by the voluntary surrender of His wholly sinless life, has paid a ransom more than sufficient for the sins of all mankind. It only remains, then, to lay hold of the grace of God in faith; for all who are saved, are firmly convinced that Christ suffered death for them; and this is the substance of the Christian faith.—And so Taurellus, on coming to the end of his treatise, *De Æternitate rerum*, asks: “Quid igitur in hac nostra religione absurdi est? Dic quæso, quisquis es, an ulla ratio nostræ salutis esse vel excogitari, quæ veritati philosophicæ magis sit consentanea? Dicam ingenue, quod sentiam: si hæc non sit, nulla erit alia.”

The fate of Taurellus is significant of the character of his age. He was certainly not without scholars and enthusiastic admirers of his genius. But his opponents greatly preponderated in numbers; and it is remarkable enough that the theologians were even more violent against him than the peripatetic philosophers. Scherbius, his colleague at Altdorf, showed himself a fanatical Aristotelian in his *Dissertatio pro philosophia Peripatetica adv. Ramistas* (Altdorf 1590). It was asserted that Taurellus believed nothing, and was worse than a Turk. He was also branded as a Pelagian. Quenstedt and Lampe number him among the Arminians. Löscher reckons him among the naturalistic thinkers, who, as related to the deists and Spinozists, were suspected of being atheists. The Heidelberg Theologians designate him as “Atheus medicus;” and from that time he appears in almost all the lists of atheists. Only Boyle and Leibniz mention him with laudatory recognition. He was otherwise either passed over in dead silence, or violently consigned to oblivion by the destruction of his writings.

#### PETER RAMUS.

Petrus Ramus (1515–72)<sup>1</sup> was the grandson of a charcoal burner, and the son of a poor peasant. After years of bitter

<sup>1</sup> Of the numerous writings of Ramus, the following deserve to be particularly noted: *Institutionum dialecticarum*, L. iii., Par. 1552. *Commentarii de*



poverty he found, as the servant of a student in the college of Navarre, the opportunity of satisfying his burning desire of learning. But after he had studied the Aristotelian logic for three and a half years, he recognised the emptiness and uselessness of this hollow verbal wisdom. The reading of Plato brought him to the Socratic mode of searching after wisdom; and in 1536, still a youth of twenty-one years, on his being promoted to the Master's degree, he maintained the bold and hitherto unheard-of thesis, "quæcunque ab Aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse." He maintained that all that Aristotle had taught was mere fable; for, in the first place, the writings attributed to him were spurious, and, in the second place, these writings contained nothing but errors. This attack was unprecedented in that age, and especially in the University of Paris, where Aristotle was honoured as a saint, and regarded as infallible. Supported by Omer Talon, Professor of Rhetoric, and Bartholomais Alexandre, Professor of Greek, Ramus carried out the union of rhetoric with logic, and introduced Greek into the public instruction. The adherents of Aristotle induced Francis I. to interdict him from all teaching and writing on philosophical subjects. This prohibition was, however, recalled by Henri II. in 1547; but the conflict still went on. The whole life of Ramus is filled with these wretched conflicts, and it was more as the founder of a new philosophy than as a Protestant that he felt himself insecure during the civil war in Paris. It is certainly established that a passionate opponent, Jacques Charpentier, a truculent Aristotelian, took advantage of the horrors of the Bartholomew massacre to get him safely put out of the way.

If we now look at this *new Philosophy* somewhat more closely, we cannot but wonder how a philosophy which goes much further than the genuine Aristotle in empty formalism, and yields but little to the formalism of the Scholastics, could have called forth such a movement. Of the ancients,

Religione Christiana, L. iv., Francof. 1577. Cf. Charles Waddington, Ramus, sa vie, ses écrits, et ses opinions, Paris 1855. P. Lobstein, Petrus Ramus als Theologe, Strassburg 1878.

it is Socrates to whom Ramus loves most to refer, and he does this from two points of view. His first object is to overthrow the respect for authority. In philosophy, authority is to be of no account, be it what it may. Instead of blindly following an authority, we ought to take our stand upon reason and upon free thinking. Further, science must be directed towards practical utility. Science ought to be made to minister to practical applications, although not to the mere trivial utilities of daily life. This follows at once from the three stages of capability which Ramus distinguishes in the relations of every science, and which are designated Nature, Art, and Practice. This principle applies to Nature, for we have received from Nature our capacity for everything; it holds of Art, which reduces to conscious and universal rules what we are disposed to by Nature; and it applies to Practice, which is strengthened by repeated activity and habit.

Ramus turns his attention chiefly to a reform of Dialectics; but even apart from his judgments about Aristotle, which are often extremely unjust, what Ramus tries to put in his place is not at all fit to be a substitute for the Logic of the Stagirite. To put it shortly, he holds that Logic should be closely connected with Rhetoric. Dialectic is *ars bene disserendi*, a guide to discoursing well; and as such it, in fact, touches none of the deeper metaphysical questions which Aristotle draws into the circle of his explanations, and which he treats at times with skill. Ramus really gives nothing more than direction as to how to discourse well about an object, to represent it on all its sides, and to maintain the reasons of it. Dialectic is divided into Invention and Judgment (*inventio et iudicium*). Invention treats of the finding of proofs; and proof is either artificial or inartificial, according as by its nature it may or may not serve as proof. The latter kind of proof applies to divine and human testimony. The former kind of proof falls into a series of classes, such as cause and effect, subject and predicate, and so on. Under every kind, Ramus quotes a number of examples from Latin and Greek writers, and gives a short

definition, although these are mostly only verbal, such as "Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur," "Adjunctum est cui aliquid subicitur." The deeper question as to the grounds of these proofs is not even raised. His doctrine of Judgment only gives direction as to the mode of disposing judgments, with rules as to the appropriate arrangement of the proofs conducive to judgment. At this point Ramus attaches himself in many respects to Aristotle, and does not advance beyond laying down certain rules for the rhetorical appreciation of proof.

We come now to the question as to the position taken up by Ramus towards Religion. He was devoted from 1561 to the Reformed Church; and a tour through Switzerland and Germany from 1568 to 1570, brought him into personal contact with the most distinguished theologians of his age and communion. In the last years of his life he took a keen interest in Synodical transactions connected with the arrangements of the Reformed Church in France. Had his life been longer spared, his authority would perhaps have led to a schism, for he represented the democratic constitution of the Church, and Zwingli's doctrine of the Lord's Supper as against Beza. His *Commentarii* do not contain a scientific or systematic discussion of theology, but only the reflections of a highly-cultured layman on the chief points of the Christian faith. Attaching his reflections to the Catechism, and frequently giving an explanation of it word for word, although occasionally diverging and softening in detail, his Commentaries reproduce, on the whole, the doctrinal system of the Reformed Church.

Ramus aimed likewise at purging theology of the subtle questions of Scholasticism, and introducing a new method into it. This method consists in beginning with the definition of each doctrine, then quoting testimonies and examples from the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, and also giving quotations from distinguished poets, orators, and historians taken from the whole of profane literature of heathen as well as Christian origin. The object is certainly

not to deduce an authority or approbation for theology from these sources, nor is it merely to procure an agreeable variety for readers and hearers, but it is to show that theology does not lie far from man, and rather receives illumination from the natural light that is found among all peoples. — In opposition to the arbitrariness with which every individual theologian adopts a separate way of his own, Ramus aims at introducing a new arrangement by discoursing first of the science and then of the *disciplina*. This is not the common distinction between Dogmatics and Ethics, but the distinction already mentioned between art and practice. The science falls into the doctrine of the faith, and of its active manifestation in law, prayer, and sacraments. Although this arrangement is simply borrowed from the Catechism, Ramus holds that the institution of it is very significant. “Whoever first brings this method into theology, kindles a peculiar light in which all the parts of theology can be clearly and distinctly surveyed.”

Theology is defined as “*doctrina bene vivendi*,” i.e. “*Deo bonorum omnium fonti congruentur et accommodantur*.” Lately, he says, in some inconceivable way, this *bene vivere* or living well has been made the same as *recte vivere* or living justly, whereas it is synonymous with *beate vivere* or living blessedly. Regarding the true meaning of the definition, we obtain some light from the circumstance that God is designated the source of all good things; and still more does its meaning become clear when it is immediately afterwards said that the ethical philosophy of the heathen deduced and determined the happy life of man from the weak powers of his nature, as if man had in himself what was sufficient for the blessed life. Theology teaches, on the contrary, that man is not able to attain the good and blessed life of himself, but realizes it only when he listens to God, and thus receives the promise of the eternal fruit of heavenly blessedness. And because this blessedness is not completely obtained in the earthly life, faith in immortality is the groundwork of the whole Scriptures and of religion. Theology is therefore the doctrine

of God which is communicated by God to men, and laid down in the canonical Scriptures. Its substance is the forgiveness of sins by Christ. This forgiveness is embodied in both Testaments, which contain throughout the same thing, and are only different in respect of the extent of their announcement and the degree of their distinctness. Taken together, the Old and New Testaments contain the divine rules for a blessed life. Hence Faith is also defined as trust in God in respect of His beneficence to His Church, for it is only through the Church that we can obtain salvation.—Works are inseparable from faith. As the fire cannot exist without heat, nor the sun without light, neither can faith exist without right action towards God. But being incapable by nature of what is good, we only obtain by divine influence the power required to perform it. The details of the theology of Ramus need not be further reproduced for our purpose here; and, besides, they contain but little that is peculiarly their own.

Ramism was the only philosophy that succeeded in breaking down the supremacy of Aristotle. It succeeded for a time at least, and it gave rise to a lasting movement through the whole learned world.

## SECTION SECOND.

### THE DOCTRINES OF THE REFORMERS.

A REVOLUTION of the religious life—known as the Protestant Reformation—took place at the same time as the movement in the domain of Philosophy which we have been describing, but it was entirely independent of that movement, and was little influenced even by the free spirit of Humanism. The Reformation separated into two movements, but the foundation of both of them lay in the striving to obtain due independence for the individual in opposition to the oppressive authority of the Roman Church. Some of the representatives of this revolution gave up all that was objective in the previous position, and in consequence of this exaggeration of the subjective principle they were unable to found a lasting Church. Others, again, accepted the historical fact of the redemption by the sacrificial death of Christ and the immediate divine revelation in the Scriptures, and only demanded the free access of the subject to both. The representatives of this position have founded a Church which still exists, but they also separated into two distinct communities, forming the Lutheran and the Calvinistic Reformed Churches. The attempts to refer the separation of the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches to merely external causes now belong to the past. A religious difference undoubtedly lay at the foundation of this ecclesiastical division. Of the various formulæ that have been proposed to define it, it may be most correctly determined in the following terms. God and man being viewed as the two members of the religious relation, the consciousness of dependence on the all-determining power of God and the consciousness of personal sin and unworthiness of the gifts of divine grace, may be regarded as



the two fundamental feelings of religion in relation to God and man. The distinction between the two communities appears in this, that the former consciousness comes into the foreground among the Calvinists, whereas the latter comes into the foreground among the Lutherans, this consciousness in each case ruling everything else. The Reformation, as proceeding from the religious interest, has, on its own showing, brought forth something quite different from mere philosophical systems of religion. Hence there are only a few points in connection with it that properly claim our attention here. These are:—1. The special character of the religious life as it took form in the most important personalities of the Reformation, and as it received objective representation in their theology; 2. The views adopted regarding the source of religious knowledge and the validity of reason in matters of faith; and 3. The position taken up with reference to the scholastic philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

## I.

## MARTIN LUTHER (1483–1546).

Martin Luther was born at Eisleben, in Lower Saxony, on the 10th November 1483. The strict training of his father's house, the stern discipline he received at school, and all the straitened circumstances of his outward life, had fostered in Luther the spirit of the Law—of fear and timidity—and so the consciousness of sin came to form the centre of his religious life.<sup>2</sup> Sin was thus realized by him, not so much as a contradiction to his own moral determination, as rather in its

<sup>1</sup> The learned work by W. Gass on the History of Protestant Dogmatics (*Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, 4 Bde. Berlin 1854–1867), has been of special service in connection with what follows in this section. A good deal of information has also been obtained from the works of Frank and Tholuck. (G. Frank, *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie*, 3 Bde. Leipzig 1862–1875; Tholuck, *Geist der lutherischen Theologie Wittenbergs*, 1852; *Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus*, 4 Th. 1853–1862; *Geschichte des Rationalismus*, 1 Th. 1865.)

<sup>2</sup> Julius Köstlin, *Die Theologie Luthers*, 2 Bd. 1863; *Luther's Leben und Schriften*, 2 Bd. 1875.

antagonism to the divine law, and as having the divine displeasure and punishment as its consequence. It was this consciousness of sin which drove Luther into a monastery, and led him to seek his own justification in zealous penances and prescribed works. And as the consciousness of grace arose in him, not through works, but in faith, grace thus constituted for him primarily liberation from the divine wrath and divine punishment, and then only in consequence did it become a source of strength for moral improvement. This antagonism of Sin and Grace which Luther experienced in himself in such violence as few other men have felt, forms the centre of his whole Theology. For as the Word of God falls into the Law and the Gospel, there are only two things which it is necessary for the Christian to know. These are knowledge of his own sin and damnation, and knowledge of justification through Christ.

Grace is appropriated by Faith; and on this was founded Luther's polemic against the Roman doctrine of Justification by works and self-righteousness. Faith is trustful surrender of the whole personality, and in this lies the mystical element in Luther. But the object of this faith is the historical Christ as the indispensable mediator of grace; and it is this that distinguishes his doctrine from Mysticism. Through Christ alone do we obtain grace; and hence in Him alone is the right knowledge of God, as the Triune God and as infinite Love, to be found.

Christ procured grace for us, and hence He is God and man in one person. Even faith is divine grace, for we can do nothing in consequence of sin, all our work being evil. This operation of divine grace in us, which effects the awakening of faith, is, however, bound to the external means of grace in the Word and the Sacraments; and this is in direct opposition to the views of fanatics. The fairest fruit of faith is man becoming inwardly certain of faith, and becoming comforted on the ground that God has forgiven him his sins. The whole theology of Luther in its characteristic peculiarities may thus be referred to this contrast between Sin and Grace,

and he has himself thus represented it. "We ought," he says, "to comprehend the whole sum of the Christian understanding in two parts, and to put them, as it were, into two sacks. The sack of Faith has two pockets: in the one is put this, that we are corrupted by Adam's sin; in the other this, that we are all redeemed by Christ. The sack of Love has also two pockets: in the one is put this piece, that we should do good to every one, as Christ has done to us; and in the other is this other bit, that we should gladly suffer all kinds of evil."

The grace presented to us in Christ, and to be appropriated by us in faith, is the centre of the Christian Religion. And at the same time this grace is all that it properly contains; what does not stand in relation to it, no longer falls within the sphere of religious knowledge. On this is based the separation that is carried through between the spiritual and the secular, the heavenly and the earthly, the divine and the human. In the former sphere, the immediate divine revelation contained in the Scriptures is the valid source of knowledge, and the divine grace is the power of action; in the latter, we follow reason and our own will. Before the Fall, along with a morally pure will directed to the love of God and his neighbour, man had also an unobscured knowledge of God. After the Fall it became otherwise. Our will is now so corrupt that without the Holy Spirit we can do nothing but sin. It is only in mere worldly things that we are able to do anything, to build houses, to discharge civil offices, and such like, and here we may even appropriate and acquire a certain "civil righteousness." In spiritual and divine things, on the other hand, man is entirely without freedom, and he can do anything that is good only by the help of divine grace. The same division is carried out in regard to knowledge. In secular things Reason is recognised throughout, and thus Luther was able so entirely and fully to give his assent to the noble arts and sciences, but in regard to spiritual and divine things Reason is viewed by him as smitten with blindness.

He does not entirely reject a natural knowledge of God. We are able to infer from the beautiful creations of the world and its wonderful, well-ordered government, to a single, eternal, divine Being, as well as from the innumerable benefits which we receive, to the goodness and grace of God. Allusions to the Trinity are impressed even on Nature. While Adam could have known the omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness of God even from the tiniest floweret, we can reach but a very feeble kind of knowledge, as we comprehend God neither as Triune nor as Love. Nay, this natural knowledge appears to be so very insufficient that it is not knowledge at all, but is complete darkness. All that Reason knows does not hold in it a droplet of the knowledge of grace and truth, of the depth of the divine compassion, of the abyss of the divine wisdom and will. Reason does not even know the Law rightly ; for it does not understand that Love is the Law. And above all, Reason knows nothing of the fact that, or of the way by which, we are to attain salvation according to God's will ; it knows nothing, and will know nothing of all this. And as to all that the heathen philosophers have said in their not unskilful disputes about God, His providence, and His government of the world, it amounts in truth to the greatest ignorance of God and vain blasphemy. Hence he holds that "it is not possible for us to comprehend even the least article of faith by human reason, and that no man on earth, without the Word of God, has ever been able to find or apprehend a right thought or certain knowledge of God." Hence Luther bows in all humility before the word of Scripture, and he even describes Reason "as Mrs. Hulda, the devil's whore," and as that "vain, quarrelsome termagant Reason." He thus drives Reason entirely out of the sphere of religious knowledge with the lash of his heavy scourge, while, at the same time, he lauds it as the highest gift of God in the sphere of secular insight.

Religious knowledge rests solely upon the immediate inspiration of God objectively contained in the Word of Scripture. It is not impossible that revelations may yet appear, but they must authenticate themselves by the Word

of Scripture, and they are unnecessary after the concluding revelation that is given in Christ. The question as to the possibility of an immediate divine revelation and the mode of its happening, is not explained any more than the trustworthiness of Scripture as the documentary record of this revelation is proved. Both points are still regarded as entirely certain in the universal consciousness of the time. Christ, and the grace procured by Him, is the centre and the essential substance of revelation. Hence Luther will not merely judge of the value of the several parts of Scripture by the degree in which they present Christ, but he also allows himself the freest judgment regarding everything which does not belong to this centre. He speaks, not merely of the diligent studies of the Sacred Writers, of the dependence of the one upon the other, of the peculiarities of their style and such like, but he distinguishes different stages of inspiration, and discriminates the object of religious faith from merely external and historical statements. In respect of the former, all the parts of Scripture agree with each other; but in regard to the latter, he admits, without hesitation, the presence of contradictions, errors, or mistakes of the text. The Scriptures are only rightly interpreted when the inner illumination by the Holy Spirit comes to our aid, and for this we can prepare ourselves by *oratio*, *meditatio*, and *tentatio*.

Further, the reception of the knowledge contained in revelation takes place by means of reason. This, however, is only possible in so far as, in the process of regeneration, the reason of man likewise becomes other than it was. This is designated by Luther at one time as an extinguishing of the light of reason, and at another time as a change of the natural light. But neither is this process, nor the obscuration of reason that came in with the fall, described in detail. Nor do we find an exact demarcation of the spiritual and the secular spheres.

The distinction of these two spheres, however, gives the deeper foundation of the proposition that something may be true in theology which is untrue in philosophy, and conversely. This is the assertion of a "double truth." Against

the condemnation of the double truth by the Sorbonne, Luther emphatically maintains that view. The proposition that the Word was made flesh, is true in theology, whereas in philosophy it is absolutely impossible and absurd. So, in like manner, the inference that as the whole divine essence belongs to the Father, and the whole divine essence belongs to the Son, therefore the Son is the Father, is entirely correct in philosophy, whereas in theology it is completely untrue. If, then, a philosophical proposition comes too close to an expression of the Scriptures, it just means "*mulier taceat in ecclesia*." To assert only one truth is as much as to say that "the truths of faith are to be reduced under the yoke of human reason;" it is the same as "wishing to enclose the heavens and the earth in their own centre, or putting them into a pepper-corn." In matters of faith we must therefore turn to another dialectic and philosophy, which is the Word of God, and we must regard the objections of a perverse philosophy as no better than a "useless croaking of frogs." It need not surprise us that different things are true in theology and philosophy, since, in the secular sciences and arts, there is not one form of truth merely. We don't measure a quart pot in the same way as we do shoes, nor with ell-wands, nor do we weigh a point with scales. It is impossible then that everything in theology and philosophy can be true in the same manner, because the subject-matters in question are far more distinct from one another than in the case of human arts and sciences.

Luther was not unacquainted with the Aristotelian Scholastic philosophy of his time. He was not merely trained in it, and had attached himself specially to the Nominalists, but he had even lectured in Wittenberg on the Aristotelian dialectics and physics. But he did not know the genuine Aristotle, his knowledge being derived only from the Scholastic commentators. The Aristotelian philosophy and the Scholastic theology were thus connected so closely with each other in his view, that his opposition to the theology necessarily turned him also against the philosophy. It is only on this ground



that his unbounded zeal against Aristotle is to be explained. It appeared to him that it was only by the complete overthrow of the authority of Aristotle that the Church could be purified. It was wrong to honour Aristotle like Christ; and Luther, even in his own drastic way, can hardly say enough in condemnation of him. Melanchthon's influence may have afterwards somewhat softened this judgment, but Luther did not advance so far as to transform the scholastic philosophy and to bring it into such a positive relation to his theology as that it might subserve the connected exposition of the doctrines of faith.

## II.

### PHILIPP MELANCHTHON (1497-1560).

MELANCHTHON<sup>1</sup> brought the Humanistic element into the German Reformation. This is accounted for by the fact that before his acquaintance with Luther his life was devoted with a purely scientific zeal to the restoration of the sciences and the purification of the ancient philosophy of the schools. In connection with Luther, Melanchthon came to recognise that there is something higher than the restoration of the sciences, and he then gave his rich gifts entirely to the service of the Reformation. And yet he could say of himself with truth, that he was almost drawn by force into the controversies of the parties in the Church, and that he longed for the quiet, peaceful life of the student. His attitude towards secular science, and especially towards the Aristotelian philosophy of the Schools, was always a far more friendly one than that of Luther.

Having become intimately acquainted in Heidelberg with the Aristotelian Scholasticism, Melanchthon turned decidedly to Nominalism at Tübingen. His youthful enthusiasm was at the same time given to the aspiring Humanism of the age, and his desire to unite these two elements is the explanation of his preference for the dialectics of Agricola. Still a youth,

<sup>1</sup> C. Schmidt, *Melanchthon's Leben und Schriften*, Elberf. 1861. Herrlinger, *Die Theologie Melanchthon's*, Gotha 1879.

Melanchthon lectured at Tübingen on Virgil and Terence; and as a teacher of eloquence and history, he prelected on Cicero and Livy. He even wrote a Greek grammar, and occupied himself with the idea of giving a new edition of the writings of Aristotle. Called to Wittenberg as Professor of Greek, it was partly the reading of the New Testament and partly the powerful personality of Luther that won him for the Reformation. The influence of the great Reformer even brought Melanchthon for a time to reject Aristotle. He exhorted his students to devote themselves to the philosophy of Paul. From him they will know the distinction between the true Christian philosophy and the false philosophy of the Scholastics, between what is necessary to salvation and what has been devised by human wit, and which cannot comfort men's hearts. In his preface to Aristotle, he declares that the wisest men have always despised philosophy, not only because it is of no advantage to the administration of the State, but because it weakens the mind, and so on.

This mood of aversion to Aristotle was, however, but transitory. Melanchthon strongly emphasizes the necessity of humanistic and philosophic culture for the servant of the Church, and among all the philosophers no one stands higher in his view than Aristotle. Without Aristotle, the right mode of teaching and of learning cannot be attained. He holds the prerogative over all the philosophers of antiquity. The Stoics are to be rejected on account of their principle of absolute necessity; the followers of the Academy, on account of their doubts; and the Epicureans, on account of their immoral life. Plato has certainly some wise thoughts, but he has not treated any part of science connectedly, and he is not to be recommended because of his prejudicial influence upon some of the Church Fathers, and especially upon the theologians. Melanchthon sought to promote the study of Aristotle by lectures on the Aristotelian writings, by commentaries upon them, and by discourses recommending them. But as a genuine Humanist, he will also in the case of Aristotle go back to the original sources; he rejects the Arabian com-

mentators, and seeks independent explanations of the text. Melanchthon was not disinclined to a certain eclecticism, as when he holds that Aristotle is not to be regarded as in opposition to Plato, but rather to be viewed as his development. Melanchthon was thus of great importance in regard to philosophical instruction, and his text-books in *Dialectics*, *Physics*, and *Ethics* laid the foundation for the supremacy of a somewhat purified Aristotelian Scholasticism in the following age.

As Philosophy, according to Melanchthon, has a certain practical value in qualifying us for any kind of work, it has likewise a positive relation to Theology. In the first place, it stands related to Theology as a formal organon. An unscientific theology is a science full of confusion, in which important subjects are not exactly explained, and in which things that ought to be separated are mixed up among one another, and those that ought to be connected are disjoined. Dialectic and rhetoric are subservient to the purpose of formal order. It is not correct to make Melanchthon identify these in the manner of Ramus. Dialectic shows us how to teach things correctly, orderly, and clearly, while rhetoric teaches us how to discourse about things; the former exhibits a subject in naked words, whereas the latter treats of the adornment of discourse. Dialectic, as the science of method, treats of definition, division, and proof. An exact definition may clear up much confusion in theology and settle many a controversy. Melanchthon therefore endeavours in his dogmatics everywhere to lay down clear and exactly determined definitions, and not a few of these have become the common possession of the Protestant Church and its science. As regards division and proof, Melanchthon already gives a completely determined scheme, which is applied, not indeed by himself, but by the dogmatic theologians of the following scholastic period, to the treatment of the doctrines of theology. Melanchthon himself, in the later editions of the "*Loci*," was already led by the purely methodical interest of the system to incorporate several doctrines which he had previously passed over. On account of this significance of philosophy as a

formal organon, Aristotle is to be preferred to all other philosophers, for he alone has a strict method, and studiously employs definite and exactly fixed modes of expression.

Again, philosophy performs certain preliminary material services for theology. Psychology contributes many conceptions which are indispensable in dogmatics, such as "will," "feeling," "desire," "freewill," etc. The immortality of the soul likewise follows from philosophical principles. The soul is not of an elementary nature because it has ideas, and even universal ideas, such as those of incorporeal things. What is not of the nature of the elements does not perish, and therefore the soul does not perish on the death of the body.—In view of the undeniable incongruity between conduct and what befalls the individual in the present life, the idea of Providence, as well as the voice of conscience, points to a state of reward and punishment in the life to come.

Philosophical ethics likewise furnishes the most important fundamental conceptions to theological ethics, such as "the highest good," "virtue," "justice," "law," and others. At the same time, the law of Nature appears, in the *Loci*, as a ray of the divine wisdom in the human soul, although the full revelation of the good is presented for the first time in the Decalogue. This law of Nature already enjoins the worship of the Deity, the observing, as sacred, of oaths, the customs of the fathers, the supreme authority, the life of others, the family, property, contracts, and promises. Upon the same foundation rest also the first orders of natural right.

From physics, which contains most of the metaphysical elements that Melanchthon retains, theology receives not merely the general view of the world, but also a whole series of expressions taken from the sphere of the so-called natural theology. To this department belong, above all, the arguments for the existence of God, of which Melanchthon enumerates no less than nine. These are—1. The order, regularity, and conformity to law of Nature; 2. The existence of reason, which cannot possibly arise out of irrational matter; 3. The innate power of distinguishing good and evil; 4. The

agreement of all men as regards the belief in God ; 5. The tortures of a bad conscience ; 6. The origination and continuance of civil Society ; 7. The series of efficient causes, or, as Aristotle puts it, of mover and moved, which, as a series and order, cannot be infinite, but refers to a first cause or a first mover ; 8. The complete conformity to design in Nature ; 9. The prophetic prediction of the future.—Further, physics contains propositions not merely regarding the existence of God, but also regarding His nature. He is one ; He is the creator of the whole world and of the order prevailing in it ; He is wise, just, compassionate, true, holy ; He demands obedience to His will and punishes transgressors. Of the definitions of God which the philosophers have laid down, Melanchthon adopts that of Plato, "Deus est mens æterna, causa boni in natura," that is, God is not body, but eternal mind, of infinite power, wisdom, goodness, truth, justice, and the creator of all good. Five arguments are adduced for divine Providence—1. The useful changes of the seasons, 2. the moral law that is prescribed to us, 3. the congruity between conduct and its consequences, 4. the appearing of heroes, 5. prophecies of the future. We also find traces of a theodicy, as when certain grounds of consolation in misfortune are adduced, such as the unavoidableness of misfortune, the dignity of virtue in bearing it, a good conscience, the calm endurance of others, the benefit to others of our suffering, or its conduciveness to the common wellbeing.

The positive value of Philosophy to Theology, as thus regarded, must not, however, mislead us into attributing to Melanchthon the fault of confusing or mixing up the two. They are regarded by him as entirely different in respect of their sources of knowledge. Philosophy draws its knowledge from natural reason ; theology draws its knowledge from divine revelation. Hence the certainty attainable in each of them is likewise entirely different. In theology, there is no room for doubt, for the divine revelation is infallible. In philosophy, one opinion contradicts another, and error is heaped on error. Reason is completely incapable of attaining the knowledge of



God, so that when any one tries, apart from God's Word, to comprehend the divine nature by means of human thoughts, he falls into fearful darkness. The darkening of the natural light of reason belongs to the inborn results of the corruption of sin. Hence whenever Melanchthon borrows any elements from secular science for theology, whether from psychology, or physics, or ethics, he points out that the true knowledge and the 'complete certainty can only be obtained from revelation. This antagonism is sometimes stretched, even in Melanchthon, to an irreconcilable dualism. Thus he will not give the literal sense of a passage of Scripture, because it contradicts the judgment of reason. Nor will he allow the rule that an individual cannot be compounded of two disparate natures to be applied to the person of Jesus, nor is the principle that nothing comes from nothing to be applied to the creation of the world. Nevertheless, Melanchthon, even in the case of such purely supernatural doctrines, always seeks at least for analogies and for certain points of connection in the domain of philosophy. It was only for a time that he adopted Luther's external separation of philosophy and theology, as expounded in his discussion "*de discrimine Evangelii et Philosophiæ*," and so he continually asserts that there is only one truth. "*Una est veritas æterna et immota etiam in artibus.*" The two are indeed separated in so far as philosophy considers everything which falls under our reason, while theology considers the divine revelation. But the two do not contradict one another, for, although theology is the higher, both in its contents and as regards its source of knowledge, yet philosophy is also a positive preparation for it, a "*pædagogia in Christum.*" They are related to each other as the law and the gospel. Philosophy deals with universal and rationally necessary truths, while theology gives particular truths and the facts of the redemption through Christ.

This friendly attitude towards philosophy on the part of Melanchthon is connected with his own view of the Christian religion. Melanchthon is well aware that his theology is a peculiar form of the Protestant doctrine. The briefest



expression for his point of view would be that the fundamental idea of the Christianity of Melanchthon is the idea of free ethical personality. This appears most directly in his rejection of absolute predestination and his assertion of human freedom. We are, of course, referring now only to the later form of Melanchthon's doctrine. The direct influence of this idea is shown in his doctrine of the subjective appropriation of salvation, which rests not merely upon the action of God, but upon the active co-operation of man, as well as in the doctrines of the new obedience of the justified, and of the Church as a communion of saints. Even the more remote parts of the system are specially determined by this fundamental idea. God appears pre-eminently as the spirit full of wisdom and the freely creating personality; and the trinitarian self-unfolding of God is brought nearer to us by the illustrations presented in thinking and willing. His Christology also strives to pass beyond the Lutheran "*communicatio idiomatum*" to the real ethical unity in the God-man, Christ. In short, if a single principle is sought from which to explain the peculiar doctrinal definitions of Melanchthon, it is to be found in the idea of the free moral personality.

### III.

#### OSIANDER, ILLYRICUS, AND ORTHODOX LUTHERANISM.

The heroes are followed by the Epigons. The age of quick religious life and of free reformatory creativeness, is followed by the period of the Lutheran Scholasticism. The question is raised as to whether this scholasticism sprang from Luther or from Melanchthon. In our judgment it sprung neither from Luther alone nor from Melanchthon alone. From Melanchthon it learned to reduce the doctrines of faith to a fixed scheme of logical formulæ and distinctions. From Luther it inherited the respect for the external word and its main doctrinal contents, and it added, of itself, what was most essential to the system, the want of deep religious life and of free unprejudiced

science. This period of Lutheran Scholasticism was introduced by a series of ecclesiastical and dogmatic controversies, which resulted partly in the suppression of the Melancthonian tendency, which was suspected of being Calvinistic, and it partly subserved the dogmatic construction of certain points in the doctrinal system. This latter function was necessary as soon as the Protestant movement passed from the period of conflict to enter upon that of calm self-reflection. But the odious method of polemics as well as the often micrological investigation of unimportant accessories, was as lamentable as the narrow-mindedness which thought to secure the maintenance of pure doctrine only by suppression of the milder tendency, and which thus strained the opposition of the confessions beyond all measure. Of these controversies it is only those connected with the names of *Andreas Osiander* and *Flacius Illyricus* that are of any importance for us here.

1. The assertion of Osiander,<sup>1</sup> that justification does not consist in merely declaring the individual to be righteous, but in making him essentially righteous, may appear at the first glance as a relapse into Catholicism. The truth, however, is that this view arose from the endeavour to show an objective connection between justification and the sanctification resulting from regeneration; and it stood in the closest connection with the whole view of the relation of God to man, which, on account of its mystical character, met with but little approbation. Osiander asserts "a real indwelling of the triune God in the religious subject, mediated objectively by the Word become man and subjectively by the believing appropriation of the Word; and, according to this view, the subject is justified or made righteous by this union with the absolute principle of righteousness realized in faith, although the principle only gradually abolishes sin in man" (Heberle). The real divine life rests upon the knowledge of God, and this knowledge upon the Word of God; for the eternal Word of God, which is the Son of God, is His own self-knowledge, or the totality of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Heberle in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1844. A. Ritschl in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1857.

ideas in which God perfectly knows Himself. This Word was ideally eternal with God, and it received real existence in the person of the God-man, Christ. This God-man is therefore the perfect image of God. Adam was created after this human nature of Christ, and therein consisted his possession of the image of God. At the same time, Adam possessed before the Fall a perfect knowledge of God, and became participative of the divine nature through this knowledge, and he was thus raised to inward fellowship with God. By sin we have lost this fellowship, and in order to save us God sent Christ as a mediator. Christ has reconciled us to God by fulfilment of the law and the endurance of punishment, and He brings us the announcement of the forgiveness of sin and justification as the making man righteous. The external word is the necessary mode in which the eternal Word works. In receiving the external word into us we also receive the eternal Word into us. We enter thereby into the inward communion with God that corresponds to our proper nature, or are justified. This justification is therefore not a mere "declaring righteous," but a "making righteous," consummated by the indwelling of the eternal Word in us, by which an inward union with God is effected. From this, sanctification or doing good actions directly follows of necessity.<sup>1</sup>

2. The controversy of Flacius Illyricus regarding Original Sin should naturally have led to the question as to whether, and in what degree, our faculty of knowledge is affected by the consequences of the Fall. But the controversy turned not upon the doctrine, but upon the words in which it was expressed, and it is a melancholy example of the empty explanations to which obstinate theologians are driven by their narrow adherence to mere logical distinctions. With hardly a difference between them on reality, they fought with unbounded vehemence over the question whether the word "substance" or the word "accident" was to be adopted.—Flacius sometimes expressed views of general significance, as that the innate knowledge of God is full of error and deception,

<sup>1</sup> The affinity of these views with those of Servetus may suggest itself.

that reason is the most obstinate enemy of God, and that it is the source of all evils, without, however, drawing further consequences from these positions.

3. The *Formula Consensus* or "Form of Concord" brought these controversies to a certain issue. With it properly commences the Lutheran Scholasticism as the period of the "ecclesiastical dogmatics." In Joh. Gerhard (1582-1637) we still find real living piety, and he has even composed writings of an ascetic and edifying kind in the spirit of an Arndt. Of the later theologians, Hutter, Calov, König, Quenstedt, Hollaz, and others embody the spirit of their theology in noteworthy contrast to its recognised definition. Quenstedt defines theology in the same way as König, as the practical habit of knowledge regarding the true religion by which, after the Fall, man was to be brought to life by faith in Christ, which proceeds from the Holy Spirit and the written word. Accordingly, theology and religion still appear to be a concern of life, but closer examination shows that it is only a matter of knowledge. Dogmatic theology, while founded upon the Scriptures, is ruled confessionally by the symbolical books, and it is elaborated down to the most subordinate doctrines. God is the absolute all-conditioning Being; according to the dogma of the ancient Church, He is three persons in one substance. Man was created as the image of God in innocence and with the joy of Paradise, in order that, by free decision for the good, he might become an eternal participator of the blessed life in communion with God. The fall brought Adam and his descendants under the dominion of sin, and its punishment is the wrath of God and eternal damnation. Moved by ineffable love, God determined to save sinful man. God the Son became man in Jesus. He fulfilled the Law in perfect obedience, expiated the guilt of men by His death, and procured salvation for all. Awakened out of the grave, he was raised to kingly dominion in heaven. In the Church the Holy Spirit effects the conversion of the individual by the word and sacraments in so far as he is but willing to yield himself to its operation. In faith he then lays hold of the

merit of Christ; and, notwithstanding his sins, he is declared by God out of His mere compassion to be held as righteous. The culmination of the gradually advancing appropriation of salvation is the mystical union with God. Faith is indeed defined as a firm trust (*assensus et fiducia*) in the merit of Christ, and sanctification is designated its fruit. But in reality the interest of these theologians was so exclusively occupied with the purity of their doctrine, that faith was commonly represented as merely assent to the doctrines of the Church. This made no change on the distinction between the *Articulæ fundamentales* and the *Articulæ non fundamentales*. It is only in respect of the latter that there is no danger to our own salvation from not knowing or not accepting them. The former are distinguished into doctrines which must necessarily be known and accepted (*primarii*) and doctrines the knowledge of which is not exactly necessary, but are such that when once known they cannot be denied (*secundarii*). The arrangement of the several doctrines under these categories, however, is not fixed, but varies.

The question regarding the source of knowledge in theology is commonly discussed in the *Prolegomena* to the dogmatic systems. This source is always regarded as the immediate divine revelation, and the contents of revelation are laid down in the Holy Scriptures. The question regarding the possibility of a revelation is still entirely foreign to that age; it only strives, by exactly determining the nature of inspiration, to exclude any doubt as to even one word of Scripture not being of divine origin. Inspiration is analyzed with this view into a number of distinct factors, *impulsus ad scribendum*, *suggestio rerum*, *suggestio verborum*, *directio animi*. Hence Calovius says, entirely in the spirit of the time: "Non esset autem divinitus inspirata, si vel verbum in scripturis occurreret, quod non sit suggestum et inspiratum divinitus." Hence the immense excitement evoked in the whole Church by the controversy between the younger Buxtorf and Capellus regarding the integrity of the Masoretic text of the Old Testament (*c.* 1680); and hence, too, the distrust with which



the first critical investigations of the New Testament text were long afterwards received. Along with the revealed knowledge of God, all the dogmatic theologians, however, recognise also a natural knowledge of God, which is the foundation of a *theologia naturalis*, resting partly upon innate ideas (*innata*), and partly upon rational examination of Nature and History (*acquisita*). In a natural way we can thus attain a certain knowledge of God, but it is mostly restricted to knowing that God is; that He is one; that He is good and just; and that He is the rewarder of the good and the bad. How little the theologians were disposed to admit more than this of the natural knowledge of God, is shown by the case of the mathematician Erhard Weigel of Jena. In 1679, at the instance of the Theological Faculty, he was compelled formally to retract anything he might have said, "as if I had unduly presumed to give explanations of the Holy Scripture, or had undertaken to demonstrate the *Mysterium Trinitatis* from arithmetical principles, or had recognised in my lectures on Scripture what was considered heterodox and impious in the judgment of the theologians." On the other hand, it is interesting to notice how the section on the natural knowledge of God gradually grows in extent and importance among the dogmatic theologians. In 1676, Baier, in his *Disputatio inauguralis theologica exhibens synopsis theologicæ naturalis collatæ cum theologia revelata*, gives a comparison of Natural and Revealed religion, in which they are represented as running parallel to each other in all points, natural religion having its goal in eternal life, and is the means of attaining the knowledge and service of God. On this recognition of a natural knowledge of God rests the well-known distinction between *Articuli puri* and *Articuli mixti*; the latter can be known by the natural light of reason, but the former only from divine revelation. This view is also supported by the consideration that reason and revelation both come from God, and therefore cannot contradict each other; and while it is true that revelation contains much that reason does not comprehend, it is not contrary to reason, but only above



reason. This relation, however, applies only to reason as before the Fall and after Regeneration. The reason of the unregenerate does not always respect the limits set to it by Nature, and it thus occasions the actually existing contradictions between reason and revelation.

These statements already indicate the position assigned within dogmatics to philosophy as the science of reason; it serves for the definition of conceptions, for the establishment of lower truths, and for the refutation of the nonsensical. Joh. Gerhard and Balthasar Meisner spoke the decisive word on this question, and all the others followed them in essentials. Gerhard, in his *Methodus studii theologiæ* (Jenæ 1620), recognises a threefold use of philosophy within theology, as a *usus ὀργανικός, κατασκευαστικός, ἀνασκευαστικός*. Philosophy serves as an organon, in so far as it sharpens the human mind and prepares it for all higher studies. The concrete sciences of philosophy likewise serve for the explanation of some conceptions (*in quorundam terminorum explicatione inserviunt*). Certainly only "some" conceptions, for there are conceptions in theology (*mere theologici*) which can only be derived from the Scriptures, such as "Christ," "election," and others; and their use is only to "serve," for theology may apply such conceptions according to its own principle in quite a different sense from that in which they are employed in philosophy. Of the instrumental Sciences of philosophy, Logic furnishes Theology with rules about definition, division, method, and proof, while Rhetoric gives laws of eloquence. The second use of philosophy, the furnishing of proofs, applies only to the *Articuli mixti*, and even here, not in the first line (*primario*), but only in the second (*secundario*), nor yet as being necessary, but only as by way of superabundance (*ἐκ περισσίας*). The *Articuli puri* cannot be proved by principles of reason, but can only be elucidated (*illustrationis gratia*) by analogies taken from Nature. And even this must be done with such caution that the difference of the two things shall at the same time be pointed out. In the third place, philosophy may be used for the refutation of

false opinions, yet only of those which we can judge of by the natural reason, and even here only in a secondary way. The meaning of the threefold misuse of philosophy, which Gerhard opposes to its use, arises simply from its opposition to theology.

Balthasar Meisner, in his *Philosophia sobria* (Giessen 1611), likewise finds the first use of philosophy in the fact that it prepares our mind for the study of theology. This preparation, however, refers only to knowledge (*cognitio*) and not to assent (*assensus*), which is the work of the Holy Spirit. In relation to the object of theology, philosophy serves for διδασκαλία, ἔλεγχος, ἐξηγήσεις, that is, for exposition, justification, and biblical proof of the theological propositions. Only the first of these needs any explanation. It finds its place in reference to simple notions, such as questions and consequences. The former are either pure, as being biblical in their expression, or ecclesiastical, as being formed from the language of the Church according to the sense of the Bible. It is only in connection with the latter that philosophy is to be taken into account. Inferences are either purely theological, or are only applied to theology, as for instance the theologian must also know whether the powers of the soul are really distinguished. Questions deal either with purely theological conceptions, or partly with theological and partly with philosophical conceptions; and hence the distinction between *questiones puræ* and *questiones mixtæ*. The former class are alone claimed by theology for itself. With regard to the latter, philosophy is not merely useful for obtaining insight into them (*intelligentia*), but is even necessary, as philosophical conceptions can only be determined by philosophy. Proof (*confirmatio*) is adduced in the first line by theology, and proofs from philosophy are admissible only as an unnecessary supplement.—The more glorious the use of a thing is, so much the more dangerous is its misuse. Such a misuse arises when it is asserted that philosophy is sufficient to lead men to the knowledge of God and to religion, or to prove the propositions of faith, and above all when a

supremacy over theology is assigned to philosophy by judging of theological questions according to philosophical principles.

## IV.

## ULRICH ZWINGLI (1484-1531).

In the commencement of his treatise, *De vera et falsa Religione*,<sup>1</sup> Zwingli puts before himself the objection that it is too difficult a thing to undertake to give an exposition of the Christian Religion. He answers this objection by saying: *Quid facilius quisque exponat, quam religionem quam de Deo et ad Deum domi habet?* "What is easier to describe than the religion which every one has within himself from God and in relation to God?" Zwingli therefore consciously sets before himself the task of expounding what is present in his own inner life as a fact. Nevertheless, he feels himself secure against the reproach of thus exhibiting only what is a subject of human curiosity and of individual liking. For what human wisdom hatches from itself in a deceitful way is wrongly called Religion; true Religion rests only upon the divine word of Scripture. Hence two distinct questions arise: In what does true Religion consist? and How does man attain to it?

Religion is a reciprocal relation; and it therefore includes two members, the one member of the relation being that towards which the religion strives, and the other member being the one that strives after the other through religion; the former is God, and the latter is man. In order to know the essence of Religion, we must take both these members into account, for their right relation to each other, as corresponding to the essential nature of both, is true religion, whereas their wrong relation is false religion.

<sup>1</sup> Of Zwingli's writings the most important in this connection are his *De vera et falsa religione Commentarius*, and his *Sermonis de Providentia Dei anamnema*. Compare also Sigwart, *Ulrich Zwingli*, Stuttg. 1856. Sigwart expressly refers to the dependence of Zwingli on Picus of Mirandola.

The essence of God consists, first of all, in infinite being. God accordingly designates Himself as "I am that I am" (Ex. iii. 13), that is, I am He who is of Himself, who is of His own power, who is Being Itself. These words thus indicate that God is the only one to whom being belongs in virtue of His own nature, while all other things derive their being from Him. Hence God alone has being of Himself and gives being to all things, in such a way that they could not be in any way or for a moment if God were not. And hence, too, God is necessarily one and infinite and eternal; and on this account He is also the highest good. In Gen. i. 31, all existing things are called good, whereas according to Luke xviii. 18, God alone is good. These two expressions can only be united with each other on the ground that all things are God, that is, that they are, in so far as God is and constitutes their essence; and so it is said in Rom. xi. 36, that all things are of Him, and through Him, and in Him. Again, God is the highest good, not in the sense that He may be compared with other goods, and that He surpasses them in worth, but in that He is solely and perfectly good, whereas all things are only good in so far as they are through God and participate in Him. God is not good as an inert, inactive mass, but all things have motion, continuance, and life through and in Him. God is what the philosophers are wont to call *ἐντελέχεια* or *ἐνέργεια*, the perfect all-embracing always active Power which never ceases, never takes end, and is never uncertain, but which always so guides, directs, and governs all things that there cannot enter any want or error into the whole of things and actions by which His power could be hindered or His decree frustrated.

How much Zwingli is in earnest with this view of the immanence and universal activity of God, is clear from the fact that he shows by a detailed examination that the being of finite things is not different from the infinite being of God, and that secondary causes cannot be properly called causes at all.—All that is presented to our senses, including

the heavens and the earth, has its being, not of itself, but from a higher being, that is, from God. "There is only one infinite Being, so that all that is, is in Him, and that it is of Him that anything is and exists. But it is not of Him as if His being and existence were different from it; and thus it is established that what attains being and existence cannot be anything that is not God, for He is the being of all things." In proof of this proposition, Zwingli, first of all, adduces an example. The earth, a plant, an animal, man, in short, all that is—is always, although every thinkable change may occur upon it; for what appears to us to be perishing and ceasing to be is nothing but a change of the form, appearance, or mode of action of that which never ceases, and which always is and is in all things. As testimonies to this view, there are then quoted along with the words of Scripture, the relevant expressions of the heathen philosophers, and especially of Seneca.—Because it stands thus with things, there is likewise only one single cause of all that happens. Secondary causes can be called causes only in the sense in which the delegate of a person in authority is that person himself, or as a hammer and chisel are the cause of a brazen vessel. As all things are, subsist, live, are moved, and operate from One and in One, this One is also the only and real cause of all things; and what we otherwise invest with the name of cause, is not properly termed a cause, but should rather be called the hand or the organ with which the eternal Spirit works, and which He uses as His instrument. Secondary causes are thus termed causes only by metonymy, or merely by transference. Zwingli's combating of free-will was merely a consequence of this view, and it is to be noted that his objections to that doctrine are drawn from metaphysical and not from psychological considerations.

God is the highest good. In Zwingli this is the standing designation of God, and it is applied to Him because He is the ground of the being and working of all things. God is not this, however, as being the universal matter of all things, but as the infinite principle of motion and life, and hence He

is also infinite intelligence and will. "*Ejus sapientia cuncta agnoscuntur, etiam priusquam sint, ejus scientia cuncta intelliguntur, ejus prudentia cuncta disponuntur.*" God, in fact, would not be the highest good, were He not, at the same time, the highest wisdom and insight. It is true that this goes beyond our finite capacity of knowledge, but we would have to think of God as imperfect if we did not ascribe to Him the highest wisdom. God, then, is not mere power and activity, but He is also intelligence and wisdom, and to these two attributes, goodness must also be added. These three qualities, power, wisdom, and goodness, are inseparably one in God. In this Zwingli sees an analogue of the Trinity, which he receives into his system somewhat externally and directly from the ecclesiastical doctrine. On the unity of these three attributes, he also founds his view of Providence, which controls the whole of his system.

Further, the goodness belonging to God is infinite. Whereas men care only for themselves and have merely their own interests in view, God, as the highest good, must necessarily be beneficent. Nor is He so in the way in which we are so, when expecting recompense or honour for our goodness, but merely in order that His creatures may be gladdened by His goodness. According to the testimony of Scripture, it is the sole end of creation that the creatures shall enjoy God, their Creator and their highest good.

Of the whole creation, however, man alone is capable of enjoying God. Hence he appears as the head and flower of the whole material creation, and what is most perfect in him is his capacity for Religion. Zwingli's doctrine of Man becomes somewhat obscure by his not clearly distinguishing between the original state and the present condition of man. Man is the most wonderful of all the creatures; he is a spirit in a visible body, an intermediate creation, between the beings that are purely spiritual and those that are merely sensible. In his union of spirit and body, man is, as it were, an image of that union with the world into which God was to enter through His Son. Man thus consists of two com-



pletely different and hostile substances, each of which follows its own nature (*ingenium suum servat*). The spirit loves and honours the Deity to whom it is related, and strives after righteousness and innocence ; the flesh turns itself back to its origin, the mire and all that is base. Zwingli describes this opposition in vivid colours. He even appears sometimes to forget that earthly matter also comes from God and is permeated by His powers, and therefore cannot absolutely resist the Spirit. The question as to why God has created man in such a state of unhappiness, and put him into this intolerable discord with himself, is simply turned aside by a reference to the infinite power of God. The question why the spirit is punished when it is overcome by the flesh, although the flesh is also a part of man and was given to him by his Creator as well as his spirit, is touched upon, and it is answered that man falls under judgment because God has given him a law. The law corresponds to the inward striving and proper character of the spirit, and if man follows the flesh, he becomes subject to punishment. Sin entered the world in consequence of the selfishness which made Adam wish to be as God ; its consequence was death and incapacity for good. For it belongs to false religion to assert that man is only inclined to evil ; this would amount in religion to "twisting a rope out of sand or making an angel out of the devil."

The definition of Religion follows from these determinations regarding God and man, between whom Religion as a reciprocal relation exists. Its presupposition is sin, and the turning away of man from God, which has arisen in consequence of sin. Religion has its origin in the fact that God recalls man to Himself even when fleeing from before Him. When man sees his guilt, he despairs of the grace of God ; but as a father who, even while hating the folly or arrogance of his son, yet does not hate the son himself, so God has compassion on the broken heart of man, and recalls him with gentle voice to Himself. Religion thus begins on the side of God. God shows man that He knows well his disobedience, treachery, and misery, and thus He brings man to despair.

But, at the same time, He shows him the fulness of His goodness, so that man knows that God's grace is still greater than his own guilt, and that it is impossible to tear himself away from Him. He who is loved by God in this way, regards Him as his Father, and thereupon considers how he may please God. For religiousness is known from the zealous striving to live according to the will of God. It is a chief characteristic of Religion that man discovers nothing in himself that makes him well-pleasing to God; whereas he finds in God a willingness to bestow upon him all things. Religion is thus, when expressed in more modern terms, the consciousness of being completely determined by God or of being permeated by His Spirit.

Religion accordingly rests upon knowledge, and particularly upon the knowledge that God's grace and goodness are greater than man's sin and guilt, so that we can be and live only in, by, and with God. The second question, How does man attain to Religion? thus coincides with the question, How do we come to the knowledge of God and man?

Zwingli decidedly rejects the opinion that man can by his own power, and through his natural faculty of knowledge, attain insight into God, and thus reach true religion. The knowledge of man is impossible to us, because man is adroit in dissimulation, and no one shows himself as he is in truth. The knowledge of God is impossible to us, because the sublimity of God far transcends our weak power of comprehension. We can certainly know the existence of God; and although many wise men among the heathen, unable to ascribe the fulness of perfection to one single being, assumed the existence of many gods, there were others who advanced to knowledge of the unity of God. The much discussed passage in Rom. i. 19 says no more than that. On the other hand, we cannot know the essential nature of God of ourselves, any more than an insect can know the essential nature of man. For the eternal and infinite God is distinguished from man even far more than man is from the insect; and a comparison of any two creatures with each other would be far

more in place than the comparison of any creature with the Creator. Nay more, it argues the audacity of a Lucifer or of a Prometheus for any one to presume to know the essential nature of God in any other way than by the power of the divine Spirit. Hence what is taken by the theologians from philosophy as statements regarding the essence of God, is but mere illusion and false Religion; and if we cannot know the essential nature either of man or of God in this way, far less can we thus attain to knowledge of the true reciprocal relation between them.

The right knowledge of God and man, and consequently of the true religion, rests entirely upon divine revelation. Zwingli, however, does not proceed to explain in detail the nature of revelation and its relation to natural knowledge, although the foregoing determination regarding the immanence and the universal activity of God might well have led him to do so. The divine revelation is primarily an immediate internal illumination by the Holy Spirit of God. This illumination comes to man in accordance with his nature. Hence Zwingli refers the law of Nature with such emphasis to divine revelation. And hence this law of Nature—in such forms as “what thou wilt not have done to thee, do not to any other”—is held to be completely equivalent to the revelation in Scripture. This purely internal revelation is bound to no people nor to any specially elect persons; but as man is related by Nature on the spiritual side of his being to God, all men accordingly participate in this revelation. On this natural illumination is founded the fact that Zwingli is able to recognise Christians and believers, even among the heathen, as participating in salvation; and upon it also rest the several elements of a true knowledge of God which are found like scattered seeds among the heathen poets and philosophers. And it is only on this ground that we understand the fact that Zwingli cites the expressions of profane writers as “testimonies” along with passages of Scripture.

This internal revelation is not sufficient. The dulness, forgetfulness, and sinfulness of men prevent them from

correctly apprehending and preserving it; and so this universal revelation does not reach its goal because man sins. For an explanation of sin, Zwingli refers less to the psychological principle presented in the double nature of man than to the fact that sin is not dis severed from the universal activity of God. Even sin has to co-operate for the realization of the ultimate purpose of the Creation, namely, that finite beings shall know and enjoy God as the highest good. To the finite understanding, knowledge is possible only through opposites. Justice would not be known without injustice, nor good without evil. In this lies the necessity of sin. God, however, would not stop with sin, but His will was to lead man, through it, to full union with Himself. In a free decree of His love, equally eternal with the plan of creation, God has decreed to bring back man to communion with Himself. The special external revelation subserves the carrying out of this decree of redemption. Zwingli has not expressly explained himself with regard to the mode of this special revelation, but the sobriety of his critical exegesis proves that he did not recognise any specific difference in the interpretation of sacred and profane writings. Nor does he designate the Scriptures as holy from their being immediately inspired by God; but he does so designate those Scriptures that announce what the holy, pure, eternal, and infallible Spirit means. Further, the operation of the external word always presupposes the internal Word. The internal revelation must first prepare the heart, and only then can the external word find a good soil for itself.

The special external revelation passes through two stages: the revelation in the Law and the revelation in Christ. When Zwingli speaks of the Law, he commonly refers not to the natural law that rests upon universal internal revelation, and was known also to the heathen, but to the Law of the Old Testament. What was made known in heathendom by God's grace only to some specially favoured men, was communicated in the Jewish world to all by the institution and arrangement of a Commonwealth. As regards the

significance of the Old Testament Law, Zwingli contests the view that it established an independent and essentially valuable religion of legal obedience in such a way that man could and should have attained to communion with God by obeying the Law. The Law was given under the assumption that man would not fulfil it. But it was not given merely as a negative preparation for redemption in order to bring home to man the knowledge of his sin or of his incapacity for good, or, in a word, death. Instead of condemning and terrifying us, the Law was to announce to us the will and inner nature of God. Thus the commandment, "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind," teaches us that God Himself loves man and all His creatures, and that we ought to love Him in return. Thus by His Law God communicates to us a twofold knowledge, namely, that we are born to know Him, and that we are destined to enjoy Him. But as God allows each of the two constituents of man to work according to its proper internal nature, the spirit lends its ear to divine things, while the flesh turns itself away from them. If the flesh were completely to subject itself, man would be an angel; if the spirit were to degenerate by combination with the flesh, man would be a beast. Now, by the Law the spirit experiences a strengthening from above, as even the body is, exists, and lives by the power of God. The revelation in the Law is therefore in its essence quite the same as the universal internal revelation; and it is likewise the same as the highest revelation of God in the person of Christ.

This highest revelation is distinguished from the former only by greater distinctness and certainty. In order to bring men actually to communion with God, a new life must be implanted in them. And this has been done by the sending of Christ. For in the person of Christ God has become man, and in Him the divine and human nature is united into the unity of a personal life. As the soul and body in man, so does the divine and human nature in Christ form an inseparable unity. Yet the two natures continue to be different in



their essence and their mode of action. Hence the divine revelation culminates in Christ, because the fulness of the divine Spirit has appeared in Him; and hence Christ is the commencement of the complete unity of man with God, because in Him this unity was first realized. The work of Christ consists in the restoration of humanity by a newly-connected relation to God, and this work is described by Zwingli by the aid of the previous ecclesiastical definitions. We obtain an interest in this work of Christ by the communication of the Holy Spirit, which proceeds from the Father and brings the individual to the living communion with God that has its foundation in Christ. God is called the Holy Spirit in so far as He effects a holy, religious life. This Spirit works inwardly and immediately in the heart of the individual. He is the special and immediate principle of the appropriation of salvation; all external institutions, such as the Word, the Church, and the Sacraments, being only means in His hand. Faith, as undivided surrender to God and immediate union with God, is not at all a work of man, but is the work of the divine Spirit alone. This is not far from the view that lowers the historical Christ to a mere visible representation of what is given by the immediate operation of God, and can be produced by that operation only. Zwingli, however, is far from holding this view; but it cannot be overlooked that two entirely different elements of his system are here rather put externally side by side than internally mediated with each other. In this connection a distinction comes out even in Zwingli between the philosopher and the ecclesiastical theologian. The former sees in Christ only the historical embodiment and the personal representation of a universal process, while the latter strives to apprehend the person of Christ as of unique and peculiar significance in universal history. It would lead us, however, beyond the scope of our present exposition to consider these tendencies in further detail.



## V.

## JOHN CALVIN (1509-1564).

A peculiar character was impressed upon the Reformation by the influence of Calvin. It consisted mainly in the great emphasis that was laid upon the verification of inward holiness in the outward life. Calvin wished to establish at Geneva a community of the holy God in which in all the manifestations of private, public, domestic, and civil life expression would be given to the fact that its members were the elect of God and the redeemed by Christ. And notwithstanding many great oppositions and difficulties, his powerful spirit succeeded, as far as such an undertaking can succeed, in changing a great commonwealth of weak, sinful men into a City of God.

It naturally fell to him as a later Reformer rather to complete the structure of the Church's Doctrine than to lay a new foundation for it. His far-reaching influence as a teacher rests more upon the firmness of his inward conviction, the clearness and conciseness of his representation, and the rounded, systematic arrangement of his theology, than upon any novelty or peculiarity in his mode of apprehension. We do not find in Calvin, as we have found in Zwingli, anything like a comprehensive system of philosophical and religious speculation. His *Institutio Religionis Christianæ* is indeed constructed according to a special form. The two members of Religion are God and man; and hence the chief interest turns upon the corresponding knowledge of God and man. The further division of the Institutes into four parts—treating respectively of God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit, and the Church—is borrowed from the Apostles' Creed. As these two divisions cross each other, Calvin treats first of God as the Creator, and of man as originally created good; then of God as Redeemer, and of man as fallen; next of God in so far as He acts subjectively in the appropriation of salvation

as the Holy Spirit, and of man as laying hold of this salvation in faith; and lastly, he treats of the Church as an institution for the mediation of salvation. The knowledge of God is the ultimate goal of a blessed life. There is a certain knowledge of God that is innate in us, and we are also able, by examination of Nature as the work of God, to know God. But on account of our weakness, particularly in consequence of sin, this natural knowledge of God does not suffice for salvation, and we thus need the knowledge of God that is immediately communicated to us in revelation.—Regarding the relation of God to the world, Calvin shares the view that was common to all the Reformers, with the exception of Melanchthon in his later period, namely, that everything in the world is determined by the absolute power of God. We do not find in Calvin any speculations about the essence of God and His relation to the world as following therefrom; but, on the other hand, the view is emphatically and repeatedly accentuated, that all that happens in the world is dependent on the absolute decree of God, which as such is eternal and unchangeable. Nor does Calvin shrink from the extremest consequence of predestination in the rejection of the godless and their eternal damnation.

The peculiar character of a doctrine becomes most certainly and clearly known from the controversies which evolve what was involved in it.<sup>1</sup>

Calvin had already maintained the doctrine of predestination in all its sharpness against the view of Pighius (1542), that grace depends upon foreknowledge, and that it therefore supports the free co-operating will and is present to every one who does not reject it, and against the view of Bolsec (1551), which was essentially the same as that of Pighius. In like manner, it was the question regarding the universality or particularity of divine grace and the question connected therewith regarding the significance of the human will in reference to the appropriation of salvation, that occasioned the great

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Alexander Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evang.-reformirten Kirche*, 2 Bde. Zürich 1844-47. *Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen*, 2 Bde. 1854-56.

Arminian schism at the Synod of Dort (1618-19). Amyraut (1596-1664) of Saumur tried to mitigate this same doctrine of predestination, nor was he expelled from the Church on account of his hypothetical Universalism.

These internal controversies of the Reformed Church show that everything was referred by its theologians to the universal activity of God. This is also shown by the circumstance that the chief of all the objections that were raised against the Calvinist system was, that it made God the author of evil. Hence we may undoubtedly characterize the special religious life embodied in the Calvinistic Churches by saying that in them everything is referred to the universal activity of God, or that the consciousness of dependence solely on God lies at the basis of everything, whereas in the Lutheran Church the consciousness of the personal forgiveness of sins is the essential principle, and accordingly the doctrine of justification by faith alone is the fundamental dogma. The dogmatic theology of the Calvinistic Church has thus to seek its sole controlling principle in theology proper as the doctrine of God, and it finds it in the principle of the universal divine activity. It is this conviction which determines the special Calvinistic doctrines. The assertion of the particularity of the divine decree of grace and the redemptive merit of Christ, of the irresistibility and inalienability of grace, are but consequences following from the doctrine of the universal divine activity. In like manner, the distinctive Christology and Sacramentarianism of the Reformed Churches point back to the striving to maintain the absolute dependence on God alone as their ultimate source.

The dogmatic theology of the Reformed Church thoroughly occupies the supranatural standpoint in the very same way as is done by that of the Lutheran Church. Man has indeed a natural knowledge of God, both innate by innate ideas and acquired from examination of the works of God. But it does not suffice to give a perfect knowledge of God, and still less to make known His decree of redemption and its execution through Christ. Hence the revelation of God must necessarily

supervene. It alone gives the right certainty to the natural knowledge of God, and completes it by making known the higher attributes, the Trinitarian nature, and the decree of Redemption; and this alone suffices for salvation. On this point we find in the Calvinistic and Lutheran dogmatics similar definitions in almost the same terms, and yet a noteworthy difference appears in the two confessions, which at least explains the objection of the Lutherans that the Calvinistic theologians conceded too much to reason. The following formula perhaps indicates this difference in the briefest way. The Lutherans emphasize the negative relation of the natural knowledge of God to the revealed knowledge of God, whereas the Calvinistic theologians emphasize the positive relation between them. The former prefer to give prominence to the fact that the natural knowledge of God is not sufficient; the latter bring out the view that it is a preliminary stage and a positive preparation for salvation, and that it is also a form of truth. This appears most unmistakeably in the keenly discussed question whether it may be said that natural reason or philosophy kindles the light of the Holy Spirit (*philosophiam seu rationem accendere lumen Spiritus Sancti*). The Calvinistic theologians generally, and not merely the otherwise notorious Keckermann, are wont to use this expression in order to bring out the positive relation of the natural revelation to the supernatural revelation, and of philosophy to theology, as well as to give recognition to the pre-Christian religion and wisdom as a certain divine revelation. It was so used perhaps with the view of being able to vindicate the salvation of the noble heathens, after the example of Zwingli. The Lutherans, such as Gerhard, Meisner, Mentzer, and others, are just as unanimous in their rejection of that proposition. They see the peculiar character of the divine revelation endangered by it, and too much conceded by it to the operation of the natural corrupt reason.

## VI.

## PROTESTANT CONTROVERSIES. VEDELIUS AND MUSÆUS.

The question as to how far philosophy is to be allowed to influence theology, led to a controversy between the two Confessions. This controversy,<sup>1</sup> which was always taken up again, and is wearisome and unpleasing in its details, throws an interesting light upon the "other spirit" which not merely separated the representatives of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches on the memorable day at Marburg, but which has operated up to the present time. Certainly it was only the heat of the contest that could drive the combatants to such extreme reproaches as that the Lutherans would give no place to philosophy in matters of theology, that they only asserted what stands on the Holy Scripture *verbis expressis*, and that the Reformed theologians assigned the supremacy to philosophy even in theology. More closely considered, the difference comes to far less than this, but its meaning undoubtedly is what these very extravagances of expression bring out, that in the Reformed Church more was allowed to the rational element than was admitted in the Lutheran Church.

It is well known that the controversies between the Lutherans and the representatives of the Reformed Churches took their beginning in Christology and the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. This was not accidental; on the contrary, these are just the doctrines of the Christian Faith in which the characteristic tendency of religion to find a connecting unity for the opposition of the divine and the human comes most directly to expression. Luther, influenced by mysticism,

<sup>1</sup> The following works which brought the literature of this controversy to a close, and which are instructive on account of their historical details, may be referred to: Nicolaus Vedelius, *Rationale theologicum, seu de necessitate et vero usu principiorum rationis ac philosophiæ in controversiis theologicis* l. tres, Geneva 1628; Johannes Musæus, *De usu principiorum rationis et philosophiæ in controversiis theologicis* l. tres. Nicolai Vedelii, *Rationali theologico potissimum oppositi*, Jenæ 1644.

here at least desired an immediate oneness of the two opposites. Zwingli, holding by the universal activity of God, in contrast to which all middle causes lose their significance and independent activity, had no interest to go beyond the sober intellectual view of the Sacraments as symbolical signs, and of the person of Christ as a union of the divine and human in the way in which every man unites soul and body in himself. Thus do we now explain the difference, but at that time the matter lay otherwise. The question then was not to explain why the one asserted one thing and the other another thing; the point was to prove which view was the right one. The common basis for this investigation was given in the fact that the Scripture alone could give the decision in questions of faith. The efforts put forth with a view to the interpretation of the Scripture in regard to the person of Christ and the Lord's Supper, thus formed the starting-point of those explanations which we are here concerned with.

It is known that Luther at the colloquy at Marburg (Oct. 1529) wrote upon the table the words of the Scripture, "this is my body," in order to be even outwardly reminded of what he could not give up. And Luther's confession is likewise known, that he would have but too gladly given up the bodily presence of Christ in the Supper, but the word of Scripture had been too powerful for him. In like manner, the Lutherans afterwards commonly referred to the literal word, and turned themselves in an unreserved polemic against all attempts to interpret it in another sense. This was the reason why the Reformed theologians objected to the Lutherans, that they wished to have all use of reason excluded from the interpretation of Scripture, from whence it followed that they could only teach what was verbally contained in the Scriptures "*quod totidem literis et syllabis aut verbis saltem synonymis in scriptura sacra continetur.*" Occasion for this assertion was given for instance by Chemnitius, who, in his inquiry regarding the Lord's Supper, gives the exhortation that we should not allow ourselves to be led away by the devil, or be turned aside by profane disputations or remote



questions from the word of Christ; and he adds that the importance of keeping in view only the sacred words of our Saviour is shown by the repugnance of opponents to the "letter," as they say. The main concern is to keep in view the spoken words of the Institution (*τὸ ῥητόν* verborum institutionis) without giving heed to the principles of physics. Lucas Osiander likewise desires to give the go-by to philosophy as soon as we have to do with theological questions, and he holds that in considering the mysteries of religion we need give no regard to the axioms of Physics.—As against such incriminating witnesses, it was easy for the Lutherans to repudiate the assertion of the Reformed theologians as an unfounded exaggeration. Their actual procedure, no less than a series of express utterances of their most distinguished theologians, from Luther downwards, proved that they admitted the use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture, both in order to discover the correct meaning of Scripture in doubtful cases, and in order to draw consequences from the transmitted word.

This controversy was extremely opportune for the Catholics. They took up the objection that was advanced against the Lutherans from the side of the Calvinists, and on the ground of it they threw out a challenge to all Protestants. The Catholics certainly recognised the Scripture as the source of religious knowledge, but they held that Tradition went along with it. They further maintained that God had instituted a continuous office of teaching, represented in the Councils or in the infallible Pope, and that they had the right to promulgate explanations of Scripture or continuations of doctrine with binding authority. Protestants emphasized the sole authority of Scripture without setting up any infallible guide to its interpretation. Hence it was asserted that either the individual has an entirely unlimited right of interpretation for himself, or that the letter of Scripture is absolutely binding. At present, the former alternative is pressed against us by the Catholics; in that age the latter alternative evidently came readier to hand. We find it first expressed in the

“Réplique à la response du serenissime roy de la grand’ Bretagne” (3rd ed. Paris 1633) of the Cardinal Du Perron, Archbishop of Sens. In the apologetic interest of his Church, he argues that the majority of the Articles of Faith are not contained with express words in Scripture, but are only deduced from it by inferences. In order to reach these Articles of Faith we need the instrument of reason, which takes up as it were a middle place between the Scriptures and inferences from them. Faith, however, thus becomes uncertain and merely probable; a certain faith only arises if the Church comes as an external authority between us and the Scriptures.—Vedelius mentions several Jesuits who urged these considerations in combating the Protestants. Gonterius takes up the controversy with the Protestants on the ground of the authority of the Scriptures as recognised on both sides. He argues that whoever draws consequences from the words of Scripture, leaves this ground and applies the principles of natural reason; and that the arguments of the Protestants therefore only deserve consideration if they are found verbally in the Scriptures. The Jesuit Arnold likewise proceeded in a similar way. This theory was systematically developed and applied in detail by the Jesuit Franciscus Veronius in his *Methodus Veroniana* (Cologne 1628). According to his view, the common principle of all the Confessions that had fallen away from Rome, is that the Scriptures, as the canon of all truth, contain all that is necessary for the worship of God and our own salvation, and hence all the doctrines relevant thereto must be measured by them as the highest rule. The representatives of these Confessions are, therefore, bound to form their faith out of the Scriptures in such a way that it shall be verbally contained in Scripture without taking from, adding to, or changing anything; and this is only admissible by putting in place of the words of Scripture a completely synonymous expression, whereas by the admission of consequences too much would be allowed to natural reason. Bartholdus Nihusius, who, it appears, went over to the Catholic Church from somewhat questionable motives (1616),

developes the same thought in his *Ars nova* (Hildesheim 1632), which was directed against G. Calixtus and C. Hornejus. According to his own statement, he was led to change his Church because the assertion made by the Lutherans, that there were many dogmas contained in Scripture that were contrary to the Roman doctrine, had been found by him to be false. He urges the objection against the Lutherans, and especially against Calixtus, that he had derived many dogmas from the Scriptures which were neither contained in express words in them, nor could be derived by certain inference from them. In detailed exegetical argumentation, the motive of which is thus indicated, he seeks to show, with remarkable subtlety, that the Catholic doctrines of the withdrawal of the cup, of divorce, of celibacy, and of the mass cannot be refuted on grounds of Scripture. Calixtus, in a thoroughgoing reply (*Tractatus de Arte nova*, etc., Frankf. 1652), gives consideration also to the earlier representatives of his opponent's view, but they appear to be known to him in part only from the work of Vedelius. The other controversial writings that were published on the subject are not of much importance.

The Lutherans therefore repudiated, as a groundless exaggeration, the assertion of the Reformed theologians, that in their interpretation of Scripture they admit no application of reason and of philosophical principles, and that they fall back merely upon the words of the text. In this the Lutherans were undoubtedly right. The difference between them only comes properly out when the question is put, Up to what degree and in what way may the principles of natural reason or of philosophy find application in theological questions, and especially in the interpretation of Scripture? The explanations given regarding the mode of expression are entirely unessential, and the principles of nature, of reason, and of philosophy are held to be essentially synonymous. In regard to the matter itself, it must be continually kept in view that the Reformed Theologians prefer to make the difference as small as possible, whereas the Lutherans are disposed

to increase it to the utmost. Even Vedelius, the leading champion upon the Calvinistic side, admits that the Holy Scripture, the mysteries, and the Articles of Faith do not require proof, and that the question of the application of principles of reason is related to the theological controversies only so far as concerns the establishment of the correct meaning of Scripture with a view to their settlement. Besides, the distinction of the *questiones puræ* and the *questiones mixtæ*, of which the former completely transcend the comprehension of human reason, is not rejected, and emphasis is laid upon the position, that in every theological question the Middle Term (*medius terminus*) must be taken from Scripture. Further, the principles of reason are not to be used as *principia* but as *instrumenta* of knowledge and inference, and not *primario* but only *secundario*, or merely as auxiliaries to the Scripture proof. The Scholastic method of resolving theological questions by reason and without the word of God, is rejected as entirely inadmissible, on the ground that philosophy does not rule or direct, but only serves in theology. It is held, however, that to support theological positions, not only on theological grounds but also on philosophical principles, is permissible but not necessary; the principles of reason have properly the position of being mere auxiliaries of the proof from Scripture. In applying them, the Middle Term must necessarily be taken from Scripture. If this term is combined with the Minor, the connection is to be established from Scripture, and only as it were *ex abundanti* from reason. If it is combined with the Major, the connection is either expressly contained in Scripture, or it must be got from it by interpretation and comparison of passages. In the former case, the principles of reason are not required; in the latter, they are absolutely necessary. This is designated by Vedelius as the subject of dispute in the controversy.

Joh. Musæus, the worthy representative of an orthodoxy mitigated by genuine piety, follows the details of his opponent step by step, and seeks to lay bare their defects. What he

himself represents as truth (*vera sententia*) shows us a deeper penetration into the question and a living grasp of it. A question does not become theological by the fact that its conceptions are taken from Scripture, nor does a conception become theological by the fact that its verbal expression is taken from Scripture. The Scriptures contain many mere natural truths, such as that the sun rises and sets; and it is not possible that a proposition should be changed from being philosophical into being theological merely on account of the accidental circumstance that it has been received into the Scriptures. In order that a proposition may be theological, its contents must also be supernatural, and the middle term of a theological inference must stand in a relation to the major and minor that rests upon the peculiar divine contents of Scripture and theology, and not upon the letter of the Bible. In this sense all the inferences in theology must have their theological character. Hence, if it is at all admissible in theological inferences to take a premiss from the principles of natural reason, and if the claim of the "*Ars nova*" is to be decidedly rejected, the following law will hold good: "When a universal theological premiss is connected with a particular philosophical premiss, the inference follows very simply by the subordination of the individual case under the universal proposition." Thus all sin is forgiven on account of the merit of Christ when appropriated in faith. Murder is sin; therefore murder is forgiven, etc. But if the philosophical premiss is universal and the theological premiss is particular, then it must be carefully examined whether the philosophical principle in question is necessarily and universally valid (*absolute et simpliciter necessaria*), or applies only to a particular sphere and conditionally (*secundum quid et physice*). It is only in the former case that a correct inference is to be got by the mere subordination of the particular under the universal. In the latter case, this procedure leads to the greatest errors, as is proved by the example of the Reformed theologians, who infer thus: Every natural body is sensibly perceived where it is really present; Christ's body is not



sensibly perceived in the Lord's Supper; therefore it is not really present.

The difference between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic theologians thus comes out more sharply in Musæus than in the statements of Vedelius. It is evident that Musæus touches the distinction between them more correctly. This is only to be explained from the fact that the controversy, as soon as it was conducted on fundamental principles, culminated in the question as to whether the principle of contradiction is also valid in theological questions, and whether reason or philosophy has the right to adjudicate on alleged contradictions in theology. This point was raised of necessity, seeing that the Reformed theologians, in the controversy regarding Christology and the doctrine of the Supper, fell back at once upon universal principles, as when they argued that "the peculiar essence (*proprium*) of one nature cannot be communicated to another," that "every body is in a determinate place," "*finitum non est capax infiniti*." The position of the parties is quite correctly described by Vedelius, when he says that the Lutherans assert there would only be a contradiction in theological things if two expressions of the Word of God contradicted each other, but not if the expressions of Scripture were merely in contradiction with the rules of our natural thinking. It is unquestionably possible for the divine Omnipotence to make things which, according to our logic, are contradictory to each other, be at the same time; at all events, our darkened reason may not presume to judge about the mysteries of faith. To concede to Reason the right to judge of contradictions in matters of faith would amount to making her the mistress of theology. It would be an abuse of philosophy and an absurd heresy in which Calvinists and Photinians (Socinians) meet. The Calvinistic theologians claim for reason the right of deciding on the contradictions in any theological questions, and not merely in those questions which can be understood even by the natural reason, but also in matters that are purely mystical. All the reasons that are advanced for this position may be reduced to this one, that error is



contained in every contradiction, and therefore no truth of faith can contain a contradiction. While the Calvinists restrict themselves to this position, they emphatically repudiate the accusation of the Lutherans, that they elevate philosophy to be the mistress and judge in matters of faith. Conrad Hornejus, in his *De Progressu Disputandi Liber* (Frankf. 1624), tries to occupy a position intermediate between the two parties. He argues that the question as to whether this or that assertion contains a contradiction must be distinguished from the other question as to which member of this contradiction is true and which false. Philosophy answers the former question; a special science and, in the case before us, theology must answer the latter question. We have also to distinguish between a formal contradiction that is clearly presented in the words of a proposition, and a material contradiction where the contradiction is hidden in the attributed predicate. Philosophy again decides the former case, while the particular science as theology decides the latter. It is clear that the first distinction only carries out what the Calvinists meant when they ascribed to reason only the *decisio* and not the *discretio* of the contradiction, whereas the latter distinction, when put in application, issues in the opinion maintained by the Lutherans.—The question “*Utrum contradictoria credi possint*” was revived and discussed, without any substantially new or important result, in the later controversy between Christoph Matthias Pfaff (1686–1760) of Tübingen and Turretin of Geneva (1671–1737).

## SECTION THIRD.

### THE CULTIVATION OF PHILOSOPHY BEFORE DESCARTES.

#### I.

#### ARISTOTELIANISM AND RAMISM.

THE judgment formed at any time regarding the significance and value of philosophy, notwithstanding the often repeated distinction between philosophy in itself and the particular prevailing system, is never formed independently of that system. Hence, we cannot avoid giving a brief review of the condition of philosophy in the Schools during the period that we have now been considering. In doing so, we may take up the subject in connection with both the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches together; for apart from the fact that the Swiss Reformers, and especially Zwingli, took a more friendly attitude towards philosophy, and that Ramism strongly flourished for a period in the Reformed Church, the position of philosophy in both the Churches was fundamentally the same. The aversion at the outset to all secular science could not but cease as soon as the Church found time to develop its own purified doctrine systematically, and had occasion to defend itself from hostile attacks. The attempts made at the commencement to create a new philosophy passed almost all away without permanent influence, or at least without the formation of a school. Hence there was nothing else that could be done but to take up one of the ancient systems; and only Plato and Aristotle could come into consideration. But the history of the development before the Reformation has already shown that Plato obtained influence only over particular minds that had an inward affinity

to him, and that he led them mostly to innovations and to heretical divergences from the established doctrine of the Church. On the other hand, we have seen that Aristotle worked scholastically and far more universally from the very reason that many used his Logic without accepting the essential doctrines of his Metaphysics, and because he was pre-eminently fitted to give systematic development and formal completion to a doctrine that was already established and regarded as incontestable. With keen vision, Melanchthon had already recognised this. Hence he urgently recommended the study of Aristotle, and advanced it, according to his power, by his text-books. It was thus the influence of Melanchthon that helped on the Aristotelian philosophy till it flourished so greatly in the German Universities of the sixteenth century. For a time the designations Philippist and Aristotelian passed as synonymous.<sup>1</sup> Alongside of this movement, Ramism was more widely spread at least for a time.<sup>2</sup> The tour of Ramus through Germany and Switzerland (1568-70) already divided the representatives of science, in all the places visited by him, into two hostile camps. Some received him publicly as the great reformer of philosophy; others combated him as an audacious opponent of the infallible Stagirite. In Heidelberg public tumults broke out among the students; and when Ramus, on the 15th December 1659, was beginning to explain Cicero's oration pro Marcello, his opponents tore away the steps leading up to the reading-desk, and a French student supplied their place with his back. The wish of the Elector to secure him as a professor of philosophy failed from the opposition of the University. Beza again opposed his intention of teaching philosophy in Geneva, on the ground that it had been resolved at Geneva that logic and the other philosophical sciences were only to be taught there by those who did not diverge in the least (*ne tantillum quidem*) from

<sup>1</sup> On this point reference may be particularly made to Hermannus ab Elsvich, *De varia Aristotelis in scholis protestantium fortuna*, Wittenb. 1720.

<sup>2</sup> A detailed exposition of the movement called forth by the conflict between Ramism and Aristotelism is unfortunately still a desideratum. The best is that of Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Phil.* t. iv.

the opinions of Aristotle. In Strassburg, Basle, Zürich, and other cities, his presence was celebrated in every possible way.

After the death of Ramus this division continued. Many of his personal scholars spread his doctrines, such as Joh. Sturm in Strassburg, Freigius in Freiburg, and afterwards in Basle and Altdorf, Fabricius in Dusseldorf, and others. Beurusius of Dortmund, also one of his scholars, among other works in explanation of the philosophy of Ramus, wrote an introduction to the system with a learned comparison of the Dialectics of Ramus and Melancthon. Scribonius of Corbach wrote a *Triumphus Logicæ Ramicæ*. Among the theologians, the most distinguished Ramists were David Chytræus of Rostock, Caspar Pfaffrad of Helmstädt, and Piscator of Herborn. Ramists taught in almost all the Universities, even at Helmstädt and at Altdorf, the chief seats of Aristotelianism. But Aristotelianism had also its valiant representatives, of whom the most conspicuous were Caselius and Corn. Martinii at Helmstädt, and Phil. Scherb at Altdorf, who, in terms far from polite, refuses to allow any value to the new logic, because it led men away from the truth, instead of bringing them to it. Further, Jakob Schegk in Tübingen, who carried on a controversy with Ramus himself, Nicod. Frischlin, Zacharius Ursinus in Heidelberg, Dasypodius in Strassburg, and Matthæus Dresser, may be mentioned as among the leading Aristotelians. Numerous controversial writings flew hither and thither, but they have only come down to us in part, and they are generally quite unimportant. The frequent academic disputations of the time specially formed a wide field for the contests of the hostile parties. Along with all this, reconciliations and mediations were also attempted by the so-called *Ramei mixti et syncretistæ* or Philippo-Ramists. We may here mention only some of the most important, as P. Frisius, Rud. Goclenius, Otto Casmann, Barth. Keckermann, and J. H. Alstedt.

The conflict between the two schools ended with the complete suppression of Ramism. In Helmstädt, a statute of the year 1576 bound every teacher to teach the Aristotelian

philosophy as *veram et antiquam*; and, in 1597, the philosophy of Ramus was expressly forbidden. In Wittenberg also, where Ramism had been taught up till 1585 by some private teachers in the University, it was thought necessary to forbid it in 1603. In Leipsic, John Cramer, appointed as public professor for expounding the Organon of Aristotle, began to lecture *privatim* on the logic of Ramus. It was only after he had subscribed an assurance that he would avoid the "novum ac insolens docendi genus Petri Rami," and that he would teach to the best of his power the "vera sana receptaque doctrina Aristotelis," that the suspension which had been passed upon him was set aside. Nevertheless in 1591, Cramer was deposed as a Ramist and Calvinist; and it was decreed that whoever qualified for teaching in Leipsic must promise to teach nothing against Aristotle. In short, about the year 1625, the triumph of Aristotelianism in Germany, and especially in the Lutheran Universities, was complete. The attitude of the theologians was of considerable influence upon this question. It was decidedly for Aristotle. This was hardly due to the confessional opposition to the Calvinists; for although at the beginning Ramus stood in high authority in the Reformed Church, he afterwards shared the fate of Arminius, who, with the support of Rud. Snell, but opposed by Justus Lipsius and Scaliger, wished to naturalize Ramus in the Netherlands—a somewhat external combination which was prejudicial to both. On the other hand, the theologians objected to the Ramists, that they allowed to philosophy too great an influence upon theology. That this objection was justified, was shown even by the semi-Ramists Goclenius and Casmann. Rudolph Goclenius, the father (1547–1628), in his *Problemata Logica*, combats with all emphasis the extremely perverse opinion that it was wrong to refer the propositions concerning God to the rules of logic, and that logic was not an instrument for theology, but only for philosophy; for, he argued, we cannot discourse about the former without the light of logic. Again, in the *Dialectica Rami*, Goclenius openly says that logic is as

it were a light, not merely to teach philosophical things, but also to lighten up the heavenly mysteries of the sacred doctrine: "Nam conveniunt notiones et termini logici divinis et fidei rebus vel propriæ vel analogicæ." Among the orthodox theologians, Goclenius was opposed in the most decided way by Daniel Hofmann in his "*De usu et applicatione notionum logicarum ad res theologicas*" (Frankfurt 1596). Hofmann accused Goclenius of equalizing God with the creatures, and of being a Sacramentarian, an Arian, and such like. In like manner, Otto Casmann in his *Philosophiæ et Christianæ et veræ*, etc. (Frankfurt 1601), wishes the mysteries of the Faith to be logically treated, and holds that faith itself requires reason in order to attain to correct insight into the objects of faith. Notwithstanding all the subordination of philosophy under theology, he derives with unusual emphasis the philosophy that is attained by the use of the senses and of the reason likewise from God as the highest wisdom; and hence he holds that a contradiction of this theology with philosophy is impossible, and that the knowledge of it is even indispensable to the theologian.—Nor did Ramism fail to exercise a material influence upon the theological system. We may find an example of this in another semi-Ramist, Bartholomæus Keckermann with his *Systema ss. theologicæ* (ed. 2, Hanoviæ 1607). We read here not merely that "God designed to kindle in the human mind the light of His Holy Spirit by the two manifestly divine sciences (plane divinas) of Metaphysic and Logic;" but that the goal of religion is union with God (fruitio Dei tanquam summi boni), and its fruit is practical activity in holiness, appears more prominently in Keckermann than among the orthodox theologians of that time, so that, notwithstanding complete agreement in details, it cannot be doubted that the spirit of the system is a different one.—It was also a fact of some importance that the Catholic opponents made use of the Aristotelian logic; and the Protestants, as J. Gerhard expressly says, could only encounter them with success when they appeared in the same armour. But it was the relative worth



of the systems which decided the struggle ; and in this respect Aristotle was undoubtedly so much the stronger that the issue of the conflict could not be doubtful.—Let us glance somewhat more closely, by way of illustrating this, at the work of Alstedt which was then much used, and which has been highly esteemed even by Leibnitz. It is entitled *Cursus philosophici Encyclopædia*, l. xxvii. (Herborn 1631). Four preliminary explanations “præcognita philosophica” are prefixed to the encyclopædic survey, of which the first, entitled *Archologia*, promises to explain the principles of being and knowing. But of the principles of being we learn nothing further than that they fall into internal and external causes. The internal causes are matter and form ; the external are efficient cause and end. The former in the first line is God, and in the second, man equipped with reason and the natural desire after knowledge ; the latter is, at the highest, the glorification of God and the perfection of man. The use of philosophy in theology, jurisprudence, and medicine is a means of attaining this end. Of the principles of knowledge we learn nothing further than that they depend on the subject knowing, the object to be known, and the particular medium of knowledge. In like manner, the section entitled *Hexiologia*, in which he treats “de habitibus intellectualibus,” leads to nothing further than the theological division of knowledge into supernatural and natural, and the further division of natural knowledge into innate and acquired. The *Encyclopædia* then presents the eleven theoretical sciences, which include metaphysics, geography, optics, music, and architecture, next the five practical sciences, including history along with ethics, and finally the seven “poetical” sciences, including along with logic, mnemonic, oratoric, and the lexical science. The treatment of the details, like the general conception, is deficient in depth. Such a mode of reasoning was not capable of overthrowing the supremacy of Aristotle ; it could not but conduce to shallowness and superficiality of judgment, and hence it was opposed by all really earnest inquirers.

This period also shows an instance in which adherence to

Plato led to heretical positions. Eilhard Lubinus († 1621), a professor at Rostock, in his *Phosphorus, s. de prima causa et natura mali tractatus* (Rostock 1596), teaches that there are two eternal primordial principles, "Ens et Non-ens," Being and Nothing. Being or God is the efficient principle of all things; nothing is their matter. From the former they have their subsistence and the good; from the latter they have all their defects, evils, and badness. The first who raised his voice against Lubinus was Albert Grauer in the dedication of his treatise, *Absurda absurdorum absurdissima* (Magdeb. 1606); and he was followed by a whole series of famous theologians. The whole incident shows, as in similar former cases, that attachment to Plato is close to the danger of material divergences from the doctrine of the Church, and that, for the merely formal elaboration of the substance of the already-established doctrine, no philosophy was more adapted than the Aristotelian. This system was therefore zealously cultivated. Melanchthon had already done important service in the way of freeing the study of the Aristotelian philosophy from the bondage of the mediæval commentators, and guiding a return to its sources. But in 1596, Sal. Gesner still complains that "instead of the sources, any sort of text-books and extracts are introduced, such as could be taught in common schools or studied privately by any one," and that thence arose great ignorance in physics, ethics, and metaphysics. Soon, however, a deeper understanding of Aristotle took its rise at Helmstädt. Nevertheless, the expositions of metaphysics which were used in that period continued to be wholly limited to a superficial formalism which did not penetrate to the profounder questions. The oldest of these is the metaphysical treatise of the Spanish Jesuit Suarez, entitled *Disputationes Metaphysicæ* (1605). Metaphysics is represented as the necessary basis of theology; for only he who controls all objective knowledge can receive the highest knowledge into himself. Metaphysics is to be carefully distinguished from the individual sciences, such as dialectics and the practical branches of science; it treats of being as

such, and of things generally in their possible and actual determinations, individuality, and differences. Unity, goodness, and truth are represented as the universal properties of all that exists. Then follow explanations in detail of the relation of substance and accident, and that of cause and effect. Concrete being is divided into the infinite and the finite, and the latter is treated according to the scheme of the Aristotelian Categories.—Jacob Martini of Wittenberg proceeds in a similar way in his *Exercitationes Metaphysicæ* (1608). Metaphysics, he says, is the science of being as such. This being, whose real existence out of thinking is simply assumed, is either simple or conjunct, whence arise the distinctions of the positive and privative, of the actual and potential. In detailed explanations and subtile subdivisions, the conception of causality is then analysed. In this system, also, unity, truth, and goodness appear as the simple properties of being. The One unfolds itself into the universal and whole, differentiates itself into the individual, divides itself still more into individuals, and sinks down to mere numerical unity; and hence proceed the opposites of limited and unlimited, and of perfect and imperfect. Truth lies at the basis of all thinking, and is presupposed throughout as the agreement of things with the knowledge of them. The good is the perfection that belongs to being in itself; and it determines itself more closely according to the opposition of the natural and the moral good. Into this scheme real things, as got from empirical knowledge, are then introduced.—There is not much difference in the method of the other metaphysicians who were much used at that time, such as Christian Scheibler of Marburg in his *Opus metaphysicum* (1636), J. Scharff († 1660), and others.

These men attached themselves to Aristotle, but it went with them as with the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. They did not penetrate into the profounder and really metaphysical speculations of their great master, but even in their so-called metaphysical investigations they confined themselves to the formalism and schematism of logic. All philosophizing

was restricted to logic, and this logic did not trouble itself about the questions regarding the theory of knowledge which necessarily lead to metaphysics; it only dealt with the external form of the syllogism, with divisions carried out to the utmost, and with the mechanical arrangement of things in the formal outlines thus obtained. This is the very characteristic of Scholasticism. Everything must be classified, schematized, brought into the form of the syllogism, and proved according to a definite form of drawing conclusions. B. Meisner having raised the question in his *Philosophia Sobria* "an semper in forma syllogistica de rebus theologicis disputandum sit," and having answered it in the negative, Cornelius Martini of Helmstädt, in his *Analysis Logica* (1594), assails him in the most violent way with odious suspicions, intentional distortions, and coarse invectives; and Meisner finds it necessary to defend himself in detail in a "brevis admonitio contra C. Martini maledicentiam, iniquitatem, negligentiam" (1621). He shows that although every sound reasoning must be of such a kind that it can be reduced to the syllogistic form of Major and Minor, yet it is not absolutely necessary to bring it actually into this form. The representatives of the other view, however, undertook to prove everything that is possible by the aid of the syllogism, a method which was satirised even at that time in the ironical treatise, "*Mulieres homines non esse*" (Paris 1693), which was often regarded as an earnest production and zealously confuted. The author of this satire undertook in the gravest manner to show that "women are not men," by employing a syllogistic method that was without a loophole and unassailable by the rules of logic.

Philosophy thus entered into the closest connection, not to say intermixture, with theology. To this may be referred the habit, in metaphysical works, of treating the section on God and His attributes in disproportionate detail. Thus J. Scharf in his *Pneumatica seu scientia spirituum naturalis* gives a detailed "natural theology." Pneumatics is the doctrine of spirits, and it accordingly treats in the first place of the

infinite and independent Spirit, God. Although we can obtain by the light of reason only an approximate knowledge of God, yet Scharf gives prolix explanations regarding the attributes of God, His relation to the world, our relation to Him, and so on. This treatment of Natural Theology in philosophy might seem like a feeble beginning of a Philosophy of Religion, were it not that the treatment of the subject is so utterly lacking in independence. Instead of philosophical expositions regarding God, we find in this section of philosophy only an outline of the corresponding parts of dogmatics, at one time under a simple change of expression, and at another even without this. It is still more characteristic of the amalgamation of theology and philosophy in the Lutheran Scholasticism, that most of the examples employed in logic were borrowed from theology. Writers, like Beckmann in his *De modo solvendi sophismata* (Jena 1667), were fond of borrowing their examples of fallacies from the confessional polemics, and examples of correct inference from their own dogmatics. It is no wonder that, on their side, the theologians likewise reduced all their explanations to the forms of the correct syllogism. In particular, controversies were almost always treated in this way, and this is another reason why these writings have become so unpalatable to us now.

The results of this scholasticism may be here but briefly indicated. Among the later theologians personal living piety went on diminishing; and, in the place of faith, came knowledge about faith and orthodoxy, which was the means of leading to those petty controversies and hair-splitting distinctions that characterize the dogmatic theology of that period. Disputations were carried on regarding the language of our first parents and the logic of the angels. Inquiries were instituted "*de partu Virginis*." The question was discussed as to whether a single drop of Christ's blood would have been enough for the redemption of the human race; and among other things it was disputed whether the blood shed in Gethsemane remained united with the Deity, and whether Christ, at the day of judgment, would show the scars of His



wounds or not. It was the age of the most violent confessional polemics, when, on the Lutheran side, the inquiry was put, with all earnestness, as to whether the Calvinists should be called Christians, and it was openly declared that there was more need to beware of the Calvinists than of the Catholics. It was also the age in which the violent controversy about the *κρίψις* and *κένωσις* in Christology led to the most subtile distinctions.

## II.

### THE DANIEL HOFMANN CONTROVERSY (1598-1601).

The University of Helmstädt was founded by Duke Julius in the year 1576. By statute, the zealous cultivation of the Aristotelian philosophy, as the "*philosophia vera et antiqua*," was required, and the theological Faculty had at the outset completely the preponderance. It was strictly devoted to the Lutheran school, and Daniel Hofmann (1538-1611)<sup>1</sup> was the ruling spirit in it. Belonging at first to the philosophical Faculty, he had zealously lectured on the Aristotelian ethics and dialectics, but at the same time had opposed Piscator and Goclenius for their unjustified intermixing of philosophy with the mysteries of faith. With the accession of Duke Henry Julius to the government in 1589, an entirely different character was impressed upon the University of Helmstädt, and from that time humanistic and philosophical studies became predominant. J. Caselius (1533-1618), who was greatly celebrated as a Humanist, was called from Rostock, and he was followed by his colleague, Cornelius Martini (1568-1621), who, with peculiar zeal and great success, cultivated the Aristotelian philosophy of the schools, and especially logic and metaphysics. Along with them there also

<sup>1</sup> The fullest accounts of this Controversy are given by G. Thomasius (*De Controversia Hofmanniana*, Erlang. 1844) and E. Schlee (*Der Streit des Daniel Hofmann über das Verhältniss der Philosophie zur Theologie*, Marburg 1862). Schlee gives the external history of the Controversy, with complete references to the literature.



laboured at Helmstädt the mathematician Duncan Liddel, and Owen Gunther, a teacher of the Aristotelian physics and a Humanist. It is possible that these Humanists were not entirely without a tendency towards the anti-theological arrogance of the Italian Humanists, but this is far more strongly expressed in the reproaches of their theological opponents than seems to be justified by their writings as we now have them. It rather appears to be indubitable that Hofmann—to whom Mylius applied the well-known expression, “his hand is against every man, and every man’s hand is against him”—had been roused to the combat, not only from the fact that the humanistic philosophical spirit had superseded the rigidly theological spirit in the University, but also from his displeasure at Caselius superseding himself in the leadership of the academic body. Only thus can we explain how it was that Hofmann, in the struggle against the humanistic Aristotelians, could enter into an alliance with the representatives of Ramism which had been prohibited at Helmstädt in 1592, although they were far less in agreement with him on the controversy in question as to the relation of Philosophy to Theology than his opponents were.

After fermenting several years, the conflict broke out openly in February 1598, when Caspar Pfaffrad, a Ramist, graduated as Doctor of Theology under Hofmann, then Dean of the Faculty. The two set forth 101 theses,<sup>1</sup> in which the errors of the Scholastics and Arians, as well as of the Calvinists, in regard to the doctrine of God, the Trinity, and the person of Christ were derived from the intermixture of Philosophy with Theology. The most important of these theses ran thus: “Those who claim for Philosophy a right to the glorious grace of God, detract from that grace, and commit the sin against the Holy Ghost by not distinguishing between what is sacred and what is profane. But we admit that he who divests Philosophy of all approbation, in so far as it conducts itself in

<sup>1</sup> Propositiones de Deo et Christi tum persona tum officiis, asserentes puriorem confessionem Dr. Lutheri, feces scholasticas expurgantis, oppositæ Pontificiis et omnibus cauponantibus verbum Dei, Helmstädt 1598.

a right way and keeps within its own limits, and who simply rejects the use of it, insidiously attacks an ornament of the human race, a prerogative of human life and a beneficent gift of the Creator and Preserver of the world." Again, "Philosophy, which is worthy otherwise of all praise, is a robber in matters of Religion, as is clearly proved by the opposition between the elements of the world and the elements of Christ." It is accordingly maintained that the assertion made by Luther against the Sorbonne, that the same thing is not true in theology and philosophy, is well founded both in religion and in science. We should therefore leave dialectics and philosophy to their own sphere, and in the kingdom of faith, which lies above every sphere, we should learn to speak in new tongues, otherwise we shall put the new wine into old bottles, so that both will be spoiled. A whole series of examples is then adduced to prove that the Scholastics were brought by their philosophy to their errors regarding the knowledge of God, and that we ought to be carefully on our guard against Philosophy in matters of faith.

Hofmann wrote a preface to these Theses, for which he is alone responsible. He asserts that if any one reviews the history of the Church from the beginning till that time, he will observe that, next to the devil, it has never had a more violent enemy than reason and carnal wisdom, and that they claim supremacy in the doctrines of faith, so that their violence even exceeds the inhumanity of carnal tyrants, since they torture souls in the most violent manner, and draw them away most forcibly from the true knowledge of God. The more that human reason is cultivated by philosophical studies, it marches forward the more completely armed; and the more it loves itself, so much the more violently does it assail theology, and so much the more blinding are the errors which it invents. Wherever we look in Christendom, a wretched condition appears, because many theologians reduce the sublime Articles of Faith to carnal wisdom, and accustom young men to empty discussions. Hence Pfaffrad would bring the excessive meddling (*πολυπραγμοσύνη*) of human reason in matters

of faith to an end by refuting the Jesuits and Calvinists with all their arts, while the Ubiquitists, who have drawn from the same cistern of reason, are passed over in the meantime.

When Hofmann was called to account by the Consistory of the University on the accusation of the Philosophical Faculty, he expressly repudiated the explanation that he had not spoken "de usu," but "de abusu philosophiæ," though he afterwards went back to it. In a series of disputations and dissertations, the controversy was carried on with unworthy invectives, and it was confused, moreover, by the main conceptions—such as faith, reason, and others—being used by the disputants in different senses. At the same time the controversy was diverted from the main question regarding the right of philosophy in theology to other related questions regarding the natural knowledge of God and the double truth. At last, Hofmann was accused by the philosophers of having made philosophy contemptible and of having injured them personally, and, after a long investigation, he was deposed from his office in 1601, to which, however, he was again recalled in 1604. Along with Hofmann, there come forward only two literary representatives of his view, not taking into account the unimportant elaborations of it by some of his own pupils. One of these two literary representatives was Joh. Olearius, Hofmann's son-in-law and colleague, but afterwards Superintendent at Halle, who, in 1599, addressed an Apology to the Duke accompanied with a *Disputatio theologica de philosophicæ pio usu multiplicique abusu et sylagogia* (Halle 1601). The other was Gottfr. Schlüter, Superintendent at Göttingen, who, with the addition of abundant material, gave an exposition of the controversy favourable to Hofmann, in his *Explicatio certaminis quod de philosophiæ in regno et mysteriis fidei actione et usu deque veritate duplici humana et spiritualia adjectatur* (1601). On the side of Hofmann's opponents, besides those already named, we may further mention Alber Grauer, General Superintendent in Weimar, who sought, in a *Libellus de unica veritate* (1611), to defend philosophy against the objection of being Socinian and Calvinistic.

If we inquire into the impelling motives of this Controversy, it might be at first naturally supposed that the philosophers had claimed too much for themselves, and had thereby roused the theologians to oppose them. This supposition, however, is found to be erroneous, for the philosophers of Helmstädt do not contest even the supra-rationality of theology, and they demand for philosophy only the modest position of an organic and materially preparative auxiliary. Owen Günther goes the farthest. In a Programme of 11th March 1599, he puts forth the following thoughts: God, as the highest good, wished to communicate Himself by a rich outflow of His goodness to the world. He put man into the middle of it as His own image in order to dwell in him, and thereby to make him blessed. In consequence of the fall, and as a punishment, our spirit has been smitten with blindness and ignorance of the Creator and His works. Our will has also been made subject to lusts and to unrighteousness, yet God left us at least a trace of His former glory. We know that there is a God who is the just rewarder of the good and the bad. The will can also follow reason and choose the good instead of the bad. The Scriptures call the good the law of Nature, which is often overcome by the law of the flesh to unrighteousness. Both the will and the reason have become blunted and weak in the fulfilment of their function, and in order to arouse them the Creator has bestowed philosophy on man, which, being derived from the treasury of the divine Spirit, expels our dark ignorance and adjusts the obstinate conflict that is waged between good and evil. The contemplation of the universe has this effect, as it leads us necessarily to an indubitable conviction. From the discharge of this task arises the dignity of philosophy and the wrong of those who would exclude it from the Church, which is a real *σκυθῶν ῥῆσις*, not merely ignorance, but raving madness.—He expresses himself much more modestly in his treatise entitled *Theologiæ et Philosophiæ mutua amicitia ostensa* (Magdeburg 1600). Philosophy and Theology, he says, spring both from God; the former rests entirely upon innate principles of Nature, and is partly theoretical and partly

practical. Theology is partly mystical and is entirely revealed; it transcends all the conceptions of men and angels, and it is partly in agreement with reason. In this latter respect Philosophy and Theology agree with one another, both as theoretical and as practical knowledge. Philosophy gives proofs, whereas Theology demands a believing assent to its assertions. But even in this relation Theology is always the determining standard according to the words of the Psalm, "Thy word is a light to my feet." If Philosophy turns aside from this rule, she becomes a deceiver, and does not deserve the honourable name of Philosophy, as in doing so she is not merely opposed to Theology, but to herself. For the true Philosophy recognises Theology as her queen and mistress, and subordinates herself to Theology as a servant. The mystical Theology, however, goes beyond our reason, and hence a Philosophy that is conscious of her proper limits will never come into contradiction with it.

This is also the opinion of the other philosophers. They all hold that Philosophy and Theology both spring from God, and that the two are therefore in harmony with each other. Putting a contradiction between them is the same as putting a contradiction in God. This position is specially maintained by Liddel. It follows that there is only one truth. Of the objects of theology, there are some that we are able to know, for the natural knowledge of God is also true (Rom. i. 19, ii. 25). Other positions of theology—as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and such like—rest solely upon revelation, and cannot be cognized by reason. The doctrines of the first rank can be accepted merely from revelation, without the application of rational principles; in other words, they can only be believed. Corn. Martini uses for this distinction the expressions, "articuli puri aut mixti fidei, revelationis aut cognitionis," from which was formed the later dogmatic expression, "articuli puri et mixti." Philosophy has therefore a preparative relation to theology, *materialiter*, and its logical laws are also applicable to revealed theology, *formaliter*. For in theology two members of a contradictory opposition cannot be true at the same time.



The existence of such an opposition is shown by logic, but it does not decide which member is true and which is untrue.

Turning to the view of Hofmann, we find it particularly stated in the Theses mentioned above, in the *Notæ* to Gunther's Programme, and in the treatises entitled *De duplici veritate* and *Num Syllogismus rationis locum habeat in regno fidei*. His view rests on the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin. The philosophers reckoned reason as an inalienable part of the divine image, or at least they regarded its obscuration as of so little importance that they held it could be counteracted by philosophy. But Hofmann refers the corruption of the fallen nature to the faculty of knowledge also, and in the manner of Flacius he carries his view up to the assertion that we have not retained a trace of our former glory, but our mind and will now bear the image of the devil. Hence Hofmann is led on in some places to assert that philosophy is, even in the purely secular sphere, a work of the flesh, is hostile to God, is full of error, and is decidedly to be rejected. These, however, were exaggerations that were afterwards retracted. On calmer consideration, Hofmann admits that there is a true philosophy in the secular sphere.

This Philosophy assumes the most direct antagonism to Theology; instead of being a positive preparation, it is a decided enemy of the Christian Faith. "Because the reason of man is the chief enemy of God, the more prudent it is in its natural kind, the more refractory a beast it is, and the more does it set itself against the wisdom of God, which it regards as folly."—Hence is explained Hofmann's attitude towards the natural knowledge of God. He was inclined to deny it entirely. The passage in Jas. ii. 19 is explained as ironical, and even Rom. i. 19 and ii. 15 are so rendered that all true natural knowledge of God is called in question. But Hofmann had expressed himself otherwise in the Theses "*De notitiis innatis*" (1593), and he had finally to admit a natural knowledge of God. But the objective truth of that knowledge is always designated as only *falsa veritas*, and it is asserted that "what is true in philosophy is all false in theology," "that



if philosophy teaches there is a God, and that He is good, just, etc., this is a lie in theology," and that "if the unregenerate says there is a God, etc., he lies." This position becomes clear from the difference in the views held regarding the relation of belief to knowledge. According to Martini, belief is necessarily given along with knowledge; according to Hofmann, the heathen have a knowledge that there is a God, but not a belief accompanying that knowledge. Now the philosophers understand by truth the objective agreement of knowledge with the object known, whereas Hofmann understands by it the subjective certainty which rests, not upon knowledge, but upon the belief effected by the Holy Spirit. But this difference does not come clearly into the consciousness of the disputants, and so the controversy moves obscurely and confusedly around the *duplex veritas*. Although Hofmann does not therefore deny the natural knowledge of God, he reckons all the propositions of theology as belonging to the mysteries of faith; he therefore decidedly rejects the distinction between the *articuli puri* and *articuli mixti*, and speaks of truth only where these are grasped in faith, and therefore by the power of the Holy Spirit. Olearius expresses himself in like manner. He admits that the heathen may indeed know God from nature, yet reason is so corrupt that it regards the surest and truest doctrines concerning God's nature and will, the immortality of the soul, and such like, as lies, and so designates them.

This distinction of the subjective conviction, had it been clearly presented to the philosophers, would as little have been repudiated by them as the distinction of the source of knowledge. Philosophy rests upon natural reason; theology upon supernatural revelation. Now, in so far as the latter stands higher than the former, there are propositions, such as that the Word became flesh, which are absurd in philosophy, and yet are entirely true in theology. Philosophers may thus also speak so far of a "double truth," and emphatically repudiate a philosophical criticism of the mysteries of faith. Hofmann, on the supposition that a hostile invasion of the

sphere of theology by philosophy was to be regarded as inevitable, carries the unimportant opposition between them farther than was necessary. The Aristotelian philosophy, on the basis of its principle *ex nihilo nihil fieri*, teaches the eternity of the world, but theology teaches the opposite; and therefore of the two contradictory opposites, the one is philosophically true and the other is theologically true, giving a *duplex veritas de uno*. Generally the philosophical axioms lay claim to universal validity; but in theology they are not valid. Olearius carries the thought farther. He holds that such propositions as that "nothing comes from nothing," that "Matter, Form, and Privation are the principles of all things," that "the whole is greater than the parts," that "the sun cannot stand still," and others, are propositions which philosophy sets up as universally valid, but which are not valid in theology. He enters even closer into the main point when he says that philosophy mixes up God, nature, the human mind, and fate with one another, or even identifies them; that by its learning it excites doubts as to the divine truth, explains away the doings of God for the salvation of men as fables, and by the rules of dialectic and rhetoric perverts the simple truth of the Scriptures; that in the schools the heathen authors are read instead of the Bible, and so on.

Further, according to the philosophers, revealed theology is *above* reason, but not *contrary* to reason. By holding fast this distinction, they also demanded the application of logic even to the mysteries of faith, in so far at least as it might point out any contradictions. Hofmann rejects this position also. In the thesis of 1598, he had desiderated "*novæ linguæ*" for theology, and he afterwards combated still more emphatically the study of metaphysics as being favourable to the Sacramentarians, and of no use in Science. He also rejected the theological use of philosophical formulæ. He says that the Apostles on the day of Pentecost did not receive instruction in philosophy, that philosophical technicalities and "*termini Scholastici*" have been, at all times, only causes of theological controversies, and that to compel theology to

make use of the language of the schools of philosophy was an "intolerabile et impium onus." These expressions, however, were in part due only to the heat of the controversy, and Hofmann has again at times expressed himself as entirely agreeing with his opponents, that theology as a science cannot dispense with syllogistic form. This holds particularly with regard to the preaching of the divine word; for Hofmann maintains, against the Enthusiasts, the view of the *Formula Consensus*, that the external word is the means of conversion by God's ordinance. But he does not mean thereby a rational proving of the doctrines. As in the work of conversion, human reason holds an entirely positive relation, the act of conversion forms a transition from the *sylogismus rationis* to the *sylogismus fidei*. The former is applicable only to those contents of Scripture which are subjected to reason in an external service of the letter and in the refutation of heretics; but applied to the sphere of faith it leads to Pelagianism and Synergism. The "sylogismus fidei" obtains its certainty from the light of Christ, to which it is subordinated in obedience, but it is not more exactly described. The whole distinction, like the earlier one of the double truth of knowledge and belief, is founded upon the obscure idea that the religious certainty of faith, even when referring to the same object, is of an entirely different kind from the intellectual certainty of knowledge. This is a sort of intuitive apprehension which vainly strives in Hofmann and his adherents to find clear expression.

The controversy went on even after Hofmann's death, although upon another stage and under a different character. The adherents of Hofmann leave Helmstädt, but gather again in Magdeburg. Wenceslaus Schilling († 1637), private lecturer of the theological Faculty at Helmstädt, was excluded from the University on account of "his hostile disposition against the good arts (*bonas artes*) and philosophy." The jurist and philosopher, Joh. Angelius von Werdenhagen (1581-1652), who had been professor of the Aristotelian Ethics at Helmstädt from 1616, was deposed from his office

in 1618 on account of his violent attacks upon the indifferentism of the Humanists and the empty formalism of the theologians. Jacob Martini at Wittenberg wrote against them his "*Mirror of Reason* (Vernunftspiegel), that is, a fundamental and irresistible statement as to what reason along with its perfection (called philosophy) is, how far it extends, and especially of what use it is in matters of Religion" (Wittenberg 1618). Paul Slevogt, a philosopher and poet, corrector at Brunswick, may also be mentioned in this connection.

The peculiar character of this last phase of the controversy comes out in the fact that the followers of Hofmann were not, like himself, representatives of the great Lutheran orthodoxy, but turned to a peculiar mystical direction. In his *Ecclesiæ metaphysicæ visitatio*, etc. (Magdeburg 1619), and his *De notitiis naturalibus succincta consideratio* (Magdeburg 1616), Schilling goes beyond Hofmann, in so far as he rejects all natural knowledge of God. He holds that God is much too lofty to be known by the human understanding, that there is no innate knowledge, and that the most that can be inferred from Nature is that there is a God. The metaphysical definition of God as the *Ens* of whom it can only be said that it is "negatio nihili," does not reach the full knowledge of God. Nay more, the arguments for the existence of God, the physical and the moral as well as the metaphysical, are untenable when submitted to criticism. Calvinism, Socinianism, and Arianism are the consequences of undertaking to establish the divine mysteries by metaphysical speculations. A special controversy was carried on between Schilling and Jacob Martini as to whether the immortality of the soul can be proved on philosophical grounds, and it was the subject of a series of somewhat uncourteous, controversial treatises. In his "Invincible Booklet of Principles" (*Unüberwindliches Grundbüchlein*, Magdeburg 1617) he desiderates a simpler explanation of Scripture, such as will leave aside "dialectical figures and modes" as a roundabout babble of words, and will not waste itself in mere logomachy.

Mysticism takes a still more decided form in Werden-

hagen. Eight of his Academic discourses, which he delivered when a Professor at Helmstädt, are collected in his *Verus Christianismus fundamenta religionis continens* (Magdeburg 1618). The scholastic theologians are opposed in the most violent manner as “ratiocinistæ.” One is a genuine barbarian; another draws his termini from the midst of heathenism and even from stony Arabia, and thus the Word of God is judged contrary to His commandment, and the faith is desecrated. Whoever applies Aristotle to theology, perverts the divine irrefragable truth of the gospel by turning it into arbitrary phantasies and empty conceits. At most, only the ancient wisdom of the Egyptians may be applied to the mysteries of the Scriptures. As the centre and the way of all truth in all creatures is Christ, sacred things should only be spoken of in the sacred words of Scripture.

Against these writers, Jacob Martini wrote his “Mirror of Reason” (*Vernunftspiegel*) with great display of learning, breadth of sentiment, and vigorous robustness. Its first part treats of Reason, and the second part treats of Philosophy. Natural Reason, even after the Fall, exists in man, and is capable of knowing not only natural things, but also that God is, that He is one, eternal, and omnipotent, although it is entirely incapable of understanding the mysteries of the gospel of itself. Hence we ought, as has been always the case in the Church, to hold philosophy in high esteem as the fairest gift of God next to His word, and to employ its several sciences as much as possible in the service of theology.

Paul Slevogt, in his *Pervigilium de dissidio theologi et philosophi in utriusque principiiis fundato* (1623), investigates, with objective impartiality and the application of a cumbrous philosophical formalism, the question as to whether the universally recognised Aristotelian philosophy and the only true Lutheran theology agree with each other. He deals with the subject in connection with four important questions. These questions are: 1. Whether the immortality of Adam was natural or supernatural? 2. Whether faith is the sole cause

of justification? 3. Whether the individual can be certain of his salvation? 4. Whether God is in any way *per accidens* the cause of sin? His answers come to this, that in regard to all these questions Philosophy must, by its very principles, stand in contradiction with Theology.



## SECTION FOURTH.

### THE OPPOSITIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN PROTESTANTISM.

**D**URING the age of the Reformation there arose certain views and tendencies, represented by men who were entirely at one with the Reformers in their decided aversion to Romanism, but who were not recognised as properly belonging to their party or cause. After the two great Protestant Churches of the Lutheran and the Reformed Confessions had become consolidated, the separate movements referred to went on, especially in the Lutheran Church. An opposition thus took form within the circle of Protestantism, and this relation points to its having a certain inner affinity with the Protestant principle; but, on the other hand, the fact that it appeared as an opposition, and was, in several instances, even driven out of the Church, indicates a certain incompatibility between its deviations and the historical development of the Church. It is in this way that these movements have to be understood. Those of them that belong to the age of the Reformation itself have been stamped with the twofold designation of the "Antitrinitarians and Anabaptists" and the "Ultras of the Reformation." The former designation was borrowed from a merely external mark, and is often inapplicable from the two terms being at times inseparable. Besides, the "Anabaptists" had carried on their irregularities for years before they introduced the baptism of adults. The latter designation is more applicable and useful. If it be an essential characteristic of Protestantism that, whereas Catholicism subjected the individual in his need of salvation under the external institutions of the Church, the Protestant principle helped him to his rights by making him dependent on God without the intervention of the Church, and thus

founded salvation on faith alone, no one will doubt that these movements were essentially Protestant. But the ecclesiastical Protestantism did not teach that the right of the individual was unlimited. It retained as an inviolable reality the historical fact of objective redemption by the death of Christ once for all, the publication of this fact in the supernatural revelation of God in Scripture, and the external word and the sacraments, as the instituted means for the subjective appropriation of salvation. The tendency to overthrow these objective elements likewise, and to procure for the individual unlimited right in belief and action for himself, is what separates the movements of these "Ultras" from the Church.

Now, if everything in Religion is made to rest upon the subjectivity of the individual, the question then arises as to which side of it is to have special authority. Religion may be put essentially on the same level with all manifestations of the spiritual life, and it will then be reduced to that faculty which otherwise manifests itself as always the highest, which is the natural faculty of knowledge or Reason. Or the characteristic of Religion will be recognised in the fact that the individual feels himself moved by a higher divine Power, and sees Religion rooted in immediate divine Revelation. Thus there arise two tendencies, which are at one in so far as they are opposed to the objectivity recognised in the Church, but they differ in that the one falls back upon Reason and the other upon the immediate inspiration of the internal Word.

Besides these two, history shows us a third form of opposition, which arose from an exaggeration of the Protestant principle in the Church itself. In opposition to the Catholic Salvation by works, Protestantism emphasized the doctrine of Justification by faith alone. The Lutheran orthodoxy sometimes carried this principle even to the assertion that good works were prejudicial to salvation, and it thus evacuated the essence of faith till it became a mere acceptance of the dogmas of the Church. Against this tendency, the fresh pulsation of the religious life set up a reaction; it aimed not merely at subduing the individual to the obedience of Christ, but at

obtaining satisfaction for the wants of the heart, and at seeing in life the fruits of the inward transformation of the soul.

Thus there arose three different forms of opposition to the Protestant Church. One was purely intellectual; another was mystical or spiritualistic and theosophical; and the third was religious and practical. The first culminated in Socinianism; the second in Jacob Böhme; and the third in Pietism.

## I.

### THE PURELY INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION. SOCINIANISM.

In the sixteenth century, Italy was the country in which the most animated spiritual life prevailed. Humanistic studies flourished there as nowhere else, and even led some to make a sort of a cult of pagan antiquity; and this caused a great portion of the most educated circles to turn away with proud contempt from the corrupt Christianity of the Catholic Church. The first efforts of independent speculation set themselves up against all authority, and opened prospects to the inquiring spirit undreamed of before. But it was just in this the land of her secular dominion that the Church had long been using her inviolable authority. It is no wonder, then, that the earliest attempts at ecclesiastical reform appeared in Italy, and that all the movements in the way of reformation elsewhere were followed here with interest and intelligence. At Naples, Rome, Venice, and indeed almost everywhere, smaller or larger societies were formed that cultivated the new ideas in private and turned themselves away from the ancient Church. Nor need we be surprised to find that just here, where the intellectual culture had risen so high and was stirred by so many impulses, the ideas of religious reform also assumed a peculiar character. In particular, the principle of Subjectivity was here more strongly emphasized, and the right of intellectual criticism was desiderated in higher measure, than elsewhere. It is well known, however, that the Roman Church succeeded in suppressing

the Reformation in Italy by the terrors of the Inquisition, till but few traces of it remained. Italy has thus taken part in the history of Protestantism only through a succession of men who had to leave their home on account of their Faith.

The number of these Italian refugees was very considerable. In many parts of Switzerland, in Zürich, Geneva, and other places, and even in Nürnberg and other German cities, we find independent Italian congregations. To these congregations came the men we have referred to, usually as their preachers; and they represent the purely intellectual opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrine of Protestantism. The Canton of the Grisons, on account of its great political and ecclesiastical liberty, as well as from its proximity, became the principal refuge and resort of the Italians when they were persecuted because of their faith. Here, along with other quiet associates, worked Bartolomeo Maturo (†1547), who was fond of plunging into theological subtilties and of proposing useless questions to the Synod. Among the others was Camillo Renato, who taught that in the Sacraments God does not operate anything in man, but that they only represent what He has already worked in him. The Lord's Supper is a mere commemoration of the death of Christ, without any enjoyment of His body and blood; and Baptism is a testimony given by the individual of his faith, and a mark distinguishing the Christian from the non-Christian. Redemption does not rest on the vicariously atoning sufferings of the death of Christ, but is realized within the individual by the inworking of the Holy Spirit, which is represented as a sudden illumination by the higher light of reason, and as a transformation of the whole nature. The regenerate man is free from the positive Law, and he alone will rise again.—Pierpaolo Vergerio appears to have maintained a marked indifference in dogmatic things, and he was at the same time of a meddlesome disposition and of boundless scepticism.

Geneva had likewise an Italian congregation, in the midst of which arose frequent doubts and discussions regarding the Trinity, the deity of Christ, and other mysteries of faith. In

consequence, its members put the patience of Calvin to a severe trial by their sceptical questions and their heretical views. Matteo Gribaldo came to Geneva every year. He had been a jurist in Padua. After his expulsion from that city he had, in 1555, become a Professor of theology at Tübingen, and thereafter he settled on his estate at Farges on the Lake of Geneva. With regard to the Trinity, he admitted that it was contrary to all conceivability that one could be three, and three one. He could only think of the subject in this way: that the Father and the Son were two substantial things, the one a generating God, the other a generated God; the one sending, the other sent; the Father *corporeus*, the Son *corporatus*; the former being in Scripture mostly called God, the latter mostly called Lord. There were, therefore, two Gods, of whom the one proceeded from the other. But in so far as Father and Son were the same Deity and a single divine Essence, it could also be said that they were both God and both one. He explained the Christological doctrine in his own way by teaching that as soul and body were united in every man, so the divine and the human were united in Christ. Giorgio Blandrata (1515-1585), a native of Saluzzo, afterwards employed as a physician in the courts of Poland and Siebenbürgen, and then in Geneva, plied Calvin with his sceptical questions. He would ask whether the name of God, when used without any further qualification, did not refer to the Father alone? Whether we invoke the true God when we pray to the Father, as the Father is only a person whereas the true God is the Trinity? Whether the Father is invoked in the name of the Son in so far as the latter is God or is man? What the expression "person" properly means, and whether one cannot quietly believe in a God the Father, a Lord Christ, and a Holy Spirit, without entering upon speculations regarding essence and substance of which, indeed, the Scripture says nothing? Gianpaolo Aleciati of Piemont, in 1557, asserted that Christ was, even in his deity, less than the Father; that the whole Christ died; and that the distinction of two natures, or of a double Christ, was not founded on

Scripture, and was therefore to be rejected. Valentin Gentile was also led to subtle opinions by attempting to comprehend the mystery of the Trinity. If the Father were an *individuum* in the substance, then we should have not a triad but a tesserad. But the Father was rather the one substance, and the Son the brightness of His glory; both were true God, yet not two Gods, but one and the same God.

Bernardino Occhino (1487–1564) was one of the most distinguished Italian refugees. Born at Siena, he was won over to the new ideas through his intercourse with Jean Valdez at Naples. Having become General of the order of the Capucines and a distinguished preacher, he aroused the suspicion of the Inquisition by his insisting upon inward simple biblical piety, until a summons to Rome to answer the accusations against him drove him in flight to Geneva in 1542. After having spent a short time as a preacher in Nürnberg and London, and then again in Geneva, he became in 1554 preacher to the Italian congregation at Zürich. He published *Thirty Dialogues*, of which the Twenty-first treats of polygamy; and, while it designates monogamy as the only moral form of marriage, it yet shows that neither in the Old or New Testament, nor in the decrees of the Fathers and Councils of the Church, is there found an express prohibition of polygamy, and therefore any one on whom God has not bestowed the gift of continency may live in polygamy without sin. This Dialogue excited such repugnance that, although now an old man in his seventy-seventh year, he was driven out of Zürich. Occhino in his *Labyrinth* raised certain intellectual objections to the fundamental doctrine of the Reformed Church as to the human will not being free. Whoever asserts the freedom of the will, he says, comes upon four insoluble difficulties; but he also who denies it gets involved in a fourfold Labyrinth. The result is that human freedom must be recognised as an indemonstrable postulate of the practical reason, and its want of freedom as a postulate of the religious consciousness. Occhino, renouncing the hope of a satisfactory solution of the problem, gives the practical rule



that we are to strive with all our power after the good as if we were free ; and, on the other hand, that we are to give honour alone to God as if we were not free. In his *Dialogues* Occhino discusses the most important points of the Christian doctrine, so that the doctrines of the Church are everywhere defended against the objections of an opponent. But these objections are so dexterous and acute, and the refutation of them is so feeble, that doubts may be honestly entertained as to the side on which the author's own inmost conviction stands. The particularity of Grace is refuted ; Original Sin is denied, because natural desire is not a sin ; the theory of Satisfaction is assailed on the ground that Christ could not give satisfaction to God either as man or as God, or as God-man. To the question, how are our sins forgiven for Christ's sake, the opponent answers : not in such a way that Christ has changed God's eternal purpose to punish sin, for God is unchangeable ; nor in such a way that He has brought them into forgetfulness with God, for God forgets nothing ; nor in such a way that He has appeased God's wrath, for wrath cannot move God ; and so on.

The last who may be mentioned in this series is Lelio Sozini or Socinus (1525-1562). Born at Siena of a noble family, which was equally distinguished by its ancient nobility and for a succession of learned jurists who belonged to it, Socinus was led by an innate speculative tendency to theological studies. It seems to him that the whole subject of jurisprudence would float without foundation in the air if it did not rest upon a positive divine basis ; and this basis could only be given in the Bible : hence his study of Scripture. A formally juridical conception of the religious relation and an unlimited scepticism, are the two characteristics of the thoughts which Lelius Socinus gave rise to regarding almost all the parts of the ecclesiastical system of doctrine, and which were to obtain such importance through the instrumentality of his nephew Faustus. Lelius, who after 1547 resided mostly in Geneva and latterly in Zürich, limited himself, probably from a prudent cautiousness, to putting before Calvin, Bullinger,

and Gualther all kinds of subtle questions regarding the most difficult problems of the faith. Thus he would ask whether the resurrection of the body can be proved on rational grounds? He said that it rather appeared to be physically impossible on account of the many transformations which matter undergoes, and on account of the change of material to which we are subjected; further, that it was to no purpose, as our salvation does not consist in corporeal things. Again, he proposed such questions as the following: Whether a confession of the Messiahship of Jesus was necessary to salvation? What was the nature and origin of repentance? Whether it was not a contradiction that our justification should be from mere free grace and yet be purchased by Christ? Whether the sacraments were not mere signs through which we confess and thankfully remember that God has already bestowed upon us salvation and life? On account of many accusations raised against him, Lelius was compelled, in 1555, to formulate a confession of his faith, and from that time he regarded it as judicious to entrust his doubts only to his paper. Thus it was that his literary remains became the chief means of forming the views of his nephew Faustus.

In Switzerland, men with such ideas did not find a permanent location. Calvin was especially zealous in his efforts to purge the Church of such errors; nor did he shrink from adopting forcible measures. Most of the fugitives, like Gribaldo, Gentile, Blandrata, and Stancaro, sought a refuge in Poland. Here, in consequence of the peculiar political relations, the greatest religious liberty prevailed. Hence it was that all the oppositional elements of that period of ferment gathered themselves together there. Already at the Synod of Secemin in 1556, Conyza of Podlachium, who had been educated in Wittenberg and in Switzerland, had openly declared that the Father alone was true God and greater than the Son, and that the Trinity of persons, the consubstantiality, and the *communicatio idiomatum*, were to be rejected as mere inventions of the human understanding. In this chaos of ideas the most diverse views met, and it was the natural soil

for subtle assertions like that of Stancaro in 1554, that Christ was our mediator only in His human nature. Statorius asserted, in 1555, that the prayer "Veni, Creator Spiritus" was idolatrous, because, in the whole of Scripture, no trace was to be found of the divine personality of the Holy Spirit, nor of His adoration and invocation. And finally, Davidis, in 1578, declared that worship is not due to Christ as a mere man.

Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) was called into this chaos in 1578, and his vigorous personality succeeded in bringing some clearness and order into the ferment of these confused and unsettled conditions. He separated out all the fanatical Anabaptists, and gathered the rest into a compact community; and upon this community Faustus Socinus impressed the spirit which he himself had assimilated from the writings of his uncle.

*The Socinian System of Doctrine*<sup>1</sup> is interesting in the highest degree as an essentially consistent representation of Christianity on the basis of an externally juridical conception of the religious relation, and of an unlimited application of intellectual criticism, notwithstanding its external recognition of supernatural revelation. The supranatural character of Socinianism is shown by the fact that it does not recognise a universal or natural religion; nor does it speak of a relation between God and man as founded in the nature of both. The older Socinianism even denies all natural knowledge of God. There is no innate knowledge of God, otherwise there could be no people found without some notion of God. Nor can we derive the knowledge of God from nature, as even Aristotle was not able to recognise the working of God in individual things. It is true, indeed, that Joh. Crell (1590-1631)

<sup>1</sup> As Socinianism does not recognise authoritative Confessions, — even the *Catechismus Racovensis* enjoying no symbolical authority. — its doctrinal system must be gathered from the numerous writings of its chief representatives. The most important of these writings have been collected in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, Irenop. 1656, 8 vols. Reference may also be made to the following works: — C. Ostorodt, *Unterricht von den Hauptpunkten der Christlichen Religion*, Rakau 1604. Andreas Wissowatius, *Religio rationalis s. de rationis Judicio in controversis*, etc., Amsterd. 1685. Fock, *Der Socinianismus*, Kiel 1847.

afterwards brought forward another view, which sees in revelation only a furthering and completing of what man can know by his own powers. The contemplation of nature and of the human world leads us necessarily, according to this view, to accept a God; and we receive in our own conscience the commandments the fulfilment of which is required by God. But, on the other hand, Wissowatius expressly repudiates the objection that the Socinians derived religion from reason and made reason the judge of religion; and he holds that from natural principles and from human reason only the natural theology and religion of the so-called Deists can be obtained, but not the Christian religion. The genuine Socinianism decidedly desiderates a divine revelation. This revelation is not regarded as some sort of internal working of the divine spirit upon man, but as a purely external communication of truths of a practical and theoretical nature. Such communication of revealed truth took place sporadically in the first period of the religious development of the human race, which was the time from Adam to Abraham; in the second period, which extended from Abraham to Christ, Moses was the medium of revelation; and in the third period, Christ was the communicator of religious truth. But as Moses was only qualified for the communication of divine revelation by the intercourse that he had on Mount Sinai for forty days face to face with God, so Christ was qualified for this office by the the so-called *raptus in cælum*; that is, shortly before the beginning of his public activity Christ was raised in a miraculous way to heaven in order to receive instruction from God in His own person in the truths of Christianity.

This revelation is contained in the sacred Scriptures, and particularly in the New Testament. Schlichting even sets forth the claim that “*nos ipsi apostolicæ et primævæ veritati in omnibus insistere volumus;*” and the sacred writers were held to have written “*ab ipso divino Spiritu impulsī eoque dictante.*” Hence it followed that the Scriptures were held to be completely free from error, although this was strictly maintained only in respect of the things that are essential to

salvation. No criterion is set up for distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential. Whereas the older Socinianism made a very limited use of this distinction, the later Socinianism adopted it in order to set aside many inconvenient testimonies in Scripture. As regards interpretation, Socinianism sets up the principles of a grammatical and historical exegesis which only obtained recognition long afterwards; but in its own individual applications of them in detail it proceeded in the most arbitrary way. The sacred Scripture, as divine revelation, is therefore the supreme unquestionable rule in matters of religion. Every law, however, requires interpretation and application to individual cases. The Catholics regard the infallible office of the Church in teaching as the means of doing this, and other Christians take other views. "The Enthusiasts" find this means in the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the inner word; and others, who are called by their opponents "Unitarians" or "Socinians," find it in the sound reason (*sana ratio*). The epithet "sound" being here applied to reason, in contrast to that reason which is darkened by prejudice and error, and in distinction from any particular philosophical system. Reason is therefore regarded as the organ by which man receives, knows, comprehends, and judges the divine revelation. For this use of the term Reason, Wissowatius brings forward a series of arguments. He holds that faith is assent (*assensus seu persuasio*); and hence he desiderates intelligence and rational insight. Again, he says that the object of theology is truth, and it has therefore to be known; but without Reason, to try to know the truth would be the same as trying to see without eyes. Further, he alleges that faith in the Scripture rests upon rational knowledge, or upon the conviction that everything that God speaks is true, that the Scripture itself demands this faith, and that any one who rejects it always returns in practice to it again, etc.

With all this, however, Reason is not allowed an unconditional right of criticism in respect of religious truths. On the contrary, it is always emphatically maintained by the Socinians that religion is above reason, because it is revealed



by God. Certainly religion is not contrary to reason, for reason cannot be overthrown by revelation. A distinction between what is above reason and what is contrary to reason is attempted, by holding that it is entirely different to say that a thing cannot be conceived, and to conceive that a thing cannot be. It is evident that this criterion is inadequate; and when miracles are characterized as *above* reason, whereas the Trinity, the deity of Christ, and such doctrines are regarded as *contrary* to reason, the principle of this division lies entirely in something else. In the application of this principle, reason is regarded as the supreme, indisputable judge of religious doctrines; and an unlimited, intellectual rationalism is thus introduced. Certain universal axioms and common notions (*axiomata universalia atque communes notiones*) are set up by reason, as being unconditionally true in relation to religious doctrines. These are the simple principles of the sound human understanding, but they are mostly directed against some particular dogmatic conception. Such conceptions are referred to, as that three times one are three and not one; that the whole is greater than its parts; that a person who is from another is not the supreme God; and that a just one does not punish a guiltless person in place of the guilty. In exegesis the principle is also maintained that what is utterly contrary to reason, cannot possibly stand in the Scriptures.

From this position Socinianism applied a criticism to the profoundest Christian dogmas, and the formally logical acuteness of it cannot be denied, however much its want of deeper insight may repel us. Almost all that has been presented with reference to Christianity in this connection, even to the present day, may be found already contained in the writings of Faustus Socinus. 1. *The Trinity* is contrary to Scripture. Such an important dogma ought to have been quite clearly and unambiguously expressed in the Scriptures, instead of which it is not found either directly or indirectly. This doctrine is also contrary to reason. Three persons in one substance are impossible; there is either one substance, and therefore one God, or three persons, and therefore three sub-



stances and three Gods. Further, the conceptions of "begetting" and "proceeding" are only applicable to finite things; and the *περιχώρησις* is unthinkable. Nor is there any ground assigned why there are not more than three persons proceeding from God. 2. *The deity of Christ* is entirely contrary to reason. It is impossible that two completely different substances—the one of which possesses immortality, is without beginning, and is unchangeable, while the other is the opposite of all these—could belong to one person. Each of the two natures is represented as a person, and the two natures must therefore necessarily result in two persons. 3. The sharpest criticism is directed against the *doctrine of Satisfaction*. This doctrine of satisfaction is not grounded in the essential nature of God, for compassion and justice are not attributes of God, but determinations of His will. Further, such satisfaction is not given to His compassion, because the guilt is not forgiven, but expiated; nor to His justice, because it is not the guilty, but a guiltless one that suffers. Satisfaction is impossible in the abstract, as well as in the concrete. It is impossible *in abstracto*, because a satisfaction by *obedientia activa* and a satisfaction by *obedientia passiva* mutually exclude each other. If any one has performed everything he ought to do, he is free from punishment; and if he suffers punishment, he requires to perform nothing. Again this holds, because both the passive obedience and the active obedience are impossible; passive obedience cannot be a satisfaction, because punishment as a personal obligation is not transferable, and because one cannot suffer death for many; nor is active obedience a satisfaction, because every one is already bound *per se* to fulfil the Law, and because the obedience of one cannot take the place of that of many, etc. In like manner, satisfaction is impossible *in concreto*, and chiefly because we have brought upon us eternal death, while Christ only underwent bodily death.

This formal and dispassionate intellectuality of the *sana ratio* is also impressed on the special doctrines formulated by Socinianism. It is regarded as vain speculation to examine into the essential nature of God. We only require to know

His will and the attributes that are related to it. The eternity of God is expressly defined as an eternal duration in which the natural distinctions of time into past, present, and future are not annulled. Omnipotence consists in power to be able to do all that God wills; omniscience consists in God's knowing how to dispose His decrees and works most fittingly, and to bring them, to pass according to their proper end. The justice of God is the only attribute that is apprehended in a profounder way, as the perfect conformity of the divine action to the rules that follow from His essential nature. Christ is mere man; but He is more than a common man, physically on account of His birth from a virgin, ethically on account of His perfect sinlessness, and officially on account of the power and glory bestowed upon Him after the resurrection as a reward for His obedience. His office is that of a teacher, who communicates and corroborates the divine revelations. His death also entirely subserves His function as a teacher. The human will is free to accept or reject salvation by its own choice.

The Socinian conception of Religion is an external and juridical one. God is the absolute Lord over us; and on account of His absolute power, He has the unlimited right to do with us as His weak creatures what He will. He may give us laws just as He likes, and put in prospect rewards and punishments for their fulfilment or transgression. The essence of Religion lies in the laws and the promises by which God will induce us to fulfil them. Noah received the moral commandment that "whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man will his blood be shed," as well as ceremonial laws which partly regulated sacrificial worship and partly forbade the eating of blood. Abraham promised to keep God's covenant, and he received the promise of the divine blessing. Moses brought man a revelation of the divine will in moral, ceremonial, and juridical laws that deal with details. The fulfilment of these laws was not exactly impossible, but the promises of the Jewish religion referred only to the present life, and they were therefore incapable of sufficiently suppressing the power of the flesh, so that a perfect fulfilment of the law

might be attained. Hence a new religion was necessary, and Christianity is this new religion. The Christian religion has in fact no peculiar character in distinction from Judaism; Christianity, like every other religion, is a religion of law, resting upon divine commandments and promises. The commandments of the Christian religion are in part the Mosaic commandments, with the additions and expansions given to them by Christ. There are certain moral laws which are peculiarly Christian, such as self-denial, the following of Christ, trust in God, love to God and our neighbour. Such are also the ceremonies of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which have merely declarative significance as external signs and testimonies of what has already inward existence. The special promise of Christianity, which determines its high value, is eternal life or endless duration. Man is, in fact, mortal by nature on account of his creation from earthly matter. Besides, by sin he has brought upon himself eternal death, which is annihilation. Nevertheless man has a strong fear of death and a keen longing after an endless duration. It is therefore to be expected that the prospect of this glorious prize will lead him to a perfect obedience. But as promises and commands are not grounded essentially in the divine nor in the human nature, but are given at will by the unlimited sovereignty of God, the Christian religion necessarily rests upon revelation. And hence Socinianism declares that "the Christian religion is the way revealed by God of attaining to eternal life."

In Poland and Siebenbürgen, the Socinians formed a flourishing community, and the school of Rakau enjoyed from 1600 a well-founded reputation. Of its important scientific teachers we may here name only Christoph Ostorodt (†1611), Joh. Völkel (†1618), Val. Schmalz (1572–1622), Joh. Crell (1590–1631), Jonas Schlichting (1592–1661), Martin Ruarus (1589–1657), Ludwig Wolzogen (†1661), and Andreas Wissowatius (†1678), the grandson of Faustus Socinus. The most distinguished theologians of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches wrote against the Socinians, such as

Calovius and Hoornbeck ; and so did some of the most obscure of their disputants. It was the habit of the time to undertake a confutation of the Socinian errors, which were referred to all the possible heresies of the Ancient Church ; it was at the same time regarded as a difficult task, and it was prosecuted with the greatest bitterness. On this very account the conflict but too frequently degenerated into unsavoury wrangling, which became fatal to all scientific treatment of profounder differences.

Socinianism existed for only a short time as a separate ecclesiastical community. The political relations of Poland hastened its decline. In 1638, the theological school at Rakau was closed, and at the "Colloquium charitativum" at Thorn in 1645, the papal legate declared that he was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, that is, to the Lutherans and the Calvinists ; and the Socinians were absolutely excluded. In 1658, the Diet at Warsaw prohibited the confession of Socinianism and any furtherance of it, under the penalty of death. There remained no alternative for the Socinians but to return into the bosom of the Catholic Church, or to emigrate within three years. It was only in some places that they could find a reception. Socinian views had indeed been silently spread through wide circles, as by John Biddle (†1662) in England, and by Soner of Altdorf (†1612) in Germany. Yet the Socinians could only find a safe refuge in Brandenburg. Here Sam. Crell (†1747) was Minister of the congregation of Königswald near Frankfurt on the Oder, and he was one of the last of the Socinian theologians. When his daughters passed over to the Moravians, the one remaining Socinian congregation at Andreaswald went over also to the Protestant Church in the beginning of the present century.—In Holland, the writings of the Socinians were prohibited in 1599. Ostorodt and Woidowski were banished, but considerable numbers of their adherents continued to maintain their opinions in secret in that country. They were favoured by the Arminians, not on the ground of their being dogmatically related to each other, but as Grotius

writes of himself, "he was not a man of that kind, that on account of a difference in opinion, which was not inconsistent with piety, he would be the enemy of any one, or would reject any one's friendship." In the end of the Seventeenth Century, the Socinians in Holland also ceased to form independent communities. Their existence as members of an independent Church was accordingly but of short duration and of still shorter prosperity, but so much the more widely did the decomposing influence of their cold intellectual criticism extend. And Socinianism thus became one of the most essential preparations for the later enlightenment of the deistic rationalism.

## II.-V.

### THE SPIRITUALISTIC AND MYSTICAL OPPOSITION.

## II.

### THE ANABAPTISTS. DAVID JORIS. HANS NICLAS. INDEPENDENTISM. THE QUAKERS.

Wherever the Reformation appeared, there arose tendencies and movements which, while having an internal affinity to it, yet fell into bitter conflict with it. Luther applied to them with all appropriateness the words, "they have gone out from us, but they are not of us;" and Spalatin also characterizes them by saying that "wherever God builds a church, the devil sets up a chapel beside it." They are usually designated "Anabaptists;" but as the movement went on for years before the baptism of adults was introduced in 1524, this is a purely external designation. In opposition to the absolute authority of the Church, Protestantism had bound the believer to Christ and to the word of the Scriptures. In the general and deep fermentation of the time, there was naturally no want of those who felt they were too much bound by this limitation. The representatives of such views maintained that the

Holy Spirit which is poured out upon all the people, and the divine revelation which every individual receives, form the only authority that is to be followed. Along with this principle it could not but happen that many heterogeneous tendencies should appear, and that these should be but little limited by the fact that the masses are fond of following a conspicuous leader. Bullinger attempts to classify these tendencies by saying that some of them demanded the ascetic renunciation of the world, and that others depended more upon millennial (chiliastic) hopes. Among the former, the Separatist Spiritual Baptists would have nothing in common with the world, and therefore laid down exact rules regarding dress—as to what material it should be made of, what was to be its shape, and so on. The Silent Baptists would have no more preaching of the gospel, and came to no decision on any question. The Praying Baptists, who left everything to God, did nothing but pray. To the class of those who cherished millenarian or chiliastic views, belonged the Apostolic Baptists, who, appealing to the letter of the Scriptures, roamed about the country without staff, or shoes, or purse, or money, boasting of their heavenly commission to undertake the office of a preacher, and discoursing to the people from the roofs of the houses. This class also included the convulsive Baptists, called also Enthusiasts and Exstatici, who boasted of their ecstasies and the excellent heavenly revelations which they received. The common Baptists formed the centre of the whole movement; they set themselves in opposition to the excessive accentuation of the external word and the ecclesiastical office of preaching, as well as to the dangerous depreciation of good works. The Free Brethren, on the other hand, abused the principle that the regenerate cannot sin, as supplying a dispensation for the greatest moral excesses. They extended the religious claim for liberty to the sphere of the State and of social life, refused to pay interest or taxes, wished to get rid of government, and demanded a community of goods and wives. They were mainly guilty of the abominations of the Peasant War and of the Münster kingdom.



Such horrors excited a general repugnance to this party; but although many of them were thrown into prison, expelled the country, or slain, there arose everywhere new representatives of their ideas, and only the strictest procedure could finally extirpate them.

Taken as a whole, although they are greatly mixed up, we may distinguish two principal directions in these movements. We may designate them respectively as the *Spiritualistic* and the *Mystical* tendency. They both emphasize the inner light, and boast of immediate union with God. But the former founds upon a communication of God that is transitory and that manifests itself from time to time in visions, ecstasies, and such like; whereas the latter asserts a continuous real inworking of God in the heart of man. The representatives of the former tendency commonly lose themselves in external particularities, and often in such as have but little to do with religion. We will, however, briefly glance at the most important of them.

Of Melchior Hofmann († 1533) we know hardly more than that he entertained millenarian hopes, as did also his associate Stifel, who prophesied that the end of the world would take place on the 3rd October 1533, at eight o'clock in the morning. Joh. Denk († 1527) saw the fundamental principle of the Christian religion in the love of man to God, and this love rests on the fact that we have within us the living, powerful, eternal Word of God, which is God Himself. This invisible Word can be rejected or accepted by us in virtue of the freedom of our will, and we are accordingly bad or good. The new life by which we are good does not come in by the external word of Scripture, nor by preaching, but by the immediate inworking of the Divine Spirit. It is a progressive communication of God to man himself. It is called the inner word, in relation to knowledge; and the power of the Highest, in relation to action. For the regenerate man the law of the external letter is abrogated, and only the love that is planted in the heart holds good. Further, the sacraments are mere external signs, and they are unimportant to

the believer. Joh. Campanus († 1578) believed that the mystery of the Trinity could be made intelligible under the figure of marriage, saying there was in God only two persons, the Father and the Son, who were united with one another, as husband and wife in matrimony. He also declared that there was no sin in the regenerate.

Among the Anabaptists of Holland, David Joris and Hans Niclas especially deserve to be mentioned. David Joris (1501–1556), a glass painter at Delft, maintained that he was led in early life, by revelations and visions, to look for the speedy return of the Lord. After the fall of Münster he became the leader of the Anabaptists. This position he won, at the Convention of Bokholt in 1536, by his success in bringing the different parties to an agreement. They were brought to one in many important points, only differing in regard to marriage and the employment of force; and soon thereafter, basing his claim upon visions, he set up as a prophet. The centre of his preaching was that the kingdom of God had come, and that the second coming of the Lord was nigh at hand. According to his view, the kingdom of God was to be fulfilled and realized through the three periods of the world. The first period was introduced by David, in whom was the spirit and power of God; the second period was introduced by Christ, in whom the whole deity was completely present; and the third was introduced by David Joris, upon whom the Spirit of God was to rest. Sometimes he calls the second of these three persons the greatest, as he had made the first his pattern, and sent the last to follow him; at other times Messianic prophecies are immediately applied to Joris himself. His adherents soon fell into two parties; one of them, notwithstanding its fanatical tinge, practised honesty of life; but the other, with David Joris himself at their head, gave themselves to libertine excesses, especially in the way of sexual indulgence. Joris was challenged to prove his doctrines by the word of Scripture, but he repudiated the challenge as human wisdom, philosophical curiosity, and Jewish unbelief. As he asserted that his doctrine was

immediately revealed to him from heaven, he said it also required scholars who would simply believe what the Spirit taught.

Hans Niclas (1502-1577) received visions as early as his ninth year. A great light of the glory and clearness of God in the form of a mountain encompassed him, raised him from his bed, shone through him in his whole being, and essentialized itself wholly with his spirit and heart. In his thirty-ninth year he received a similar vision, in which God sank down upon him and became entirely one substance with him. His views were briefly as follow. In the beginning, when God had created all, there was only one God and one man, and God was all that man was, and man was all that God was. God gave man no other law than to live with joy in the naked clearness of his God. By sin the man fell into blindness, and estranged himself from God. In order to save him, God created a new man, Christ. He entered into the science of men, and found it false and lying; and in order to redeem man from all foolish wisdom, He has introduced another science. His disciples have proclaimed to all the world that God has appointed a day of love in order that He may judge the earth on that day by a man who was to present the faith to every one. That day had now come. God would now fulfil all His promises, and give to the good eternal life, and to the bad eternal death. All the members of Christ were now to be conjoined into a real body of Christ, or into a man of God, in order that in the end, as in the beginning, there should be one God and one man, and all in the one body of Christ. Hence Hans Niclas also distinguished three periods. In the first period, the law rules under sin; in the second period, the gospel of Christ rules; and in the third period, there rules that love of which Hans Niclas was the proclaimer. For although he was the least of all, and was entirely dead, and was lying without life among the dead, God had wakened him from the dead, had made him alive through Christ, had humanized Himself with him, and deified him with Himself into a living tabernacle, or a house of His dwelling, in order

that thereby all His wonderful works might be proclaimed to all the world.

Menno Simon (1496-1561) succeeded in forming a distinct Church out of these wildly fermenting elements, and it has continued to exist till the present day. The Mennonites retain the baptism of adults, but otherwise they reject almost wholly the spirit of the communities from which they have descended. In place of the spiritualistic appeal to immediate revelation, they hold strictly to the word of Scripture, and instead of unbridled libertinism, they seek their glory in a quietly laborious and strictly moral life. In their case, therefore, we do not find any peculiar formation of Protestantism in the sense under consideration.

In England, in opposition to the purely external reformation of the doctrine and hierarchy of the Church by Henry VIII., the tendency towards a practical reformation of the religious life likewise found expression in Puritanism. In connection with it, Robert Browne (1550-1630) founded a movement which represented the unconditional rights of the individual. This principle was at first applied only to the external order of the constitution and worship of the Church, and thus was formed *Independentism* or *Congregationalism*. It claimed that every separate community should form an entirely independent congregation, whose members should all possess the same rights, and decide on all matters by the majority of votes. In the services of the public worship every brother obtained the right to speak, and all prescribed forms of prayer and the received festival days were rejected. John Robinson spoke out the general thought of a progressive reformation in the words, "I cannot sufficiently deplore the state of the Reformed Churches which have come to a finality in religion, and will now not go beyond the instruments of their reformation." The poet Milton (1608-1674) represents the deep incisive principles in religion and politics that were held by this party from 1644. Their political principles were deeply significant; for the ruling prince was represented as only a delegate of the people, and

hence, under certain circumstances, regicide was justified. Their religious principles were also distinctive, for the inner word of the Holy Spirit is emphatically set above the external word of the letter. As if the prediction of the prophet Joel, iii. 1, were fulfilled, every one appealed to the word of the Lord which he had heard as to an immediate revelation which he had received, or to the Spirit of God which spake in him. Those who were the subjects of grace, therefore, called themselves no longer believers, but saints; for even in the present life man must become free from all sin. With this prophetism there were joined millenarian hopes of an immediately approaching completion of the Church, when a life would begin in the full bright clearness of the divine light, and in all the power and fulness of the Spirit, realizing the age of the glorious freedom of the children of God. Along with this it was declared, with all definiteness, that religion is an internal power of life. Religion is not a name but a thing, not a form but a power, not an idea but a divine reality; religion is an inner power of the soul by which it is united with God in holiness and righteousness. Any one has just as much of religion as he has of this power; and where this power is not, there is no religion. It was openly declared that even the heathen, who have never heard anything of the earthly Christ, have the gospel revealed to their hearts; and it was asked doubtingly whether Christ was a historical personality at all. Emphasis was laid upon the fact "that it is not the head, but the heart, that makes the Christian," and faith in the reconciliation of man with God by the death of Christ was set up as the sole criterion of being a Christian; and hence they demanded from the State the universal toleration of all religious parties.

This enthusiastic party of reform fought under the banners of Cromwell until they obtained the supremacy, and by the "Short Parliament" they carried on the government of the country. Cromwell's Protectorate (Dec. 1653) saved England from the threatened dissolution of all social and political order. He kept the revolutionary tendencies in check, yet held fast



by the principle of toleration, so that with the exception of Catholicism, all the denominations were recognised in England which confessed the faith of God in Christ, although they might differ from each other in doctrine, worship, or discipline. With this period of external rest there emerged a separation of the heterogeneous elements which hitherto co-operated in Congregationalism. This first appeared in the separation of the political and religious tendencies. The adherents of the former claimed unlimited freedom of conscience as an inherent right of man, and they prepared for the English Deism through the medium of the Levellers. Some of the representatives of the religious movement laid aside the former enthusiasm, and, led by Richard Baxter, merged themselves in Puritanism. Others of them, in hostile opposition to Cromwell, intensified the enthusiastic millenarian element, and at last found a permanent form in the Quakerism that was founded in 1654 by George Fox (1624-1691).

"No, it is not the Scripture, it is the spirit!" With these words Fox interrupted a sermon on the words of the text in Second Peter, "We have a sure word of prophecy," etc., which the preacher was applying quite correctly to the Scripture. After long years of internal struggle, this was his first public appearance; and this thought was the centre of all the sermons which he preached, under many perils but with rich blessing, everywhere throughout the country. He who lives in the words of the Scriptures is not a Christian, but only he who lives the life of the Scripture. It is not the external word that is the source of salvation, but the light of Christ which is in us; it is the seed of God in us; it is God's power, life, and presence in us. This light of Christ does not appear, however, as a continuous calm possession, but as the sudden direct seizure of us by a higher power, and this is combined with convulsive movements of the body, from whence arose the name "Quakers." In Fox, however, we seek in vain for clear definitions regarding the nature of this Light and its relation to the natural Reason.

When the Act of Toleration was passed by William III. in



1689, the Quakers obtained freedom to exercise their religion, and they entered upon a calmer development. The chief authority on the later position of the body is Robert Barclay (1648-1690), and his *Theologiæ vere christianæ Apologia*, published at Amsterdam in 1676, almost obtained the authority of a creed among the Quakers. He begins his exposition by saying that as the highest happiness consists in the true knowledge of God, the most necessary of all things is a correct insight into the ground and origin of this knowledge. But we must carefully distinguish between spiritual knowledge and literal knowledge, the former being the saving knowledge of the heart, and the latter being the high-flying, empty knowledge of the head. This latter knowledge may be obtained in various ways, but the former can only be got by the internal direct revelation and illumination of the Spirit of God. All other knowledge of Christ and God is as little true knowledge as the chatter of a parrot is the voice of a man. This revelation of God by His Spirit has always been the same, at the time of the creation of the world, and under the Law, and now in Christianity. Hence the object of faith is also everywhere the same, for it is God speaking in us.

Of this inner saving Light, it is further said that God has given to every man, be he Jew or heathen, Turk or Scythian, Indian or barbarian, a certain time of visitation in which it is possible for him to be saved, and that for this end God has bestowed on every man a certain measure of light or of the Spirit. Whoever receives this Light obtains salvation, even if he knows nothing of Christ's sufferings and death. This Light may in fact be resisted, but no one is able to entirely disregard it. Moreover, this inner Light is emphatically distinguished from natural Reason. It is an error of the Pelagians and Socinians that has been caused by the devil, to hold that man can follow the good in virtue of his natural Light, and direct his course heavenwards. The inner Light is not a part of human nature, nor is it a survival of the good which we have lost by Adam's fall, and it is to be carefully distinguished from the natural light of reason. It is certainly

not God's proper essence and nature, but it is a spiritual, heavenly, and invisible principle in which God as Father, Son, and Spirit dwells; it is an absolutely supernatural gift, an inconceivable immediate indwelling of God in us. It is this heavenly light by which all are called to salvation. Both those who have heard the history of Christ and those who have not heard it.

On the other side, prominence is again given to the position that the Spirit of God as the fountain of all truth cannot contradict the Scriptures or sound reason. The Scriptures have their revelations of the Spirit of God as the saints received them. Hence the Scripture is certainly the most excellent book in the world, yet it is always but an explanation of the source itself. However important Scripture may be as a credible attestation of the revelations of the Spirit, and as a mirror in which we can make ourselves certain of what we inwardly experience, yet it is not to be regarded as the main principle of all knowledge, nor as the highest standard of faith and practice. It is the Spirit who leads us into all truth, and it does not merely serve to open the Scripture to our understanding. The uncertainty of the text, the difficulty of understanding it, the indemonstrableness of the Canon, are likewise adduced as grounds against the sole validity of Scripture. In accordance with this merely historical view of Scripture as a faithful narrative of the doings of the people of God, as a collection of partly fulfilled and partly yet unfulfilled prophecies, and as a complete statement of the most important principles of the doctrine of Christ, the historical Christ is relatively put into the background. It is true that Barclay speaks of the Person and Work of Christ entirely in the expressions of the ecclesiastical dogmas, such as that Christ has offered Himself a sacrifice for us, reconciling us by the blood of His cross to God. But these forms of expression are again in part naturalized. He holds that no substitution took place, because God never regarded Christ as a sinner; that if the redemption had been finally completed sixteen hundred years ago, the whole gospel with its preaching of

repentance would have been useless; and that it is only the inward birth of Christ in our heart that is truly atoning. Besides, the doctrine of the historical Christ is completely out of connection with the system, as even one who has not heard the history of Christ may be saved by the Spirit of God; and in this manner he becomes, as it were, a member of the Christian Church. Again, justification is not a mere declaration of righteousness on the ground of the imputed merit of Christ, but is a real process of making righteous by the true atonement which Christ works in us. This birth of Christ in us takes place at a definite moment, so that every one must be able to assign the day and the hour of its happening; in whomsoever it is completely produced, his heart is immediately united with Christ, the body of death and of sin is got rid of, so that he is free from actual sin and from transgression of the law of God, and becomes perfect. The sacraments are of no importance either as means of salvation or as symbols of salvation, but they stand on the same level with the other usages of the early Church. The baptism by water that was administered by John, was only a prophecy of the baptism by the Spirit, and with the coming of the latter the former must cease. The Lord's Supper is a mere symbol of the communion with the inner divine Light, which alone is the true spiritual body of Christ. The same principle of the internal Light is also made to be valid in the doctrine of the Church and in the order of worship.

### III.

THE MYSTICS. SERVETUS. PARACELSUS. CARLSTADT.  
MÜNZER. FRANK. SCHWENKFELDT.

1. Mysticism had a close affinity to these spiritualistic movements through their common polemic against too high an estimate of the external letter, and their common inclination to dive directly into the depths of the Deity. To the mystical tendency we may most properly assign Michael

Servetus (1508-1553), the famous physician, geographer, and theologian of Arragon, well known for his denial of the Trinity, and for having been burned at Geneva. He is altogether peculiar in his personal characteristics, and he is extremely interesting in his own way. He holds a somewhat isolated position, from his rejecting the baptism of children as well as the doctrine of the Trinity, and his appealing neither to immediate revelation nor to the insight of natural reason. He held that a reform of the Church was necessary; for the papacy and all connected with it is the work of the devil himself, who intruded into the Church as early as the times of the Apostles, and who became particularly powerful when Constantine consigned the secular sword to Pope Sylvester, and when the Council of Nicea established the tritheistic dogma. But it was only a definite period of 1260 years that had been assigned to this supremacy of Antichrist; it was to be broken down in the year 1585, and Servetus believed that he was called by God to co-operate in bringing it about. This reformation of the Church was to be founded upon the genuine doctrine of Christ as it is obtained by correct interpretation of the Holy Scripture, and as it is found in harmony with the utterances of the ante-Nicean Fathers. But although Servetus emphatically blames the exegesis of his opponents for their dependence upon the Aristotelian philosophy and their ignorance of the Hebrew language, and promises to interpret every word of Scripture according to its proper meaning, his own expositions would also be searched in vain for a really grammatical and historical exegesis.

Looking at the spirit of the system of Servetus before entering on its details, we find at once a remarkable mixture of cold intellectual thinking and a profound mysticism that drew its nourishment specially from Neo-Platonism. The former element exhibits itself especially in criticism. With unquestionable acuteness he points out the contradictions which the mystery of the Trinity presses upon the thinking of the understanding, such as that the Spirit is not a person ;

that the Christology with the two natures in one person and the essential equality of the Son and the Father is untenable; and that one substance and three persons is completely unthinkable. The baptism of children is also opposed on rational grounds.—A Mysticism, reminding us at many points of Nicolaus of Cusa, shows itself in all parts of the circle of thought in which Servetus moved; and drawing from the depths of a truly religious soul, and equipped with great wealth of knowledge, he has exhibited in his expositions his inner life to others.

God is described as being in Himself far above everything that is finite and limited, as not limited by space and time, as not light but higher than light, as not substance but above substance, as not spirit but above spirit, and indeed as above everything which can be thought. On the other hand, God communicates Himself to all finite things, which without this would have no being or subsistence. This communication is a gradual one. God communicates Himself to all things by ideas, and to Christ, men, and angels in substance; but to Christ alone without measure, to men and angels in limited measure by the Spirit—as well by the inborn spirit as by the Spirit that is superadded by grace. Now, because God communicates Himself to all things, Servetus can say that the world is identical in essence with God; God is all in all; God is everywhere full of the essence of all things; God Himself is the essence of all things, etc. Yet this is not to be understood as if God were corporeal and divisible, or as if He were the one substance lying at the basis of all things, and these were its different forms and parts. God is the Spirit who contains all forms (*mens omniformis*), or who includes in Himself from eternity the ideas, images, representations, and substantial forms of individual things. These ideas are not merely the divine thoughts and patterns according to which things are created, but they are essential substantial forms by means of which God enters into things and bestows upon them their definite individual existence; for it is the divine idea or the Deity which makes this a



stone, that gold, and a third thing iron. Matter is the only thing that is created out of nothing. The four elements are earth, water, fire, and air, of which the latter three as the higher have an archetype in the heavenly matter in God. The creation of individual things takes place by the introduction of form into matter. It is mediated by created light, which has a life-giving power derived from the uncreated light, and it formatively introduces into matter the substantial forms of things according to the eternal ideas.

All eternal ideas are contained in the Word of God, which was not separated in eternity from God, but assumed independent existence at the time and for the purpose of creation. In the Old Testament this Word appeared veiled under manifold forms; in the person of Christ, it became man. Because the Word was to become man in Christ in order to reveal God wholly and fully to us men, and because the idea of man is the most perfect of all ideas, the Word bore in Itself even in eternity a prefiguration or adumbration of the human personality. The man Christ is as such the Son of God; He is completely identical in essence with God and of the one substance. As the Word He was from eternity with God; He was the mediator of the creation of the world. As man He is of divine substance; not merely in the body in so far as God in His generation represented the place of the bodily father, whence are the three higher elements of the heavenly substance, but He is so also in the soul, in so far as the Spirit of God is inbreathed into Him without measure, as well as in the spirit which was bestowed upon Him.

Man consists of Body, Soul, and Spirit. The body is derived from matter. The soul is only in part identical in substance with the body, from whose vital warmth in the blood it takes its origin; for, on the other side, it springs directly from God as an emanation from the divine substance or as a breath of God. Hence it is that the soul can receive the holy Spirit of God in itself, which is partly born in us and partly communicated to us in baptism.



Even if Adam had not fallen, Christ would have appeared as the perfect visible revelation of the invisible God, in order to bring eternal life and the true knowledge of God to man. This was indeed the essential purpose of His mission, only that under the present dispensation He had further to break the power of the devil by His death and His descent into hell. By faith in Christ as the perfect revelation of God, we obtain justification and the true knowledge of God. In baptism, our soul is essentially transmuted by the heavenly elements taking the place of the earthly elements, and thereby there is established a substantial community of the soul with God in Christ. In the Lord's Supper our earthly body is also transmuted into a heavenly body by Christ substantially communicating His body to us. When we are thus transmuted in body and soul, the works of our external conduct likewise become good and holy.

The essence of Religion, according to Servetus, thus consists in true knowledge of God and substantial union with Him. From this conception he also obtains a certain historical view of religion. The heathen know of God only what the innate spirit and the careful observation of Nature teach them. The Jews have divine revelations, yet they are veiled because Christ had not yet appeared in the flesh. The Christians have the perfect revelation.

Servetus belongs to the class of the solitary souls. His opponents saw in him only the obstinate denier of the Trinity, and it is uncertain whether his followers—who were most numerous in Venice—really penetrated to the depths of his thought. It is only in the present age that men are beginning to rescue him from oblivion, and to appreciate him justly.

2. Theophrastus Paracelsus Bombastes von Hohenheim was born at Einsiedeln in Switzerland in 1493, and he died at Salzburgh in 1541. Attaching himself to the Cabbala, he founded a school that became widely spread, especially among the physicians, and which fused in a peculiar way Alchemy and Astrology with Theosophy. Paracelsus, as a physician,

set up the principle that diseases must be studied, not in the books of Galen and Avicenna, but by observation of Nature, and thus he became the reformer of medicine. This position is not affected by his whimsical cures and cabbalistic phantasies, his zealous searching for the philosopher's stone, and his inquiries into the influence of the stars upon human life. He at first taught German at Bâle, and he also composed some of his writings in the German language. But as, in spite of all his striving, he could not free his thoughts from the fantastic superstition of an age which was just beginning to apply itself to the observation of Nature, his language likewise struggles in vain after the right expression for new thoughts, and he coined a multitude of peculiar words which greatly increase the difficulty of understanding the German Theosophist.

According to Paracelsus, theology is the basis of all knowledge, even of the knowledge of medicine. The natural knowledge that flows from the light of Nature does not reach far. Man has all knowledge, all wisdom and art, from God, and we Christians from the new birth in the gospel. For everything must be founded in the gospel that we teach in history, jurisprudence, medicine, and philosophy, and even the heathens, like Plato, Aristotle, and others, had their wisdom from above, although not from faith in Christ. "The book in which is the ground and the truth and the knowledge of all things is God Himself. By this knowledge all things are guided and ruled and brought to their perfection, for it is only in Him who has created all things that there lies wisdom and the principle that is in all things." Hence we must first seek the knowledge of God; in this lies the ground of all wisdom. God is the ground of all things, and they are all animated. God has "not created a single *corpus* without a *spiritus* which it secretly carries in it, for what would be the use of the *corpus* without the *spiritus*? Nothing." All beginnings lie enclosed in the great chaos from which they proceed by separation. Matter is formed from salt, sulphur, and quicksilver, and its *spiritus* or spiritual

essence is constituted by salt, sulphur, and mercury. This means that, according as matter assumes the quality of being solid, fiery, or fluid, it is formed by the elements of salt, sulphur, and quicksilver. From the varied mixture of these three elements, the different things arise; and hence, notwithstanding the diversity of all things, there is a universal harmony among them. This mixture depends on the star-spirit or *cagaster* indwelling in everything, which is the ground of its predestination. These spirits have their body in the constellations, and they proceed from God as the primal source of all life.

Man as a microcosm has part in all the three worlds or spheres which go to form the macrocosm; that is, he participates in God, in the stars, and in the elements. The body is formed from the elements, and is supported by elemental nourishment; and hence it corrupts after death and dissolves again into the elements. The body has its proper principle of life in the *spiritus vitæ*. The soul is the sidereal spirit, and it comes from the constellations. From it flow the orbs and the natural sciences, in which we are dependent on the influences of the stars. The spirit is, as it were, the soul's soul, and it is breathed into man by God directly from the substance of His nature. By the spirit man is capable of receiving divine knowledge, and he receives the gifts which God communicates to every one. By it he is also destined for eternity.

Man is thus a being of a twofold kind. He is of an animal nature, and can live to the animal spirit, and therefore be known as an animal. Hence the Baptist calls the Pharisees a "generation of vipers," and Christ speaks of dogs, swine, and wolves in sheep's clothing. But it was not in accordance with the will of God that man should live as an animal; he was to live according to the higher nature of the divine image, in order that he might fill up the place of the devil and his angels. Yet man turned to what was animal, fell into sin, and came under the dominion of the devil. For our salvation, the Son of God, as the Word of the

Father, became man in Christ; and by His bitter suffering and death He paid for the guilt of our sins, freed the souls of believers from eternal death, and led them into Paradise. Nevertheless, he who desires to live with Christ and to be saved must also first suffer and die with Him; and he must be buried with Him and rise again in order to be glorified with Him. An orthodox Christian must not only believe that Christ was despised and mocked and buried for him or for his sin, but he must believe that every one in his own person must be despised, mocked, tortured, slain, and buried with Christ. Imputed righteousness helps no one without this fellowship in the suffering of Christ.

In agreement with these views, Paracelsus depreciated all that was external in religion and the Church. He praises Luther for his bold attack upon the externalized ecclesiasticism of Rome, and yet he remained a Catholic himself. He says that we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven with the fleshly, elemental body that perishes at death, and hence we must obtain another flesh from above. We must be born anew of a virgin from faith, incarnated of the Holy Ghost, the third person of the Godhead who cometh after Christ. Baptism serves this end; by it we are incarnated of the Spirit into that flesh in which we see Christ our Saviour, and rise again from death and pass into the kingdom of God. Now everything must live upon that from which it has being; and as the mortal body must be fed from the natural elements, so the new birth must be fed from Christ. His flesh and blood, which is begotten of the Holy Ghost from the Virgin, and is therefore heavenly, is given for our enjoyment in the Eucharist. In virtue of this non-mortal flesh of the new birth, we will rise again at the last day with Christ. Then shall we no longer rot nor be consumed, but be clarified with a divine clarification, so that we may enter with Christ into the kingdom of the heavens. But the damned will be darkened, and suffer the punishment which God will assign to them in the judgment.

The views of Paracelsus became very widely spread, espe-

cially among physicians. All the alchemists, the fantastic astrologers, and naturalists of the age attached themselves to him. This movement is of considerable importance in regard to the history of the culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but its details are of no value or interest for us here.

3. Carlstadt († 1541) was of the men who stood near to Luther, the one who gave himself up to Mysticism; and he was specially led thereby into paths which separated him from the great reformer. He was a man of great erudition, and his treatise on Resignation or Self-abandonment (*von der Gelassenheit*) shows strong evidences of the influence of Tauler. Self-surrender is the renunciation of all creatureliness, and it is immediately followed by the union of the soul with God. The highest degree of renunciation consists in man surrendering his own self or his personality to God, and keeping himself from all godless and selfish impulses. Then does the Spirit of God come into the soul and fill it completely; for faith consists in the union of the human heart with God, who pours His power into it. Hence the Lord's Supper is not an external enjoying of the flesh and blood of Christ, but the act of internally becoming one with God.—Thomas Münzer (1490–1537) also shows mystical thoughts, only they are infected by an appeal to immediate divine revelation and by his revolutionary ideas. Man must turn away from external things, must go out of himself, and become a mere nothing, in order that God may come in with His light, and possess the pure ground of the soul. When man has forgotten himself and every creature, then will God pour Himself into the soul and work His work in it. The letter is good for nothing. "It would avail nothing even though one should have eaten a hundred thousand Bibles!" And just as little does faith alone avail without moral conduct.

4. Sebastian Frank (c. 1495–1543) of Donauvörth is important as a historical writer of that time, although he estimates the value of everything according as it is a means of education and religious edification. He was also an excellent popular writer, and Luther himself says of him that "he had taken

the right grip of things, and that he knew how historical books are most willingly read, and are greatly liked." He sided with the Reformation, inasmuch as he was a zealous opponent to the papacy. He was the first to prove, and he did so with great acuteness, that the twenty-five years' episcopate of Peter at Rome was but a fable. He showed that the Roman Faith had its origin from the popes and their institutions, and was without the word and command of God. He said the popes knew as little of the New Testament as a cow knows about the game of draughts, or an ass does about playing on the lute. Nevertheless, their over-estimate of the value of the written word and their sectarian withdrawal from the universal Catholic Church, separates him from the Reformers. Because the Scripture is divided in the letter and is discordant, he held that the letter must give rise to heresy, and that men can never be one, nor at one in it. The worst thing that he dislikes in these and other sects is their partisan separation. It is not the order to which we belong that makes us pious, nor even our works, but the Spirit of Christ, as the only true faith which regards all things as depending on God, and which makes the person agreeable to God, so that all that the person does is done by God, God mirroring Himself in the person, like the sun in still water. This Christian faith is a free thing; it is bound to nothing external, and hence there is one Church scattered among all the heathen, but gathered together in the spirit. But do as we may, the world will have a Pope, even though it should steal him or dig him out of the earth.

All death in the Church comes, according to Frank, from the literal understanding of the Scripture, while life rests only upon the inner Word, which is the eternal Spirit of God. In our relation to heaven there is something necessary that is higher than a Bible, nor is it possible that the written word can be God's word on account of the very change in its languages and the uncertainty of its letter. The inner Word is the divine Spirit, who is sent into the world, and especially into every human soul. Hence faith does not consist in



holding certain external things to be true, but in living and experiencing inwardly the facts of faith. Faith is the inmost fact of life, and with it man surrenders himself and sinks his heart entirely in God, in order that God may work in him both to will and to do.—In accordance with this view the historical Christ is made to retreat into the background, behind the eternal Christ. We ought to regard Christ not merely from without according to the flesh, but we should know Him in His best part as He is the word and the expressed will of God. Christ in His true nature is eternal, and therefore He did not come first into the world with the birth of the historical Christ, nor even only among the Jewish people, but He also influenced many an enlightened heathen who knew nothing of the historical Christ. It is not what is external and historical in the sufferings and death of Christ that saves, but He must come into our heart, and must be united with our soul. Christ must be born, live, die, rise, and ascend to heaven in us.—With this corresponds the general relation of God to the world and to man. God is different from the things which we can see, hear, touch, taste, or smell; and He is knowable by us, but as men we only know Him in so far as He is in us. So far as it is possible to indicate afar off what God is, He is an incorporeal soul diffused through all things in Nature, and He essentially communicates reality and living feeling to all things. The relation of God to Nature is represented by the image of a juggler, who with his hand seizes a figure or puppet, and moves it how and where he will, and as soon as he withdraws his hand the things fall from their being again into their own nothingness; but God always remains in Nature. As the air fills all and is nowhere, so is God in all things and all are again in Him. The portion of life and soul which God has merged in every one, is the form of God. In us God first becomes determinate will. All feelings and accidents which we attribute to God—such as anxiety, suffering, displeasure, wrath, and such like—are not in God, but in us. As we have spectacles on our nose, so does God thus appear to us through our feelings.

5. The congress of theologians at Schmalkald in 1540 gave a warning against the fanatical errors of Sebastian Frank and Caspar Schwenkfeldt. Schwenkfeldt (1490–1562) was at the beginning a zealous adherent and promoter of the Reformation, but he was afterwards driven to join its opponents, and he was universally assailed as a fanatic, for which Luther was not without blame, as he attacked him with undeserved violence. He likewise objected to the over-estimation of the external word in the Lutheran Church, as leading even to the assertion that the preaching of a Judas Iscariot would have been just as effective as that of the Apostle Paul. According to Schwenkfeldt, Religion rests upon the inner experience of the divine life. God needs no external thing or means for His inner working of grace. Even Christ as in the flesh was a hindrance of grace, and He was raised to heavenly being, that the Holy Spirit might come to us. Whoever wishes to proceed from external things to what is internal, does not understand the course of grace. The sole means of grace is the omnipotent, eternal Word, as it proceeds immediately from the mouth of God, and not as coming by the Scriptures, sacraments, or such like. The hearing of faith is an internal inblowing of the spiritual wind of God; it is as a drop from the fountain of life; it is a secret whispering of the mouth of God. It is the acceptance of the living word of God in the soul, when man, along with the sinful, carnal nature is transformed. Man belongs by his body to the external world, and by his immortal soul to the higher spiritual world, and hence what is external can alone move the external man, whereas God alone can penetrate into what is internal. The first man was created of the earth, earthy; but his destination was to become perfect through Christ, who alone is the image of the invisible God, in order that God might wholly dwell and live in him. God works in a twofold way in Nature; after one manner in Creation, and after another in Regeneration. Creation brings forth products which are alienated and far from the divine Being; Redemption is an activity of the divine nature, by which it communicates itself in its undivided power. It may

be said of the creation that all creatures are in God, in so far as He has arranged, ruled, and known them all; but in the redemption there is realized in a still higher sense a union with God. For faith is a state of the soul entirely identical with its object; in its object it becomes completely one with God, and participates in the divine nature. True faith is participation both in Nature and in the divine Being, according to its measure; it is a scintillation of the eternal sun; a sparkle of that burning fire which is God. Along with all this, Schwenkfeldt insists emphatically upon the verification of the inward life in the strict morality of outward conduct.

In closest connection with all this stands Schwenkfeldt's peculiar doctrine of the Deification of the flesh of Christ. This is founded upon the view that communion with the exalted Christ on the side of His body is the source of the new life. It is not the suffering and dying of Christ, nor generally His earthly life in the state of humiliation, that stands in the foreground with Schwenkfeldt, but it is the Christ who is glorified in the heavens. We ought not to preach a half Christ, that is, we ought not merely to proclaim His redemption and satisfaction for us, but also our regeneration and sanctification,—not merely Christ on the cross, but also the Christ who is exalted to glory. What the Christian experiences within of the influences of grace is all made up of doings of the Christ who has entered into His glory, and is personally ruling over His believers. It is Christ who inwardly communicates forgiveness of sins. It is Christ who sheds abroad the Holy Spirit with the fulness of His gifts in the hearts of His believers. It is Christ who Himself communicates Himself in the undivided unity of His personal life, and gives Himself as food to the hungry soul. The body of Christ has also part in the heavenly glory, for His single person may not be divided, as is done by the Lutheran doctrine of the two natures and the *communicatio idiomatum*. From the outset the flesh of Christ was a flesh of a higher endowment, furnished with powers of innocence and holiness; and afterwards, in the resurrection and ascension, there came in

the complete deification of the flesh of Christ. Its present state is designated at one time as the glory of the flesh; at another time it is described as sitting at the right hand of God; and again it is represented as anointment with a holy Spirit. This Spirit is nothing but the totality of the operations of grace proceeding from the deified humanity of Christ, for the Spirit proceeds from the body of the glorified Christ. The Lord's Supper is a real communication and appropriation of the glorified Body of Christ; but this spiritual enjoyment is purely internal, and needs no external mediation.

With all vehemence the Reformers set themselves in opposition to these "fanatics;" but when the Lutheran theology stiffened into a rigid scholasticism, and continued to lose all true life and every regard to the interest of piety, the living religiousness of the time led again to similar modes of opposition to the worship of the letter in the Church. Among the less important representatives of this tendency were Aegidius Guthmann of Swabia (*c.* 1580), Paul Lautensack, painter and organist at Nürnberg (1478–1552), and Bartholomæus Sclei of Poland (*c.* 1596). The following are some of their positions:—"Hence it now follows incontrovertibly that the outward Christ, according to the flesh, is of no use at all, with all His doing and suffering, if we have not the inward Christ in us, who rightly encourages us in the love of God, and makes us new and spiritual creatures." "Whoever finds these the highest of all the mysteries of God, has found noble pearls and the highest treasure, which no man can find elsewhere than in himself." "For what is outward in Nature and the Old Testament, we must perceive in the New Testament in ourselves as it is fulfilled in the spirit and in truth." The culmination of this movement was reached towards the end of the sixteenth century in Valentin Weigel.

## IV.

## VALENTIN WEIGEL (1533-1588).

Valentin Weigel was born at Haim, near Dresden. He was educated as an Electoral bursar in the Royal School at Meissen. From 1554 he studied at Leipsic, and from 1563 to 1567 at Wittenberg; and from that time to his death he laboured as a preacher at Zschopau. As his course of training indicates, Weigel was well acquainted with all the logical and philosophical science of his age. This is shown also by his writings, for Weigel does not disdain to quote his predecessors and masters, in spite of certain attacks upon the scholastic learning of the time. Of the ancient philosophers, Seneca, Plotinus, and Boethius were his favourites. Of the Church Fathers, Origen and Augustine were most diligently studied by him, while others are at least named. Weigel was quite familiar with the German Mysticism as in Tauler, "the German Theology," Thomas à Kempis, and Eckard. Schwenkfeldt and Sebastian Frank are rarely quoted, nor have we found any quotation from Carlstadt or Nicolaus of Cusa, notwithstanding undeniable points of contact with them. We will endeavour to present the thought of Weigel according to those writings that are recognised as undoubtedly genuine.<sup>1</sup>

His opposition to the Church of his time is expressed most plainly in the original *Dialogus de Christianismo*. A "Hearer" or layman who is a follower of Weigel's ideas converses with a "Preacher" who is the representative of the ecclesiastical orthodoxy. The Christ who has passed by

<sup>1</sup> The most important of Weigel's writings are the following:—*Libellus de vita beata*, etc.; *Ein schön Gebetbüchlein*, 1612; *Der güldene Griff*, etc., 1617; *Vom Ort der Welt*, etc., 1613; *Dialogus de Christianismo*, 1614; *Philosophia theologica*; *Πρώτη διατριβή*, 1614; *Principal und Haupt Tractat von der Gelassenheit*, 1618; *Soli Deo gloria*, 1618; *Kurzer Bericht und Anleitung zur Teutschen Theologie*. Naturally these writings contain many repetitions, but they everywhere bear evidence of a scientifically educated man who controls his thought and expression. Reference may be made to Opel, Valentin Weigel, 1864.

death into glory comes in in the character of "Death" as umpire, and agrees decidedly with the Hearer. In the last chapters we are told how the Preacher peacefully dies after confession and absolution; but as he had experienced no penitence and expiation within, he enters into Hell, whereas the Hearer, on account of his true inner life, goes to Heaven, although he dies without the sacrament and lies buried in an open field. The subject of the discussion is—(1) the internal unction and illumination by the Holy Spirit in contrast to the letter of Scripture as well as to confessions and teachers, and (2) the inward essential indwelling of Christ after mortification of the natural flesh, in opposition to the theory of imputed righteousness. While the Hearer refers to the spiritual understanding of the Scriptures, the Preacher builds upon the symbolical books, the current doctrines, the words of wise teachers, and the science which he had learned in the universities, and he indignantly asks the layman whence he, an unlearned man, got his wisdom, which was not taught in any pulpit whatever. The Hearer argues that we require to slay our own Adam, and that Christ must be born in us and be essentially united with us; whereas the Preacher refers to the *justitia imputativa*, saying that Christ has given satisfaction for us, and that "we carouse at His expense."

The main thesis of Weigel is that true knowledge does not come from without, but from within; it does not arise from what is known, but from that which knows; not from the object, but, as he says, from "the eye" or the cognitive subject. This proposition follows from his whole theory of knowledge, which is carefully elaborated in detail. The external seeing, which belongs even to "the cow grazing before the gate," is to be carefully distinguished from that internal seeing which is cognition. Three things belong to mere external seeing, the Eye, the Object, and the Air; whereas only two things belong to the inner seeing, the inner Eye and the Object. The Object is twofold, according as it is infinite when it is God, and according as it is finite, which is the creature. The creature again is twofold, as visible



and as invisible. The inner Eye is threefold, being the five Senses, with their inner unity, the Imagination, and the Reason with the understanding. The higher two of these Eyes can work without the lower, but not conversely. Corresponding to them there is a threefold knowledge: sensual knowledge (*sensualis*), directed to the external, visible appearances of things; rational knowledge (*rationalis*), including the arts and sciences; and intellectual knowledge (*intellectualis*), relating to the knowledge of God.<sup>1</sup> In like manner there is a threefold school, namely, that of Man, that of Nature, and that of God.

All this knowledge proceeds from the Eye, and not from the Object. The continually recurring proof of this proposition is as follows:—If knowledge came from the Object, then “a uniform undivided knowledge must come from any one object into all the eyes which have this object presented to them.” In other words, the same thing would have to be known in the same way by all. This, however, is not the case. When several men look at the same colour, to one of them it appears grey, to another blue, and to a third green. If a hundred men read the same book, they have a hundred different opinions about it, as is shown in the case of the Bible, to which all appeal in support of their peculiar views. Hence knowledge cannot come from the Object, but from the Subject; not from the Thing presented, but from the Eye. Further, the following grounds are also adduced in support of the position. Without internal knowledge we could not assent to the judgment of another nor recognise its correctness; nor could we form an estimate of writings; nor could we learn anything by instruction from others or from books. The same way from within to without is likewise prescribed in Nature. The root, branches, fruits, and seed come from the germ, and not from without, or from the earth and air. In the creation the visible proceeded from the invisible, some-

<sup>1</sup> In a way that reminds us of Nicolaus of Cusa, Weigel refers many theological controversies and accusations of heresy to the fact that many continue in the sensible or rational knowledge of God, while others rise to the intellectual knowledge of God.

thing from nothing; and not conversely. All diversity of knowledge therefore rests, not upon the Object, but on the diversity of Eyes; for all knowledge is contained within ourselves. This is the natural knowledge by which we conduct ourselves "really," that is, actively.

This knowledge reaches to God. We are able to know the Creator from the creatures, as they present a shadow or copy of the eternal undivided being of God. As we infer from a work to its maker, or from smoke to a fire, so do we infer from the creature to God, partly by negation of all imperfection, and partly by affirmation in the ascending and descending series of things. This natural knowledge of God is, however, insufficient for salvation. Sometimes this position is established by the imperfection of that knowledge, "for we see God only from afar off, or from without, by the footsteps of the creature, which are as it were His shadow." Nevertheless, when it is said again that "if Nature becomes entirely silent and still, and comes to be forgotten," it may be turned to a saving knowledge; but the main ground of this assertion is another reason which is often repeated, namely, that natural knowledge rests upon our own self-activity. If it led to salvation, then salvation would rest upon our own merit, which, however, would be Pelagianism. Faith and salvation are not dependent on the creature, but entirely belong to God, who is compassionate in Himself; and hence we must also accept a supernatural knowledge.

The natural knowledge rests upon the light of Nature; the supernatural knowledge upon the light of faith and grace. Hence the same thing appears quite different according as it is viewed from the standpoint of God or of man. These two points of view ought to be kept asunder and not mixed or confused; they are not hostile to one another, but the natural knowledge or philosophy leads in an auxiliary way to the supernatural knowledge or theology. In the supernatural knowledge our relation is entirely passive; it is produced in us by God Himself; God Himself is the Eye and the Light in man and through man; and hence there

is no controversy or difference among religious men in regard to the supernatural knowledge, but rather is there everywhere harmony and unanimity. Any difference among them is founded merely on the different degree of their receptivity for the divine illumination; for man can here do nothing else but stand still and keep Sabbath, or wait upon God in the obedience of faith. Weigel describes this relation in his "Tractate on Renunciation." It is only when man gives up all things, renounces all that is his own, all his egoism, and all the pleasure of the world as well as the delusion of knowing anything, and when he has even abandoned this abandonment so that he does not boast of it nor rely upon it, —only then will God wed Himself to the soul in an inward conjugal communion.

The entrance of this supernatural knowledge is Regeneration. Hence man has a twofold birth: a natural birth from which all natural knowledge arises, and a supernatural birth from the spirit of God which leads to supernatural knowledge. Regeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit, not by means of external ceremonies, but immediately, and it is only possible by the fact that all supernatural goods, or in a word Christ, lie previously concealed within us. Thus does all supernatural knowledge flow from what is within, because God Himself is within us as our light and eye. For the supernatural knowledge, the same principle thus holds good as for the natural knowledge, namely, that knowledge does not come from the object or from without, but from within, or from the Eye. The foundation and truth of things are never got from books, they remain always an uncertainty unless the Eye becomes shown to us much more distinctly than all teachers and their books. But "this book in me and in all men, in great and small, in young and old, in learned and unlearned," is the right book by which we are able to understand even the Holy Scripture. "It is the light of men which lightens them in the darkness, and it is the Word of God. This word is the wisdom of God in man; it is the image of God in man; it is the spirit or finger of God in man; it is the seed

of God, the law of God, Christ, the kingdom of God ; it is the wife of the life in us."

This inner word is the earlier. It is put externally before the eyes and ears of man in three ways : in the law of the tables, in the person of Christ, and in the preaching by the office of the Spirit ; for were God's word not in us, all that falls below, the whole historical Christ, and all the drawing of the Father to the Son, would help and profit us nothing. "He who has not confession and absolution in himself by faith in Christ, is helped nothing at all by confession and absolution in connection with the priest." But, on the other hand, the external is not entirely in vain. As there is no knowledge attained without an object, so preaching the Scriptures and external instruction form a useful means of awakening and stimulating, in order to excite and draw forth the word of God that lies hidden within us, only the Scriptures are not to be regarded as if they were a vehicle on which the knowledge is brought into us from without.

These positions are put into their correct light by the views that are expressed regarding the relation of God to finite things in general and to man in particular.

There are necessarily two beings, the perfect and the fragmentary or "part-work." The perfect is the eternal, self-subsisting true Being, that includes all things in Himself as well when they were in secret as now when they have come to the light. The imperfect "part-work" is the creature which arises from the true Being. God may be compared to the number *one* ; for the eternity of God can just as little be divided as we can divide the one in arithmetic. He is one without any division or multiplicity, and so much so that two expressions, which, applied to earthly things exclude one another as contradictory opposites, may both be applied to God. Hence God is likewise the highest good, and it is only in the possession of Him that our longing for happiness can be stilled, whereas all finite goods are naught, and the right relation to them is to be entirely without desire of them. The creature corresponds to the number *two*, because it is not

sufficient for itself, but requires God for its preservation ; it is only a likeness or shadow of God, a reflection or semblance of the One and the Eternal.

Finite things have been called by God out of nothing to something. Accordingly, we distinguish a threefold Heaven ; the highest Heaven is God ; the middle Heaven is the angels or stars ; the lowest Heaven is the heavens and the earth, or the visible world as formed of sulphur, salt, and mercury. God dwells in a light to which no man has access. As the eternal Word, He comprehends all the angels, while the angels have all the creatures in themselves spiritually. As the nut is said to be the tree *complicite* or infolded, and the tree is an *astrum explicitum* or an unfolded nut, and as in the number one the other numbers are involved, whereas two, three, etc., are the number one evolved, so are all the angels in God, and all things in the angels or constellations. All created things do thus participate in God ; they have their very being and their subsistence from Him ; for without Him they would not be, nor would they be able to exist. Hence God is in all things, and all things are essentially in Him. For "God and His Will or Word is not only in all creatures, but is also out of them, as it comprehends and includes them, and therefore even a fly could not live out of God, so that all must be in God in substance although not in will." Yea, even Lucifer is by his substance in God, because he would otherwise not be at all. Along with Being, finite things have also nothing in them, because they were called out of nothing to be something.

By his natural birth man is composed of three parts : Body, Spirit, and Soul. Body and Spirit constitute the mortal part of man. The former is the tangible or sensitive part, and it is taken from the earthly elements and returns to them at death ; the latter, the intangible and insensitive part, is taken from the stars, which therefore influence our whole life in so far as that life depends on the Spirit. By his body man is a microcosm, that is, he comprehends all the lower creatures ; yet the body is only the external house of the man.



The soul comes from the *spiraculum vitæ*, that is, it is immediately inbreathed into man by God; and on account of this divine origin it has to live with God as a wife with her husband. Hence man has a double nature, Adam and Christ; and natural and supernatural are both in him.

Thus was man put into the middle between God and the creature, that he might choose between good and evil. God could indeed have settled him in the good without giving him choice, but then man would have been just like the cattle. Man did not fall by some external seduction, but he carries in himself the subtle serpent. The Angel in heaven and Adam in Paradise both thought: I am an image of God, the Almighty, and should be as God; but God is His own master, free, without commandment or law, and loves and seeks Himself; therefore, I will also turn myself to myself, love myself, and have delight in myself, and so shall I also be free and blessed like God. By this self-love the Angel fell as well as the man, turned himself from unity to heterogeneity, from the one to the divided, from life to death, from heaven to hell. This turning from God to evil is, however, realized only in the will. Even the fallen one remains, as to his essence, in God, and everything viewed in its essence as Being is good. This distinction is indicated by the prepositions *juxta* and *in*; God is in those who are pious as He is one with them in essence as well as in will; he is along with or beside (*juxta*) the Devil, who has turned himself away from Him as regards his will. The sinner, in his essence, must love God as his origin and his true being, yet hate Him in his will; and so he finds himself in a constant conflict between love and hate, and this is hell. For heaven and hell are not two separate places somewhere in the universe, but we carry heaven and hell within us. To live in heaven means the same as to live in the will of God or to be one with God; to live in hell means to live after our own will, or to be turned away from God.

Although it thus depends only on our will whether we are in heaven or in hell, yet after we have once sinned the new life can only arise in us by the immediate operation of divine



grace. It is preached from the pulpits that man becomes just by faith, and imputation of the death of Christ; but, in truth, nothing external is of any avail, unless Christ is born, dies, and rises again within us. By the immediate inworking of God, the Christ in us who was overcome by sin is thus reanimated again; and for this it is required above all that we mortify the old Adam, or the carnal life, with all its selfishness and its attachment to earthly things. If Adam is dead, then will Christ live anew; or in other words, we will be really united with God. "Christ's death and merit are not imputed to any one; but if he has Christ's death in himself, and if he is then baptized by baptism to a like death, and if his whole body is crucified with Christ, then is there imputation." "Faith is this, that Christ's life is ruling in us, so that His spirit is in us, His flesh and blood are in us," etc. "As God the Father is in Christ the Son, and the Son is in the Father, and these two are one; so is God the Son in the believer, and the believer is in the Son, and these two are one." "We must dwell in God and God in us; this is the eternal marriage, the heavenly marriage by which we remain united and connected with God."

From these positions there follow several consequences. And first of all the regenerate man must give himself earnestly and diligently to the work of holiness. So long as we continue to live in the flesh, we cannot indeed be entirely without sin, but we can turn our will away from it; and whereas we formerly sinned joyfully with our will, after regeneration we do so only with deep pain and against our will. Again, the Church is not a limited community enclosed in a particular place with exactly defined doctrines, but in all countries and among all nations wherever pious men are found who have died with Christ in their own hearts, and been renewed unto a holy life, they form the true Church. Even here on earth, after terrible conflicts, there will come a golden age, when all the sects will cease and the universal Catholic Church will everywhere prevail; when Christ will really rule; and when love for the brethren will be the highest law among men.

The historical Christ has, like the letter of the written word, the significance of an external remembrance and testimony. The Word was born man of the Virgin in order that God might reconcile us through Christ with Himself, and might show us a light, a way, a guide, a door, a pattern, or exemplar as to how we should walk after Him. The depreciation of the external means of grace is only in a limited measure extended to the sacraments. Baptism is not a nullity, but we have to obtain by it a new flesh and blood from heaven. Confession and the Lord's Supper are not indeed necessary, as the believer bears the true High Priest in himself, but they minister to greater assurance.—In opposition to the supremacy of the priests, the universal priesthood is emphasized; every believer has the Christ in himself, who can forgive him his sins and bestow absolution.—Prayer does not procure us anything from God: it would be blasphemy to assert that God, who is eternally unchangeable, would be determined or occasioned to do anything by our prayers. The kingdom of God, for which we pray, does not lie without, but within us, and therefore prayer serves as an inward monitor, and to awaken us within.

Weigel remained unimpeached till his death. Entirely averse to the dogmatic wranglings of that age, he appears to have devoted himself chiefly to the duties of his office of preaching. He subscribed the *Formula Consensus* without hesitation, but says, "I have not sworn by the books of men, but I have promised, by this subscription, to continue to hold by the writings of the prophets and apostles, and never to diverge from them; and if I find anything in the writings of the teachers or the Church that may be in conformity with the apostolic doctrine, I will also accept it." From this point of view he must also have exercised a wise silence with regard to his opinions in the pulpit. Of his writings there only appeared before his death an unimportant funeral sermon. They were for a time only circulated in manuscript within the circle of his faithful adherents. It was not till 1604–1618 that his productions appeared in various places along with a

number of spurious writings, and it was only then that the conflict about Weigelianism began.

The theological polemic carried on by J. Schellhammer, Zacharias Theobald, George Rost, Lucas Osiander, and others,<sup>1</sup> does not deserve to be dealt with here, and the less so because they do not enter in detail upon Weigel's doctrines. To most of them, Weigel appears as a dangerous revolutionary, who, like a Thomas Münzer, aims at overthrowing the political and social order. To others he is already objectionable because he opposes the literal sense of the doctrines and the dogmatic positions fixed in the creeds. They all rail and declaim against him in the rhodomontade style of the seventeenth century.

Weigelianism became widely spread. The tractates of Weigel were first printed at Halle. In the Archbishopric of Magdeburg many of the nobility adhered to him. He gained numerous followers in Anhalt; and in the gymnasium of Marburg in 1619 two teachers, named H. P. Homagius and G. Zimmermann, suddenly declared themselves Weigelians, and were particularly zealous against the use of profane writers in the schools. They had already gained a not unimportant following in Hesse, and it was only by severe measures that the Landgraf could check the movement. In Worms, Stephen Grunius (1623) preached regarding the division of man into body, spirit, and soul. In Frankfurt-on-the-Maine, some likewise declared themselves to be Weigelians. In Nürnberg, William Eo gathered a numerous congregation in 1622. In the second and third decades of the seventeenth century, an abundant literature appeared, which brought Weigelian thoughts, without their philosophical basis and in a popular form, to the knowledge of the public. This literature does not contain anything new, and it mostly exaggerated, even to caricature, the antagonisms of the system to learned culture, or

<sup>1</sup> Johannes Schellhammer, *Widerlegung des vermeynten Postill Valentini Weigelii*, Leipz. 1621. Zacharias Theobald, *Widertaufferischer Geist*, Nürnberg 1623. Georg Rost, *Heldenbuch vom Rosengarten*, Rostock 1622. Lucas Osiander, *Theologisches Bedenken Vnd Treuhertzige Erinnerung*. Tübing. 1624.

to the letter, or its appeal to immediate revelation, or its astrology, or the hope of a renovation of the political and social relations. This also applies to Esajas Stifel († 1627), an inn-keeper at Langensalza and his nephew Ezechiel Meth († 1640), to whom the usual Weigelian errors are imputed, as also to Paul Nagel († 1621), a professor of mathematics at Leipsic, who sees a universal corruption coming in from the worship of the letter by the preachers who are not taught by the Holy Spirit. By the aid of the stars, he tries to spell out from the Apocalypse the signs of better times. Hans Engelbrecht, a clothmaker at Brunswick († 1642), moves on the same lines, only that he lays more stress on the verification of faith in active love, and he claims special respect for his personal character.

A movement closely related to Weigelianism, although of independent origin, is represented by the *Rosicrucians*. In the year 1614 there appeared the "*Fama Fraternitatis R. C.*," or the Brotherhood of the famous order of the R. C. to the heads, estates, and learned men of Europe," prefaced with a plan of a universal and general reformation of the wide world. In 1615 there followed the *Confessio Fraternitatis R. C.* In the "General Reformation," carried out by the arrangement of the Emperor Justinian, the seven wise men of Greece, along with certain Roman philosophers, are represented as consulting about an improvement of the world; but they come to the view that their century could not be helped. To vindicate their call they carry on much talk about their trouble and labour, and give an order regarding a new tax on vegetables, turnips, and parsley. The *Fama* invites all the learned men of Europe to attach themselves to the new Brotherhood for the improvement of the corrupt world. Its philosophy is the head, origin, and mistress of all other arts and sciences; and it aims at bringing thoroughly to light heaven and earth, and the nature and being of the unique man.—It is a characteristic sign of that age, and of the degeneracies to which a noble mysticism may lead among the masses, that this mysterious

summons called forth the Rosicrucian movement. Certainly there was no lack of calm intellectual judges, who doubted the existence of a society of Rosicrucians, and regarded these writings as composed merely in order to ridicule or befool the world. But incomparably greater was the number of those who everywhere inquired after that society, and expected from it the salvation of the world. They all gathered around the mysterious name of Rosicrucian, and there were then not a few who, from an obscure longing to penetrate into the depths of nature and to grasp the supernatural directly, gave themselves up to boundless fanaticism and astrology. The truth, in fact, was that a pious Würtemberg pastor, named John Valentin Andreæ (1586-1654), had in these writings sought to ridicule the fanaticism and folly of his time in keen satire. And when, against all his expectation, the satire was taken as earnest, and it became the very gathering point of blind enthusiasts, he came forward himself against it on several occasions, but in vain.

We turn now from these caricatures. Such morbid offshoots are not to be taken as our standards in judging of that mysticism and theosophy which shot forth such splendid blossoms in several individuals. In none, however, did it appear with more magnificence and perfection than in Jacob Böhme, to whom we now come.

## V.

JACOB BÖHME (1575-1624).<sup>1</sup>

Böhme was born at Alt-Seidenberg in the Oberlausitz, near the Bohemian frontier. He grew up amid rustic surround-

<sup>1</sup> The works of Böhme have been used in the collected edition published at Amsterdam in 1682 (*Des Gottseligen, Hoch - Erleuchteten Jacob Böhmens Teutonici Philosophi Alle Theosophischen Werken*). Compare Hermann Adolph Fechner, *Jacob Böhm's Leben und Schriften* in the *Neulausitz. Magazin*, xxxiii. 4 and xxxiv. 1, Görlitz 1857. The work of Julius Hamberger (*Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jakob Böhme in einem systematischen Auszuge aus dessen sämmtlichen Schriften, etc.*, München 1844) is only to be used with caution.



ings. On account of the weakness of his body, he obtained a good school education, yet this went only so far as the school of the place could carry it. In 1589 he became a shoemaker's apprentice at Seidenberg, and in 1599 he became a master of the craft at Görlitz. Böhme was entirely self-taught from the time he left school. He read the writings of Paracelsus, Weigel, Schwenkfeldt, as well as those of Stifel, Meth, and the Rosicrucians, along with the Bible; but he received no learned culture. As he represents it himself, he knew neither the language nor the writings of the ancients, and in philosophy he was entirely a *homo rudis*. He says that all that he gives he draws from the depths of his own soul, or rather from the overpowering illumination of the Holy Spirit; for he speaks only from the impulse of this divine Spirit and not from his own understanding. When the Spirit comes upon him, he is laid hold of irresistibly; and when He has withdrawn, Böhme himself knows hardly how to interpret what has been spoken through him. It is no wonder that to us in these later times this interpretation much more frequently fails. It is almost impossible to relish his language. At one time he confuses us by the very affluence of the sensuous images which are heaped up by his active phantasy in order to enable us to conceive the inconceivable; for they are not often happily chosen so as to be easily intelligible, and still more rarely are they consistently carried out. At another time he repels us by his efforts to obtain the spiritual meaning of a word of Scripture from the sound and tone of its several syllables. And at other times it is almost impossible for us to pick out the few grains of genuine gold from the heaped-up rubbish of mere empty phantasies, or to hold fast the thread of connection through the wearisome labyrinth of prolix details which skip hither and thither without order. We might read into his mysteries the wisdom of all ages if we were to proceed with Böhme according to the well-known saying of Socrates regarding Heraclitus, that "what I have understood of him is splendid and to the point, and therefore I believe that the rest of him is likewise good



and true." But it would be quite unjust, on the other hand, to thrust aside all that is obscure and difficult as unintelligible. As Socrates said of Heraclitus, Böhme in fact needs a "Delian swimmer."

Since the time of Schelling and Hegel, it has become usual to reckon Böhme among the philosophers, and to regard him as a precursor of the modern speculation. Nor is this wrong; for in a mystico-theosophic way the cobbler of Görlitz already beheld in sensible intuition what Hegel long afterwards sought to embrace in the conception, namely, that the finite or Evil proceeds from the infinite or Good by the process of self-determination, and returns again from this estrangement into the same; and we have thus the dialectical process of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, or of the "In-itself, For-itself, and In-and-for-itself."

We must, however, beware of overstraining this affinity in thought between Böhme and these later philosophers; and, above all, it is not to be extended to the first of his greater writings, which is the one most frequently used, the "*Aurora, or the Dawn at its Rising*, that is, the root or mother of Philosophy, Astrology, and Theology," etc., 1612.<sup>1</sup> This treatise falls into the three parts indicated in the title. Philosophy treats of the divine power, of what God is, and how Nature, the stars, and the elements are qualified in the Essence of God, and whence everything has its origin. Astrology treats of the powers of Nature, the stars, and the elements, showing how all the elements arise therefrom, how they impel and govern all things, and how good and evil are effected by them. Theology treats of the kingdom of Christ, how it is opposed to the kingdom of hell and is in conflict with it, and how men by faith and the spirit may overcome hell and obtain blessedness.

Böhme starts from the view that on examination of Nature we find everywhere two qualities, one good and one evil, and that in this world they exist together in all powers and all

<sup>1</sup> *Aurora, oder Morgenröthe im Aufgang*, das ist, Die Wurzel oder Mutter der Philosophie, Astrologiæ, und Theologiæ, etc., An. 1612.

creatures. Thus Heat, as Light, brings life to all things, and, as Fierceness, it brings corruption. The good quality alone rules in the angels only, and the evil quality alone rules in the devils. This Opposition in the creatures is produced by the stars, whose powers control the creation, and it is not effected immediately by God; for God, although He permeates the whole world as the sap does the tree, has not the opposition of the good and the evil in Himself, but is wholly good. God the Father has in Himself all the powers which are in Nature; not, however, in such a way that each power exists in Him in a particular place, but all the powers are united together in the Father as one power. From this one power, which is without beginning and without end, all creatures have been produced. God the Son is not another God than the Father, nor is He out of the Father, but He is the Heart in the Father, the core in all powers; He is a self-subsisting person, and is eternally and always born of the Father. Should the Father cease to bring forth, the Son would no longer be anything; did the Son no longer shine in the Father, the Father would become a dark abyss; and if the Father's power did not spring up from eternity to eternity, neither could the divine Being exist. God the Holy Spirit is a still spiration of all the powers of the Father and Son; He is the spirit of life who forms and shapes all things. The Trinity is brought near to us by its likeness in man. It is shown forth by the Power which is in the whole heart, and the Light which is in the whole soul, and the intellectual spirit of both; and again in all things, by the power out of which a body is formed, the sap or the heart of things, and the forth-streaming power in it or the spirit.

The opposition of the two qualities arises through Lucifer. In God there continually spring up and flow forth seven Fountain-Spirits or qualities: the Sour, the Sweet, and the Bitter, Heat, Love, Sound or Mercurius, and the last spirit, which is called *Salitter*. These mutually bring forth each other, and all the seven united in one another are as one spirit. From the seventh Fountain-Spirit God created the angels by

a process of contraction. They formed three kingdoms, each under a supreme head,—Michael, Lucifer, and Uriel,—created respectively after the form of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and formed out of the midst of the kingdom belonging to them. Lucifer was at first the most glorious angel, with the most beautiful and most powerful body, and with a light which was incorporated with the Heart or Son of God; but he set himself up to triumph over the divine heart. Instead of obeying God, his Fountain-Spirits raised themselves up and began to form a higher, prouder qualification than God Himself possessed. The Fountain-Spirits then inflamed themselves too strongly; the sour quality drew the body too hardly together; the sweet water dried up, etc. Amid this frantic foaming and tearing, a Son was born to Lucifer in his heart, and the Spirit went out from his mouth. Lucifer, along with his angels, was driven in a violent conflict from his kingdom, which is the region of this world; then men were created as a compensation, and their king, born in the middle of time from an angel, was to take up the place of Lucifer. When, in the third birth in the region of Lucifer, God was kindled into wrath, the light in that birth was extinguished; it all became darkness, and out of it was made the sensible world. The first birth is that of the Son of God; the second is the proceeding forth of the seven Spirits; the third is the conceivability of Nature. Nature flows from a double fountain: from the lovely, joyful Essence of God, and from the Wrath-fire which was kindled in the fall of Lucifer; and hence, in all its parts, it is mixed of good and evil, of heaven and hell. This world has accordingly a threefold birth. By its first or inmost birth it is of one nature and will with the higher heavens, that is, with the kingdoms of Michael and Uriel. By its second birth it is found in the present bipartite or dual life. The third birth is the carrying of it back to the divine unity, as the clear and holy heaven which inqualifies with the heart of God beyond and above all the heavens. The second birth is depicted by Böhme, under the guidance of the Mosaic record of creation, in prolix and fantastic images, carried on

till the fourth day, when the creation of the stars gives occasion for unpalatable astrological reveries. Then the author suddenly breaks off with the words: "For the devil thought of making a festive evening therewith, because he saw that the day was therein to dawn."

The thought that Evil has its ground in God Himself has its first appearance in the writings of a later period. The most important of these are entitled, *Description of the Three Principles of the Divine Nature* (1618); *Of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ* (1620), and *High and deep grounds of the threefold Life of Man* (1620). The principles expounded in these writings may be summarized as briefly as possible in the following propositions. The first Principle is the wholly universal indeterminate Will, which is therefore called the Unground and Darkness; but it bears in itself Fierceness, or the longing and desiring after determinate willing. This first Principle being mirrored in its Wisdom, brings forth out of itself, or makes contract into itself, the second Principle, the determinate separated will, the principle of Light. The first Principle then imagines itself into the second Principle, thus as it were fertilizing and differentiating itself by Light, and then there proceed from it the good powers and effects. That is, to God the Father and God the Son there supervenes the accession of the Holy Spirit to complete the holy threefoldness in the Trinity. The first Principle makes the Angels proceed from itself. These, in like manner, should imagine into the second Principle, Light. Instead of this, Lucifer turns himself round to the ungrounded principle, to darkness, in order to persist there. Thereby Fire, or Fierceness, instead of being mitigated by Light, is concentrated into itself, and there arises the Satanic Nature, which is wholly evil. At the same time, by the upflaming of Fire and the contracting of the fervid fierceness, the lower earthly Elements arose from the heavenly Elements, and the formation of this earthly World was completed. This is the third principle. Hence the three principles and the three Persons of the Trinity do not now wholly coincide.

These short and comparatively clear propositions do not yet, however, entirely express Böhme's view. We must therefore follow him somewhat farther, keeping as close as possible to his own words:—God is the Being of all beings, and from Him all things take their first beginning. It cannot be properly said of God that in Him there is fire or Sourness, still less that there is air, water, or earth, but that such have arisen from Him. Nor can it be said that death, or hell-fire, or sorrowfulness is in God, but that such have arisen from Him. The devils also have arisen, and therefore we must inquire after the source, or *prima materia*, of badness; for, in the primal principle, all is one thing and all is made out of God, out of His Essence, according to the triad. In God, indeed, there is neither beginning nor distinction, but because the ultimate source of wrath and of love has to become disclosed, and because they are both from one primal principle or mother, and are one thing, we must speak thereof in a creaturely way, as if there was a beginning. All things are of God, but God has created all, not from another matter, but from His own being. Now God is a Spirit, but a spirit does nothing else but rise, bubble up, move itself, and always bring forth itself. It has in its birth primarily three forms in itself, as being bitter, sour, and hot; of these no one is first or last, but all three are only one, and they all bring forth each the other two. Between bitter and sour, fire brings itself forth, and thus there appear, in the first principle, likewise the four forms or qualities, Sour, Bitter, Fire, and Water. The primal principle of all life and of all movement consists in fierceness or ferventness, in accordance with which God calls Himself a fiery, angry, jealous God. In man, when he is angered, his spirit draws into itself; he thrills with bitterness, and unless it is soon resisted the fire of wrath becomes kindled so that he burns in rage; and so is it likewise in the primal principle that is the ground of the production of Nature. The first Being is described as sour; it contracts into itself and becomes a hard, cold Power. On the other hand, bitterness resists and pierces and rubs itself so hard that a flash of lightning flames



forth in terrible fire. The fire-flash has now become *primas*, and the matter, which in the primal principle was so hard and terse, has become as if dead and powerless. When, then, the Fire becomes mixed up with the sourness, there arises from the ferventness a terror of great joy, and it flames up like a kindled light. Thus springs up the fifth Fountain, graceful, charming Love, and here there is vain caressing and love-making, as when the bridegroom embraces his bride; and therefrom is brought forth the sixth form, which is Tone or Mercurius. As with this gracious Love or gentle Fountain the eternal light of God is born, it is the only-begotten Son of the Father. In this great joy, however, the birth can no longer maintain itself, but obtains the seventh form in an unfathomable multiplication, which is the Paradise or kingdom of God. Further, when the heart or light of God is born in the Father, there arises in the fifth form from the Water-fountain in the light a most lovely, fragrant, savoury spirit, and this is the procession of the Spirit from Father and Son. God now created the Angels that He might rejoice in the creatures, and that the creatures might rejoice with Him. Among the angels, Lucifer was also created from the Eternal Nature; he saw the birth of the holy Deity, the heart of God and the confirmation of the Spirit, and he was to continue an Angel. But because he saw that he was a prince in the first Principle, he despised the gentleness of the heart of God, and would not imagine into that gentleness, but would rather qualify into fire-power. Hence everything vanished from him; he was spued out from his princely throne, and is now unable to raise his imagination any longer to God, but remains fixed in the four Anxieties of the primal Principle, and therefore God has enclosed him in the third Principle, or this World.

Böhme has also expressed these thoughts in a less physical garb in the following way: There is an eternal, unfathomable divine Essence, and in its nature there are three persons. The first person is the eternal Will. This Will is not being itself, but the cause of all being. There is nothing before it which constitutes it, but it constitutes



itself. A mere will, however, is thin like a nonentity. This causalises the will so that it becomes desireful, and the process of desire is a mode of imagination, as the will beholds itself in the mirror of wisdom. By this Imagination of the will into the eternal wisdom, which is identical with it, there arises the Will's Son, the other person of the Deity, who is born from eternity to eternity as the heart of God, as His Word, as the Revelation of the Being of all beings, and the Power of the Life of all lives. The third person is the Spirit, which proceeds out of the power of speech, from the grasp of the will by the imagination; this is the Life of the Deity, a Person other than the Father and the Son. The office of the Spirit is to disclose the wisdom of God. The will of the heart of God laid hold of the *sour fiat* in the centre of the Nature of the Father; and as the figures of eternity had been beheld in wisdom, they were now grasped by the fiat in the Will-spirit of God, and were born and created, not from alien matter, but from God's essence, or from the nature and proprium of the Father. Their destination was to imagine into the nature and property of the Son, and eat of God's love and essentiality in the light of His Majesty; and they did this with the exception of Lucifer, who turned himself away from the light of love, and wished in the severe fire-nature to rule over God's gentleness and love. He was therefore driven into the eternal Darkness. The expelled spirits then kindled by their imagination the nature of the Essentiality, so that earth and stones were produced from the heavenly Essence, and the gentle spirit of water in the qualification of fire became the burning Firmament. Thereupon ensued the creation of this world as the third Principle, and the devil was shut up in darkness between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of this world.

The theory of the Principles took a somewhat different form in certain later writings. The most readable of these are entitled, *High and deep grounding of Six points* (1620); *A short explanation of the following Six points*; *On the earthly and heavenly Mystery* (1620); *On the Election of Grace*; and *Theo-*

*sophic questions* (1624).<sup>1</sup> There now appears before the three Principles the wholly indeterminate Unground, which embraces all things and powers, yet on account of its undistinctiveness it is an entirely unqualified unity. From this proceed the two objective principles, the Evil and the Good: the former proceeding first as a consuming fire, as an angry and jealous God; and the latter second, as a lovable, compassionate God, who neither wills evil nor can will it. The procession of this Love, or its turning itself to the primal Ground, is the Holy Spirit of the divine life. The third Principle lies in the creation of the world; its exemplar or eternal model is the idea of all things, and it has its primal existence in wisdom as the eternal mirrored form of the primary divine principle, or the *Mysterium magnum*. Both principles co-operate in the creation, and hence good is mixed with evil in all the things in the world; that is, good and evil are not materially separated, but everything is good or evil according to the centre in which it has its subsistence.

There is no essence without will, but the will is the father of all essence. And hence God as the ultimate ground of all essences is a will. This first will, however, is an eternal nothing; it is the unground, or the eternal unity apart from all possibilities and properties. It is without origin in time, and without place and position, yet at the same time it is out of the world and in the world, and deeper than any thought can plunge. This nothing is at the same time a craving after something, and as there is nothing which can give anything, accordingly the craving or the nothing itself must give it, and so it makes something out of nothing. This is the meaning of the *Magia* or *Mysterium magnum*. Whatever is something, however, or every particular thing, be it divine or devilish, consists of Yes and No, of divine power and light, and their object. The eternal will of the divine Unground emanates from itself; Unity becomes

<sup>1</sup> Von sechs Punkten hohe und tiefe Gründung, Anno 1620. Eine kurze Erklärung nachfolgender sechs Punkten. Vom irdischen und himmlischen Mysterio, Anno 1620. Von der Gnadenwahl. Theosophische Fragen, Anno 1624.

plurality, and with plurality there arises also distinction and opposition. The distinguished many are the No; for, on account of the distinction, the emanated will is an individual will which desires to be a thing of its own, and to distinguish itself from identity or sameness, and which therefore in Desire draws itself inward. The unity, on the other hand, is an emanating Yes, which is insensient in itself and only becomes manifest in the No as its object, and thus it obtains something that it can will. The Nothing wishes to pass out of itself that it may become manifest, and the Something wishes to be in itself that it may be sentient in the Nothing, in order that the unity in it may become sentient. The emanated desiring individual will has several properties: Sharpness, the movement of attraction, the feeling of anxiety, and fire. Accordingly God is called an angry, jealous God, and a consuming fire. Now, as the distinguishable will lays hold of unity, there arises a fifth property in Love, which in fire becomes mobile and desirous, and as a great love-fire it forms the second principle. We have thus along with the Unground two principles, or two centres in one principle, as two kinds of fire. The Wrath-fire in the emanated will of receivability is a principle of the eternal Nature; the centre of Love, or the Word of God, is the breathing of the unity of God, the foundation of power. The former is the Father, the latter the Son, and the emanation of the love-breathing of the life of love is the Holy Spirit. The angels were formed out of the essence of both the eternal centres; their powers are the great emanating names of God, all having sprung from the Yes and been led into the No. The angels are the servants and instruments of God in the guidance of the creatures. Their destiny was to sing in blessed joyfulness and to play in the divine kingdom of joy. Lucifer fell because, raising himself above his throne, he wished to exist in his own receptivity, to make the No rule over the Yes, and to persist in the Wrath-fire of the first Principle. The will of the ungrounded being has shaped itself from eternity into a form in wisdom as a thing images itself in a mirror,

and there were thus in this idea the pattern forms of all things which were ever to be created, only without distinction and motion. With the object of giving a revelation of Himself, God has created this external world as the objective representation of what is inward; and the spirit of the stars and the elements thus constitutes the third Principle. Both centres have been introduced into the form of the world, so that darkness and light, evil and good, are mixed in all earthly things.

The other views of Böhme were little affected by this modification of his theory of the Principles. In what follows of our exposition we accordingly found upon all his writings except the *Aurora*.

He regards the opinion that God is outside of the world in a particular place, as a widespread but utterly carnal error. Heaven and Hell are not bounded spaces above or below the earth, but every man is in heaven or hell according as he lets the good or the evil, the joyous will of God or the selfish, individual will, rule in himself. God is and works in and through us as in all things and through all things, only everywhere by different powers and qualities. He also holds that the opinion is erroneous that represents God, the three-fold, as having first reflected as to how it was to be in and with the world, and that He has in His decrees set up for the creation immutable laws from without. God works in the world as the sap does in the tree. Our carnal reason is indeed blind, and incapable of exploring the mysteries of God and of Nature; but if we have experienced in ourselves the new birth from Christ, the eyes of our spirit are opened, so that in the contemplation of our Ego, of God, and the world, men can know and understand what the divine Spirit has been gracious enough to communicate to them through His weak instrument, Jacob Böhme.—When Lucifer had fallen, God created man in order to fill up the gap that arose. He created him in His own image, so that he might participate in the three Principles. The body was indeed formed out of the earthly matter of this world, but God breathed into it the

true soul of all the three Principles in the temperament : the true creaturely Fire-soul, from which God is called a jealous God and a consuming fire ; the Light-world, as the kingdom of the power of God ; and the Air-soul as the *spiritus mundi*. Thus created, Adam was put into Paradise, that is, into the constitution of the divine world of light that was innate in him ; and in this world he was to remain. And, as every life must be nourished with the food that is related to it, God made a number of trees of Paradise to grow of whose fruit Adam was to eat, but only with his mouth as a spiritual nourishment of the divine life of light. Among them stood a tree with earthly elemental fruit of which Adam was forbidden to eat. Because all the three Principles were in him, each of them wished to rule over him ; his soul stood therefore between the two opposite centres of fire and light ; and, according to God's will, its destination was to direct its imagination upon the light. But man inclined himself to the spirit of this world, and thereby he became bad. Hence he fell into sleep, which was alien to him by his original nature. During the sleep, the Tincture, or the living spiritual form,—which is conceived as a medium between the merely ideal being in the divine wisdom and the actual reality, and which is called the Holy Virgin,—then gathered itself together and vanished into the heavens. Man was thereby changed, and in order that he might not be completely destroyed by the enjoyment of elemental fruit, God created Eve from the sleeping Adam, who till then had been androgynous. Now for the first time did men eat of the forbidden fruit ; and thereby they fell completely under the influence of the earthly, and were driven out of Paradise. Yet they received even then the consoling prophecy of the serpent “bruiser” Christ.

God is not, as reason represents Him to us, an unmerciful Being, who damns man to death on account of his disobedience, but His will is that the sinner be converted and live. For this end the Second Principle, the Light-Life or the Heart and the Son of God, must become man in order to



kindle again the nature that was shut up in death, with the brightness of light. Already in the ideal world Christ as the future Redeemer had on this account embodied Himself in the form of eternity, and in Him God has elected the human race. After the Fall, the word of the promise, that the seed of the woman should bruise the head of the serpent, was made good to the woman, thereby the holy voice went out of God into the woman's deadened heavenly nature in order to overpower the kindled wrath of God with the highest divine love. By this voice the poor soul again obtained divine life, and it was propagated as a covenant of grace from man to man. In this way all men have part in the word of promise and in the eternal light in Christ. Nevertheless, mankind divided soon into two kingdoms, the one of which turned itself more to the light and the other more to the darkness. From their founders they are called the Church of Abel and the Church of Cain. Eve, entangled in carnal desire, hoped for an earthly kingdom, and therefore believed that she had already brought forth the Bruiser of the serpent in Cain; but Cain sprang only from the selfhood of the Adamic soul by carnal pleasure, whereas Abel sprang from the divine desire that was produced by the inner Word of God. That Abel was slain by Cain is a type of the fact that Christ was to suffer death for men. Abel's place was filled up by Seth, in whose race Christ was to reveal Himself in the flesh. Cain's race, on the other hand, turned themselves to earthly arts. After the flood, the three Principles appeared in the Sons of Noah. Shem being a figure of the Light-world, Japhet a figure of the Fire-world, and Ham a figure of the Outer-world. Similar representations of the opposition of light and darkness, of good and evil, are found in Isaac and Ishmael as well as in Jacob and Esau. This opposition, however, is not so extreme as that the Jews alone should have part in the divine light, and that the heathen should walk wholly in darkness; but as Adam proceeded from the one God into his carnal ignorance, so does grace also come out of the same one God and is



offered to all ignorant ones, to heathens as well as to Jews. In the covenant which God concluded with Abraham the heathen do not indeed share, but they certainly share in the first covenant of the word uttered in grace. Paul can therefore say that God has called and chosen the heathen also in the covenant of Christ; for the purpose of grace which had embodied itself in Paradise after the fall, the Promise lay in them, and after this God calls them His love. The error of the heathen is that they fell away from the only God to the magic birth of Nature, and chose for themselves idol-gods out of the powers of Nature, and that they honoured the stars and the four elements because these govern all things. Those heathen, however, who from the itch of corruption passed out into the light of Nature because they did not know God, yet have there lived in purity, have not merely discovered great wonders of wisdom, but at the restoration of all beings they will also dwell in the tents of Shem.—Even in the Church of Abel, the kingdom of light, Christ could not immediately appear in the flesh because of the universal corruption. The saints of God, however, or the prophets, prophesied out of the goal of the covenant, out of the promised word which was again to move in the flesh. The law of sacrifice is likewise nothing else than a type of the humanity of Christ. What Christ did as man, when with His love He reconciled the divine wrath, was realized also in the sacrifices with the blood of beasts. God's Imagination looked upon the blood of beasts, with which Israel sacrificed through the medium of the goal of His covenant. Not as if the sacrifice produced salvation without faith, but man must die to the false selfhood, and turn himself with his desire to God. This is indicated by the sacrifice. The fire of the divine wrath of God consumed the impure substance of the animal flesh, and when the Jews ate the flesh of the sacrifice they ate the flesh of Christ and drank His blood in prefigure or type.

The Son of God entered into humanity completely and really in the person of Christ. God was not thereby changed.

“Certainly He has become what He was not before, but He Himself has at the same time remained what and how He was.” The Word of God has a threefold formation: the first being from eternity in the Father, a second person in the Holy Trinity; the second being assumed in the hour of the salutation when Mary said to the angel, Be it to me according to thy word; and at the same moment there was assumed the third form, even as if there were sown an earthly seed from which a child grows. Christ is a true human creature, and has also received a true human soul from Mary. Mary, although in the outer flesh truly the daughter of Joachim and Anna, was, by the will, the daughter of the covenant of promise, or the goal to which the covenant pointed, and in which it was fulfilled. Hence the pure heavenly Virgin was embodied in Mary; the soul of Mary having laid hold of the heavenly Virgin, and the heavenly Virgin having put on the soul of Mary, as the heavenly pure vesture of the holy element of a new regenerate man. Thus did Mary become the blessed among women; in her did the true nature of humanity, which had died in Adam and been shut up, become again alive. Christ received the earthly essences from Mary in entirely the same way as every child does from its mother. He has therefore all the three Principles in Himself, but in the divine order and not mixed through one another; and by this is explained the fact that Christ remained completely free from sin. The human essences have not, however, laid hold of the eternal Godhead; nay, even the Soul and the Word are not one being, but they only permeate each other, as do the quality of the iron and that of the fire in the glowing iron. On the other side, the union of the divine and human in the person of Christ is regarded as so close, that even the corporeality of Christ was all present in it. Christ has not become man in the Virgin only, as if His deity sat cooped up there, but Christ’s corporeality is the whole fulness of the heavens, which in the person is creaturely, yet lives outside of the creature; but both in one spirit and one power, and not as two.

The purpose of the Incarnation is to bring back man, who owing to the Fall has let the spirit of this world rule in himself, to communion with God by a complete new creation through the implanting of the Principle of Light. Böhme expressly rejects as erroneous the view that this effect might have been attained had God remained in heaven and only looked upon mankind with love, as it were clothing every individual with the heavenly Virgin or the pure nature of man. The eternal word and heart of God must enter into human flesh and into the death of the poor soul, in order to take away from the flesh its power, to draw out the fierce sting of hell, and to lead the soul up from death and hell. The conquest of the devil and the power of death began with the forty days' temptation of Christ in the wilderness. The devil sought, but in vain, to excite in Christ the desire of earthly bread, the spirit of pride, and the lust of universal empire. The complete transmutation of the earthly being into the heavenly was only possible by the Son being obedient to the angry Father, even to the death on the cross. The human Fire-life stands in blood, and therein does the wrath of God rule; there must therefore come another blood born out of God's nature of love into the angry human blood. Both of these united with one another must enter into the fierceness of death, and thus the fierce wrath of God must be quenched in the divine blood. The outer humanity in Christ must therefore die, in order that the egoism in mankind should cease, that the Spirit of God may be all in all, and that egoism may be only His instrument, all living in self-renunciation. The Form of love itself also gave itself up to the horror of dying in order that out of Christ's dying and death the eternal divine sun might arise in human quality. When Christ died, He did not throw away the earthly body, the quality of this world, and put on the incorruptible in order that this body might live in divine power and not in the Spirit of this world. Nor did the soul of Christ, when released from the body, descend into hell in order to overcome the devil; but when Christ laid away the kingdom of this

world from Himself, His soul penetrated into death and the wrath of God, and thus wrath became reconciled in love. Thus devils and all godless souls in wrath were taken captive in themselves, and death was broken to pieces. But life budded forth through death.

The question now obtrudes itself as to how we can become participative of the new life in Christ. It is an error to hold that God has from eternity destined some to blessedness and others to damnation. Man is free, and can by the decision of his own will choose life or death. When man has once fallen he is not able to convert himself, yet he retains from his origin out of the eternal scientia of the unground the power to plunge into the Ground in which God brings forth His word, and the soul may here be laid hold of by the grace of God. This transformation is the work of the Holy Spirit which works immediately in the heart, enlightening and bringing it forth anew. As an external assistance, God has given us His Word and the sacraments. In baptism, man gives up his Adamic will to the death of Christ and desires to die to his own will in the death of Christ, to rise again by Christ's resurrection in a new will, and so to live and to will with Christ. In the Lord's Supper the divine nature of the Lord does not mingle with bread and wine, nor does Christ unite Himself by His flesh and blood to the coarse carnal flesh and blood of man, but by the Tincture or the heavenly paradisaic power of bread and wine, Christ infuses His heavenly flesh and blood into the life of man. The mere use of these sacraments has as little value as the external word alone has. It is not enough to go to sermon and to know the lettered word. It does not make me a child of God to hold it to be true that Christ died for me and rose from the dead; the devil, too, knows that, and it does not profit him. Hence we ought not to wrangle and contend about mere external knowledge of the word and the doctrines of religion, nor be proud of that knowledge. For a Christian who cherishes an ungodly will is just as much out of God as a heathen who has no desire of God. And a heathen may be saved even

without the science of the kingdom of Christ if he turns to the living God, and, in true confidence, gives himself up to God's will. It is not on the external church of stone and lime or on the word that we should depend, for learned science and historical faith in the latter profit nothing. Further, the forgiveness of sin is not to be thought of as taking place by God putting Himself in motion on account of each individual, and throwing away sin from him. God has put Himself in motion from eternity only twice,—for the creation of the world and the incarnation of Christ,—and the Scriptures say that our works do follow us. By forgiveness of sin nothing is therefore taken from us, nor does God come down from heaven to us, but our soul is gone out from God, out of the holy will of His majesty, into wrath; and as Christ has now made a way through death and wrath to the majesty of God, we must turn round and enter by the wrath into the majesty. The atonement has indeed taken place once for all in Christ's blood and death; but that which took place once in Christ must, by the shedding of Christ's blood, take place also in me. Christ has truly broken down death for us and in us, and made us a way unto God; but what does it profit me that I take comfort from it and learn to know it as such, yet continue shut up in dark wrath, and am bound in the chains of the devil. I must enter into this way and walk in this path, as a pilgrim who marches out of death into life. Regeneration is therefore realized in these two points: negatively, in the mortification of the flesh and of selfishness; and positively, in the reception of the divine life in Christ. The corrupt earthly will must die through real right repentance, and enter into renunciation, into nothingness, by giving up the will of the reason entirely unto death; and it must no longer will or know itself, but depend on the mercy of God. For as God says, speaking through the prophet: "My heart breaks, so that I must be merciful to him." In this mercy of God the new man arises and grows up in the kingdom of heaven and Paradise, although the earthly body is in this world. Our walk and conversation, says the

apostle, is in heaven, so that the new man walks in heaven, but the old man in this world; for the heaven in which God dwells is in the new man. Then does the creature give up its own selfwill, and sinks into the Nothing from which it arose. The Something stands in torment if it has not its joy in this, that the life of the Nothing may dwell in the work of the Something. The means of regeneration is faith, but it is not a thought or admission of history, it is a process of drawing out of God's nature, it is the introducing of God's nature by the imagination into the fire of one's soul, and putting on God's nature as a body of the soul. In the present life the struggle between the good and bad principle continues to go on even in the regenerate, and it is only under a continual severe struggle that we can advance in holiness. In the other world, the soul is either in light or in darkness. There is thus realized a complete separation of the good and the bad; the former enjoy a blessed union with God, the latter are eternally damned.

In his lifetime Böhme found many adherents, especially among the noble families of Silesia and Saxony, that were attached to the views of Schwenkfeldt, as well as among the physicians, who were acquainted with the doctrines of Paracelsus. Dr. Balthasar Walther and Abraham von Frankenberg († 1652) of Ludwigsdorf may be mentioned. Of the writings of Böhme only two small treatises were printed before his death, but his works were afterwards published in Holland. They were reproduced in numerous editions, and obtained a wide circulation. Böhme's views thus penetrated into wide circles; but as the fanatical element gained ground, we find few who developed in any way the profound and permanently valuable thoughts of their master. —Johann Roth intensified the dissatisfaction felt regarding the corruption of the age; he emphasized the demand that every preacher must be born again and have the Holy Spirit, and even increased the millenarian hopes by demanding of his adherents that they should eradicate the godless by force, and



set up the kingdom of God upon earth. He was kept a prisoner in Holland from 1676 to 1691, but found a place of refuge at Friederichstadt.—Quirinus Kuhlmann, born at Breslau in 1651, and burned at Moscow in 1689 for his perverse opinions, gave up his study of law because he was prevented by the inner light that rose within him from soiling himself with the antichristian degree of Doctor of Law, and he worked thereafter for the spread of Böhme's writings and views.—Friederich Breckling (1629–1711), pastor at Zwill, exercised considerable influence upon the best-known follower of Böhme, Joh. Georg Gichtel (1638–1710). The external work of the Scriptures falls, in his view, completely below the knowledge that unfolded itself within his own mind. “The gifts and powers of God lie all hidden in the soul, like the seed in a field, and all that is required, is that we dig with earnest prayer after it and awaken it.” God is represented in the Scriptures at one time as an angry God, and at another as love; but in God Himself the two principles are one, and God in Himself is neither good nor bad. It was by the fall of Lucifer that this harmony was first destroyed, and that the strife of the two principles began. The whole of history is an uninterrupted conflict between them; man must die to his own will, and, in rest resigned to God, he must enter into the divine will. Christ, or the holy wisdom, is then born in us, and gradually drives out all darkness till the whole man is transformed in body, soul, and spirit into a holy flame of love. In order not to hinder this union, it is advisable to avoid the carnal conjunction of marriage. The idea of a Melchisedekian priesthood is specially adopted. Whoever has entered into close communion with God continues to participate in the work of redemption, as He offers up His life for the brethren in order that God's wrath may be appeased in them. The millenarian hopes again come strongly into the foreground in Gichtel's views. After a changeful career, Gichtel lived from 1668 in Amsterdam in complete retirement. He gathered around him a community of adherents, called “Angel-brothers,”

who afterwards spread widely, especially in the north of Germany.—Ueberfeld (†1732) is to be regarded as their head.—Christian Hoburg (1607–1675) likewise demanded inner illumination by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, instead of the external word of the Scripture and the worldly learning of the Universities. Instead of the external imputation of the merit of Christ as a “gunnel and plaster over all the stinking sin-sores of the unrepenting children of the world,” he desiderates the inward transformation and the essential renovation of the man himself; in place of incessant controversies about doctrine, he will have earnest striving after the true Christ in us.—Angelus Silesius or Joh. Scheffler (1627–1677), who passed over to Catholicism, was quickened by Böhme. He is well known as one of our best hymn writers, and in his “Spiritual Shepherd Songs” (*Geistliche Hirtenlieder*) he has fondly invested the thought of becoming completely one with Christ in the image of Christ as the bridegroom of the soul. His mystical system has been expounded in his “Cherubic Wanderer” (*Cherubinischer Wandersmann*) in deeply moving language, and it diverges from the kindred writings of the time by giving strong expression to the thought that God first attains a distinctive self-conscious existence in man.

“ I know that without me God cannot live for a moment,  
And should I perish, He must needs give up the ghost.”

In England, Böhme’s writings and views became also disseminated; and this was largely due to King Charles I., who, after he had read in 1646 the “Forty Questions of the Soul,” exclaimed, “God be praised that there are still men who are able, from experience, to give a living testimony to God and to God’s word!” Of Böhme’s writings there appeared three English translations, one after another.<sup>1</sup>—John Pordage († 1698) and Joanna Leade († 1704) were led to attach themselves to him, and the celebrated Henry More († 1687), professor at Cambridge, in his *Philosophiæ Teutonicæ*

<sup>1</sup>[By Sparrow, Edward Taylor, and William Law (1764), the last being considered the best.—TR.]

*Censura*, instead of the desired refutation of Böhme's views, gave a comparatively undisguised recommendation of them. Jean Leade became the centre of the followers of Böhme, and in 1695 they attempted, under the name of the Philadelphian Society, to establish a union of all the really regenerate of all the churches and sects.

---

This may be the most suitable place for referring, in a few words, to *Swedenborgianism*; not as if it were to be regarded as a product of Böhme's views, but on account of the affinity of its fundamental characteristics with these views. The dualism of Swedenborg (1689-1772) should not, in my opinion, be referred to the influence of Cartesianism. It rather presents the fundamental character of Mysticism in the mode in which it immediately plunges into the Divine, which is clothed by a sensuous phantasy in the strong colours of a tangible materiality. Swedenborg receives his wisdom by visions. In 1740, on the first occasion, there appeared to him by night a Form clothed in purple and gleaming in light, and it spake, "I am God the Lord, the Creator and Redeemer, and I have chosen thee to explain to men the inner spiritual meaning of the Scriptures, and I will declare to thee what thou art to write." Thereby the eyes of his inner man were opened, and while his body walked among men his spirit dwelled in the upper world, conversed with the spirits in heaven and hell, and received instructions from them. The purpose of this revelation was to found a new Church. There were in fact four Churches: the first with immediate revelation comes down to the flood; the second with revelation by "Correspondences" prevails in Asia and a part of Africa, and is sunk in idolatry; the third or Jewish receives revelations by the Spoken Word; the fourth or Christian by the Written Word. This fourth Church again passes through four periods, beginning respectively with its first institution; with the Council of Nicea, in which the errors of the Trinity and of justification were established; with the Reformation, when the light broke in but did not spread universally; and with

Swedenborg, who was to pave the way for the establishment of the new Jerusalem promised in the Apocalypse. The doctrines of the Trinity and of satisfaction are the two grave errors of the Church. The triad of divine persons leads necessarily to three Gods, notwithstanding the oral confession that God is one. There is indeed a certain triunity to be recognised in the Deity, namely, the unity of the first, middle, and last being, or of final end, cause, and effect, or of being, becoming, and existence. This true triunity is a pearl of the greatest price; by it alone do we obtain the true conception of God. This triunity is first realized in the divine human person of Jesus Christ. As in man soul, body, and working are one, so in Him there are the Father as the primal Divine, the Son as the Divine human, and the Holy Spirit as the processional Divine. There are accordingly three manifestations of the Deity, as creating the world in the Father, as redeeming in the Son, and as sanctifying in the Spirit. The redemption has a universal cosmical significance. God, as substance, has likewise a form, and it is the human form; He has thus a heavenly corporeality. God created the world out of His wisdom and goodness, and He enters into all things, especially into men, by His powers, according to the measure of their knowledge and love. Man belongs by his body to the natural world, and by his spirit to the spiritual world. The universe is accordingly divided into the natural and spiritual worlds. These two worlds stand towards each other in an entirely exact relation of *Correspondence*, so that there is nothing in the natural world which is not also in the spiritual world. As the upper world is divided into heaven, an intermediate kingdom, and hell, so in like manner the lower world is divided according to the different degrees of the good. Death is the transition from the one world to the other; for the spiritual world is only populated by the souls of the departed, who enter there into exactly the same relations as they have left here, only somewhat spiritualized. Hell had, in the course of time, widely extended its domain. In order to repress it, God became man, a wider substantial

communication of God to humanity. We come to participate in this communication of God by regeneration, a new creation which is alone produced by God through the two means of active love and faith. Faith takes its stand upon the word of Scripture. This word has been dictated by God Himself; but, because it was adapted to the wants of men, it has been written in the prefigurative form of the things of this world. The Scripture has therefore a double meaning, a natural meaning and a spiritual meaning; and, by means of the Correspondences, the former is transposed into the latter, for the word is written in pure Correspondences. After the spiritual sense had been entirely lost, Swedenborg was raised in ecstasy to heaven in order that, by instruction received there, he might open up to men this true spiritual Sense. With the completion of his principal work, the *Vera Religio Christiana*, on the 19th June 1770, the New Church, called the New Jerusalem, began, and it is represented as the crown of all the Churches.

---

The system that took its rise from Edward Irving, and which has been known since about 1825 as Irvingism, may also be mentioned here. Its fundamental principle is the expectation of the early reappearance of Christ. The apostolic gifts of speaking with tongues and of prophesying were renewed in order to separate a community from the corruption of the Church, and this community is united in absolute holiness with Christ, its holy and perfect head. The offices of the apostolic age were also introduced again. In doctrine, the only peculiar point in the system is that the human nature of Christ is strongly emphasized. By His being born of a woman, Christ was subjected in all points to the relations and conditions of fallen human nature. He was also tempted internally and externally like us; He was internally assailed by impure thoughts and impulses, yet He was without actual Sin. He also fell under the power of death as a man, and it was not till the resurrection that He received another flesh, and was exalted to be the perfect Priest of God and the Head of His Church.

## VI.

## THE PRACTICAL OPPOSITION. PIETISM.

There are certain manifestations of Religion which are completely at one with Mysticism in emphasizing the internal experience of Christianity instead of external acceptance of the ecclesiastical doctrines, but which, at the same time, are specifically distinguished from it by bringing into the foreground the actual verification of the inner life in working for the improvement of the individual and the perfection of the world, instead of the idle revelling of feeling in the inner vision of God. These forms of the religious life hold fast by historical Christianity and the external word, but they aim at completing the reformation of the sixteenth century by adding a reform of the Christian life to its reform of doctrine. We may designate it in this relation as the "practical" Opposition, without overlooking the fact that its ultimate roots are frequently found in views that are more related to mysticism. The examination of this movement in detail would not furnish much result for our special subject of investigation, yet it cannot be passed over entirely.

It must be remarked, however, at the outset, that the doctrine of the Reformed Churches insisted strongly upon sanctification as furnishing the assurance of election and justification; and where Calvin's influence was of authority, the whole life of the Church was regulated in so strict a spirit that the efforts we allude to did not arise in this sphere as an Opposition. In England, where the Reformation by Henry VIII. was purely external, the tendency towards an inward Christianity and a practical piety expressed itself in *Puritanism*.<sup>1</sup> Its share in the political revolutions of England is well known. Its most distinguished scientific representatives were William Perkins, professor at Cambridge († 1602),

<sup>1</sup> H. Heppe, *Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der Reformirten Kirche, namentlich der Niederlande*, Leiden 1879.



Thomas Hooker (1586–1647), and Thomas Goodwin (1600–1679). The Puritans aimed at shaping the life of the individual Christian according to God's Word. For the true faith does not consist in holding the ecclesiastical doctrine as true, or as that in which there is nothing needing to be altered, but it is the inner certainty of peace with God and union with Christ. The regenerate man is completely incapable of doing the works of the former life; rather must he strictly order his whole external life according to the demands of Scripture; and thus does the regenerate soul enter into a union with Christ that is closer than the union of the body and the soul.

The Netherlands, in consequence of their political relations in the age of the Reformation, became the country in which all anti-Catholic movements found toleration. Here Cornhart (1522–1590), secretary of the city of Haarlem, an adherent of "the true religion which is Christian love," declared it to be his motto "that Christianity does not consist in the lip, but in the life; it is in the walk, not in the talk."<sup>1</sup> He also designated the persecution of heretics as a crime in the kingdom of God, for God enjoins us not only to understand the good, but to do it, and the end of Christ's suffering and dying is that we may become divine in Him by His active obedience in us. The controversy between the Arminians and the Gomarists regarding predestination, with which were connected the questions as to the relation of the Church to the power of the State, and the authority of the written creeds, has also a bearing upon our subject. For the representatives of predestination always zealously repudiated the position that this doctrine is dangerous to the striving after holiness; and at the same time their opponents, and especially Arminius himself (1560–1609), maintained the universality of divine grace in connection with the requirement of an active verification of Christianity. Arminianism is, however, not to be regarded as an opposition to an already existing formation in the

<sup>1</sup> "Dat het Christendom niet en bestaat in den mondt mar in den grondt, in de daadt, niet in de praat."

Church of the Netherlands, rather might the victory of the Gomarists at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619) be regarded as the introduction of a more rigid form of Calvinism than had hitherto prevailed. At the time when the bitterest hate divided the Gomarists and Arminians, and the interest in pure doctrine absorbed everything else, there arose among the Gomarists in William Tellinck (1579–1629), a preacher at Middleburg, a powerful expounder of the inner Christianity and of the maintenance of godliness in active life. Holding decidedly by the doctrine of the Reformed Church, and emphasizing the sole authority of the external word in opposition to all enthusiasm, he, however, does not regard faith as the mere holding of a thing to be true. Love is connected with it in the closest way; it leads to inward fellowship with Christ, and makes itself active in the mortification of the natural man and progressive holiness of life. Among the adherents of this movement we may here name Gisbert Voetius (1585–1676), Professor and Preacher at Utrecht, “who was the most conspicuous of the teachers of the power of godliness.” On his entering upon his office as an academic teacher, he delivered a discourse, entitled *De Pietate cum Scientia Conjungenda* (1634). He says that the only one who really studies theology is he who does so with piety, and therefore the students should begin and end every day with God; they should exercise themselves daily in the study of the holy Scripture, in prayer, and other exercises of devotion, and they should also daily turn themselves in earnest repentance to God. Voet likewise delivered lectures on Ascetic Theology, which led to his book, entitled τὰ Ἀσκητικά s. *exercitia pietatis* (1664), a collection of the utterances of Catholic as well as Protestant theologians regarding “the practice of faith.” —Coccejus (1603–1669), Professor at Leyden, who excited so violent a storm in the Reformed Church of the Netherlands, reminds us of Pietism by his assertion that it is only the believer who is a true theologian. But Pietism cannot be regarded as peculiarly his own view any more than the Federal Theology he expounded, which had been long anticipated. In

opposition to the ecclesiastical scholasticism which asserted the supreme authority of the Scriptures in words, yet lowered it by an interpretation regulated according to the ecclesiastical doctrine, Coccejus aimed at developing the doctrine of the Church by an unbiassed and profound assimilation of the spirit of the Scriptures. Among the Coccejans there soon arose an opposition, dividing them into the "Free," who specially emphasized the knowledge of the Christian doctrine, and the "Earnest," who demanded a practical and living Christianity. At the head of the latter class stood Friederich Adolph Lampe (1683-1729). The Reformed Church in Switzerland was also affected by these movements when the representatives of the German Pietism extended their efforts to that country. But on the whole the Lutheran Church of Germany was the natural soil of what is properly called "Pietism."

Among its representatives Theobald Thamer († 1569) stands nearest in time to the Reformation.<sup>1</sup> When an Army Chaplain, during the Schmalkald War, he learned by sad experience that the new doctrine had not improved the morals of the time. His views were met by the assertion that man was wholly incapable of good, and that he could be justified by faith alone. This gave occasion for the formation of Thamer's peculiar doctrine. He held that man is justified by faith, but not without works of love; and that original sin only consists in the want of understanding and weakness of the body. The historical Christ has only value as doctrine and example, whereas the true Son of God is virtue. This virtue is also our reconciler; for it is only by virtue that we can be reconciled with God, and the doctrine of satisfaction by the death of Christ is to be rejected. This virtue requires a certain necessary power along with the knowledge of it, and we obtain both by the indwelling power of God. The habit of holding by the letter of Scripture and of the symbolical books is irreligious. "The Jews have the Talmud, the Turks the Koran, the Papists the Jus Canonicum, the Lutherans the Augsburg

<sup>1</sup> Neander, Theobald Thamer, Berlin 1872. Hochmuth, Zeitschrift für historische Theologie, 1861.

Confession,—where then is the Gospel?" There are three witnesses of the truth: Conscience, Nature, and Scripture. The most important is the Conscience, which is the Deity Himself, and Christ dwelling in the heart and understanding, and judging what is good and bad. From the contemplation of Nature we can also draw the knowledge of God. Out of the abundance of His goodness God has also given, as a third witness, the Scripture, which, however, on the whole only brings to remembrance and refers to these two witnesses. The Lutherans, on the other hand, depend on a carnal notion of inspiration. They think of the matter not otherwise than as if God were sitting at hand with a grey beard, such as the painters paint Him on the wall, and as if He laid hold of a word with His hand, and laid it upon the tongue of a prophet. Instead of this, it is to be maintained, not that a thing is true because it stands in the Scriptures, but that it stands in the Scriptures because it is true.

Johann Arndt (1555–1621), Court Preacher and General Superintendent of the Church at Celle, obtained the most important influence among the Pietists, especially by his "Books of the True Christianity" (*Bücher des wahren Christenthums*). In the godless and unrepentant life of those who make a boast of Christ and His word with a full mouth, and yet lead an entirely unchristian life, Arndt sees a great and shameful abuse of the gospel. Therefore will he show to the simple in soul that "the true Christianity consists in the evincing of true, living, active faith by upright godliness and the fruits of righteousness. So then we are to be named by the name of Christ, in order that we may not only have faith in Christ, but also live in Christ and Christ in us. So must true repentance arise from the inmost principle of the heart; and the heart, the mind, and the soul must be changed, so that we shall become conformed to Christ and His holy gospel." His own living piety urges him to impress practical Christianity on his readers in this incisive popular language. His work appeared in many editions, and was eagerly read, but among the theologians it found almost nothing but opposition.

J. Gerhardt is the only one who praises it. A preacher of Danzig declared that "he did not wish, after his death, to come to where Arndt had gone;" and Lukas Osiander of Tübingen, in 1624, called it a "book of hell," which was affected by no less than eight grave heresies.

Among Arndt's contemporaries and followers who shared his views, mention ought specially to be made of Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654), a grandson of Jacob Andreae, who was celebrated in connection with the composition of the *Formula Consensus*. Dissatisfied with the scholastic theology and the confessional feuds of his time, Valentin Andreae devoted the energy of his life to the composition of a series of spiritual writings, and in various offices of the Church of his country, to preaching that Christ of whom his heart was full, and whose love constrained him to verify the faith of his heart in genuine morality and virtuous conduct. Joachim Betkins († 1663) laments that Christianity had become an antichristianity, because the mode of life was entirely unchristian. For this the many unconverted preachers were to blame, for an unconverted preacher cannot possibly bring a sinner to repentance and faith. The importance laid on justification brought it about that holiness and the true imitation of Christ were but too frequently forgotten. In the seventeenth century the University of Rostock was the nursery of practical piety, as distinguished from a cold orthodoxy dependent on the letter of doctrine. Here from 1638 laboured Joachim Lütke-  
mann, a scholar of the pious John Schmid of Strasburg († 1658), and faithful to his motto, "I will rather save one soul than make a hundred scholars;" and he became the spiritual father of Scriver, H. Müller, and John Jakob Fabricius. In 1649, Lütke-  
mann was expelled as a heretic, because he had taught that Christ, on account of the separation of His soul from His body in consequence of death, had not been truly man during the three days in the grave. After him, however, the Quistorps, father and son, continued the work at Rostock; and the latter, in his *Pia Desideria* (1659), reprehended the shortcomings prevalent in the Church, the school,



and the household. J. Meyfart, a professor at Erfurt from 1631, reproaches the theologians who were satisfied with being able "to syllogize, declaim, and chatter pretty well," and he desiderates a higher standard of morality and the increase of devotion among the people by prayer-meetings, fast-days, and ecclesiastical discipline. J. B. Schuppius († 1661), who became senior pastor at Hamburg in 1649, insisted with great zeal on piety of heart and the fear of God, and repeatedly declared that theology is almost more of an experience than a science. All these representatives of Pietism and many others were only precursors of its maturest formation in Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705).<sup>1</sup>

Spener was of a deep religious character, full of inwardness and warmth, and equipped with high endowments of mind, and a rich treasury of learned knowledge. Strongly influenced at Geneva by the earnest spirit of the discipline of the Reformed Church, as well as by the profound mysticism of Labadie, Spener began to work on wider circles after he was called to the senior pastorate at Frankfurt-on-the-Maine in 1666. He saw the evil of the Church in the fact that faith was preached without sanctification, and justification without the right fruits of godliness; and he found the reason of this in the suppression of the simple, living word of Scripture by theological subtleties and human dogmas. Hence it was that in 1670 Spener began the so-called *Collegia Pietatis*, assemblies of limited numbers, held at first in the house, and then in the church, at which religious subjects were explained by the aid of edifying writings, but afterwards in connection with reading of the New Testament in the unrestrained form of free conversation. With the view of working upon wider circles, Spener wrote in 1675 his well-known *Pia Desideria*. He held that in order to save the Church from its state of corruption, and to carry on to completion the reformation begun by Luther in the morals and the life of Christians, it was necessary to penetrate more profoundly, and on all its

<sup>1</sup> W. Hossbach, Philipp Jakob Spener und seine Zeit, 2 Aufl. Berlin 1853. H. Schmid, Geschichte des Pietismus, 1863.



sides, into the word of God, and to diffuse the knowledge of it more universally. For this purpose private meetings ought to be held, and "ecclesiolæ in ecclesia" established, not as separatistic conventicles, but in order to advance a deeper understanding of Scripture. Men required also to be reminded of the universal priesthood in order that pious laymen may also cultivate religious life in the circle of their house. Above all, however, it needed to be pointed out that Christianity does not consist in doctrine, but in practice, and hence that the main thing was to mortify one's own flesh, to be zealous in good works, and to show Christian gentleness towards unbelievers or false believers. Spener maintained that one of the chief defects of the time lay in the training of the preachers in the schools and universities, because, instead of a theology being learned in the light of the Holy Spirit, and received with the heart, a human philosophy of divine things was impressed on the brain. He declared that it was a strange judgment of God that men had taken the heathen Aristotle in our schools almost as the standard of truth. He held that worldly science may find an application to theology only as the spoils of Egypt were applied for the use of the sanctuary, whereas all care was to be given to the inward piety and the godly walk of the students of theology. Then would the pulpits no longer be abused, so as merely to give displays of erudition in foreign languages, and artificial elaborations in discourse, but the word of the Lord would thus be preached simply, yet powerfully. — These proposals and suggestions met with approval on many sides, and house meetings were instituted in many places, in accordance with Spener's model. But there also soon appeared, under less circumspect guidance, certain accompaniments of the movement which were emphatically opposed by Spener; such as arrogant separatism, self-righteous security, unworthy hypocrisy, fanatical millenarianism, and even moral aberrations. Hence numerous attacks and accusations against the system were soon called forth. Spener published various writings in defence, and of these his *Universal Theology of all*

*believing Christians and upright Theologians* (1680) deserves especially to be mentioned, because of its presenting the always recurring principle upon which he founds. The principle is, that while there is a science and knowledge of divine things acquired from Scripture by mere human industry, yet this is not the true knowledge of God, and that the illumination of the Holy Spirit is requisite for the attainment of the true knowledge, but that no unregenerate man obtains this illumination ; and therefore, as put briefly, that it is only a regenerate man who can possess the true knowledge of God, or become a right theologian.

Spener was Court preacher in Dresden from 1686 to 1691, and there he worked in the same spirit, but limited himself to preaching and the function of catechizing, which he prosecuted with great zeal. Having fallen into disfavour with the Court, his position became so unpleasant that a call to Berlin came as a welcome release. Among the undertakings which were then carried out in his spirit, the most important was the *Collegia Philobiblica*, at Leipsic, of August Hermann Franke, Caspar Schade, and Paul Anton, in 1687. Thereafter the newly-founded University of Halle (1691) became the seat and the proper nursery of Pietism, and from Halle it continued to spread over the whole of Germany.

Coming now to consider *the inner essential nature of Pietism*, we must above all keep in view the fact that Spener, anxious to maintain the reputation of his orthodoxy, has repeatedly asserted and shown that he did not deviate in any point from the normal doctrine of the Lutheran Church. The dogmatic errors which opponents have charged him with were only certain consequences of his peculiar view of religion. Starting from the deep corruption of human nature, he sees the essence of Christianity in a divine power which works a total renovation of the inward man, and which in like manner is the only source of the true knowledge of God, as well as of the genuine moral life. The former position is the basis of the demand for a reformation of theology, the latter for a

reformation of the Church. It is only the regenerate who can be right theologians. "An unregenerate man has no true light in his soul; he may, however, have the literal truth regarding the things that are to be believed in his understanding, and he may present them without theoretical mistakes in an ecclesiastical form." The Christian religion is a power from God, which, by internal illumination and awakening, transforms and revivifies man in the centre of his being; and hence no one can proclaim the truth in divine things but he who traces in himself this inner life from God, who is himself moved by the power of the Holy Ghost, and illuminated by His light. Above all, this holds true of the theologian. It is therefore erroneous and reprehensible to try to teach theology in the Schools and Universities after the manner of common human knowledge, and with all possible worldly sciences conjoined with it. Instead of this, the main thing to do is to supplicate with zeal and prayer for personal illumination, and to strive after inward personal experience of the new birth and the divine life. The more deeply sin is felt as a hereditary evil propagated by the body, and as awful corruption that has left nothing good and pleasing to God, so much the more emphatically is it declared that the regenerate man must regulate his whole life according to the demands of the divine will. Perfect holiness is indeed impossible; even in the best there still remain stirrings of evil, and reminders of their own weakness. Nevertheless the regenerate ought to labour with careful observation of themselves, and with unremitting zeal, to mortify their old Adam, with his carnal desires, and to become perfect in all points.—Upon this requirement is founded the hope of a glorious age of perfection, which the future of the Church will bring when it has struggled out of its present corruption. From this fundamental thought sprang all those deviations from the ecclesiastical orthodoxy which were urged against Spener as heresies. He held that faith appears to be more important than purity of doctrine; for faith is not merely knowing the doctrine of the Church, and holding it to be true,

nor is it merely the means of receiving the objective redemption that is through Christ, but it is the inward reception and experience of the new-created divine power culminating in the inward fellowship of the soul with the Saviour, so that even Luther's expression, "I am Christ," is not entirely to be rejected. It is true that faith cannot be without some purity of doctrine, at least in those points which relate to the work of salvation; but the assertion is false, that he only has the saving faith who possesses a complete knowledge of the pure doctrine in all its Articles. For it is not from purity of doctrine that our salvation immediately comes, nor is it error in doctrine that condemns us in itself; rather does salvation come from faith, and condemnation from the want of faith. Thereby Spener put dogma into the background as relatively unessential for faith and salvation, without materially attacking it; and he thus attained in dogmatic controversies, and in relation to other confessions, a breadth which was entirely foreign to that age. On the other hand, Spener's material deviations from the Lutheran dogmas were unimportant; such as, that he makes regeneration proceed from the will instead of the understanding; that in the doctrine of Justification he represents the beginnings of the righteousness anticipated from the divine judgment as already actually present, yet without attacking the theory of imputation; that he extends Sanctification to the whole conduct, and excludes all *adiaphora*; and that for the individual as well as for the Church, he holds that there is a time of relative perfection already in the present life.

Such is in brief the spirit and the principal contents of the Spener Pietism. It would be unjust to burden it with the outgrowths which were afterwards connected with it, and which brought the whole movement unduly into disrepute. It need hardly surprise us that the straining after earnest holiness did lead to external or even hypocritical semblances of salvation by works; or that the assertion of regeneration as the necessary condition of true knowledge led some to despise all worldly science and the office of preaching, as well as to

separate themselves from the Church with its external worship ; or that the Self-examination so much recommended, led occasionally to a self-sufficient contemplativeness and carnal security. Further, the millenarian and mystical elements in Spener led, in the case of some who came after him, to extravagances. Gottfried Arnold († 1714), known as the author of the *Impartial history of the Church and of heretics*, turned to a contemplative Mysticism, as an immediate intuition of God that is raised above all sensuous knowledge, and imparts to man always new power for a holy mode of life. The millenarianism of the system was developed with all exactness into a comprehensive whole by Petersen (1649–1727). The most violent attacks upon the Protestant Church were led by Johann Konrad Dippel (1673–1734). At first an orthodox theologian and then a Pietist, he published from 1697 a series of violent satires under the name Christianus Democritus. Along with considerable talent he possessed a boundless ambition, for the satisfaction of which any means appeared to him justifiable, and his restless and inconstant life hunted him from place to place, and from employment to employment, without any satisfactory result. His writings correspond to his character and life, being full of the most heterogeneous views in religion, philosophy, medicine, and natural science ; they are at one time inspired by a fanatical mysticism, and at another guided by sober and practical acuteness. According to Dippel, man consists of body, a lower sensible soul, and a higher spirit. The spirit has to be united with God, and the feeling of this union is man's greatest blessedness. Religion does not consist of opinions, but of a bettered heart filled with love to God and His creatures, and of a pious, upright mode of conduct. He who has this becomes saved, be he Jew or Turk, heathen or Christian ; for God works immediately in our spirit, and not by the external means of the letter or empty ceremonies.

The ecclesiastical Orthodoxy waged a violent polemic against Pietism. Several hundred writings were directed against it. We need not enter here upon this controversy, in which there



were for the most part only individual questions examined, without regard to the universal character of the movement, and, besides, this was done in a manner that was far from agreeable or profitable. The general result of this conflict was the gradual decomposition of the rigid orthodoxy by its permeation with Pietistic elements, as was shown very soon in the controversy between Joachim Lange (1670-1744) and Valentin Ernest Löscher (1673-1747). This controversy was distinguished, not merely by the fact that its polemical tone was far more intellectual than the others, that attempts to reach a mutual understanding accompanied the polemic, and that the opposition between Pietism and Orthodoxy is everywhere exhibited as not itself the highest opposition of the time. Nay more, in spite of the decidedness with which the particular points at issue were examined, Löscher, as a really noble representative of the ecclesiastical doctrine, shows such a living, deep, inward piety, so warm a heart and so open a vision for the faults of the Church, that the influence of the spirit of Spener upon him is unmistakeable.—We shall have to return to the later influence of Pietism when we come to discuss the German Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

Count Nicolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760) was decidedly influenced by Spener. He was a man of deep inward piety; his fortunate intercourse with the Moravian brothers preserved him from self-sufficient Quietism, and he impressed the character of his own personality upon the community of the *Herrnhut Brotherhood*. In Zinzendorf, even more than with Spener, religion appears as the inmost concern of the heart, as an immediately felt life in one's own soul. It is not, indeed, loosed from the external word of Scripture as the pure source of the divine revelation, but neither is it restricted to any mediation by learned culture and science. The opposition between sin and grace appears as the substance of the inner religious life. It is a deep consciousness of one's own weakness and guilt, which is hardly bearable were it not accompanied with the equally powerful consciousness of



redemption by the bloody sufferings and the sacrificial death of Christ, intensified even to a mystical self-sinking in the sufferings and death of Christ in order to participate in the joy of blessedness. The following verses express this thought with a heartfelt simplicity that is truly touching :—

“*Fac, ut possim demonstrare, quam sit dulce, te amare !  
Tecum pati, tecum flere, tecum semper congaudere !*”

This special character of the Zinzendorf piety comes out on its own showing in the objective representation of his doctrine. Christ is the centre of his doctrine, but Christ is the suffering and crucified one ; and the liberation of man from the misery of sin by fellowship with the death of Christ, is its fundamental idea. All speculative questions regarding the Trinity, the nature of the God-man, the meaning of the Lord's Supper, the Last Things, and so on, retreat into the background. Out of the whole range of the Christian doctrine, it is only the Person of Christ, and more particularly His sufferings and death, that is treated with essential interest and in detail. But this point is dwelt upon with such emphasis that Zinzendorf can say with right : “the point of suffering, the blood-theology, is mine ; we are the crucified Church (*cruciata*) ; others have the unbloody, we the bloody grace.” Along with this is the fact that this suffering of Christ is painted vividly and in a sensuous way, and the sinking into it, even apart from the period of “sifting,” is described with the play of an almost voluptuous sensuousness which repels more sober minds. From the inward fellowship with the suffering Christ, which is intensified in the case of the community to the so-called “special covenant,” there follows for the individual a rest and a peace in the heart that has received the grace of God. This is usually designated “unction,” and it expresses itself in the outward life, both in the cheerfulness of the heart that has entered into peace in Christ, a cheerfulness which is at once equable and unmoved by the external accidents of prosperity or misfortune, and in the earnest striving to come as near as possible to perfection in the advancing sanctification of the external life. This theology does not lay importance upon

worldly science, nor upon the testimony of natural reason ; for "the vain reason which does not understand what is meant by the inbreaking of grace, or treading with the feet and lying at the feet of the crucified Jesus, are compabilia." Nor does it lay stress upon sharply formulated and dialectically defined dogmas. The Moravian Brethren have even collected together adherents of the different confessions although under distinct tropes. Their doctrinal system afterwards lost still more of its peculiar character, and Spangenberg's *Idea Fidei Fratrum* (Barby 1778) is a somewhat colourless exposition of the Protestant system of doctrine. But as a nursery of inward piety and of upright life maintained in rigid discipline, the Moravian community has still its importance in the present day.

---

The Methodists arose in England almost at the same time as the Moravians (c. 1740), and not without some personal relations between their respective founders. The melancholy state of the English Church, in which its own stagnation and the strongly encroaching Deism were equally damaging the religious life, awakened the thought, not of a reform of doctrine, but of a renovation of the inner religious life. Notwithstanding its peculiar violent convulsiveness in the forms of repentance and instantaneous regeneration, Methodism has essential points of contact with Moravianism ; for it also rests upon a deep feeling of the opposition of sin and grace. Man is corrupt in every capacity of his soul ; he is corrupt wholly and at all points. Every man has to expect eternal death as the just reward of his inward and outward godlessness. The pains of hell are painted by the Methodists in the most glaring colours in order to call the sinner to repentance by the terrors of the judgment. For repentance is the first step to faith, and it proceeds from the free resolve of man ; and faith is worked immediately in our broken heart as the immovable conviction that God was in Christ, and that He reconciled the world with Himself ; yea, that Christ has loved me and has even given Himself up to death for me. There is thus produced

an entire new creation of the soul, which must necessarily bring forth external fruits, and a gradual advancing sanctification even to total redemption from all sin and to complete perfection.—The later and especially the present practice of the Methodists has unfortunately brought into the foreground the momentary convulsiveness of repentance, which is excited by all the terrors of hell, and appears outwardly in convulsive starts, but is not always inwardly felt. And so much is this so, that the striving after an inwardly felt and practical Christianity, which was what is most justifiable in the movement, hardly now finds a place within it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>[The translator cannot pass this concluding paragraph through his hands without adding that he cannot regard it as either an adequate account of the principle of Methodism, or a fair representation of its present working and methods. The abnormal and extreme phases of the Methodistic revivalism are sufficiently familiar to all, but the Author has been misled by them to an erroneous idea of the contemporary striving and spirit of Methodism generally, which is still very imperfectly represented in Germany. It has, however, been thought better to reproduce the author's sketch as it is, than to modify or omit it.—Tr.]

## SECTION FIFTH.

### THE ENGLISH DEISM.

THE period that followed the Reformation has this in common with the preceding period, that theology and religion entirely occupy the foreground of interest both in science and life. And this was natural; for where the revolution encountered the most powerful forces, the conflict could not be otherwise than extremely bitter and very protracted. Moreover, there arose, especially in the Lutheran Church of Germany, a Protestant scholasticism which resembled in many points the Catholic scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Thus a new revolution became requisite in order that the mind might obtain its complete freedom. This revolution began in England with that movement which we are accustomed to designate *Deism*. Its roots lay in the sober, practical, common-sense character of the English people, and its beginnings took their rise in the characteristic movement of the English Reformation. We have already had repeated occasion to allude to this movement. Alongside of the somewhat external reformation of the Anglican Church, we find a double current flowing through the time. The Puritans laid peculiar stress on the practical verification of the inner religious life in external sanctification and in the moral order of the whole conduct, and it is manifest that this tendency is not far from that which sees the essential nature of religion only in the universally recognised requisites of morality, because their conditions are inborn in every one. Again, the Enthusiasts and their last offshoots the Quakers, with their mystical character and their accentuation of the inner immediate life of piety, appear to be far removed from the sober

practical conception of Deism. Yet they also prepared the way for it. By their view of the inner Light, the external word of Scripture and the binding dogmas of the Church were stripped of their authority. Experience, not to speak of the arbitrary preference of the individual, was put into the place of the objective authority, and when the religious life grew cold, it resulted, as a matter of course, that the Natural Reason was regarded as the inner light.

In politics and in philosophy Deism also found the way prepared for it: in politics, by the doctrines of the Levellers; and in philosophy, by Francis Bacon.

The Levellers<sup>1</sup> took their rise from the party of the Independents by a separation of the political and the religious elements. With the Independents the democratic doctrine, according to which the renovation of the State was to be effected in accordance with the principle of the Sovereignty of the people, formed, indeed, a criterion for judging of religion and its relation to the State; but to the Levellers, Religion appeared as a matter of personal freedom, and as entirely subordinate to the wellbeing of the State. The supreme principle of the Levellers was that the will of the people is the highest law of a country, and that all authorities obtain their rights only through the consent of the people. On the basis of this principle they wished a purely democratic constitution in the State; and they were the first to demand an absolute separation of Church and State on the ground that all union between them leads to intolerable constraint of conscience and to endless civil misery. Every religious confession, and even atheism itself, should find toleration; and every ecclesiastical community should regulate its own affairs in entire independence. No binding authority belonged to dogmas, whether they were founded on the divine origin of Scripture or upon the constraining authority of the Church. The ultimate criterion of faith was held to be the inner voice of the heart and conscience of the individual; and although certain fundamental conceptions, such as the existence of God and

<sup>1</sup> Weingarten, Die Revolutionskirchen Englands, Leipzig 1868.

the immortality of the soul, were decidedly maintained, yet it was only the conditions of practical morality that appeared to be essential in religion.

In philosophy, Francis Bacon (1561-1626),<sup>1</sup> the founder of empiricism, brought about a radical reform, of the full significance of which he was himself well aware. Hitherto theology and philosophy had appeared mixed up with one another so as to be even undistinguishable. Bacon sees in this condition the false union of an ill-assorted pair, whose offspring was a heretical religion and a fantastic philosophy. Hitherto God had been the essential object of speculation, Bacon now gives Nature this position. Hitherto philosophy had been a theoretical and purely contemplative mode of knowing; Bacon will now make her subservient to the purpose of man's dominion over Nature, and he would therefore make her practical. Hitherto the syllogism and general principles had been regarded as the inexhaustible source of knowledge; Bacon will now found everything upon experience. Hence he does not regard it as his function to set up a completed system which should lay claim to perpetuity, yet might be overthrown by the next comer; he finds his mission in founding a new method by which future generations would be always able to enlarge the boundaries of our knowledge. He therefore directs his attack primarily against the prejudices of the school as well as those of life, against the personal peculiarities as well as the universal human weaknesses which plunge us into a thousand errors. On the ground thus cleared, he then sets up his new method of experience, of experimental observation, and of induction. Such was the foundation laid by Bacon of the Empirical Philosophy, which was further developed by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and the French Materialists, and which was to find its culmination for a time in the Scepticism of Hume.

As the whole of this philosophy assumed a regulative position in the development of Deism, so did Bacon's special

<sup>1</sup> His most important writings are the *Novum Organum*, and the *De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum*.



*attitude towards religion* work by way of preparation for it. In his view, all knowledge is divided into knowledge of the facts and knowledge of the causes in Nature, and between them stands poetry. For poetical invention gives an image of the world just as the description of nature and philosophy do, only with this difference, that its image of the world is sketched by the phantasy, and therefore does not correspond to the actual, but to the wished-for state of the world. This view furnishes Bacon with a criterion for judging of the religious myths of heathenism. He sees in these myths only allegorical investments of philosophical truths, and strives to explain them as such. The knowledge of causes has a threefold object: Nature, Man, God. This knowledge accordingly falls into three parts: the Philosophy of Nature, Anthropology, and Natural Theology. Along with this Natural Theology, Bacon further recognises Supernatural or Revealed Theology, but it lies beyond the sphere of philosophical knowledge.

Natural Theology arises from the contemplation of the natural order of things, and it attains to the knowledge of the existence of God as an Intelligence creative and regulative of the world. This conclusion is so certain that Bacon says (in his Essay on Atheism): "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind; and therefore God never wrought miracles to convince Atheism, because His ordinary works convince it. It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to Atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."

Natural Theology, however, does not reach further than this. Of God's purposes with regard to man, of His decree of salvation and such like, it knows nothing. There exists no relation at all between Natural and Supernatural Theology; the former can neither establish nor justify the latter, but if we would pass from the one to the other, we must step out of the boat of human reason and enter into the ship of the

Church, which alone is enabled to keep upon the right way by the Divine Compass. Theology and Philosophy are completely separated; mixing them together only leads to unbelief and fantastic ideas. Religion does not rest upon the light of Nature, either in the external knowledge of the senses or in the internal knowledge of the conscience, but upon immediate Divine revelation. This holds true of the reason no less than of the will, and hence we ought to believe not merely what corresponds to reason; but the more contrary anything is to reason, so much the more does it correspond to the honour of God and to our duty of obedience to believe it. How far the rules of reason may find application in the connection and systematic arrangement of the divine revelation, should be determined by a "Divine Logic," the working out of which Bacon says is still awaiting.

There is no reason to doubt of the sincerity of Bacon in his recognition of Revealed Religion. It was but natural, however, that the interest of science should turn mainly to Natural Religion, and that it should obtain the chief attention. This was shown among others by Newton and Boyle. Newton (1642-1727), by his discovery of the law of gravitation, opened up new paths for natural inquiry in the sense of Bacon. At the same time he held firmly by the position that motion could only be communicated to matter by an extra-mundane being, and he sought to found a Natural Theology upon it. Boyle († 1691), the founder of the Royal Society, invested a sum that was to yield fifty pounds for each of eight sermons that were to be delivered every year in a London church, and their object was to defend the Christian religion against unbelievers on the basis only of the rational principles of Natural Religion.

Such were the most important currents in the spiritual life of England about the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century; and such was the soil upon which Deism grew up. Deism itself is not a philosophical system; it represents a special conception of life which ruled the

spiritual interest of England for almost two centuries. If we inquire into its essential nature, it seems at the first glance as if it first really brought forward that conception which we are now in the habit of designating as "Deism" in the current philosophical and religious terminology. The term is now commonly applied to that view of the relation of God to the world which, in opposition to Atheism, affirms the existence of God, and in opposition to Pantheism, affirms the personal, independent, extra-mundane existence of God, but which at the same time, in opposition to Theism strictly so called, denies the continuous, ever-present action of God upon the world and His activity in it. According to this deistic view, God called the world once for all into existence by His omnipotent creative word, but then left it to itself as the workman does with his finished work; and thus the world is supposed to proceed upon its course according to the laws of the *causæ secundæ* that are immanent in it, without any interference on the part of the *causa prima*. But such an identification of the older English Deism with the current conception of Deism is erroneous. On the contrary, several of the most conspicuous English Deists express themselves most emphatically against this view, and repudiate it as atheistical and even as irrational. Thus the example of the watch, which is usually adduced as an illustration, is applied by Herbert in an entirely different sense from that of the later representations. He says that the Epicureans ascribe everything to chance, and yet no one can conceive how under such a condition different species or a fitting series of things could arise. Now, if even a half intelligent man understands that a watch which shows the hours night and day is constructed with intention and great art, then any one must be completely mad who would not refer this world-machine, which holds on its course not for twenty-four hours only, but for many centuries, to a supremely wise and powerful origin.—And Hobbes expressly says that it is an unworthy view of God that assigns to Him complete idleness, and withdraws from Him the government of the world and of the human race; God is thus, indeed, recognised as

omnipotent, but if He does not concern Himself about what is below, then the common saying applies, What is above us does not concern us. But if there is no reason why we should love Him or fear Him, it would be just the same as if there were no God. In like manner, Charles Blount, in the preface to his treatise, *De anima Mundi*, declares that the view referred to amounts to Atheism: "It were Atheism to say there is no God, and so it were (though less directly) to deny His Providence, or restrain it to some particulars and exclude it in reference to others." The second article of his *Short Sketch of the Deistic Religion* accordingly expressly declares that "God governs the world by Providence." The same view is expressed by Morgan in the most decided way. He designates himself a Christian deist, and distinguishes himself as such on the one hand from the Christian Jew or Jewish Christian, and on the other from the Atheist. But he designates as Atheists, not merely those who deny the existence of God, but all who assert that the natural or moral world, after it had been once created, put into its proper order and provided with certain powers, qualities, and universal laws of motion, continues to exist, to move, and to develop itself without any influence of the First Cause. On the contrary, Morgan as a Deist teaches that God governs the natural and the moral world by His continuous uninterrupted presence, power, and incessant action upon both. As a chief objection to his opponents, he proposes the question, If the natural and essential forces of the world can maintain and govern the world without God and without the continued operation of the First Cause, why then could they not also originally create the world? For if the corporeal world, by means of its own internal laws and essential powers, and without God's indwelling and working, can continue to exist but a single moment, it may be as well conceived as going on a longer time, and even to all eternity.

These references may suffice to show that we would form an entirely erroneous notion of the historical Deism if we were to confound it with the recent conception of dogmatic Deism.

It would also be incorrect to impute to the whole Deistic movement a hostility to religion such as we encounter, indeed, in some of its offshoots, and as we find most sharply reflected in such works as Swift's *Tale of a Tub* and Butler's *Hudibras*. On the whole, Deism bears an earnestly religious character; it certainly does not show an uninterrupted belief in positive religion, but it does manifest an incessant searching for something fixed and certain behind the positive forms of religion that are recognised as untenable. All the representatives of Deism are convinced that it is not a body of particular dogmas, but at most a few general principles, not a sacrifice of the understanding, but a morally regulated life, or the inner power of the heart, that constitutes the essence of Religion. All the various religions participate, although in different ways, in this one religious truth, and hence the question is raised as to how these religions have arisen. It is only here and there that we find the beginnings of a rational solution of this question, for most of the Deists go no farther than the view that the religions have arisen from priestly fraud and the calculation of rulers. In like manner, they attack the basis of the positive religions, but not the conception of immediate revelations. But as enthusiasm for the written word requires a proof and guarantee in the inner word of the enlightened heart, Deism sets up certain intellectual criteria by which the true revelation is to be distinguished from the merely pretended revelations. We might characterize the English Deism as a general movement in the way of intellectual inquiry and investigation regarding religion, with the tendency to derive all positive religions from one "natural" Religion. It does not admit of a more precise characteristic, for the answers which are given to the question which it puts and investigates are as various as their starting-points. Taking it as a whole, however, three phases may be distinguished in it. 1. Its Beginnings, as represented by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Sir Thomas Browne, Thomas Hobbes, and Charles Blount; 2. Its period of full development, as represented by Locke, Toland, Collins, Shaftesbury, Tindal, Chubb,

and Morgan; and 3. Its last representation in Dodwell and Hume.<sup>1</sup>

## I.

## THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH DEISM.

## LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY.

Edward Herbert de Cherbury (1581 – 1648)<sup>2</sup> in his principal work, *De Veritate*, gives the results of his theoretical investigations into the nature of knowledge. These investigations were occasioned by the variety of the opinions then existing, which caused the author to waver undecidedly between one view and another. The study of the various writers could not save him from this unfortunate position, for they also represented various positions as the truth of philosophy and religion, but gave no satisfactory explanation of Truth itself. Hence Herbert resolved to start from a critical examination of his own process of cognition “*objectis libris veritates nostras in ordinem digessimus.*” Now all true knowledge rests on the fact that objects are given under certain circumstances to our faculties. The question regarding the

<sup>1</sup> For the whole of this Section the following works are referred to :—Lechler, *Geschichte des Englischen Deismus*, 1841, a work of rare objectivity and reliability; Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 1876; Noack, *Die Freidenker in der Religion*, 3 Th. Bern 1853. [Reference may also still be made to Leland’s *View of the principal Deistical Writers*, etc., 1754, etc.]

<sup>2</sup> Edward Herbert of Cherbury was an offshoot of the noble family of the Earls of Pembroke. He was equally distinguished by his chivalrous character, his insatiable thirst for knowledge, and his strict love of truth. He gave up the quiet life on his estates and made several long journeys through the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy to satisfy his thirst for knowledge or to indulge his longing for adventures and knightly deeds in famous military service of foreign princes. In the midst of this changeful life Herbert found time to compose a series of writings which show that he was a man of rich knowledge and an acute thinker. The most important of his productions—and his own favourite work—is his “*De Veritate prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verismilli, a possibili et a falso*” (Paris 1624). A further application of the thoughts of this theoretical investigation relating to Religion is contained in his “*De religione Gentilium, errorumque apud eos causis*” (London 1645). His other writings may be left out of account here.



nature of knowledge thus falls into a threefold inquiry—(1) regarding our Faculties, (2) regarding the Objects that are to be known, and (3) regarding the Laws of the agreement between these objects and faculties. All our faculties are divided into four classes, namely, *instinctus naturalis*, *sensus externus*, *sensus internus*, and *discursus*. The object of the Internal Sense is the good (*bonum*); and hence the conscience, as a reliable, universally - heard and universally - recognised judgment regarding good and evil, is also called the *sensus communis* of the internal sense. Eternal blessedness is the highest good. The object of the External Sense is the true (*verum*). It is common to regard the five senses as all that belongs to the External Sense, but this is false; for to every separate objective quality or differentia of external things there corresponds a special faculty for receiving it in our External Sense. The intellectus is described as something divine, and it realizes its own truths without requiring the influence of external things. These truths are represented as certain *notitiæ communes*, which exist in every sane man, with which our mind is as it were filled from heaven, and by which it judges of the objects of this world. There is no observation nor experience without these common notions; but they are silent and concealed when no external things are presented to them. The proper object of the Intellectus is eternal blessedness, and so much is this highest goal set before all men that it is quite impossible for us to pursue what is not happiness. We are free only with regard to the means that may be adopted for the attainment of this end. Side by side with this *objectum proprium* of the Intellect, stands also the *objectum commune*, or the common notions that are obtained by reflection (*quodcunque ex reliquis facultatibus seu noeticis seu corporeis conformari potest*). These intellectual notions are distinguished by a series of marks from the immediate common notions, but they have both the same certainty and truth.—The application of these common notions to all the particular questions of whose solution our faculties are capable, is the function of the fourth faculty, called *Discursus* (*munus*

est ut quæ circa utramque analogiam sciri possunt in suam infimam latitudinem ope notitiarum communium deduceret).

How Herbert conceived of the agreement of objects with these our faculties is shown most clearly by his distinction of a fourfold truth. 1. The *veritas rei* consists in the agreement of the thing with itself, which at the same time involves the fact that nothing can be contained in it to which our faculties could not be related. 2. The *veritas apparentiæ* consists in the agreement of the appearance of a thing with the thing itself; it therefore desiderates that the object shall be presented to us a sufficient length of time and in proper distance and position. 3. The *veritas conceptus* is founded partly upon the healthiness of the percipient sense, and partly on the fact that the faculty corresponding to the object that is to be known is applied to it; thus the infinite is apprehended by us only in a finite manner, and the eternal only in time. 4. The *veritas intellectus* is the "conformitas debita inter conformitates prædictas," and it is the product and the highest result of the previous truths from the combination of which it springs. The true cognition is therefore founded upon the intellect and its common notions (*notitiæ communes*), and these are discovered by means of the *consensus universalis*, or the congruent judgment of all. This "consensus" is the highest rule of truth even in morals and religion. For Religion is also a *notitia communis* or common notion, as there is no nation and no century without religion; and religion is enjoined neither by philosophy nor by priests or governments, but by the conscience.

Herbert puts Religion very high. It is the chief distinguishing and differentiating mark of man (*tanquam ultima hominis differentia*; *solæ et ultimæ hominis differentiæ religio et fides*). Hence there are really at bottom no Atheists. The so-called Atheists only object to the false and inappropriate attributes that are assigned to God, and all they mean is that they will rather have no God than such a one as these attributes indicate. Nevertheless, if there be irreligious men and Atheists, let it only be considered how insane and

irrational those are among them who make reason the distinguishing mark of man.

By the rule of the "*consensus universalis*," the universally recognised and therefore essential truths of all religions are ascertained, and they are comprised in five propositions.

1. There exists a supreme Deity or God (*esse supremum aliquid numen*). This is not, however, the mere abstract conception of a Supreme Being, but Herbert enumerates no less than eleven attributes belonging to God. He is blessed, the end, ground, and means of things, eternal, good, just, wise, infinite, omnipotent, free.
2. Worship is due to this Supreme Being (*supremum istud numen debere coli*). This worship is founded upon the faith that God regulates all things, including the destiny of individual men, and that He is moved by prayers.
3. Virtue and piety form the most important part of divine worship (*virtutem cum pietate conjunctam præcipuam partem cultus divini habitam esse et semper fuisse*). From this point of view there then opens up through various intermediate stages a prospect leading to eternal blessedness as the last goal of things (*ex conscientia notitiis communibus instructa virtutem cum pietate conjunctam ex ea veram spem, ex vera spe fidem, ex vera fide amorem, ex vero amore gaudium, ex vero gaudio beatitudinem insurgere docetur*).
4. Sins must be repented of and expiated (*horrorem scelerum hominum animis semper incedisse, adeoque illos non latuisse vitia et scelera quæcunque expiari debere ex pœnitentia*). Hence every religion recognises sacrifice and expiation as practices which God, in His goodness, has instituted as expiations for the violation of His justice by sin.
5. After this life we receive reward or punishment (*esse præmium vel pœnam post hanc vitam*).—As universal elements of religion, although differing in form, there are also enumerated: faith in the Supreme God; fixed hope in Him; love which unites man with God; and virtue as the best worship. At another time, he mentions only God and virtue; or again, common concord along with natural virtue. These universal truths are found in all religions; and hence Herbert can say that there is

no religion or philosophy so false that it has not its truth, and that in every religion there are found means sufficient to be agreeable to God.

In contemplating *the historical Religions*, the problem is thus raised as to how the manifold additions which they contain besides these truths are to be explained. In this connection, Herbert, with fine intelligence, enters upon a physico-psychological explanation of natural religion, but then suddenly breaks off from his inquiry, and takes refuge in the assumption of the imposture of priests and the prudent calculation of statesmen, which really explain nothing.

God reveals Himself to men in two ways: inwardly, as He who is eternal life and blessedness, in the desire implanted in all men after an eternal life and a happier state; and externally, in the wonderful creation of this world. Now the ancients sought in the world for something that was eternal; they found this sublunary world subject to change and decay, but in the heaven under the stars they found a relatively eternal and blessed state. Further, they attributed to the stars an influence upon visible things, and therefore they did them reverence, yet not as the Supreme Deity, but as His servants. In short, led by the voice of their own conscience and from reverence and love to God, men attained to the hope of a better life, and they then gave honour in the stars to the greatest works of the Supreme God; but it was God Himself whom they honoured in His works. In ancient times this was the only form of religion, and it was the same gods who were honoured under various names, as in particular the sun was the Osiris of the Egyptians, the Baal or Adonis of the Phœnicians, the Moloch of the Ammonites, the Bel of the Assyrians, etc. Along with the sun came the moon, the five planets, the fixed stars, and the heaven itself, which was regarded as a corporeal substance; but "*in corporea cœli natura animam ejus, in anima cœli Deum ipsum venerabantur.*" The diversity in the names of God had an external reason, in the fact that every one assigned a name to God in his own language and as it pleased him; and an

internal reason, in the fact that God received a special name for every effect or every benefit that flowed from Him. Afterwards, the gods that were honoured in all countries and among all nations were contrasted as *dei consentes* or *dei majorum gentium* with the particular gods as the *dei minorum gentium*; yet all assumed a Supreme God as the head over the others, assigned to Him the highest attributes, and revered Him as "Optimus et Maximus." Hitherto man had revered God in his own heart only according to the *notitiæ communes*, but now came in the *falsification of the true Religion*.

—This falsification of Religion is at one time attributed to priests, philosophers, and poets, and at other times to the priests alone. Its occasion lay in the consideration that as every power, such as that of the king, had an external reverence paid to it by practices and ceremonies, should there not also be an entirely special worship rendered to God from whom everything springs? Nay, is there not a corresponding honour due even to His ministers and priests? Hence arose the worship of images in temples, groves, and upon hills; the priests regulated this worship, and promised from it all happiness and all furtherance. Then impostors arose and asserted that a star, or a sphere, or an angel had spoken with them, and commanded them how the rites of worship were to be performed, and how life was to be led; but, in truth, they had only spent the night in the temple, and received there any such revelation in dreams. These illusions could only be imposed upon the people by the priests through employing prophecies regarding the future which easily found credence. For if, instead of the good that was promised, some misfortune occurred, it was imputed to the sin of the sufferer; and if, instead of prophesied evil, some good resulted, it was declared to be a consequence of the prayer of the priest. Such superstition first arose among the Egyptians, and from them it spread among all peoples. Besides, the priests added to the Supreme God a whole series of other subordinate gods, divided into three ranks or classes, the *supercoelestes*, *coelestes*, and *subcoelestes*. For each of these they arranged a distinct



cultus; and from such fables did the priests form the religions which have suppressed the chief articles of the one universal Religion.

The heathen thus honour the same Supreme God as we do, only in another way. But the One True Religion has not become completely lost; to the heathen also *virtus, fides, spes, amorque* were undoubtedly the higher rules of divine worship, and sacrifice was a symbol of repentance. For the more intelligent at least, who have a deeper insight into them, the heathen religions are likewise found to contain those five fundamental Articles, but they are hidden by a mass of false accessories. Herbert does not express himself distinctly about Christianity, yet he indicates that it has also undergone a similar process of falsification.

A *revelation of God* is spoken of by Herbert both in the narrower and in the wider sense. In the *wider* sense, revelation is "quodcunque ex gratia divina demandatur;" it is therefore the aid which is sent down from heaven to the unfortunate in response to his prayer; it is the inner experience of the activity of God in the process of faith, good works, repentance, remorse, prayer, etc. Revelation, however, is commonly regarded in the *narrower* sense, as something that goes beyond general providence, as a communication of propositions or commandments in addition to those five Articles. Herbert expresses himself with great caution regarding the question whether a special revelation is requisite to salvation, or whether the five Articles suffice, saying that every one will admit that these five Articles are good, and are universally accepted. Some, however, affirm that these Articles are not sufficient for the attainment of salvation. Whoever speaks thus, he declares, alleges in his opinion something bold, not to say dreadful and rash, as the judgments of God are completely known by no one. Therefore, he says, I should not like straightway to assert that these Articles are sufficient, yet it appears to me that the view of those who judge piously and mildly of the judgments of God is more probable, if only man performs what he can. For it is not in the power of every one



to make faith and tradition come to him, nor can any dogma be added to the five Articles from right and universal reason, so that man would thereby become more honest and pious, or the public peace and concord would thereby be furthered. Herbert does not examine more closely the possibility of an immediate revelation of God ; his skepsis is only exhibited in his making an effort to determine those conditions under which we are alone justified in receiving a professed revelation to be such, and he lays it down as implied conditions that the Supreme God is wont to give oracles or to speak with articulate voice ; that the receiver of the oracle knows certainly that it comes from the Supreme God and not from any good or evil angel, and that he himself at the moment of receiving it was not demented, drunk, or half asleep ; that the oracle is handed down complete and inviolate by oral tradition or writing to the after world ; and that the doctrine derived from the oracle shall also so appeal to the later generations that it will necessarily become an article of faith. Herbert elsewhere also desiderates caution as necessary in accepting a statement given out as a revelation. Our knowledge has its foundation in our faculties, and revealed truth is based on the authority of the revealer. Hence we can only give credence to a revelation under the condition that prayer, vows, faith, in short, all that Providence demands, has preceded it, and that the revelation becomes by participation our own ; for what is accepted from others as revealed, is no more revelation, but tradition or history, which for us can only be probable as the ground of its reference lies outside of us. Further, it is required that it teach us something that is entirely good or true, because it is only by this that a rational revelation is distinguished from irrational and godless temptation ; and that we can trace the breathing of the divine Spirit, because it is only by this that the inner efforts of our faculty in the pursuit of truth are distinguished from external revelation.

## SIR THOMAS BROWNE.

The *Religio Medici* of Sir Thomas Browne (1605–1681)<sup>1</sup> already contains the most important thoughts of the English Deism; but along with a penetrating scepticism, it likewise gives expression to a fantastic credulity, so that the different judgments that have been pronounced on the book and its author need cause us no surprise. Browne uses the precaution to explain that his purpose was not at all to lay down a rule for others, or to give definite canons of religion, but that he only wrote his book with the object of exercising himself, and that its contents might not be forgotten. He also boasts that he had smitten down all the objections which Satan himself or his rebellious reason had opposed to him by that saying of Tertullian, “certum est quia impossibile est.” To hold as true what one knows to be such is a matter of conviction, and not of faith; and hence he who does not live in the age of miracles is to be congratulated, for it is only in the case of such a one that there is any merit in believing, because it is only in his case that faith is difficult. But although the author will rather shatter his own arm to pieces than desecrate a sanctuary or overthrow the monument of a martyr, he nevertheless only confesses the faith which Christ Himself taught, which the apostles propagated, and which the fathers and martyrs confirmed. His faith may thus be assumed to be the simple primitive Christianity of Christ, from which the Christianity of the Church is carefully to be distinguished, as it has been adulterated by the violences of Emperors, the ambition and rapacity of Bishops, and the corruption of later ages. He speaks much and in competent style of the conflict between reason and faith. Sentiment, faith, and reason are at strife with each other, and are as hostile to peace as was the second triumvirate of the Roman Republic. But as there

<sup>1</sup> Browne was born in London on the 19th October 1605. He studied at the Universities of Oxford and Leyden, and settled as a physician at Norwich in 1636. Here he wrote his chief work, the *Religio Medici* (1642). He was knighted by Charles II. in 1671, and died on the 19th October 1681.

is no holy of holies for philosophy, neither does the original religion of Christ know any mysteries. Browne begins to speak of "the two books" out of which theology draws, the one written by God and the other by nature. The relation between the two is, however, not closely explained; but as the original religion contains nothing in the way of metaphysical speculations, but realizes the knowledge of God from the rational contemplation of nature, so it is only the uneducated crowd who behold miracles in Nature, whereas the wise man perceives in it a high divine conformity to law. And although Browne in his view of miracles stops at an untenable half-way position, yet he not merely emphasizes the fact that the providence of God is more clearly seen in the regular course of nature than in miracles, but he openly declares that the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah, the falling of the manna, and such events, took place quite naturally. As he excludes from religion all metaphysical speculations, he teaches regarding God not much more than His existence, to any doubt of which he had never been carried away, and he even affirms that there have never really been Atheists; and he regards eternity and providence as the most important attributes of God. The knowledge of the divine nature or essence is reserved for God alone. All positive dogmas appear as arbitrary, subjective opinions and errors. In theology, he declares for keeping by the traditional way, and he will not dispute about the Trinity, the incarnation, and similar subjects. But as in all *adiaphora*, he will have liberty to follow his personal genius, he exhibits such indifference towards the differences of the various Churches, that everything positive is regarded by him as very insignificant.—Sir Thomas Browne shows throughout a want of systematic completeness in his thoughts, but his widely-spread writings served to communicate the deistic method of thinking to the widest circles.

## THOMAS HOBBS.

Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679)<sup>1</sup> appears as a decided adherent of philosophical empiricism. He defines philosophy as a knowledge of effects from their known causes, and as knowledge of possible causes obtained from known effects by means of correct reasonings (*effectuum ex conceptis eorum causis seu generationibus, et rursus generationum quæ esse possunt ex cognitis effectibus per rectam ratiocinationem acquisita*). Reckoning or calculation is represented as the method of philosophizing, for rational thinking is just a process of adding or subtracting, and all syllogistic inference consists of these two operations. All our knowledge is derived from sensible perception. This sensible perception is described as a process of sensation in a strongly materialistic way. Its basis is an external body, which presses either immediately or mediately upon the corresponding organ, and propagates this impression by means of the nerves to the brain or to the heart. Thence arises a counter-pressure in order to be freed by an outward-going motion from the external pressure. This motion, however, appears as an external thing, and is called a sensation. Its different qualities are nothing but differences of the motion in us produced by the differences in the motions of external matter. The imagination is nothing but the continuance of the motion according to the universal law of persistence. Words are mere counters, that is, arbitrarily chosen designations for particular sensations. Reason has no

<sup>1</sup> The principal writings of Hobbes were called forth by the contemporary circumstances of his country. He says himself that the third part of his *De Cive* (London 1642) was published by him because, some years before the outbreak of the Civil War, his country had been violently excited by explanations regarding the rights of the rulers and the due obedience of the citizens. He hopes by it to show that it would be better to bear some inconvenience in private life than to bring the State into confusion, and that the justice of an undertaking should not be measured by the speeches and advice of individual citizens, but by the laws of the State. His other important work is his *Leviathan*; or the matter, forme and power of a Commonwealth, ecclesiasticall and civill, London 1651. He also indicates its purpose to be to show that there is no pretext by which infringement of the laws can be excused.

other function than to add or to subtract generic names. By the addition of two names there arises a judgment, by the addition of two judgments an inference, and by the addition of inferences a proof. From the sum-total, again, one quantity is found by the subtraction of others, because all thinking consists in the simple processes of adding and subtracting. Mathematical method is the only philosophical method, and arithmetic is the model of all science. Because all thinking rests upon sensation, there is no thinking and knowing but of corporeal and finite things. There are only two kinds of body, the natural and the artificial, the latter being those that are made by the will of man. Therefore philosophy is divided into the Science of Nature and the Science of the State, to which Logic has to be added as the theory of method.

The same naturalism controls the views of Hobbes in the ethical sphere. Here, however, it is necessary to distinguish between the condition of life prior to the existence of State and the life in the State. In respect of the former pre-political condition, it does not sound in accordance with naturalism when we read that he who is not bound by a civil law sins when he acts against his conscience, for, except his reason, he has then no rule for his conduct.—But the notion of conscience does not go far. If two or more are cognisant of the same thing, they are called *consci*; and as they are mutually the most fitting witnesses of their deeds, it has been held in all times as the greatest crime to give evidence contrary to *conscience*. The word conscience (*conscientia*) is also often used of the secret knowledge of one's own acts or thoughts.—Reason which, as we have already seen, is only a faculty of reckoning, does not lead to any higher conception of the good. It is expressly declared that there is no universal rule of the good, the bad, and the indifferent, derived from the nature of objects themselves. These conceptions are entirely relative, and are significant only in reference to that person who may use them. What is the object of any man's desire, he calls good; what is the object of his aversion, he calls bad; and what he despises, is

indifferent. Desire and aversion (*appetitus*, *aversio*) are real motions in man which rest upon the motion of the senses. The goal of appetite or desire is naturally the happiness of life. If there were only a universally recognised criterion for the determination of what constitutes and what does not constitute our happiness in life, an objective determination of the good would be thus attained. But in the present life there is no ultimate goal of our desire and no highest good. If any one were to attain the goal of his wishes, he could just as little live as if he had lost all sense and memory. Happiness is rather the continual advance from one pleasure to another; and it is so for this very reason, that we do not merely strive after a momentary gain, but the future calm enjoyment of the object of our wish. Hence it cannot surprise us when it is said to be "right" to preserve the body from death and pains, to protect the limbs, and to keep oneself in health. But as every individual forms his own judgment about what is good, the wishes and strivings of one man are diametrically opposed to those of another. And because in the state of nature all men have an unlimited right to all things, there results as a consequence the war of all against all. This universal state of war is, however, contrary to the requirement of reason, in so far as it demands the preservation of the life of the individual and of the race. Hence reason demands that an end be put to this state of universal war; and thus the establishment of the State, as proceeding from fear and brought about by a compact, is at the same time a command of natural reason. While reason thus desiderates the preservation of life and the members of the body, it commands the individual to seek peace, and therefore not to hold by his right to all things, but in consent with others to transfer his right to one will. Along with this supreme and fundamental law, Hobbes enunciates nineteen other more special laws, such as those relating to the keeping of compacts, the pardon of the repentant, against ingratitude, pride, immodesty, injustice, drunkenness, etc. All these laws are derived from natural reason, and they should



lead in the interest of the individual to the founding of a State.

The State is a civil person, which arises from all the citizens subjecting their will to the will of one man or of one assembly. It is all the same whether it is a natural or a political State, that is, whether a ruler has acquired power over the citizens, or the citizens themselves have transferred the supreme power to one man; in either case the holder of the supreme power in the State has an unlimited authority. He holds the sword of justice and of war, jurisdiction, legislation, the nomination of officials, and the examination of doctrine. And he is not at all bound to the laws of the State. As soon as a State is founded, he becomes the person by reference to whom conceptions are defined as good and bad. As in fact the supreme law of natural reason involves the founding and maintenance of a State as a necessary condition for the maintenance of peace, so in correspondence with the natural reason all that furthers the subsistence of the State is good, and all that is prejudicial to it is bad.

This view of the State is not without an influence upon Hobbes's *Doctrine of Religion*. While the State is formed by the free compact of men, there exists before it by nature another kingdom to which man belongs, and this is the kingdom of God. The right of God to govern follows from His omnipotence; the duty of man to obey follows from his weakness. There are, however, two kinds of natural obligation: in the one case, liberty is cancelled by corporeal restrictions, and in this sense God rules over all men; and in the second case, liberty is annulled by hope and fear, and in this sense God rules over those who recognise His existence, His providence, the commandments given by Him to men, and the punishments attached to their transgression. For this a Word or proclamation of God is necessary. And there is a threefold Word of God—reason, revelation, and the utterances of the prophets; and hence we might distinguish a threefold kingdom of God. But as revelation is now supplanted by Scripture, Hobbes speaks only of a

twofold kingdom of God, a natural kingdom and a prophetic kingdom. The natural kingdom of God, however, undergoes a great revolution in consequence of the foundation of States. Hence there arises a tripartite division into (1) natural Religion in the narrower sense, (2) natural political Religion, and (3) prophetic Religion. The first two of these may be taken together as Natural Religion in the wider sense, in contrast to the last as Prophetic Religion; and, again, the last two may be taken as positive religions (formed religion), in contrast to the first as natural religion in the narrower sense.

Natural Religion, in this narrower sense, is explained by Hobbes on natural principles. It is proper to human nature to inquire into the grounds of events, and especially into the grounds of the happiness or unhappiness of oneself. When men see a thing begin, they immediately infer a cause by which the thing is made to begin just at this time and not at another; and if they do not know the real causes of it, they assume certain causes. Hence arises fear; for as men certainly know that all things have their ground, they cannot escape a constant care for the future; but, looking ahead, they are incessantly tortured by the fear of death, or poverty, or misfortune, or similar things. This constant fear, arising from ignorance of causes, has necessarily an object, and as men do not see any other cause of their fate, they refer it to "some power" or an "invisible agent." Hence an ancient poet says that the gods have been made by fear. "Primum in orbe Deos fecit timor." And this is correct as regards the many gods of the heathen. The recognition of the one eternal, infinite, omnipotent God can be derived more easily from the investigation of the causes of natural things; for if any one infers from any effect which he sees to its proximate cause, and then advances to the cause of this cause, and thus goes deeper into the series of causes, he will at last, with the best of the ancient philosophers, come to a single first Mover, that is, to a single and eternal cause of all things whom all call God. And this result will be reached without any thought of one's own happiness, such as awakens fear, diverts the soul

from the investigation of natural causes, and gives occasion to as many gods as there are men who form them.—Although by the natural light we can know that there is a God, every one does not apprehend the existence of God, because there are some men who direct their sense only to sensible pleasure, or to the acquisition of honour and riches; there are others who do not draw the correct inferences in this connection, because they either cannot or will not do it; and there are still others who are too weak to do this.

Hobbes likewise gives a natural explanation of some important points in detail. We think of the substance of God, he says, as the substance of the human soul, and after the fashion of a man or of another body that appears in a dream or in a mirror. Hence the soul is called "spirit," meaning a very fine body. Yet, because the spirit is still corporeal, those who have attained to the knowledge of the one infinite, almighty, and eternal God rather designate Him as inconceivable than describe Him as an incorporeal spirit.—How these invisible agencies produce their effects, most men do not know, yet, without any insight into what is meant by "being a cause," they often, according to some unreal analogy, connect things that are unrelated. Others, again, ascribe such invisible power to certain words and invocations, as for instance to change bread into a man, etc.—Worship can be offered to these invisible powers only by signs of honour and respect, such as presents, supplications, thanksgiving, invocation, etc.—As to the way in which such powers indicate to men what is past and future, or favourable and the contrary, nature tells nothing.—Here, however, we have the fourfold natural germ of religion: the fear of spirits; ignorance of second causes; worship of what is feared; and expectation of what is contingent according to prognostications.

In the state of nature, God makes Himself known only through the natural law of reason. This law relates, in the first place, to the duties of men towards each other; and, in the second place, to natural worship. Honour consists in the opinion which is held of any one's power and goodness.

Worship is a name for those signs by which this sentiment is exhibited to others. Honour involves three states of mind: Love, which relates to good sentiment; and Hope and Fear, which are related to the power of others. From these states of mind there proceed external actions as natural signs of the honour by which the powerful are wont to be conciliated and to become kindly disposed. The end of honour in the case of men is that as many as possible may obey them from love and fear: in the case of God, its only end is that He may do good to us. Like all other signs of the soul, so does the honour or worship of God consist in words and in actions. It consists in words, in so far as we assign properties and names to God. The existence of God implies that He is the cause of the world, and excludes the view that the world is God, or God the soul of the world as well as the eternity of the world. Further, it is unworthy of God to attribute to Him complete inaction, and to withdraw Him from the government of the world and of the human race. Neither are we entitled to attribute to Him anything finite, such as a form, or to say that we can grasp or conceive God with the imagination or any other mental power, or that God has parts, or that He is in a place, or moves, or rests. It is true that the word "infinite" indicates an idea of our soul; but when we say that something is infinite, this does not express any determination of the thing itself, but only the impotence of our mind. Above all, it is unworthy of God to assign to Him those epithets that indicate a pain, such as revenge, anger, pity; or those that express a want, such as desire, hope, longing; or that love which is called fondness, or passive states. Even when we ascribe to God a will, or knowledge, or insight, nothing similar to what is in us should be understood thereby. If we would assign to God only attributes which correspond to reason, we must either use negatives, such as "infinite," "unending," "inconceivable;" or the highest degrees, as "the best," "the greatest," "the strongest;" or such indefinite words as "the good," "the righteous," "the creator," "the king," and so on; and always in the sense that it is not the attributes

themselves that are thus designated, but only our admiration and obedience. Reason admits, in fact, only one word as a designation of the nature of God, and that is His *Existence*, or simply that He is, in which it is implied that He is the King as well as our Lord and Father.—As actions by which God is honoured, reason recognises prayer, thanksgiving, gifts, and sacrifice as the expressions of gratitude; swearing by God alone, and speaking of Him with reflection. In the highest degree, however, attention is to be given to the observance of the natural laws; for all depreciation of the dominion of God is the highest offence, and obedience is more agreeable than all sacrifice.

Along with this natural worship, which devotes words and deeds to the honour of God, and which is honourable in the case of any one, Hobbes also speaks of an arbitrary worship which takes its acts and designations from the sphere of things that are indifferent in themselves. Thus, as regards the divine attributes, there is nothing that is fixed in itself, because in every language the use of words and names rests upon convention, and therefore it may be also altered by convention. The appointment of words and actions, that are indifferent in themselves, to be used in the worship of God necessarily demands an authority; in the state of nature every individual may appoint these, but it is otherwise in the public State. In the State the holder of power is an unlimited ruler, and he has therefore the right to arrange what words and names for God shall be regarded as honourable, and what others shall not be so regarded; that is, he has the right to arrange what doctrine is to be maintained and to be publicly confessed regarding the nature and activity of God. On the other hand, there are certain actions which are always signs of contempt, and there are others that are always signs of honour, and the State can make no alteration upon these. At the same time, however, there are innumerable things which are indifferent in themselves in regard to honour or contempt. The State can make these into signs of honour, and then they actually become honourable. With the forma-



tion of the State, the individual has to transfer to the State the right to regulate worship. Otherwise, amidst the diversity of worshippers, one would regard the worship of another as unsuitable and godless, whereas worship can only then serve as a sign of inward reverence when all recognise it as honourable. At the same time, Hobbes expressly declares that the State can only prescribe the external worship and never the internal faith, and that it is not necessary to obey, should the State demand the dishonouring of God, or prevent His being honoured.

Along with the natural word of God, Hobbes also takes notice of a prophetic word, but he does not examine the question of the possibility of an immediate revelation; he merely sets up a series of rules which ought to be observed in testing any professed revelation. Only that is wholly a word of God which God has spoken by the assurance of a true prophet. Hence we must know above all who is a true prophet. The people believed in Moses on account of his miracles and on account of his doctrine. The later prophets likewise found faith on account of their prophesying coming things, and on account of the faith in the God of Abraham. But it is the function of natural reason to investigate whether these two things were actually founded on fact.—When we examine the supernatural revelation of the prophetic word, we should not set aside sense, experience, and right reason; for the word of God, while it contains much that is above reason, as what can neither be proved nor refuted by natural reason, yet contains nothing contrary to reason. As often then as we may stumble upon a passage that we cannot comprehend, we must subject our intellect to the words; for the mysteries are like the pills which physicians prescribe for the sick—swallowed whole they are healing, but when chewed they are mostly spat out again! This subjection of the intellect is, however, not to be so understood as if we were held bound to assent to divergent views of Scripture. This is not in our power; only we are not to contradict those whose task it is to establish doctrines. God speaks to us



either immediately or by means of other men. How He speaks immediately to a man may be recognised by those to whom He so speaks. But while it is not just impossible, it is very difficult for another to know it. For if any one says to me that God has immediately spoken to him, I do not see how he will make it probable to me. If some one says it to whom I owe obedience, then I am bound neither by word nor by deed to make known my *dissensus*; but, on the other hand, he cannot constrain my belief. If some one says it who has no authority, then there is no reason to believe him or to obey. If some one says that God has spoken to him in a dream, then he says that he has dreamed that God spake to him; but no one will hold the dreams of others to be God's word, at least no one will do so if they can be naturally explained from the pride and arrogance of the dreamer. When any one asserts that God has supernaturally inspired him with a new doctrine, intelligent men will recognise of him that he is transported by the over-estimate of his own mind. Although God can speak to a man in a dream or vision by a voice and inspiration, yet no one is bound to believe one who asserts that God has so spoken to him; he may in fact err, and, what is still worse, he may lie. The Scriptures give two signs as marks of a true prophet: the annunciation of the religion which is already received, and the performance of miracles; yet not the one without the other, but both of them together.

Hobbes speaks about miracles in some detail. That man wonders at an event is conditioned by two things: first, that he has seldom or never seen anything similar happening; and, secondly, by the fact that he cannot understand that it happens from natural causes, and not by the immediate operation of God. Thus it is a miracle when a horse or an ass speaks, but not when a man or a beast produce their like; the first rainbow was a miracle, but the present rainbows are not so. In this way ignorant men regard many a thing as a wonderful miracle about which educated men do not wonder, such as eclipses of the sun and moon. Again, the purpose of a miracle is always to accredit the prophets and

ambassadors of God, and hence creation is not a miracle. Further, neither the devil, nor an angel, nor a spirit can perform miracles, nor any one but God alone.

It is assumed as a historical fact without closer investigation that God has revealed Himself immediately to the prophets, but Hobbes alludes to a double meaning of the expression "Word of God." It signifies, in the first place, the discourse of God, and in so far the Word of God is contained in the Scripture. Again it means the doctrine of God, and so far the Scripture is God's Word. Hobbes also lays the foundation of important beginnings in the criticism of the Old Testament canon; he brings forward in particular certain weighty grounds against the Mosaic composition of the Pentateuch.—By this immediate revelation, the *prophetic kingdom of God* is founded. Although natural reason can bring man to a certain knowledge and reverence of God, there is always a danger of his falling into atheism and superstition. The former arises from the opinions of a rationalism which is without fear; the latter arises from the fear which has separated itself from right reason. Now, while the greatest part of men sank into idolatry, God called Abraham to lead men to the true worship. God immediately revealed Himself to Abraham, and entered into a covenant with him and his seed, to the intent that Abraham should recognise God as his God, so as to subject himself to Him as ruler, and that God, on the other hand, would give him the land of Canaan. Circumcision was to serve as a sign of the covenant; but besides this we find no laws that go beyond the demands of natural reason. This compact was renewed with Isaac and Jacob, and afterwards with the whole people at Mount Sinai, and it then obtained the name of the "Kingdom." The laws of this Kingdom are in part, as relating to morals, of natural obligation; in part they are derived from Abraham, as in the case of the prohibition of idolatry and the law of the Sabbath; and in part they were given by God as the special King of the Jews, as is the case with the political, judicial, and ceremonial laws. Moses united in his person the supreme

power of the State and the right to interpret the divine Word. Afterwards both powers were united as of right in the hand of the High Priest, but were really exercised by the prophets. After the choice of a king, he exercised the two powers, as the kingdom of God had been abrogated with His consent.

This Kingdom of God was restored by Christ. Christ's office is threefold: that of a Redeemer, of a Teacher, and of a King. The kingly office is undoubtedly the most important. Christ was sent by God in order to conclude the covenant between Him and the people. The kingdom of God, established by Christ, does not begin till His second coming at the day of Judgment. His first appearance upon the earth did not yet constitute the kingdom itself, but only the calling of those who will be received into the future kingdom. For although His kingdom is only to come in the future, its members must conduct themselves in such a manner here, that they will persevere in the obedience promised by the covenant. For the Christian Religion is also a covenant or compact, God promising forgiveness of sins and introduction into the kingdom of heaven, and men promising obedience and faith. These are, in fact, the two conditions of entrance into the kingdom of God. Obedience alone would suffice, if it were perfect; but as we are subject to punishment, both for Adam's sake and on account of our own sin, we need, as the condition of obedience for the future, also forgiveness of past sins. Faith is a free gift of God. The only article of faith that is necessary to salvation, is that Jesus is the Christ; and this article includes that God is omnipotent and the Creator of the world, that Jesus Christ has risen from the dead, and that He will raise up all men at the last day. It is also evident that the Christian Church is completely subordinated to or rather incorporated in the State as the supreme authority. The community of citizens constitutes the State; the community of Christians constitutes the Church. "A Church and a Commonwealth of Christian People are the same thing."

## CHARLES BLOUNT.

The writings of Charles Blount (1654-1693) contain little that is peculiar or noteworthy. He gives a short sketch of the Deistic Religion, and is the first to use this expression. He holds that there is one supreme perfect Being, that God is not honoured by images and sacrifices, for it is not external rites, but only repentance and future obedience that can reconcile God. He further holds that a mediator is unnecessary on the ground that God must determine Himself, and that such mediation would derogate as much from His infinite goodness as an image would derogate from His spirituality and infinity. There is nothing required but only the observation of all the things that are just by nature, such as the imitation of God or the practice of virtue. In another place Blount enumerates seven principal points as belonging to Natural Religion, which consists in the belief in an eternal, intelligent Being, and the duty that is due to Him, and which is communicated to us by our reason without revelation and positive law. These seven points, however, differ essentially from the five points of Herbert. He argues for the advantage of natural religion over positive religion on the well-known ground expressed in the following syllogism. The precepts that are necessary to eternal salvation must be made known to every one; the precepts of revealed religion cannot be known everywhere; therefore it is not positive religion, but only natural religion, that is necessary for our salvation. Blount can refer to nothing as explaining the positive religions but the imposture of selfish priests, who deformed the primitive religion of mere rectitude by the introduction of all sorts of gods and images, oracles and sacrifices, in order to guide the people in leading-strings for their own advantage.

## II.

## THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF DEISM.

JOHN LOCKE.

The philosophical theory of Locke (1632-1704)<sup>1</sup> may be designated Empiricism by reference to the result it attained, and it may also be called Criticism by reference to the method it pursued. The object and purpose of his principal work was an Inquiry into the origin, the certainty, and the extent of human knowledge, as well as the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. The result of this examination of our faculty of knowledge is primarily negative. There are no "innate ideas" either of a theoretical or of a practical kind. On the contrary, the soul is originally a *tabula rasa*, like a blank sheet of paper without any lines written or engraved upon it; but it is capable of receiving all sorts of impressions. All our ideas arise from Sensation, that is, from external experience by means of the senses, and from Reflection, that is, internal experience by means of consciousness. The former process takes place in so far as the external objects furnish the soul with ideas of sensible qualities; and the latter, in so far as the soul gives the understanding ideas of its own operations. We obtain ideas of the Qualities of bodies by impulse; and there are various kinds of qualities

<sup>1</sup> Locke became dissatisfied with the Scholastic Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and felt himself drawn more towards Descartes. In the course of his study of Medicine and the Natural Sciences he passed through an appropriate training for his later empirical inquiries. Locke formed an intimate friendship with Lord Ashley Cooper, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, grandfather of the philosopher of the same name, was appointed by him to important political offices, and even accompanied him into exile when he retired to Amsterdam. The last years of his life he spent partly in the discharge of public offices as Commissioner of Commerce and of the Colonies, and partly in learned leisure. His *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London 1690, is the most important of his works, and it has secured him a permanent place in the History of Philosophy. Here we have chiefly to consider his treatise, entitled *The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures*, 1695, and his *Letters on Toleration*, London 1689-92.

in bodies. The Primary Qualities are Solidity, Extension, Figure, Number, Position, Motion, and they are inseparable from bodies in any of their states. Ideas of these Qualities arise in us as copies of the objects themselves, as when certain minute imperceptible particles come into our eyes and propagate thence a certain motion to the brain. The Secondary Qualities have nothing corresponding to them in the things themselves, but are only certain powers they have of producing sensible ideas in us; and this happens in like manner by the action of imperceptible particles upon the soul. These ideas, however, have no similarity to the bodies. Hence the soul can neither produce nor annihilate Simple Ideas, but is purely passive in receiving them. On the other hand, it has the power to retain the ideas that have once been received, and to deal with them freely and actively. By combination of Simple Ideas the soul forms Complex ideas; it conjoins several ideas, and thus forms notions of Relations; and it further separates one idea from the others along with which it appears in existing things, and by this abstraction it produces General Ideas. But in these operations the soul is also so far restricted that it cannot go beyond the material furnished by Sensation and Reflection. Words serve as signs of Ideas, and their meaning rests merely upon the free, arbitrary convention of men, and it has nothing to do with the actual existence of things. Most errors and disputes rest upon a misunderstanding of words. By words becoming sanctioned, an error is often propagated and confirmed. Doctrines may even grow into the dignity of principles in religion or morals by length of time and the agreement of neighbours, although they have no better source than the superstition of a nurse or the authority of an old woman.

Corresponding to this Empiricism in the theory of knowledge, Locke, in treating of Ethics, makes the sensations of pleasure and pain the criterion of what is good and bad. We call good whatever awakens in us pleasure or diminishes pain, and the opposite is bad. It is thus that our passions are put



in motion, for the wish for happiness determines our desire, and in such a manner that on account of the different ideas of happiness, different things appear as good or bad, and so that a present pain determines us more strongly than a pleasure that is hoped for in the future. When we are capable of performing actions according to the ideas which our soul forms of things in their bearing upon our happiness, we are free. It is not the will that is properly free, but the being who acts. Further, what is morally good and bad is not objectively or in itself good and bad; but it is the agreement or the opposite of our free act with a particular law by which, in accordance with the will and power of the lawgiver, what is agreeable and disagreeable is connected with our state. Of such moral rules there are three: the Divine law, the civil law, and the law of public opinion. The Divine law alone is the true test of moral rectitude, and it is communicated to us either by the light of nature or by the voice of revelation.

What then does Locke make of Religion in connection with such views? In the first place, his universal rejection of innate ideas also applies to the idea of God. It is admitted that it is one of the greatest practical truths that God is to be worshipped, but neither the idea of worship nor the idea of God is innate. There are peoples who do not possess this idea, and besides, there are found in the creation such visible traces of the wisdom and power of God that men can come to the knowledge of God without having the idea innate in them. If the innateness of this idea is inferred from the goodness of God, which, in such an important matter, could not leave man a prey to doubt and uncertainty, the reply is, that to infer from what appears good to us to what God ought to have done, is rash and presumptuous. Besides, there prevails the greatest diversity of opinion regarding the idea of God; and the fact that the wise men of all nations have found out the truth, at least regarding the unity and infinity of God, rather proves that correct ideas are the fruit of reflection. Locke thus designates the notion of God as a very natural discovery of

human reason. The notion of God is formed in the same way as the notion of immaterial spirits; they are both complex ideas made up of simple ideas of reflection. When we enlarge those ideas that appear to us excellent, such as existence and duration, knowledge and power, pleasure and happiness, by the idea of infinity we obtain that idea which is most conformable to the loftiest being. The notion of God is thus formed by enlarging the ideas which we have obtained through reflection on the activities of our mind and through the senses from external things, to the degree that it includes infinity in it. We cannot know God's essence; in His essence God is possibly simple, but for us, in this relation, there is no other idea possible but a complex one. Yet here we must not hold to the idea of a body, but to that of a mind.

Locke also expresses himself regarding the ground upon which the idea of God is formed. God has not left us without witnesses of His existence. The truth of His existence presses itself upon all, and its evidence comes up to mathematical certainty, although it requires reflection and attention. Every one has a clear consciousness of his own existence; every one is also certain that nothing cannot possibly produce a being; and therefore something real must have existed from eternity. A thing which is produced from something else has in this the source of all its powers; and hence the eternal source of all beings must necessarily also be the source of all powers, and therefore must be supremely powerful. Of the two kinds of beings, those that think and those that do not think, it is not possible that those that do not think can have brought forth those that think; and further, as man finds in himself consciousness and knowledge, these powers must therefore also belong to the original Being, and even in the highest degree. Hence there exists an eternal and most powerful Being who possesses the highest knowledge. It is a matter of indifference as to whether we call this Being God, but from this idea may be derived all the attributes which we are wont to assign to the Supreme and Eternal Being. — Locke considers that the ontological argument is not properly fitted to prove this truth.

Along with this natural knowledge of God, Locke speaks also of Revelation ; but instead of investigating its possibility, he only sets up certain caveats to warn and guard us against the too easy acceptance of pretended revelations. After having spoken of the doubtful value, and the necessity of making an examination of, all historical knowledge, he proceeds to show that there are propositions which are supported upon mere testimony, and yet lay claim to the highest degree of trustworthiness, because their testimony comes from Him who can neither deceive nor be deceived, that is, from God Himself. This is Revelation. Its trustworthiness is dependent on the certainty, first, that a certain thing actually is a Divine revelation ; and secondly, that we rightly understand the meaning of the expressions. In both respects great caution is required.

The relation between Reason and Faith is explained at considerable length. A distinction is made between (1) rational propositions, the truth of which we can discover by an examination of natural ideas ; (2) supra-rational propositions, or propositions above Reason, the truth of which we cannot derive from those sources ; and (3) irrational propositions, which are inconsistent with themselves, or are incompatible with clear and distinct ideas. Thus it is according to reason that there is one God ; it is contrary to reason that there are many Gods ; and it is above reason that there is a resurrection. When reason and faith are opposed to each other, by reason is understood the accepting as true of propositions to which the mind comes by the exercise of its natural powers, and by faith is meant the acceptance as true of a proposition that has not arisen from rational thinking, but is adopted merely on the ground of the authority of one who proclaims it as a divine ambassador. In this connection there are three things to be observed. In the first place, an external revelation can never communicate to us a new Simple Idea which we have not previously received from sensation or reflection. The communication is made, in fact, through language, but this is always connected with the impressions given by experience. In the second place, revelation may

communicate to us truths which reason can attain by natural means, such as the truth of a proposition in Euclid ; yet revelation never establishes the same certainty as deduction from the natural powers of reason does. Hence no revelation can have validity as against the clear evidence of reason, otherwise the divine revelation would contradict what flows from the faculty of knowledge that is likewise given by God. As reason decides in the case of a communicated revelation as to whether it is really divine, the belief in it thus rests always upon reason. In the third place, things that are above reason form the proper objects of faith. They are therefore such things as we have no ideas or only imperfect ideas of, or of whose past, present, or future state we can have no knowledge, such as the rebellion of a part of the angels and the resurrection of the dead. In these things revelation must be of more authority than the probable conjectures of reason ; but even here reason judges as to whether a certain thing is a revelation as well as the expressions in which it is communicated. In short, "whatever God hath revealed is certainly true ; but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge."

Christianity is represented as entirely conformable to reason, for nothing is requisite for a man to become a Christian but repentance and faith. Locke rejects as erroneous the view that all men were condemned to eternal and infinite punishment by Adam's fall, and the opinion that Christ was only a teacher of natural religion, from a special redemption being unnecessary. Christ has delivered us from the power of death, and thereby acquired for us again what we had lost by the fall of Adam, namely, righteousness, happiness, and immortality. Every righteous man has now again received a title to eternal life, whereas the sinner is excluded from Paradise. As a substitute for that obedience, which no one perfectly performs, God requires along with repentance the faith or belief that Jesus is the Messias. The rule of obedience is the moral law as purified by Christ, and Christ has enabled us more easily to fulfil it by pointing to inexpressible rewards and punishments in another world.

Locke expressed himself emphatically in favour of the universal toleration of other religious communities, and he supported this claim by a detailed theory regarding the relation of the State to the Church.

## JOHN TOLAND.

John Toland (1670-1722)<sup>1</sup> was the author of *Christianity not Mysteriorious*, which was published in 1696. It was only the first part of a proposed larger work, which, as planned, was to consist of three parts. The object of the first part was to prove that the chief qualities of true Religion are clearness and conformity to reason, and that Christianity possesses these qualities. The second part was to give a rational interpretation of the supposed Mysteries of Christianity, and to show that they were grounded in human reason. And the third part was to defend the necessity and design of divine Revelation against all the enemies of revealed Religion. Only the first part appeared, and it falls into three sections. The first section speaks of reason generally, and breathes throughout the spirit of Locke's empiricism; the second proceeds to show that the doctrines of the Gospel are not contrary to reason; and the third goes on to explain that there is no Mystery or anything above Reason in the Gospel.

Reason is not the soul viewed abstractly, but it is the soul

<sup>1</sup> Toland was born in Ireland. He was the son of Catholic parents, but in his sixteenth year he passed over to Protestantism, and as he had not learned "to subject his understanding any more than his senses to any man or society," he became the chief representative and the best known writer of the Deistic school. His principal work is his "*Christianity not Mysteriorious* : or ■ treatise showing that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason, nor above it, and that no Christian doctrine can be properly called a Mystery," London 1696. Toland had to withdraw himself by flight from the violent attacks which this work provoked. Two phases are to be distinguished in Toland's development. In his *Christianity not Mysteriorious*, which is to be regarded as the standard work of the English Deism, Toland still represented a certain supernaturalism, as he does not contest an immediate Divine Revelation, but openly acknowledges it, and only demands that it should be in harmony with reason. In his later period, as represented in his *Letters to Serena* (London 1704), his *Pantheisticon* (*Cosmopoli*, 1720), and his *Adeisidæmon* (Hague 1709), Toland turns from his earlier position to a decided Naturalism.



as active in a particular way. Neither is it the soul as it receives ideas into itself through the senses. The simple ideas which we obtain by Sensation and Reflection rather form the material upon which the activity of our Reason is exercised. Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or non-agreement of our ideas. It is either immediate or mediate; the former constitutes intuitive knowledge, or self-evidence, the latter demonstrative knowledge or demonstration. It is only in connection with the latter that reason is active as the faculty of the soul which discovers the certainty of doubtful and obscure things by comparing them with those that are completely known. What evidently contradicts our common notions, or our clear and distinct ideas, is contrary to reason. The ground of all right conviction is evidence, which consists in the exact agreement or conformity of our ideas with their objects. From this ground of conviction the means of information must be carefully distinguished, and as such there are experience and authority. Experience is divided into internal or reflection, and external or sensation; and authority is divided into human and divine. The divine revelation is not a ground of conviction, or a motive of assent, but a means of instruction. Revelation is indeed the way upon which we actually come to the knowledge of truths, but it is not the ground on which we believe them. Hence it follows that in Christianity as a divine revelation there can neither be anything against reason nor anything above reason.

The assertion that things occur in revelation that are contrary to reason is the ground of all absurdities, as of the doctrines of Transubstantiation, of the Trinity, and so on. A doctrine contrary to reason should be entirely unintelligible to us, because we would have no idea of it. Further, whoever says that he can accept what is a tangible error and contrary to reason, if it is contained in the Scriptures, justifies all absurdities; he sets the one light in opposition to the other; and since both come from God, he makes God the author of all uncertainty. Hence all the doctrines and precepts of the New Testament must agree with natural reason and with our



own common ideas. And this rationality and comprehensibility of the Christian religion is also supported by the order and method, as well as by the easy and simple style, which prevails in the New Testament.

In order to prove that the Gospel contains no mystery, or nothing supra-rational, it must first be settled what a mystery is. By a mystery is meant, in the first place, a thing which is conceivable in itself, but which for the time is veiled in figurative words, or types, or images; and it also comes to signify a thing that is inconceivable by its own nature. It is erroneous to call anything a *mysterium* as soon as we have no adequate idea of all its qualities or its essential nature. As, in fact, we do not know the inner essence of things, but know them only in so far as their qualities stand in relation to us as useful or prejudicial, in this sense everything would be irrational. It would be as little correct to designate a doctrine of the Christian religion as a mystery, merely because we have no complete and adequate idea of it, as it would be to do this with any ordinary part of nature. What is revealed in religion being extremely useful and necessary for us, is easily conceived, and it completely agrees with our ordinary ideas. With proper examination, such doctrines may be just as well conceived as natural and common things. Thus with regard to God, we certainly do not know the nature of His eternal essence, but we do know quite correctly His attributes; and every act of our religion is guided by the contemplation of one of His attributes. The same limitation of our knowledge to attributes is found in regard to all things. In the heathen religions, *Mysterium* (*Μυστήριον*) designates a thing that is conceivable in itself, but which is so much concealed from other men that it cannot be known without special revelation of it, that is, without initiation into it by those who know. In the New Testament, *Mysterium* never designates a thing that is inconceivable in itself; it indicates a thing that is conceivable by its nature, but which is either veiled by figurative words and practices, or is kept solely in God's knowledge, so that it cannot be known without a special

revelation. *Mysterium* therefore at one time signifies the gospel; at another, the Christian religion; at another, the doctrines revealed by the apostles; and again, something that is veiled in parables and similes. This view of the nature of mysteries is also held by the Church Fathers.

Against this assertion, however, reference is made to the nature of Faith or Belief as something that transcends knowledge, and to Miracles as events that are essentially inconceivable. With regard to Faith, Toland maintains that the true faith is a firm conviction which rests upon previous knowledge, and therefore upon the exercise of reason. God does not, in fact, speak to us immediately, but we must rely upon the words and writings of those to whom He may have spoken. It thus becomes necessary to examine whether such writings have actually proceeded from their alleged authors, and whether these persons and their works are worthy of God or not. Only if Faith is a conviction, founded upon previous knowledge and understanding, can there be various stages and degrees of faith, and only on that condition are we able "to give to others a reason for the hope that is in us." That all are commanded to believe under the threat of damnation, necessarily presupposes that the object of faith is intelligible to all.—Toland does not deny Miracles as events which exceed all human power, and which the laws of nature are not able to bring about by their ordinary modes of operation. But as what is contrary to reason is nothing at all, and is therefore impossible, miracles must happen according to the laws of nature, although it may be by supernatural assistance. "Miracles are produced according to the Law of nature, though above its ordinary operations, which are therefore supernaturally assisted." Further, God allows Himself this alteration of the natural course of things; but this seldom occurs, and always for a purpose that is important, rational, and worthy of the divine wisdom and majesty.

If Christianity, then, is essentially without mysteries, the only question remaining is, how did mysteries come into it? Jesus preached the purest morality, but when the Jews and the

heathen passed over in such great numbers to Christianity, the former wished to retain their Levitical ceremonies and festivals, and the latter wished to maintain their mysteries. When the philosophers also became Christian, Christianity became from day to day more mysterious, and it was soon intelligible only to the learned. When, still later, the imperial power protected Christianity, the Christian mysteries were made completely like those of the heathen in the preparations and the stages of the process of initiation, and they were carried above the sphere of all sense and all reason.

An essentially different mode of thought is expressed in the later writings of Toland. The most harmless of them relatively are the *Letters to Serena* (London, 1704), and especially the first three Letters. Serena was the intellectual Sophie Charlotte, Queen of Prussia. Starting with the complaint made by the recipient of the Letters, that she was greatly preoccupied by prejudices, the author shows in the first Letter that it is impossible to keep oneself in youth free from errors, and that it is difficult to free oneself afterwards from them. Even before birth a foundation is laid for them in inherited propensity, and with birth there begins deception on all sides: superstitious ceremonies on the part of the midwife, magic words and symbols on the part of the priest, fear of ghosts on the part of the nurse, stories of spectres and miracles at school, etc. The most fruitful nursery of prejudices is the University. The priests are driven to abstain from undeceiving the rest of the people, and rather to keep them in their errors. Every class and profession has its own peculiar prejudices. It is not openly expressed, yet it is sufficiently indicated, that the whole of religion rests upon this rotten foundation of groundless prejudices. The second and third Letters discuss the origin of the belief in Immortality and Idolatry. Both of these beliefs arose among the Egyptians, and spread from them to all peoples. The Egyptians came to believe in Immortality merely from their treatment of dead bodies, and by the piety with which they preserved the memory of deserving persons. The honouring of the dead then became the chief source of

Idolatry. All the heathen religions are distortions of the natural truth of reason, and they are founded on the selfish deceptions practised by priests and politicians.

Toland applies the same scanty resources to giving an explanation of Religion in his work entitled *Adeisidæmon* (Hague 1709). The first part proceeds to show that Livy was able to give excellent psychological explanations of the *portenta, prodigia*, etc., narrated by him, and that he regarded worship as an invention of priests, and religion as a bugbear prudently invented by politicians to terrify the people. The second part makes the Jews Egyptians, and Moses an Egyptian priest and monarch, who has expressed in the ten commandments only the pure law of nature. All the other doctrines and practices were later idolatrous additions falsely attributed to the great lawgiver himself.

Of special interest for Toland's later philosophical views are the last two of the Letters, which explain the philosophy of Spinoza, and his *Pantheisticon* (Cosmopoli 1720). The criticism of the philosophy of Spinoza contained in these letters well deserves to be considered in the history of philosophy. With no little acuteness, Toland seeks to show that the whole system of Spinoza is not merely false, but unsafe, and without any solid foundation. The philosopher's greatest weakness was a boundless passion to become the head of a sect, to have disciples, and to adorn a new system of philosophy with his name. Toland hits quite correctly upon the weakest point in Spinoza's system, when he shows that it teaches only one substance with many attributes, among which extension and thought are the most important; yet it tells nowhere how matter attains to motion, nor, like the systems of Descartes and Newton, does it make God the first mover, or motion an attribute of substance. Hence it is entirely impossible for Spinoza to derive the diversity of the many individual bodies from the unity of his substance, and to combine them with it. A sure proof, he says, that even men of acute judgment are led in many things by mere prejudice.

Toland, on the other hand, asserts that motion is as essential

to matter as extension and solidity, and that it is not at all possible to think of matter without motion, so that motion necessarily belongs to the definition of matter. There is no absolute rest in the whole world. The apparent rest of individual bodies only arises from the fact that opposite acting forces of motion neutralise each other. If motion belongs essentially to matter, it cannot possibly be outside of things. In like manner, it is impossible to speak of an absolute space in which the world moves as if it were contained in it, or of an absolute time outside of things. Motion, however, and particularly motion as essential to matter, is not merely the change of place which one object assumes in relation to another, it is likewise the change of the material arrangement within individual things. Hence motion is the so-called *principium individuationis*, that is, it depends upon motion that the innumerable different individual things proceed out of the one all-embracing matter. Upon motion, rest, form and colour, heat and cold, light and sound, for all things are nothing but a restless moving up and down, an eternal change of matter, a universal becoming and perishing; in short, all change in things is nothing but the movement of matter. Toland confesses that he is not able to explain what motion is, for such simple ideas as motion, extension, colour, and sound are clear in themselves, and are not capable of definition. Notwithstanding this materialistic principle, that motion or force is essential to matter, Toland shrinks from the last consequences, which were afterwards drawn by the French Encyclopædists. He designates it as an extremely thoughtless and inconsiderate inference that would regard a guiding Intelligence as unnecessary as soon as we have apprehended force as essential to matter. For, entirely apart from the fact that God could create matter as well with motion as with extension, he holds that the mechanical motion of matter alone can as little produce the artistically formed plants and animals, as shaking letters together could form an *Æneid* or an *Iliad*.

The same view is contained in the work called *Pantheisticon*.



Here Toland imagines a numerous sect of Pantheists, for whose assemblies, modelled after the Greek symposia, he constructs liturgical forms as a substitute for the ecclesiastical worship. "Swearing by the words of no one, led neither by education nor custom, not hindered by inherited religions and laws, they discuss without prejudice, and in the freest and calmest way, all things sacred and secular. They are called Pantheists because their judgment regarding the relation of God to the world is the same as that of Linus: *Ex toto quidem sunt omnia, et ex omnibus est totum.*" "The universe is infinite in extent and power; it is one by the connection of the whole and the collision of its parts. As a whole it is immoveable, because there is no place or space outside of it. In respect of its parts, it is moveable, imperishable, and necessary. It is eternal in existence and duration; it knows with the highest reason, which, however, can only be called by the same name as our faculty of knowledge, from a slight resemblance to it, for its parts are always the same, and as parts are always in motion." Everything is produced out of matter, and consists of matter, which separates into four fundamental elements. From the motion of these elements, and the varied mixtures of matter thus arising, the different individual things are produced, every one of which includes both form and matter. Thought is also a kind of motion; it is a peculiar motion of the brain resting upon the ethereal fire, for the ether is the efficient cause of all perception, imagination, memory, and elaboration of ideas. God is the "*vis et energia totius, creatrix omnium et moderatrix ac ad optimum finem semper tendens.*" He may be called the Spirit or Soul of the universe, but He is not to be separated from the universe itself otherwise than in thought.—The Liturgy of the Pantheists is a worship of genius, and it is mostly borrowed from heathen writers. We may only mention here, in particular, how all that is positive in religion is expressly repudiated, in accordance with the view of Cicero in his *De republica*, lib. iii.: "*Est quidem vero lex recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vitando*



a fraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat nec improbos jubendo aut vitando movet," etc.

## ANTHONY COLLINS.

Anthony Collins (1676–1729) worked for the wider diffusion of deistic thoughts. His principal work, entitled *A Discourse of Freethinking, occasioned by the rise and growth of a Sect called Freethinkers* (London 1715), falls into three parts. It shows, in the first place, the right to Freethinking generally; in the second, the right to Freethinking in religion; and in the third, it vindicates this right against a number of objections raised against it. The definition which Collins gives of freethinking is by no means precise, and this defect shows itself in the whole detail of his discussion. He defines it as "the use of the understanding in the effort to find out the meaning of a proposition by weighing the nature of the evidence for or against it, and judging of it according to the evident weakness or strength of this evidence."

The general right to freedom of thinking is based mainly upon the consideration that any limitation of it would be absurd in itself; for if I were to restrain my thinking from the free treatment of a subject, I must have a reason for this, and this reason I can only assign to myself by freethinking. Moreover, we have the right to seek the knowledge of every truth; for the knowledge of some truths is enjoined upon us by God, the knowledge of others is required for the good of the State, and no knowledge is forbidden to us. But the only means by which we can attain to a knowledge of the truth is Freethinking, without which science cannot possibly be perfect, as without it we could not but fall into the greatest errors, both in theory and in practice.

In matters of religion especially, we have the right to think freely, both in regard to the nature and attributes of God, and the truth and meaning of the books of the Bible. And even the enemies of freethinking assert that a correct

opinion in these things is absolutely necessary for the attainment of salvation. But the best and surest means of coming to truth is freethinking, and in view of the multitude and variety of the professed revelations and divine commandments, it is only in this way that the one truth is to be found. Freethinking is also the safest means that can be used against the pernicious evil of superstition. All missionary activity among the heathen is based upon freethinking, because it is only thus that the heathen can be moved to receive Christianity. The Bible likewise demands freethinking; it is only the priests who condemn it, and they do so in part from dishonest motives.—Of the objections urged against freethinking, Collins deals at greatest length with the objection that all freethinkers have been, in the highest degree, dishonest, profligate, and foolish. In opposition to this view, he brings forward a succession of extremely virtuous freethinkers, from the time of the Greek philosophers down to his own contemporaries.

ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY  
(1671–1713).

Shaftesbury (1671–1713)<sup>1</sup> is usually regarded as the representative of “the autonomy of the moral element,” that is, of the independence of morality both of the institutions of the State and of divine revelation. He is thus put in opposition to Hobbes, who does not recognise an individual morality, but sees the moral only in relation to the State; and also to Locke, who indeed admits an individual morality, but finds it in relation to an alien and entirely external law.

<sup>1</sup> This the third Earl of Shaftesbury was a grandson of the first Earl of Shaftesbury, who has been referred to above as the patron of Locke. He was also a statesman, and as a member of the House of Lords he was a zealous defender of civil liberty, but he did not enter into any political office in order that he might be able to devote himself undisturbed to his learned studies. His writings were collected under the title *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 3 vols. 1711. They are mostly prolix, but elegant in style, and on account of the variety of the subjects and their being treated without connection, it is difficult to bring his thoughts into any systematic order.

We would prefer, however, to adopt a different characteristic, which appears to us to be more comprehensive and more correct, as being founded upon the fact that, in Shaftesbury, the idea of Beauty comes everywhere into the foreground. Beauty and harmonious order form the basis of his theism; upon the beauty, which pleases every one and everywhere as agreeable, rests moral goodness or "Enthusiasm." In other words, the human presentation of the divine truth, goodness, and beauty is here regarded as the common psychological root of art, religion, and morals, and indeed of everything great that man realizes in the business of daily life or in noble enjoyment.

We may begin by looking at Shaftesbury's principle of Enthusiasm, and it will disclose to us the subjective origin assigned to Religion. Enthusiasm is a fundamental impulse of human nature from which none of us are free. Its object is the good and beautiful, τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, which are inseparable from one another. A sort of definition of enthusiasm is set forth in the statement that number, harmony, proportion, and beauty of every kind possess a power which naturally chains the heart and raises the imagination to an opinion or idea of something majestic or divine. Whatever this object may be, the thought of it enraptures us so much, that without it our life would lose all charm and value, and no other interest would remain for us but how to satisfy our coarsest desires as cheaply as possible. This Enthusiasm has a very wide range; even the play of atheism is often not free from it; and it is difficult to distinguish it from divine inspiration. This was the spirit which Plato regarded as the gift of heroes, statesmen, orators, musicians, and even philosophers; and everything great that is brought forth by these men is to be all ascribed to a noble Enthusiasm. This passion is the most natural, and its object is the most excellent and appropriate in the world. Virtue is a noble enthusiasm which is directed to the most appropriate end, and it is formed according to the highest pattern which is to be found in the nature of

things; and religion, as the main object of this noble enthusiasm, is the basis and support of it all. Hence that cold philosophy which denies the order and harmony in things and rejects the admiration of the beautiful, also regards religion as included among those evils which it is incumbent upon us to exterminate. — Subjectively, then, religion is founded on Enthusiasm, as a passion for all that is beautiful and sublime, implanted in our nature. But it would be ill for this passion were there nothing corresponding to it in the objective relations of the world. If the object itself does not exist in nature, neither the idea nor the passion founded upon it can properly be natural, and all admiration and enthusiasm cease; but if, on the other hand, there is such a passion by nature, Religion is manifestly also of this kind, and hence it is natural to man.

Shaftesbury therefore refers, again and again, with emphasis and enthusiasm, to the harmony and order that prevail in the universe, to the wise purposes which we encounter everywhere, and to the established unity to which the various systems and circles within nature belong. Full of enthusiasm, the author pours himself forth in poetical descriptions of nature, and of the harmony, order, and unity that appear everywhere in it. From this point of view he also reaches his theodicy. If we were to call a being wholly and really evil, it must be evil in relation to the whole. On the other hand, if the evil of any particular system is a good for other systems, and if it is conducive to the well-being of the general system, then the evil of this particular system is not in itself really an evil, as little as the pain in the process of teething is to be regarded as an evil in a body which has been so constituted, that, without this cause of pain, it would be defective, and so it would be worse without it. We cannot say of any being that it is wholly and entirely bad, unless we are able to prove that it is not good in reference to any order or economy in any other system. Now those things which stand related to one another are infinite in number,

and our mind is not capable of looking through infinity ; and hence we cannot see anything completely. But we very often regard what is actually perfect of itself as imperfect. Notwithstanding the manifold evil which we encounter in individual things, we must therefore admit it to be possible that all things work together for the common well-being of the great whole, and are thus truly good. If it may be so, it follows that it must be so ; for all that is possible in the whole will be made real for the well-being of the whole by nature, or by the spirit of the whole.

From this point of view a Theodicy can only be completed by the aid of the conception of God. By God we designate a being who is elevated to any degree above us and the world, and who rules with intelligence and understanding in nature. He who does not believe in a higher Being working with purpose and understanding, and who believes in no other cause of things than chance, is an Atheist. He who believes that everything is governed, ordered, and directed for the best by a first cause working with design, or by an intelligent Being who is necessarily good and unchangeable, is a Theist. He who accepts several higher beings working with purpose and understanding, is a Polytheist. He who accepts one or more higher beings who are not necessary in themselves and who do not choose the best, but act in accordance with mere arbitrariness and phantasy, is a Dæmonist. It is manifest that it is only the Theist who can adopt the inference that " as all things may be good in relation to the great whole, they are also really good ;" and hence Shaftesbury regards it as incumbent upon himself to establish this theism.

Shaftesbury does not adduce either the cosmological argument or the ontological argument as proofs of the existence of God. Neither does he bring in the conception of a first cause, nor of an unmoved mover ; but, faithful to the ruling character of his system, he proceeds, in this connection also, from what exists now and here, and proves from the unity and harmony of the structure of the universe that



it is animated and governed by One Spirit. The unity of the great universe necessarily points to a universal Spirit, for what hangs thus together in itself as a world, one part conditioning and presupposing another, necessarily requires an all-comprehending Spirit. Further, the beauty of nature comes into consideration. The beautiful, the attractive, the amiable, never lie in matter, but always in art and design ; never in the body itself, but in the form or formative power. We cannot sufficiently admire this beauty in nature, and accordingly a formative power must also reside in the world. On account of the harmony of the whole, this power is one only ; and on account of the beauty and harmony that appear everywhere, it is a power that works with design. Hence the æsthetic contemplation of nature necessarily leads to theism, and theism to the faith that there is no evil in the whole of the world.—Religion is thus surely and sufficiently established, both subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, in the passion of enthusiasm implanted in us by nature ; and objectively, in the unity and order, beauty and harmony of the Universe, which on account of these qualities must be guided by one higher Being working with purpose and intelligence.

Enthusiasm is the subjective source of religion ; and all enthusiastic admiration is united with a sort of religious reverence. As reverence is related to fear, some have made fear the basis of religion. But enthusiasm is essentially of another kind ; it unites in itself love and fear. A wise limitation and moderation of enthusiasm is, however, absolutely necessary, as the inclination to indulge in wonder and contemplative rapture but too easily degenerates into high-flying fanaticism or into servile superstition. What is usually called religious zeal is seldom without a mixture of these two excesses. The ecstatic emotions of love and admiration are almost always conjoined with the awe and the consternation of a lower kind of devotion. The heathen religions, especially in their later periods, consisted almost wholly of external pomp, and they were especially maintained by that sort of enthusiasm which is excited by external objects that are grand, majestic, and



imposing. The Syrian and Egyptian religions tended more towards a contemptible and abject form of superstition, especially after the priests increased in number and power, so that they threatened even to swallow up the State, and from natural causes they inclined to superstition. "The quantity of superstition will, in proportion, nearly answer the number of Priests, Diviners, Soothsayers, Prophets, or such who gain their livelihood or receive advantages by officiating in religious affairs." In fact, these systems regarding the deity were enlarged even by mystical genealogies, consecrations, and canonizations. The Jewish religion was also strongly influenced by the Egyptian religion, Abraham having received from it circumcision and other practices, Joseph having been raised to the rank of an Egyptian High Priest, and Moses having been initiated into all the wisdom of the Egyptians. In short, although he begins so rationally, Shaftesbury also has recourse at last to the inadequate theory of the fraud of selfish priests; and he thus explains the extravagances of the heathen religions and their superstition and mysticism by their one-sided exaggeration of fear or of love.

Christianity is not dealt with in detail. Theism, however, is not apprehended in such a way as to lead to the rejection of revelation and Christianity, but all rests upon theism, and "No one can be a well-grounded Christian without first being a good theist." For the belief in divine Providence which is attained by contemplation of the order of things is the basis of the Christian faith. Shaftesbury does not express himself regarding the specifically Christian doctrines of redemption and atonement, or the historical character of Christianity, or the person of Christ. Towards revelation he takes up an entirely sceptical attitude. He believes in revelation in so far as this is possible for a man who has never himself experienced a divine communication, or been an eye-witness of it. He looks with contempt upon the later miracles and inspirations as a mass of devised fraud and deception. With regard to those earlier times, he subjects his judgment

completely to those in authority, and to the opinions that are prescribed by the Law. The best Christian is a sceptical Christian. When he relies merely upon history and tradition for his faith in revelation and miracles, he has only a historical faith, which is exposed to many speculations and to critical investigations regarding language, literature, etc. Freedom of thought is therefore emphatically demanded. A Christian who supposes he cannot believe enough, may, by virtue of a slight natural inclination, so far extend his faith, that, along with all the miracles of Scripture and tradition, he may also take up a complete system of old wives' fables. This would be to play the sycophant in religion and the parasite in devotion, in the manner of crafty beggars who address every one as "your honour," or "your lordship," and the practice is founded on the idea "that were there nothing ultimately in the affair, such a deception would do no harm." At the same time he holds that the authority in the State must adopt a religion; and that the people must stand, in matters of religion, under a certain public guidance. As there are public walks side by side with private gardens, and public libraries are provided along with private instruction by domestic tutors, so in like manner a public authoritative religion is in place. But it is irrational to prescribe limits to phantasy and speculation, or to throw religious opinion into fetters. Universal love appears as the main point, and it is the peculiar characteristic of Christianity. The purpose of religion generally is to awaken in us all moral inclinations and sentiments, and to make us more perfect and accomplished in the practice of all duties; yet this is not to be done by a reference to reward and punishment, but by the inner relationship between religion and virtue. The Christian religion realizes this purpose in the highest degree by implanting an all-embracing love. This position leads us to the view taken of virtue and its relation to religion.

In his *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, Shaftesbury discusses at length the question as to what rightness in conduct or virtue in itself is, and as to the influence which Religion has upon

it. He is far from identifying the good and the bad with pleasure and pain, or from referring them only to the State and its wants. Virtue is likewise founded subjectively in enthusiasm, and objectively in the unity and harmony of the world. He regards virtue itself as nothing but a noble enthusiasm which is directed to its proper end, and is formed in accordance with that high pattern or exemplar which he thinks he finds in the nature of things. There are certain moral forms which work so strongly upon us, that they only need to show themselves to cast down all opposite opinions or ideas, all resisting passions, sensations, or mere corporeal inclinations. Whether a creature is good or bad depends on the inclinations and impulses by which it is guided. Inclinations relate either to ourselves or to the whole to which we belong, or there arise inclinations which neither further the general well-being nor the private good. These latter are from the outset vicious, and of the first two classes the selfish stand more on the side of vice, and the benevolent more on the side of virtue; but they are not unconditionally so. Virtue is rather the right condition of our inclinations, not merely in reference to ourselves, but to society and to the whole, so that none of them may be awanting. Their relation is to be regulated according to the relation of the harmonious unity which obtains objectively between the whole and its parts. Hence the admiration and love of order naturally improves the disposition, and powerfully furthers virtue. But at the same time virtue also brings happiness along with it, and vice unhappiness, which is partly proved from the inward relation of the individual to the whole, but above all from the reaction of our own acts upon the states of the soul.

Hence Virtue and Religion are fundamentally one. Virtue makes us put the selfish and the unselfish impulses into that relation to each other which corresponds to the objective co-ordination of the individual in the whole; religion makes us view the world as a harmoniously ordered unity, regulated and guided for the good of the whole by the wise and beneficent God. Hence the right knowledge of God is

conditioned by morality; for we only see anger and wrath, revenge and terror, in the Deity when we are full of unrest and terror in ourselves. It is religion that makes virtue perfect. "The highest perfection of virtue rests upon faith in God, for without it there can never be found so much benevolence, steadfastness, and immoveable perseverance in goodness, nor so much order and harmony of inclinations or uniformity of sentiments and principles."

#### MATTHEW TINDAL.

Tindal (1656-1753)<sup>1</sup> takes the position of an adherent of Locke in his philosophical views, and especially in regard to the theoretical principles of knowledge. Reason is the faculty of apprehension, judgment, and inference. The object of these operations is not things themselves, but only our ideas of them; and these ideas come either from sensation or reflection. Hence our knowledge, as consisting in the agreement or disagreement of our ideas with things, is either intuitive or demonstrative. Certainty in religion is also founded upon the agreement of its truths with essentially clear ideas. Tindal approaches Shaftesbury in the moral and practical view which he takes of religion. He makes the true religion consist in the constant inclination of the heart to do as much good as we are able, in order thereby to promote the glory of God and our own well-being.

Tindal's diffuseness, and the want of order and definiteness in his style, make it difficult to reproduce his thoughts clearly and briefly. The main points expounded by him are the following:—True religion is always necessarily the same. It consists in the observance of what the nature of God and man and their relation makes incumbent upon us as duty, and it is conducive to our happiness. This same goal is always attained by the same means. Hence revealed and natural

<sup>1</sup> His chief work is entitled *Christianity as Old as the Creation; or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature*, London 1730.

religion, if they are both true, cannot differ in regard to the means that are conducive to this end, but being like two pieces of wood that dovetail into one another, they are only distinguished by their mode of publication. If there be then a true natural religion, revealed religion and Christianity must also agree with it. What is contained in positive religion, in addition to the rules of natural religion, is but superstition.

Natural religion consists in the belief that there is a God, and in the practice of those duties which arise from our rational knowledge of God and His perfection, of ourselves and our imperfection, as well as of the connection in which we stand with God and our fellow-men. On account of this purely juristic conception of religion, the expression "Law of Nature" is frequently used by Tindal instead of Natural Religion. The substance of this law, or what it contains, is the honour of God and the well-being of men. God imposes these duties upon us, not for His own sake, but for our sakes; yet prayer is a duty, not because any persuasion of God or an alteration of His eternal providence could be attained by it, but because, by its leading us to contemplate the divine attributes and to know His constant goodness, it incites us to the imitation of the divine perfection and to mutual love. It is likewise clear that God receives nothing by our actions, either agreeable or disagreeable, but that everything happens for our good. Duties must also coincide with happiness; because the happiness of a thing consists in the perfection of its nature, and the perfection of a rational being consists in the agreement of all his actions with the rules of right reason. "Religion is thus a moral mode of conduct resting upon the reason of things, or upon the objective relation of things to each other, having the good of man as its final end, and arising from free inclination, while the moral duties are regarded as commandments of God" (Lechler). This natural religion has actually existed; it has existed even from the beginning of things. From the beginning of the world God has given men a law, by the observance of which they

could make themselves agreeable to Him, and with the law He at the same time has given sufficient means to attain to the knowledge of it. This natural religion is perfect, universal, and eternal. The essence of God, the nature of man, and our relation to God and to other men are immutable, and so likewise are the duties that arise out of these relations. God would proceed arbitrarily and tyrannically, were there any other rule regulating the actions required by Him than that which is given by the connections between things and the fitness arising therefrom. This original religion must also be perfect, because it has an infinitely wise and beneficent author, namely God. As perfect, it must likewise be immutable, like the wisdom and goodness of God. The perfection of natural religion is further clear from the fact that God implants it, even after the publication of Christianity, in the hearts of men, and that the perfection of the Christian religion is often proved from its conformity to natural religion. And if the value of a law can be heightened by its supreme internal excellence, its great distinctness and simplicity, its uniformity, universality, high antiquity, and even its eternal duration, all these qualities belong in a high degree to the Law of Nature. Besides, the acceptance of an external revelation presupposes a conviction of the existence of God, a conviction which springs alone from the internal light, by the aid of which alone we are able to distinguish among the professed religions the one that is true from those that are false.

In these positions the judgment of Tindal regarding positive religion is already expressed. He still stands so far upon supernatural ground, that he does not at all examine the possibility and truth of an external revelation, to say nothing of his contesting it. Positive (instituted) or revealed religion is true in so far as it agrees with natural religion; if it contains more it is tyrannical, because it imposes unnecessary things; and if it contains less, it is defective. Thus even Christianity, however new be the name, is yet *as old as the Creation*, and it has been implanted in us by



God Himself as an innate law of human nature from the beginning. Identical in their contents, natural and positive religion are distinguished merely by the mode in which they are communicated. The former rests upon internal revelation, and the latter upon external revelation, but both spring from God, and therefore they cannot possibly contradict each other. The purpose of Christianity or of the mission of Christ, was to teach men repentance, to deliver them from the burden of superstition, to put the law of nature into the proper light, and thus to restore natural religion and to publish it again.—The adulteration of natural religion by superstition is not satisfactorily explained. Superstition is represented as being mostly founded in the fact that man has no proper and correct notions of God, but makes a god like himself; but the question arises, on what is this founded? From superstition have sprung the mediating gods among the heathen. Expiations and mortification have their origin in the delusion that God takes delight in the pain of His creatures. Sacrifices are also referred to the delight of a cruel God in the slaughter of innocent creatures; and here, moreover, deceptive and selfish priests had their hands in the game. The clergy promote superstition from a selfish interest, partly by means of mysterious dogmas, and partly by pompous ceremonies. Tindal does not enter in detail upon the Christian dogmas. He only says of the dogma of the Trinity: I do not understand these orthodox paradoxes, nor yet do I reject them.

Tindal designates his view as "Christian Deism," and makes the difference between the Christians and the Christian Deists lie in the fact that the former do not venture to examine the truth of the scriptural doctrines, whereas the latter, who do not believe in the doctrines because they are contained in the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures on account of the doctrines, have no such anxiety.

## THOMAS CHUBB.

Thomas Chubb (1679-1747)<sup>1</sup> holds religion to be the ground of the divine favour. True religion is what really procures us this divine favour as contrasted with that which man merely imagines. This true Religion is founded either upon "the moral fitness of things," that is, the objective nature of things and their relation to each other, or upon "the arbitrary will and pleasure of God." The former is real by nature; for it only corresponds to the character of God. It appears from the whole order of nature that God should act as a wise and good being. Only thus does God act justly and rightly with His creatures; only thus is man put by his own nature into a position for discovering the true religion, for distinguishing between divine revelation and deception, and for recognising the true sense of a revelation in contrast to false apprehensions of it; and it is only thus that true religion is a simple thing, everywhere the same, unchangeable in time or place, and only subject to change along with the nature, the relations, and circumstances of things.

These positions give at the same time a canon for the estimation of Christianity. The end and aim of the appearance of Christ was to save human souls, or to secure to men the grace of God and future blessedness. In a less proper sense, He wished also to promote the present well-being of men, the happiness or unhappiness of this world being closely connected with that of the next. This promotion of present as well as future well-being does not flow, however, as is often otherwise the case, from the bestowal of temporal power over others, but is dependent on the condition that every individual is brought to a state of mind and to a mode of conduct which

<sup>1</sup> Chubb was a common artisan, working as a glover and also in the service of a tallow-chandler. He was self-taught, but in spite of his defective education he composed some of the most important of the Deistic writings. The most important of his works are: "The Previous Question with regard to Religion," 1725; "A Discourse concerning Reason with regard to Religion," London 1730; and "The True Gospel of Jesus Christ asserted," London 1738.

make him a blessing to himself and the community, and which also at the same time make him happy. In order to prepare this happiness for men, Christ addressed Himself to men as free beings, and proposed to them certain doctrines which they ought to obey on the basis of their own conviction. They were thus to improve themselves and become worthy of the grace of God and of future happiness. To believe means to follow such doctrines on the ground of real conviction; and this belief is the bond which connects one Christian with other Christians, so that they are to one another like brethren.

Christ has laid three truths before men. First, He enjoins us to submit our heart and life to the eternal and immutable laws of action that are founded in the reason of things, as the only ground of the grace of God and of eternal blessedness. Christ thus enjoins upon us no new way to the grace of God and to eternal life, but the good old way which has held for all time, of keeping the commandments, or of loving God and our neighbour. Secondly, if by violation of this law we have drawn upon ourselves God's displeasure, repentance is the only certain ground of the divine forgiveness. It was a chief part of the work of Christ to preach this gospel of forgiveness by repentance and improvement. Thirdly, Christ impresses upon us the fact that God will judge men at the last day, and that according to their works, and not from His mere pleasure He will reward some and punish others.

Christianity thus consists objectively in the natural moral law, and subjectively in a submission to it that is founded upon conviction. Hence it does not consist in a historical narrative of facts, such as that Christ died and rose again; for the gospel, in fact, was preached before all that happened. Chubb takes such a sceptical attitude towards the history of Jesus, that he declares it to be only "probable" that there was a person like Jesus, and that He did and taught in the main what is related of Him. This probability rests upon the actual existence and the wide diffusion of

Christianity. As for the rest, Christ was a man who was born, grew up, and died like all other men; and that He declared Himself to be the Son of God only means that He was one to whom the word of God came.—Further, the gospel does not consist in the private opinion of any of the writers, as in John's doctrine of the Logos. Besides, these private opinions are often abstruse and difficult to understand, whereas the gospel is intelligible to the simplest understanding.

As the gospel is founded upon reason and corresponds to the nature of things, we might expect that it would be universally received, and that it would have exercised everywhere its purifying influence upon the moral life. But a multitude of inherited prejudices and of political and hierarchical interests have been opposed to its universal acceptance. Its blessed influence has also been hindered by the rise of doctrines that represented moral effort as unnecessary, such as that of the imputed righteousness of Christ, and by the error that it is not moral conduct but orthodox belief that makes men acceptable to God. But more than all, the progress of Christianity has been impeded by the intermixture of civil and Christian Societies.

Although Chubb describes Reason as entirely sufficient to guide man in the affairs of religion and to obtain for him the favour of God and the hope of a future life, he does not reject revelation. The purpose of Revelation is to rouse men from their indolence and security, to bring them to reflect and consider, to assist them in their inquiries and facilitate the work of inquiry, to awaken in men a right feeling of the pledge which is entrusted to them and of the duties which they have towards God and their neighbours, to call those who walk in the ways of vice to repentance and conversion, and to show them the consequences of a good and a bad life with respect to the pleasure and displeasure of God. But at the same time the position is emphatically asserted that revelation must be conformable to reason, and that reason is the only external criterion by which the true revelation is to be distinguished

from the merely pretended revelation. From this point Chubb enters upon an incisive polemic against the Christian dogma of satisfaction.

THOMAS MORGAN.<sup>1</sup>

In Morgan († 1743) we do not find much that is new as regards general principles; but he presents a good deal that is new regarding the historical construction of religion; and, in connection therewith, regarding the criticism of the Old Testament and of important Christian dogmas. The general principles of his point of view are summarized by Morgan as follows:—1. The moral truth of actions is founded on the natural and necessary relations of persons and things, which relations are prior to every positive law, and therefore cannot be changed by such a law. 2. The moral truth of things is the only certain criterion by which we can determine whether a doctrine comes from God and constitutes a part of the true religion. 3. The extraordinary powers and gifts of the Apostolic Age were not restricted to persons of moral character, but were also shared in by false prophets and teachers. 4. Infallibility and sinlessness belong to God alone, and hence those extraordinary gifts could not make man infallible or sinless. 5. The doctrines and obligations of moral truth may be communicated to us in various ways, as by reason, by immediate revelation, and by authentic evidence of such revelation. But religion is always the same, and its certainty as constituted by the moral truth of its doctrines is also always the same.—These principles explain how it was that, against all attempts to prove the truth of a doctrine from miracles, Morgan emphatically declares that any acceptance of

<sup>1</sup> Morgan was the Pastor of a Dissenting Congregation, but lost his office on account of his going over to Arianism. He then devoted himself to Medicine, and practised as a physician among the Quakers of Bristol; and finally lived as an author in London. His principal work is, "The Moral Philosopher. In a Dialogue between Philalethes, a Christian Deist, and Theophanes, a Christian Jew" (London, i. 1737, ii. 1739, iii. 1740).

immediate revelation rests only upon historical faith ; that it is therefore subject to careful criticism ; and that in the last resort it can only be justified by the moral truth of the revealed doctrines. Hence he proceeds to show that natural and revealed religion, being identical in their contents, are only distinguished by the fact that the former rests upon the eternal and immutable principles of moral truth, while the latter rests upon tradition, history, and human authority. Further, Christianity contains nothing that is essentially new, but is only a complete renovation and restoration of natural religion.

On account of these views Morgan designates himself a *Christian Deist*, in distinction from the *Atheist* on the one hand, and from the *Christian Jew* or *Jewish Christian* on the other. The Deist is distinguished from the Atheist in this, that the Atheist completely separates God and the world, so that after the creation the world is maintained and governed without the influence of the first cause, and merely by the forces and according to the laws of second causes ; whereas the Deist asserts a constant and continual influence of God upon the world. The Christian Deist and the Christian Jew are distinguished by the view they take of Christianity. The Deist sees in Christianity a renovation of natural religion in which the various duties of moral truth are more clearly exhibited, are confirmed by stronger grounds, and are made easy by the promise of active assistance through Jesus Christ. Christianity is that form of Deism, or of Natural Religion, which was first preached by Christ and His apostles, which has come to us through human testimony, and which is confirmed by the natural truth and essential divinity of His doctrines. And only because Christ has made the best communication to us of this Natural Religion does Morgan call himself a disciple of Christ and not of Zoroaster or Mahomet. Revelation is therefore nothing else than the renovation or reanimation of natural religion. Nevertheless its importance is very great. By it we have been raised out of the state of great ignorance and darkness which cover the



whole world to the true knowledge of God and of ourselves, including the knowledge of our moral relations and obligations towards the Supreme Being and towards one another. Revelation has brought us from great uncertainty regarding our future life and the divine providence in the government of the world to clear knowledge regarding them, as well as from the conceit of our own natural capacity to the humble recognition of our natural weakness and of the necessity of divine assistance which we are assured of as soon as we ask for it. It would be very precipitate to infer that these are natural truths and moral obligations which are clear of themselves to reason, and which therefore do not require a revelation to communicate them. The books of Euclid and Newton's Principia undoubtedly contain natural truths that are founded in the reason of things, but only a fool or a lunatic would say that he could have learned these things just as well without those books, and that no thanks were due to their authors. The Christian Jew, on the other hand, connects Christianity closely with Judaism, sees in Christ only the national Jewish Messias, and would have the whole law retained.

The opposition thus indicated goes back, according to Morgan, to the primitive Christianity as represented by the names of Peter and Paul. Morgan proceeds in detailed explanations and with critical acuteness to give such an exposition of the original Christian antagonism between Jewish and Gentile Christians as makes him appear almost a precursor of the recent critical school. On this point we can only touch briefly here. The Jewish Christians are represented as accepting nothing that was new in passing over to Christianity except that Jesus was the Messias, and this they accepted in the literal national sense. Hence they demanded from all Jewish Christians rigid observance of the whole Jewish law, and from all Gentiles the observance at least of the laws of the proselytes. Paul rejected both requirements, because he would not connect things that were indifferent in themselves with necessary moral duties flowing

from the eternal natural Law, and because he regarded the Jewish ceremonial law as annulled. Paul was "the great freethinker of that age;" he was "the bold and brave defender of reason against authority" in opposition to those who had set up a godless system of superstition, blindness, and slavery against all sound reason, under the specious pretext of a Divine revelation.

The eternal and immutable religion of nature consists in childlike love and reverence towards God, in brotherly love to men, in the fulfilment of all those moral duties of truth and honesty which flow therefrom, in a trustful confidence in and dependence upon God, and in the constant sense of His power and presence in all our actions as the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. *Whence then has the corruption of this pure, primitive religion sprung?* Morgan answers this question at some length. The falling away from the pure religion began among the angels even before men existed. God had equipped this highest class of intelligent beings with various powers and capacities, and put them at various points in the government of the world, yet in such a way that He retained the one undivided supremacy. At the beginning this order was maintained, but afterwards the lower orders of the angels turned no longer to God Himself, but to Lucifer or Satan. Thereupon the Archangels demanded that all supplications should be brought solely through their mediation before God. In a heavenly war, Satan was then overthrown with his adherents and banished to the earth. Here they sought to turn man away from God. At first they persuaded man that, as ministers of Providence, they had great power, that God had deputed to them dominion over the world, and therefore that prayers should only be directed to God through their mediation. Afterwards the demons were regarded as independent, and all worship and obedience were withdrawn from God; and ultimately there were other mediators and intercessors, such as dead heroes and princes, interposed even between these new Gods and men. The general diffusion of this error is explained only by the influence of priestcraft, and

this influence is connected with the practice of sacrifice. Sacrifice was at first a purely personal action, an act of obedience, or of subordination and surrender to the will of God on the side of the sacrificer. As such it was agreeable to God, and it availed as a means of reconciling God and winning His favour. Then, because liberality passed current as a sign of love to God and to men, public festivals and rich banquets received pre-eminently the name of "sacrifices." At first the patriarch or prince himself, as the host or entertainer, supervised the festival. Afterwards certain festive speakers were appointed to announce the festival, to welcome the guests, and to superintend the bakers, butchers, cooks, etc. These were called priests; and, like all royal servants, they were paid from the public treasury. Once established in this office, they were enabled to connect all religion with sacrifices and festivals, and to allot all the merit that was connected with the practice of these functions. From being masters of ceremonies and supervisors of festivals, they were able gradually to elevate themselves to the throne of God, and to make princes and people dependent upon them by the blessings which they supplicated from heaven.

The first priesthood that was independent of the crown and equipped with great privileges, was founded by Joseph in Egypt. Thereafter Egypt became the mother of superstition, the patroness of new gods, the mistress of idolatry through the whole world; for every new god was a gain to the priests. During their long residence in Egypt the Jews also adopted much of this idolatry, and became completely Egyptianized. Hence it was not possible for Moses to communicate to them the true religion unveiled, and it became necessary for him to accommodate himself to their errors. Moses and the prophets spake in a double sense: in a literal sense, according to the errors of the people; and in a secret sense, which disclosed the true religion. The matter really lies thus: the ancient authors, sacred as well as profane, did not write as pure historians, but as orators, poets, and dramatists. By means of this style they maintained the historical truth, and yet

by reference to the nearer surroundings of the action they took the liberty of decorating the history with sensuous images and dramatic representations, such as were agreeable to the views of the people and fitted to excite their interests. Morgan compares the historical narrative of the Old Testament with Homer's description of the Trojan war, and with the writings of Æsop, Ovid, Milton, and Shakespeare. Thus he lays the foundation for an incisive criticism of almost the whole of the Old Testament history, in which he is not sparing with reference to the miraculous narratives or the moral character of the heroes that come into view.

Among the Christian dogmas, the doctrine of satisfaction specially appears to Morgan as a coarse result of Jewish superstition. His criticism of it reminds us in many points of Faustus Socinus. As a Deist, Morgan indicates the purpose of the death of Christ to have been (1) to manifest His obedience to God, to attain the highest honour, and to verify His religion; (2) to show that there is no respect of persons with God; (3) to exhibit God's absolute authority and our absolute obligation to obey Him; and (4) to strengthen our hope of a life hereafter. The origin of the dogma of the Church is explained by a mistaken literal transference of the Old Testament view of sacrifice to Christ. Even in the Old Testament, sacrifice was originally only a sign of repentance, and it was by priestly selfishness that it was made into a means of expiation. This conception was transferred by the Jewish Christians to Christ, and it was necessary even for Paul to attach himself, at least in figurative, ambiguous expressions, to this view in order that he might accomplish anything. In truth, the death of Christ is not the *causa meritoria*, but the *causa effectiva* of our salvation, as by His death He does not justify us, but leads and guides us to the right way in which we are justified and reconciled with God. We say that we are justified and saved by Christ, because, by His righteousness and obedience even to death, He has procured the grace of God so as to establish a kingdom of peace and of righteousness in the world as the most rational

means of bringing men to personal faith, repentance, and upright obedience; and this is absolutely necessary in order to reconcile them with God, to make the Deity gracious to them, and to win again the divine favour. By a natural metaphor, we accordingly call Christ our reconciler and redeemer, the founder of our salvation, and the author and finisher of our faith.

### III.

#### SPECIAL CONTROVERSIES AND THE APOLOGETIC WORKS.

Before we turn to the last representatives of Deism, it still remains for us to notice briefly a series of works which it occasioned, and to mention at least the Apologies that were written in opposition to it.

1. The Immortality of the Human Soul has been regarded from of old as one of the most important religious truths. Hence the strictly supranatural view of Religion has found it difficult to admit that we can obtain the knowledge of this truth without the aid of Divine revelation. Sometimes a further step has been taken, and not merely the knowledge of immortality, but immortality itself, has been made to rest upon special divine grace. In England this latter view was also asserted. Henry Dodwell (1706) proceeded to show from Scripture and the oldest Fathers that the soul is mortal by nature, but is made immortal by God. He held that this takes place by the Divine Spirit which is communicated in baptism. And because since the time of the apostles only bishops have the right to administer the sacraments, only the members of the English Episcopalian Church are immortal and all Dissenters are mortal.—Against this high-flying claim of the high Episcopal party, there arose a general opposition, and a series of controversial writings represented the more rational view that the human soul is essentially immortal.

2. Prophecies and Miracles, from of old, have been held in chief estimation as the means of proving Divine Revelation.



As Deism sought to carry back the contents of the Christian Religion to the expressions of natural reason, although without calling in question the principle of revelation, it was not possible to pass over these means of proof in silence. The Debate on Prophecies (1724-1728) was opened by William Whiston (1667-1752). Having become embarrassed from perceiving that many passages of the New Testament which professed to be fulfilments of Old Testament prophecies do not agree with the existing text, he asserted that the Jews in the second Christian century had falsified their sacred Scriptures in the original text as well as in the LXX., in order that the testimonies drawn from them in the New Testament might appear not to be valid. He also attempted to restore the earlier text in order to prove that the prophecies had been literally fulfilled.—This assertion was the occasion of the publication by Anthony Collins of his work entitled *A Discourse of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* (London 1724). Such a universal intentional falsification of the Old Testament he held to be completely incredible; and if it had taken place, it would be impossible to restore the correct text. It is admitted that the truth of Christianity can be proved only on the ground of Prophecies; for as every new revelation is attached to an earlier one, so is Christianity attached to the Old Testament. This proof by Prophecy is not, however, to be obtained by literal interpretation of the Old Testament passages, but only by typical and allegorical interpretation of them. To assert that they prove in their literal sense what they have to prove, would be to give up the truth of Christianity; for it can be easily proved that in their literal acceptance they refer to entirely different things. Christianity rests wholly upon types and allegories. But as Collins gives no judgment as to the value of this proof, it may appear doubtful whether he holds the proof of Prophecy as binding, and the revealed character of Christianity as proved or not. His personal conviction was probably this, that Christianity may be proved as a revelation only on the ground of fulfilled prophecies; that the fulfilment of Old



Testament prophecies in the New Testament can be proved only on the ground of allegorical interpretation; that this method is uncertain and false, and hence that it cannot be convincingly and certainly established that Christianity rests upon revelation. That the argumentation of Collins was understood in this sense, is shown by the immense number of replies which appeared in opposition to him. Only a few of the positions they took up may be here mentioned.—Bullock combats the view that Christianity was founded in a positive way upon the Old Testament, and that its fundamental article was that Jesus was the promised Messiah. He maintains that the references to the Old Testament had merely the intention of setting aside Jewish prejudices, that Christianity is a new Law proclaimed by Jesus, and that it may be proved by rational grounds to be divine.—Others, and especially Sykes, seek to show that the Old Testament prophecies were literally fulfilled in the New Testament, but they have recourse to the greatest arbitrariness in carrying out this thought. Others again, and in particular Chandler and Jeffery, assert that the New Testament writers did not themselves mean to narrate fulfilments of prophecies, but only in a free way attached themselves to Old Testament phrases and narratives. In Jeffery's *Christianity the perfection of all Religion, natural and revealed* (London 1728), the view, however, first breaks through here and there, that the truth of Christianity is not lost even if the Apostles erred regarding the Old Testament prophecies.

3. The Debate on Miracles was opened by Thomas Woolston (1669–1731), who proceeded to apply the allegorical interpretation, not only to all such historical facts as the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem, but also to the miracles of Christ. Even the history of the resurrection of Christ has no meaning in its literal acceptance, but is a type of His spiritual death and of His resurrection from the grave of the letter. Woolston supported his recommendation of the allegorical mode of interpretation by showing that a literal interpretation meets with the greatest difficulties. The same method is pursued by Peter

Annet († 1768), who, in a series of writings, some of which are composed in an extremely repulsive tone, endeavoured to overthrow the credibility of the Gospel history by pointing out contradictions and improbabilities in it. He likewise advances from the criticism of the particular miraculous narratives to the consideration of the conception of miracles. In his view a miracle is not merely an unusual event within the regulated course of nature, but it is a supernatural event contrary to the laws of nature; and this contradicts the wisdom and immutability of God. Nor are miracles capable of producing belief; it is the imagination that shows us miracles.

4. The deistic movement called forth numerous Apologists, but only a few of them occupy such a general point of view as to come into consideration here. Henry More and Ralph Cudworth brought Platonism into the field in opposition to the dissolving effects of the thoughts of Hobbes. Theophilus Gale (1628–1678) had already made an attempt to carry all the science and philosophy of the heathen back to the Sacred Scriptures as their ultimate source. Henry More (1614–1678) turned away from the Aristotelian Scholasticism, and found satisfaction in a Platonism alloyed with Pythagoreanism and Kabbalistic elements. With the conviction of the irrefragable truth of the Biblical Revelation, he combined the assertion that Pythagoras, and Plato also through him, drew their wisdom from Moses. Metaphysics is the rational investigation of immaterial substances; or, it is a natural theology. There are four kinds of spirits: the Germ-forms or the material principle which lies at the basis of the formation of plants, Animal Souls, Human Souls, and the Souls of the Angels. Besides these there is also a universal soul of nature or World-soul, which permeates and animates the whole universe. The uncreated Spirit or God is essentially distinguished from these created souls. His existence indubitably appears from the idea of a necessarily existent being which is innate in us. The constitution of the world, with its manifestation of design in the whole as well as in its parts, also points to the infinite reason and wisdom of its Author.

Above all, however, the designed structure of our body and the faculties of our mind, make us certain of the existence of God.—Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688),<sup>1</sup> equipped with astonishing learning and no little acuteness, undertook a refutation of the whole philosophy of atheism, of which Hobbes appears to him as a leading representative. The view which is favoured by the despisers of God, that there is nothing in the mind which has not been formerly in the senses, is erroneous; God in knowing Himself also knows all things, and in these ideas and necessary truths we also participate. Above all, the view is to be rejected which would empty the notions of good and evil of all universal and essential contents, and which would found them upon the arbitrary institution of any will whatever. Morality is fixed and natural, and it is founded in the nature of things; for no divine or human law can bind us to anything but what is good in its own nature (*φύσει*). The atheists, who all assume an insentient and unconscious matter as the principle of all things, are systematically classified according as they think of matter without life, or as involving a vegetative life. The former assume either certain qualities or certain atoms, and thus form the Anaximandrian and the Democritic Atheists; the latter hold either that the whole of matter is animated, or that its several parts are animated, and they are accordingly divided into the Stoical and the Stratonian Atheists. The most important of these systems are the Democritic and the Stratonian; but neither the atomism of Democritus nor the hylozoism of Strato, lead by inner necessity to the denial of the Deity. By the aid of a great wealth of historical material, Cudworth goes on to show that the idea of God, and, in particular, of a single Supreme Being, is found everywhere, even among the most pronounced heathens. To this idea we are led by the investigation of causes as well as by the contemplation of the design in the world. The reality of God

<sup>1</sup> His principal work is, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, London 1678. It was translated into Latin by Mosheim with notes (Jena 1733). [Edited along with the *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, by Harrison, in 3 vols., London 1845.]

follows from His idea in us as well as from the existence of eternal truths and innate ideas generally.

Most of the writings published to refute Deism appeared as replies to Collins' *Discourse of Freethinking*. Richard Bentley, the great Greek scholar (1662-1742), wrote against him his *Remarks upon a late Discourse of Freethinking*, under the pseudonym "Phileleutherus Lipsiensis." He puts himself in so far upon the same ground with his opponent, as he also demands freedom of thinking; and, besides, this is so universally admitted that it is superfluous to vindicate it. The polemic is not always quite dignified or worthy, as when Bentley asserts that the "freethinkers" had a personal interest in denying hell, and when he advises them to put it down by force. He shows, with great acuteness and superior knowledge of the subject, that the definition given of "freethinking" was extremely indefinite and defective, that freethinking actually tends to become rash, bold, inconsiderate thinking, that the diversity of opinion in religion is extremely natural, and is no reason for rejecting it. He also shows that the "Freethinkers," instead of only following their reason without adopting any hypothesis, were from the outset convinced that the soul is material, that Christianity is a deception, that the Scriptures are falsified, that heaven and hell are fables, and that our life is without a Providence and without a Hereafter. —Benjamin Ibbot, in his Boyle Lectures (1713-1714), likewise claims for reason the right to examine whether an alleged revelation is really a revelation, and what is its meaning. He only objects to Collins, that he does not love the truth for its own sake, and that he does not proceed impartially. Even Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London, in his *Five Pastoral Letters to the People of his Diocese* (London 1728 ff.), concedes to reason the right to examine whether the grounds in favour of an alleged revelation are convincing, although he also emphasizes the demand that reason since the fall, must subject itself in matters of religion to the divine revelation.

Of the treatises called forth by Tindal's *Christianity as old*

as the *Creation*, it may be mentioned that some of their authors, such as Campbell and Stebbing, attempted to explain the origin and the partial truth of natural religion by deriving it from revelation. John Conybeare, in his *Defence of Revealed Religion* (London 1732), takes the view that natural religion is certainly independent of revelation and certainly true, but that revealed religion is alone perfect and sufficient for salvation. He gains a no small advantage over his opponent by showing that Tindal plays in an extremely obscure way with conceptions; that he uses the phrase "Law of Nature" as synonymous with "Religion of Nature;" and that he calls religion natural at one time because it can be known by natural reason, and at another time because it is founded in the nature of things, and so on. Conybeare restricts the expression natural religion to the former meaning. If we assume at the outset that man has a sufficient insight by nature, even in this case revelation would not be superfluous. It would promote our insight as a means of instruction, by exhibiting a comprehensive and orderly system of doctrine; and by its appeal to divine authority, it would claim our attention and respect. Further, even assuming the perfection of reason, a distinction must be made between reason before the fall and reason as it now is, and also between the reason of the whole of mankind and that of the individual. In truth, however, natural religion is perfect only in the degree in which natural reason is so; but natural reason is imperfect, and therefore natural religion is so too. It is wanting in clearness; it rests upon insufficient sanctions; it does not embrace all that should properly pertain to it; and it furnishes no means for the support of virtue. Further, natural religion is changeable like our reason, which is the means of knowing it, and like the relations of things. Hence we must expect that a divine revelation, if there be such a revelation, would contain certain positive determinations in addition to those of natural religion; and we actually find such in all revealed religion. There are therefore sufficient grounds in reason for accepting a special positive revelation and recognising



it in Christianity. For although we owe an unlimited obedience to revelation, yet reason has to examine any alleged revelation as to whether its contents are consistent with certain and known principles, and whether it is accompanied with sufficient external evidence so that it can be received as a revelation.

Joseph Butler (1692–1752),<sup>1</sup> who died Bishop of Durham, undoubtedly takes the most conspicuous place among the Apologists of his time. The fundamental thought that he has expressed is that Natural and Revealed Religion are not opposites that exclude each other, but that they stand in “Analogy” to one another. Butler first considers Natural Religion. The hypothesis of a Future Life cannot, he says, be in any way strictly proved, but it may be made probable by examination of nature. Observation of the moral life makes it probable to us that all things are guided by God according to a wise Providence, and that they are governed according to moral laws; and hence the work of training the human race, which is thereby begun, makes us expect that it shall be continued in a future life. Christianity is represented by Butler under a twofold point of view. In the first place, it is a republication and external arrangement of Natural or Essential Religion, adapted to the present circumstances of men, and destined for the promotion of natural piety and virtue. Natural religion teaches that the world is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and is governed by Him; that virtue is His law; and that in the future life He will deal with all men according to their works. This Natural Religion is thus taught in its original simplicity, and free from all the superstition by which it has been adulterated; and as Christianity, by its miracles and prophecies, has given Natural Religion the support of external authority, it makes the reception of it easier to all men. It is also thus accommodated to the particular wants of one people and one age, in order that it may thereby be brought nearer to men.—

<sup>1</sup> His principal work is, *The Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, London 1736.



But, in the second place, Christianity contains things which cannot be discovered by Reason, and in this connection natural religion is its basis, but not its whole. What is peculiar and characteristic of Christianity, consists shortly in this, that it teaches us to know God, not merely as Father on the side of His omnipotence, but also as the Son who is the Mediator between God and man, and as the Holy Spirit by whose assistance our corrupt nature is renewed. From these new relations to God as the Son and the Spirit, there likewise spring certain obligations, or positive commandments, which cannot be known by our natural reason, but can only be ascertained on the ground of immediate Divine Revelation.—Butler then proceeds, although in a less original way, to refute the objections which have been urged against a Revelation in general, and against Christianity in particular.

## IV.

## DAVID HUME.

The general significance of Hume (1711–1776) may be briefly summarized by saying that in him the whole movement of Deism reached its close. In the development of philosophy, Locke had hitherto been the chief authority in England. Hence, apart from the æsthetic theory of Shaftesbury, the discussions of the Deists rested on the basis of Locke's empiricism, and they contributed little to the promotion of general philosophical speculation. Hume attaches himself closely to Locke, in part correcting him and in part developing his doctrine. In the discussions relating to religion, Hume likewise brings the movement to a close. Hitherto Deism had maintained an essentially supranatural character; for although it demanded rationality in revelation, and assigned to rational thinking the right to decide as to accepting or rejecting it, it nevertheless founds upon the position of an immediate revelation. It takes this position, however, with a difference

worth noting, namely, that from the outset the function assigned by it to Revelation is to communicate to us actually new knowledge relating to those things of which we could not otherwise be certain, or which we would not so easily and quickly have attained to, if left to ourselves, but which reason is capable of accepting and recognising as true. Afterwards, however, the only function assigned to Revelation was to guide men again, in opposition to the errors that had arisen, to the natural truths of reason which had been formerly known. Hume, on the other hand, knows nothing of Revelation as standing in harmony with Reason. He evidently returns to the judgment of Bacon concerning the complete separation of faith and reason; but while Bacon earnestly maintained his faith along with his knowledge, in Hume the element of faith is also assailed and consumed by his philosophical scepticism. We may well consider this point somewhat more closely.

In philosophy, as has been said, Hume attaches himself in the closest way to Locke, and he proceeds to develop Locke's principles. As Locke, in his theory of knowledge, had undertaken a critical examination of the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, as well as of the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent, Hume likewise proceeds on the same lines in his *Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748). He aims at giving a "mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind," because he sees in this the only possibility of freeing the sciences at once from transcendental investigations and the way "to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved." Hume goes even farther than this, designating philosophy briefly as the "science of human nature;" he also founds his inquiry regarding morals and religion entirely upon it.

In theoretical philosophy, Hume accepts it as an established position that the whole material of our mental operations consists in "perceptions." In this connection Berkeley had already saved him the trouble of having to repeat the negative criticisms of Locke regarding innate ideas, and of

inquiring with him into the sources of our ideas. "We may observe that 'tis universally allowed by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." Perceptions, according to the higher or lower degree of their liveliness, are divided into "Impressions" and "Ideas"; the former designate the ideas and sensations that are immediately produced by an external impress, the latter indicate the reproductions of these in memory and imagination.<sup>1</sup> All Simple Ideas are mere copies of simple impressions, for the understanding has no power to create anything new. It is otherwise with Complex Ideas. There are complex impressions to which no ideas exactly correspond, and there are also complex ideas to which there are no exactly corresponding impressions. The understanding has not only the capacity of recalling ideas before itself in memory, but it can also combine and separate, multiply and divide these ideas, in the phantasy, although it is always restricted to the material which it has received from experience. There are certain general Principles which undeniably regulate the combination of individual ideas into complex ideas. The most important of them are Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.<sup>2</sup> Along with these natural relations, Hume also distinguishes certain artificial relations, which are infinite in number yet may all be reduced under these seven general heads: Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degrees of Quality, Contrariety, Causes or Effects.<sup>3</sup> The three natural Relations mainly occupy him. The relation of Identity rests on resem-

<sup>1</sup> "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call *impressions* and *ideas*. The difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas*, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." *Treatise*, Book I. Part I. Sec. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Inquiry, Sect. III.

<sup>3</sup> *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I. Part I. Of Relations.

blance. This relation arises when we view one and the same objects at two different moments of time, and only attend to its unchangeableness during the lapse of the time; and the identity of an object is thus equivalent to its unchangeableness and uninterrupted duration during a received portion of time. This relation of Identity has therefore a merely subjective foundation, and its expression has no objective significance, apart altogether from the fact that it is almost always expressed where differences are present. The objective validity of the conception of Substance, both as material and immaterial, thereby also falls. We perceive certain qualities in repeated combinations, or even in a certain constant union, hence we regard their coexistence as a thing or as a simple object. At the same time, however, the qualities appear to us to be different and separate; and in order to combine these two things with one another, we form for ourselves the idea of the one substance with its many accidents. But this idea is not presented in any perception, and we have no right to transfer this fiction of our imagination to the external objects of perception. In other words, our conviction of the continued existence of the external world, as a world of external bodies corresponding to our earlier and later perceptions, rests merely upon our imagination, and is only attained by means of that fiction. As in the case of the objectivity of the external world, the immaterial substance of the soul, or the personal identity of the Ego, is in like manner resolved into a mere subjective fiction. There is neither an impression, nor is there an idea of the self or Ego founded upon any impression. When I exactly examine myself, I find in fact various individual perceptions, but not a separate "self," whether as an independent perception along with others or in connection with these. It is a purely subjective addition to the process, when we connect the various independent perceptions in the Ego into an imaginary unity.

The relation of connection in space and time, leads us to examine its significance. The Ideas of Space and Time do not arise from separate perceptions that exist along with other

perceptions, nor are they prior to all perception, nor are they afterwards separated from perception. The idea of Space arises from the perception of visible and tangible points, which are distributed in a certain order, and the idea of Time is abstracted from the succession of different perceptions. We can neither form an idea of empty space and empty time, nor the idea that space and time can consist of infinitely small parts.

The Relation of Causality leads Hume to the inquiries by which he became the precursor of Kant, and by which he established his reputation in philosophy. It is Causality which alone enables us to pass in our knowledge beyond the immediate present perception; that is, to infer from the perceived existence of an object to the existence of an object which is not perceived, as preceding or as following it. Hence the knowledge that proceeds according to the Relation of Causality is distinguished from other knowledge, in that the former constitutes empirical knowledge or experience, and the latter intuitive or demonstrative knowledge. Intuitive knowledge arises when two presented objects are compared; and demonstrative knowledge arises when the relations of quantity are examined in geometry and arithmetic. Intuition and demonstration give certainty, whereas experience gives mere probability.—What is essential to experience as aided by the Relation of Causality, consists in the fact that we thereby obtain a knowledge of the existence of objects which are not presented to our perception at the time. Hence the great question is, How, on what ground, and with what right, may we infer generally from the idea of one object to another that is not included in it? It is impossible to infer to the connection of one object with another merely from the idea of the first object, or *à priori* by a mere operation of the understanding. In regard to rare and wholly new objects, this is not doubted; but with regard to the common occurrences of daily life, such as, that heat melts wax, or that a ball in motion communicates its motion to one at rest, we believe that we are able to draw inferences *à priori*. This opinion,



however, is only the result of a deceptive influence of custom. The Relation of Causality thus rests in every case upon experience. But what does experience actually show us in two things which we regard as Cause and Effect? It is not any particular quality of these objects, for anything may as well be a cause as an effect. What we are presented with, is rather a mere *contiguity*, or at most a succession of these objects in space and time. Even in those cases in which the Relation of Causality meets us most directly, as in the consciously-willed movements of the body, nothing further is presented to our observation than this contiguity or succession in time and space. But a single observation of this relation, does not suffice to lead to the knowledge of cause and effect. This knowledge requires that such observations should be frequently repeated. If, in a series of cases, two objects continually appear in the same relation of connection in space and time, the two impressions of them become combined so closely with one another in our experience that our imagination is determined by custom, on the repetition of the one impression, to add to it the idea of the other. This subjective necessitation is the only ground on which we assume an objective necessary connection of the two objects, and because we accept this connection we also become firmly convinced that quite another significance belongs to this combination of the ideas than belongs to mere images of the imagination; in other words, we think that the objects really correspond to this subjective combination of ideas. This conviction is founded upon Belief. We distinguish, no doubt, between objects of experience and the inventions of the phantasy; but in neither case have we anything but ideas before us. There must, however, be some distinction between those ideas which we accept as true from their corresponding to an external object, and those which we reject as untrue. This distinction can only be relevant to the sensation or feeling as not depending on choice, and as without reference to the will being connected with true ideas, but not with those that are untrue. It is as impossible to explain



this feeling as it is to explain the sensation of cold, or the emotion of anger, to a being who has no experience of them. But every one knows this feeling, and is conscious of it in himself. The correct expression for it is "Belief." "Belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination." "The sentiment of Belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination." This Belief is the guiding principle of our whole human life. By it alone we make experiences useful to us, in so far as we assume for the future the same course of events which we have observed in the past; by it alone do we extend our knowledge backwards and forwards beyond the sphere of the objects immediately perceived. We therefore come to a certain harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas, and it rests upon the habit which regulates our whole knowledge and action. The necessary causal connection which we attribute to things, thus rests merely upon our being subjectively compelled to represent two things, which we have often observed in a certain particular mode of coexistence in space and time, as always in that relation, and as thus connected with one another. The greater or less probability of the empirical inference, rests on the number of the cases in which this coexistence is observed in proportion to those in which it was not found. For such an inference from experience always remains a probability, and it never becomes a certainty. —A special kind of merely probable knowledge, is that which is founded upon Analogy. As yet we have been considering Experience only under the point of view that the very same object that we have observed hitherto in constant combination with another object, meets us again. But it is commonly the case that it is only a more or less similar object that is afterwards presented to us. The main question then comes to be, How to determine degrees of similarity from identity on to contrast? For the less resemblance there is, so much the more improbable does such an inference from analogy become.

It is this same spirit of subjective empiricism, that appears in Hume's investigation of moral questions. With penetrating self-observation and careful psychological analysis, Hume gives at the outset a survey of the human "Passions" as forming the natural substratum of our actions. Generally, he maintains and emphatically argues that the Science of Ethics has no imperative or constructive character, but is entirely descriptive. It has not to establish universal Laws derived *à priori* from no one knows where; nor has it to subordinate individual cases to such laws; it has rather to examine with care the actual conduct of men, and to derive from the observation of their individual actions the general laws of action. The will is not a particular power, nor a special faculty. "By the *will* I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.*" It is only from the fact that there has been no agreement regarding the notion of the will, that the endless and still unsolved controversy regarding freedom and necessity is explained. Were it not that the subject of the dispute is treated in endlessly ambiguous expressions, a recognised result would have been reached long since; for as regards the matter itself, the disputants are really at one. Nobody questions the essential equality of all men, at all times, and in all places. In like manner, nobody disputes the fact that, in human life, all actions stand in constant connection with certain motives, characters, and relations. The constant connection of two objects is, however, the only objective relation which underlies our conviction of the necessity of material events. Hence there is no reason for not attributing the very same necessity to human actions as to external things. In the practical judgment of life and men, we are also wont constantly to proceed on the assumption of necessity; and we are only prevented from keeping strictly to it by our idea that we might have acted otherwise, as well as by the opinion that necessity properly implies something more than a coexistence in space and time that is without exception. Now it is

asked, By what then is our will determined? Is it by reason or by feeling? It is not by reason; for reason has to do only with knowledge, that is, with observation of the relations of certain ideas in intuition and demonstration, or with the establishment of facts in experience. In none of these cases can reason be the ground of an action. Just as little can it combat a passion, for the passions belong to an entirely different side of our mental life than that of knowledge and perception. Morality does not therefore consist in certain relations that have to be discovered by reason, nor in facts that have to be established by it. Rather is it feeling that determines the will. Our feeling moves in the opposition between the agreeable and the disagreeable. Hence our moral judgment regarding a character and an action, as well as the determination of our will to action, must rest upon a feeling of the agreeable and of the disagreeable. This, however, is not to be understood as if all agreeable feelings excited in us the idea of what is morally good, and all disagreeable feelings that of what is morally bad; but the feeling of the morally good and bad rests upon a peculiar and wholly specific kind of pleasure and pain. By this feeling virtue becomes happiness, and vice unhappiness. The only question remaining relates to what it is in the objective world that excites in us the feeling of moral satisfaction or the moral feeling of pleasure. The reply to this question is that it is what is *useful* for others. This is reached as the result of an analysis of the universally recognised social virtues. Benevolence, Philanthropy, Gratitude, and Friendship are universally esteemed on account of the advantage or Utility which arises from them for the common weal as well as for the individual. This holds still more of Justice, the rules of which have only arisen from the advantage which society and its members derive from their observance. Hence even suicide is quite permissible, as Hume argues at length in his celebrated *Essay on Suicide*. Suicide is not a violation of duty towards God, because it would be blasphemy to assert that the individual could thus

interfere so as to destroy the divine plan of things. Nor is it a violation of duty towards society, because our obligation to work for the well-being of society ceases if a disproportionate pain is thereby prepared for us, or if we would thus become a mere burden to society. Nor is suicide a violation of duty towards ourselves, as no one will throw away life so long as it appears worth the living. The moral estimate of actions thus rests upon the specific feeling of pleasure which is excited by actions that promote the advantage of human society. Hence the feeling of humanity or sympathy, is determined more correctly as the ultimate moral principle. It has the twofold significance of giving a rule for the moral judgment of all actions and characters, as well as furnishing the motive of all really good actions.

Hume's Moral Philosophy, like his theory of knowledge, thus forms in its own sphere, the culmination and close of the preceding development of English thought. His Philosophy of Religion holds exactly the same position and significance. It grew up wholly on the soil of the English Deism, and is only to be understood in connection with it; but at the same time it goes in essential points beyond it. Hence, as in his theory of knowledge, Hume is here, too, not merely the consummation and close of the previous development, but he is at the same time the precursor and beginner of an entirely new movement, which was to be carried on and completed by the labour of a later time and by the thinkers of another country.

His principal work relating to the Philosophy of Religion is entitled *The Natural History of Religion*. At the outset, Hume distinguishes two principal questions which claim our attention in any inquiry with regard to religion; the first question relates to "its foundation in Reason," and the second to "its origin in human nature." The main progress made by Hume beyond Deism, lies in the fact that he deals with the latter question independently, and that he does not attempt to refer religion, after its untenableness by reason has been proved, merely to priestly deception which explains nothing. The first question appears to him

to be the most important; and "happily it admits of the most obvious, at least the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author, and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion." Notwithstanding this expression, Hume has not regarded it as superfluous to subject this question also to an incisive examination. Along with particular sections of the work entitled *An Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* mainly deal with this subject. They were not published till after Hume's death, which took place in the year 1779; but they had been composed as early as 1751, and after more than twenty years of preparation.

The literary form of this investigation presents it as a report by Pamphilus to Hermippus regarding a discussion concerning the existence and nature of God, carried on in Dialogues between three friends, Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes. Demea represents the belief in Revelation; but in the philosophical relation he stands not upon scholastic, but upon sceptical ground, — that is, he will not establish the truth of Divine Revelation by the aid of human reason, but he will corroborate the necessity of immediate revelation from the fact of the insufficiency of human knowledge. Philo is likewise a sceptic, but he holds fast by his philosophical scepticism, and does not save himself on the sure ground of revelation. Cleanthes again has good confidence in human thinking. Instead of doubting of the reliability of knowledge, he will not merely criticize any alleged revelation by its aid, but will also apply it so as to obtain a natural knowledge of the existence and nature of God. He therefore represents the so-called Natural Theology, or the Deism of the time. These characteristics are manifested in the introductory Dialogue regarding the significance of scepticism, which Cleanthes rejects as practically impossible and scientifically impracticable, while Demea and Philo recommend it, the former advocating it as a preparation to belief, and the

latter as the true scientific method of procedure.—The existence of God, as the most certain of all things, is not called in question in the subsequent discussion. The only question treated is as to whether the proofs of God's existence are sufficient, and what light falls from these proofs on the knowledge of the being and nature of God. Of the traditional Arguments, the Ontological Argument is not even mentioned. This is quite natural, for a theory of knowledge like that of Hume could recognise nothing at all in the assertion that the existence of God follows from the idea of God. The Cosmological Argument is merely touched incidentally. Demea believes that even if the arguments *à posteriori* were to prove insufficient, yet the argument *à priori* would lead to the goal in view. It is expressed thus. All that is, must have a cause or a ground of its existence, as a thing cannot produce itself. In rising from effect to cause, we must therefore either assume an infinite succession, which would be absurd, or we must have recourse to an ultimate cause, which necessarily exists, and the non-existence of which cannot be accepted without contradiction; in other words, we must come to the existence of God. On the other hand, Cleanthes objects that it is of itself an absurdity to try to demonstrate facts, or to establish them by arguments *à priori*. There is nothing demonstrable but that of which the opposite involves a contradiction. Anything may be thought as not existing, and hence nothing can be demonstrated as existing. Further, in case there were such a thing as "necessary existence," why may the material universe itself not be this necessarily existing being?

The greatest part of the Dialogue turns upon the Teleological Argument, or, more exactly, on the question as to whether the inference of design and intelligence in the origin of the world is founded upon facts of experience. The point then is not to prove the existence of God, for this stands fast, but to know more exactly the nature of this original, or the nature of God. Cleanthes proceeds to show that the world is an artificial machine quite analogous to the products of human art; and as



the likeness of the effect enables us to infer a like author, we must therefore accept the existence of an intelligent author of the world. Demea protests immediately against every inference by analogy from man and his actions to God. Philo then proceeds to argue that an analogical inference in this case, in which the resemblance is so small and the dissimilitude is undeniable, is far from being an inference from experience. It is neither legitimate to transfer the contrivance or economy of a part, such as a house, to the whole of the universe, nor to apply the procedure of the existing and regulated world to its mode of origin. "Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house and the generation of a universe?" If we were to judge about the origin of the universe from experience, and therefore with any certainty, it would be necessary that we should have been present at its origin and have seen how in fact a world arises.—These preliminary objections cannot, however, convince Cleanthes. In vivid and rhetorical language, he refers again to the fact that everywhere in nature we find design in its arrangements; and that the simplest natural explanation which presses itself at once upon unprejudiced thinking, is the acceptance of a divine intelligence. We ought to stop at this immediate impression, and not labour to seek out sceptical objections to it. Demea brings forward the view once more that God's nature is entirely inconceivable, that it is presumption to wish to make God accessible to our understanding, because we thereby degrade God and make Him like man. On the other hand, Cleanthes asserts that this mystical conception of God differs in little from the view of the sceptics and atheists, and that, if it is denied that God is knowable, there will not be much inquiry after His existence, and the belief in God will then be but an empty belief in a vague something.

And now Philo begins to give a special and systematic refutation of that inference from Analogy. 1. Anthropomorphism, he says, infers that as a human work of art has its ground in the plan of the artist, so does the world *per ana-*

*logiam* point to an intelligent Creator and His preconceived plan of the world, But it is asked what is gained by this assumption? We see ourselves always compelled to rise still higher in order to find for any cause again another cause. To carry back the universe of things to a universe of ideas in God, is only the first step in a *regressus in infinitum*. "How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or according to your system of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world?" This infinite regression, however, cannot satisfy us; the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant applies to it. If we are to stop at the first ideal world, why not at once at the present material world? It would be better not to look beyond it. "By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better." As the Peripatetics found the cause of an occurrence in an occult quality, so do the Anthropomorphists in like manner find the cause of order in the ideas of the Supreme Being, or in a rational Power which constitutes the nature of God. In the same manner the order of the universe may be explained without going back to a Creator.

2. The Teleological Argument leads neither to the infinity, nor to the perfection, nor to the unity of God. "Like effects prove like causes." This is the ultimate principle upon which all inferences from analogy rest, and therefore it is also the principle of the teleological argument. This principle is not considered in itself, but it is taken and applied strictly and precisely. Now the effect in question, in so far as it comes to our knowledge, is not infinite, and therefore we have no ground in it for attributing infinity to the Divine Being. Further, there are in nature, at least so far as our knowledge reaches, difficulties, defects, etc., and therefore we cannot

assert that God is perfect or free from error, mistakes, or inconsequences. Or, again, as a human work of tolerable perfection often comes into shape after many mishaps and failures in the attempts to produce it, may it not also be that "many worlds have been botched and bungled throughout an eternity ere this system was struck." And now as a great number of men are combined in the building of a house or a ship, it might also be that various deities had combined to form a world. That would merely constitute so much the greater a resemblance of the world to human things. Nay, if the position of the Anthropomorphist is to be taken, why then is it not carried out at once more completely? "Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.?" 3. In experience the principle holds good, that where certain circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown circumstances will in like manner be similar. The world shows much similarity to an animal or organic body. We may therefore infer that the world is an animal, and the Deity is the soul of the world, moving it and moved by it. If the objection is raised that thereby the eternity of the world is asserted, but that this position is refuted by the recent origin of intellectual and material culture, an escape may be found by taking up the view that endless periodic revolutions follow each other, and that they are guided by an eternally immanent principle of order.

4. As the world is much more like an animal body or a plant than a human work of art, the origin of the world might be much rather explained by generation or growth than by intentional creation. "In like manner, as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds." This view certainly gives free scope to the imagination, but from it we see how incapable we are to determine anything from experience regarding the origin of the world, and how the principle of resemblance leads us astray.

5. Once more, even the hypothesis of Epicurus might be defended. If we take a finite quantity of matter that is continually and everywhere moved, it must necessarily in the course of time assume all possible formations. Most of these would have no internal power of existence and would therefore perish, but at last there would come about one which could maintain itself in being. Although accidentally arisen, such an arrangement would present the appearance of an adaptation of means and ends; for were the parts not suited for the preservation of the whole, the whole would in time have perished.—Hence the result of this discussion is summed up in the view, that as innumerable hypotheses may be maintained with the same probability, we must exercise the reserve of the sceptic, and confess our ignorance.

Cleanthes represents the deistic mode of thought of the time. According to his view, Design prevails in the world, and hence its origin must go back to an intelligent author. In that age human happiness was regarded as the final purpose of things. The Dialogues could not therefore conclude without looking at the question of human happiness, or the problem of the Theodicy with reference to the knowledge of the existence and nature of God. Demea expresses this position thus: "I own that each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion in his own breast, and from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek protection from that Being on whom he and all nature is dependent." Demea and Philo describe alternately and with great eloquence, the misery of life, the unhappiness of man, and the universal corruption of human nature. But while Demea will merge this mystery in the incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, Philo borrows weapons even from that position against the argument for the existence of God advanced by Cleanthes, arguing that the boundless misery on the earth compels us to think either that God's omnipotence, or His wisdom, or His goodness is limited. For if God were of unlimited power, wisdom, and goodness, the happiness of living beings would not be

impaired by any unhappiness. And although it may be admitted that a world even under that condition might be compatible with the idea of a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity, yet it can never furnish us with an inference to His existence that is without difficulty. All evil rests upon four circumstances: (1) Pain and pleasure serve to incite the creatures to action, and to make them watchful in the matter of self-preservation; (2) The course of the world is governed by general laws; (3) All powers and capacities are bestowed with great parsimony upon individuals; (4) The several principles of the great machine of nature do not work with complete exactness, but exert an influence beyond the bounds of their utility. This is expressed as "the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature." None of the four sources of evil appear to us to be necessary, and hence one might be inclined to adopt the Manichæan theory of a dualism in the origin of the world. The universal connection of the order of the world is, however, hardly compatible with this view. Hence it comes as a result to this, that as regards the origin of the world, the happiness and unhappiness of the creatures does not appear to have been taken into consideration.—At the close, Cleanthes and Philo come to agree in thinking that their dispute was really but a dispute about words. The one admits that the original intelligence is far removed from human reason, and the other confesses that the original principle of order has some distant resemblance to reason. Why then should they still dispute?

The eleventh section of the *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, entitled "*Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State*," is connected by its contents with the subject of the Dialogues. Hume here makes a friend take up the part of Epicurus, who defends himself against the reproach of godlessness in a speech delivered on the Areopagus before the assembled Athenian people. The chief argument for the existence of God is derived from the order of nature. In every inference from effect to cause, the two must be pro-



portional to one another, and qualities may never be assigned to the cause that are not necessary for the explanation of the effect, and no inference may be drawn again from the discovered cause to other effects than those that have been observed. If we therefore suppose that the gods are the authors of the existence and order of the universe, we may indeed ascribe to them the particular degree of power, understanding, and benevolence which is visible in their work, but never more. Further, "we can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect from that cause, as if the present effects were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes which we ascribe to that deity." Only because this is overlooked is the inference made to an all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful Creator, and then the effort is again made backwards to explain away evil and imperfection from the world.—Epicurus is further represented as saying: I deny a Providence, you say, and Supreme Governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious and rewards the virtuous; but I entirely acknowledge that according to the present order of things, virtue is connected with more tranquillity of soul, and finds a more favourable reception in the world, than vice. Whether I derive this perception from an experience, or refer this arrangement to an intelligence acting with design, is all the same as regards my conduct. The expectation of a special reward of the good and punishment of the bad in addition to and beyond the usual course of nature, "must of necessity be a gross sophism, since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause but what you have antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full in the effect." It is quite unreasonable to render this life only a passage to a future life. "*Are there then any marks of a distributive justice in the world?* If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods."



If we abandon the sure path of experience, and infer by the imagination to a distinct intellectual being, who produces and maintains order in the universe, we maintain a principle that is equally uncertain and impracticable, as such an inference from the cause to the effect is not allowable. An inference from effect to cause, and again from the cause to the effect, is indeed allowable in reference to the works of human invention and art. As we learn to know man in his nature, motives, and qualities, from experience, our knowledge of the cause in this case is not founded upon the one present effect, but upon a hundred other experiences and observations which justify an inference to wider effects. It is otherwise with reference to the Deity. We infer a Deity merely from the world as an effect, and therefore inferences drawn from the Deity cannot carry us beyond the world of experience. The great source of our mistakes lies rather in the fact that we put ourselves in the place of the Supreme Being, and assume that He will observe the same rules as we would do in His place. But the analogy between the Supreme Being and us, does not at all justify this assumption.

The views of Hume regarding the Immortality of the Soul and Miracles, are also of interest in connection with his Philosophy of Religion. His views regarding Immortality are expressed in his *Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul*, which were not published till after his death in 1783. The contents of these Essays correspond exactly to the logical consequences which result from his dissolution of the idea of the substance of the soul. The inference is drawn that, "Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to Divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth." This inference, however, is only meant to soften the aversion of the reader to the repulsive contents of these Essays, but it will not weaken their result. Hume subjects the metaphysical, moral, and physical arguments for the Immortality of the Soul to a sharp criticism. "Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that 'tis im-

possible for thought to belong to a material substance." The notion of substance is entirely confused. We represent it as an aggregate of individual qualities which inhere in an unknown something. Matter and Spirit are therefore equally unknown to us. We do not know what qualities belong to them. At least it is only experience that can decide as to whether matter may be the cause of thought. And if thought is only attached to a spiritual substance which is dispersed, like the ethereal fire of the Stoics, through the world, the various thinking forms and existences are formed out of it as from a sort of paste or clay. The same spiritual substance therefore lies at the basis of the most various formations. The individual form is dissolved in death; and as we know nothing of existence before our birth, in like manner the existence after death does not affect us.—The moral arguments assume that the justice of God has an interest in the future punishment of the vicious and the reward of the virtuous. These arguments are thus founded upon the assumption that God has attributes besides those that are expressed in the world, and that are alone known to us. And yet, if there be any purpose that is distinct in nature, we may assert that the whole purpose of the creation of man was limited to the present life. Only on this ground can it be explained that our interest is so completely limited to this world. "On the theory of the soul's mortality, the inferiority of women's capacity is easily accounted for," in view of the less important tasks of women. The main objection lies in the fact that "heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men," the one completely good and the other completely bad. In truth, however, men oscillate between vice and virtue. The physical arguments, which are the only philosophical ones, speak distinctly for the mortality of the Soul. If two objects are so closely connected with one another that all the changes of the one are accompanied by corresponding changes of the other, by the rules of analogy we must infer, that if the one is dissolved, the dissolution of the other also follows. This, however, is the relation that subsists

between the body and the soul. Everything is in a continual flux or change, and shall the soul then alone be immortal and indissoluble? Further, "how to dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences, ought also to embarrass the religious theory."

Hume expresses his views regarding Miracles in the tenth section of his *Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding*. In entire conformity with the subjective character of his whole philosophizing, he does not discuss the objective possibility of Miracles, this being passed over as unquestionable. What he examines is their subjective credibility. The positions which he maintains here are the necessary consequences of his assertions regarding the theory of knowledge. He begins with a reference to Tillotson's argument against the *Real Presence*. "It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the Scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the Apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour by which He proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the *Christian* religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses." But the weaker evidence must yield to the stronger. In the same way Hume will meet the belief in Miracles. The external occasion, at least for the last revision of these thoughts, was undoubtedly the excitement caused by the miracles "lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist," and the recollection thus reawakened of the Port Royal Miracles.

Even experience, Hume maintains, may lead us into error. Here also there are all possible degrees of conviction from the highest certainty to the lowest degree of moral evidence or probability. It is therefore important to bring one's faith into proportion to the degree of evidence. If inferences are founded upon an infallible experience, we may expect the event with the highest degree of assurance; in other cases, we must weigh the opposite experiences against each other, and incline to the side on which the greatest number of

experiences is found, yet always only with uncertainty. This is the probability which assumes an opposition of observations, and according to the relation of these cases it has a different degree of certainty. This position holds also where we accept statements upon the testimony of others. In this case the incredibility of a fact may invalidate the testimony of a witness for it, however credible. Now, let us suppose "that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof, but that the fact related is a miracle, in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. The plain consequence is, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish." Hitherto it has been supposed that the testimony upon which a miracle is founded, may rise to a complete proof. This supposition, however, never holds true in fact. In the whole of history there is no miracle found which was attested by a sufficient number of sufficiently credible men. And, moreover, as we are disposed the rather to accept statements the more they contradict our other experiences, it is also shown that miracles excite wonder, and astonishment, and agreeable sentiments which lead men away to accept them. Supernatural and miraculous narratives are specially suspicious, in that they are found most numerous among ignorant and barbarous peoples. Lastly, we have no testimony for any miracle which is not opposed by an infinite number of counter testimonies. Hence not only does the miracle of itself annihilate the credibility of the statements, but these statements neutralize each other; and in matters of religion there is great diversity and controversy. Now, in so far as

any miracle supports a particular religion, all the other religions will throw it overboard. The result then is, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever risen to probability, and still less to historical certainty. "And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments," and "there is no testimony that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses." If we deduct the one from the other, "this subtraction with regard to all popular religions amounts to an annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any system of religion."

Notwithstanding this criticism, Hume admits that Miracles and deviations from the usual course of nature are possible. The same holds true of Prophecies, for all Prophecies are really Miracles, and only as such are they proofs of a divine revelation. "So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the *Christian Religion* not only was at first attended with Miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable being without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and whoever is moved by *Faith* to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." With these words Hume concludes his discussion of Miracles. We must, however, beware of seeing in them a personal submission to the Christian faith or its Miracles. The philosopher expresses himself here with his wonted circumspection and reserve, convinced that every one will draw the necessary consequences from his argument, as they apply also to Christianity, without his needing expressly to point them out.

The second question, which according to Hume's view is of special importance in regard to all investigation of Religion, is that which relates to *its origin in human nature*. Hume devoted his work entitled the *Natural History of Religion* to the solution of this question, and it is in connection with it



that we find the main advance then made beyond English Deism.

Deism consoled itself with the fiction that the pure faith of reason, of which Christianity appeared as a restoration, actually existed at the beginning of the human race as a Religion. It was therefore necessary for Hume to examine at the outset the question as to the original form of Religion. This, he holds, was not Monotheism, but Polytheism. "It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about seventeen hundred years ago all mankind were polytheists;" and that the farther we are carried back by history we find men sunk the deeper in polytheism, and no marks nor symptom of any perfect Religion. It is certainly possible that in still earlier and more ancient times men maintained the principles of pure theism. But how improbable it is that as ignorant barbarians they found the truth, and then sank into error as soon as they became civilised! On the contrary, our knowledge of barbarous nations and savage races shows the improbability that there should not have been in this very point a gradually ascending progress of mankind from lower to higher, and this is confirmed by the impossibility of explaining to ourselves how the purer knowledge of God had ever become lost.

The original form of Religion, then, was Polytheism. The question regarding the origin of Religion, is accordingly determined more definitely as a question regarding the origin of Polytheism. This origin is not to be found in thinking. Had men been led by the examination of nature to the acceptance of an invisible, intelligent Power, they could have accepted nothing but a single being who bestowed upon this magnificent machine its existence and order; for although not impossible, it is yet extremely improbable that the world, which is arranged into a unity, should be referred to several authors. Again, if we leave the works of nature out of view, and follow "the footsteps of Invisible Power in the various and contrary events of human life," we are necessarily led to Polytheism, that is, to the recognition of several limited



and imperfect deities. For the course of events is so full of change and uncertainty, that we cannot refer it to a single intelligent Being otherwise than by assuming that there are opposite purposes in Him, and a constant conflict of opposite powers. The first religious ideas do not arise from "a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind." It is therefore not speculative curiosity, nor pure love for the truth, that leads man to accept the existence of intelligent powers. It is rather "the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessities. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize with a trembling curiosity the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."

The fear and hope with which we contemplate the unknown causes of our prosperity or adversity, and especially the events of the future, are thus the deepest psychological roots of Religion. And there is another consideration which has to be added to these. Men have the general tendency to think all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities of which they are conscious in themselves. Thus we find human faces in the moon, and armies in the clouds, and thus do we ascribe to everything that pleases or displeases us benevolence or ill-will. Along with this, it is explicable that these unknown powers from which we expect the formation of our future with fear and hope, likewise assume in the imagination the form of human beings. Not merely are spiritual qualities, such as knowledge, and will, and human affections and passions, but even the human shape, is attributed to them. It is evident that these limited beings can have only a narrow, limited sphere of action; and as such a being is assumed for every peculiar sphere of life, there are very many of them.

It may very well be doubted as to whether the name of Religion should be applied to such conceptions. We find in all this nothing of what we now call Religion and regard as its necessary constituents. These gods constitute no first principle of being and thinking; they exercise no supreme universal dominion; and they pursue no divine plan or purpose in the creation. Entirely unworthy representations are contained in the older heathen religions; the gods stood wholly within the world as belonging to it. The question regarding the origin of the world was not at all examined in these religions; and even the philosophers who were associated with these religions only began with Anaxagoras, and therefore very late, to refer the world to an intelligent Author. The further development of these religious ideas proceeded with much arbitrariness. Man is certainly inclined to accept an invisible intelligent power in nature, but his attention at the same time clings strongly to visible things. In order to unite both inclinations, the invisible power is connected with a visible object, and thus all the remarkable products of Nature herself appear as real deities, such as the sun, the moon, the stars, and the fountains inhabited by nymphs, etc. The partition of different domains to special deities becomes the foundation of allegory, both physical and moral. The god of war is represented as barbarous and cruel, and the god of poetry as elegant and refined. As the common deities were but little elevated above man, there were also certain men regarded specially as heroes or public benefactors, and held to be worthy of reverence, who were raised among the gods. By this apotheosis there arose a great number of heathen deities. And when sculptors and painters represented the gods, an exact distinction was seldom made between the god who was represented and the statue or painting that represented him.

These are the general features of all polytheistic religions; and now it is asked, How did Monotheism arise out of this Polytheism? At first it might be supposed that intellectual thinking and the speculative interest in the comprehension of the universe, led man from the acceptance of many gods to the

belief in one God. This supposition, however, turns out to be erroneous. In Europe, where Monotheism has already so long and so universally prevailed, if we ask a common man even now why he believes in an Almighty Creator of the world, he will not refer us to final causes. He will not speak to us of the artistic construction of his hand, of the wonderful articulation and flexibility of his fingers, and so on, but will tell us of the sudden death of a man, or of the great drought of the summer, etc. In short, the common people found their faith in a divine government of the world upon extraordinary incidents and marvellous events, which appear to the thinker rather as counter instances than proofs of it. The wonderful connection of the universe and the strict observance of its established laws, which is to us one of the main arguments for Monotheism, appears to the multitude rather as an argument against it. Hence the origin of Theism cannot be referred to the theoretical want of the speculative thinking, but is only explained from universal practical reasons, from its acceptableness to the human mind, or from "irrational and superstitious principles." Polytheism already makes one of its many gods the object of special worship and adoration, whether it is supposed that the particular nation is subject to this particular god, or after the manner of human relations, that the one is king or supreme lord over the rest. Now, if God is regarded as a special patron, or as the universal King of the gods, men seek to gain His favour by very special manifestations of honour to Him, and thus there arises among men a sort of rivalry for the favour of God, and a hunting after the highest possible expressions to use in His praise and as signs of His honour. And thus do they come to the idea of infinity, beyond which there is no further progress. Hence men are satisfied with the knowledge of a perfect being, the creator of the world, and this knowledge coincides by accident with the principles of reason and true philosophy; but this position is not attained by reason, but by flattery and fear, and a propensity towards the most common superstition. Both among savage and civilised peoples, flattery of the ruler carried to the

highest degree leads to his being designated as a real deity, and to his being brought before the people for worship, and it is likewise quite natural that a limited deity should be finally raised to the position of the universal Creator and Ruler of the universe. But on account of its origin the idea of this elevated deity, contradictorily enough, still continues such that human infirmities, passions, and partialities are ascribed to it.

It is only by reference to this origin of Monotheism that we can find an explanation of the fact that there is generally a peculiar flux and reflux in connection with it, or a striving to rise from idolatry to Monotheism, and again a tendency to relapse from Monotheism into idolatry. "The unknown causes" which control life always press in again upon the knowledge of the one Supreme God; and they are regarded as mediators of a lower order, as subordinate beings between men and the Supreme divinity. These half-gods or middle beings stand nearer to us, and thus become the main objects of worship, and thus there arises a gradual reintroduction of idolatry. The religion then sinks always deeper into idolatry until a reaction ensues, and it again attains to the full purity of Monotheism. Thus do even Christianity and Mohammedanism fluctuate between this descending and ascending movement, passing from an omnipotent and spiritual deity to a limited and corporeal deity, or even to a visible representation, and conversely passing from the material image to the invisible power, and even to the infinite and perfect Deity, the Creator and Ruler of the universe.

To this historical review Hume adds a comparison of these various religions. With respect to toleration this comparison turns out very unfavourably to Monotheism. Polytheism by its very nature has room for other religions, and this toleration has been frequently shown by it in history. Monotheism must be exclusive, and shows itself repellent and cruel towards others of a different faith. Polytheism has yet another advantage. If the Deity is conceived as infinitely elevated above man, this view is fitted, when connected with superstitions, to plunge the human soul into the deepest debasement and dejec-

tion, so that mortification, expiation, and passive suffering are regarded as the only actions that are pleasing to God. On the other hand, if the Deity is considered to be only a little higher than man, there arises the spirit, courage, self-consciousness, the love of liberty, and all the qualities which make a people great. Nor has Monotheism any superiority from the point of view of reason. The whole mythological system of antiquity appears natural and probable. Monotheism formed the fundamental principle of a national religion, and its basis so greatly corresponds to sound reason, that philosophy can become united with such a theological system. But as the other dogmas are contained in a sacred book, the controversy against reason only properly begins there, and then the irrefragable principles of reason cannot be recognised in the theology. Nay, even when we wonder at the impossible and fabulous histories that are accepted by the confessors of the heathen religions, we are deceiving ourselves from inherited prejudice; when examined in the light, Monotheism has even more incredible positions.—The idea of God is everywhere found to be of a twofold origin. In the first place, it originates in fear, then in flattery; the former makes God appear terrible and evil, the latter represents Him as sublime and good. Hence there arises an irreconcilable contradiction regarding the idea of God and conduct towards Him. The scanty influence of religion upon morals is most lamentable. In every religion the majority of those who confess it, however sublime their verbal definitions of the Deity may sound, do not seek to gain the favour of God by virtue and good morals, but by petty observances, unmeasured zeal, and the acceptance of mysterious and absurd opinions. Nay, even the greatest crimes are commonly practised with superstitious piety.

Good and evil are everywhere mixed in the world, and this applies also to religion. Certain advantages may be admitted as belonging to its theistic form, but along with these it has also its dark sides. “The propensity to believe in invisible intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being yet a general attendant of human nature, may be considered as a kind of

mark or stamp which the Divine workman has set upon His work," "but what caprice, absurdity, and immorality are ascribed to Him!" "The noble privilege of man to find God in nature is replaced by sick men's dreams, or by what may be regarded rather as the playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of a being who dignifies himself with the name of rational." "The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a-quarrelling, while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy." Thus does Hume close his *Natural History of Religion*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The best edition of Hume's Philosophical Works is that of T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. London 1875.—Reference may also be made to Friedrich Jodl, *Leben und Philosophie David Hume's*, Halle 1872, and Edmund Pfeiderer, *Empirismus und Skepsis in David Hume's Philosophie*, etc., Berlin 1874.



## SECTION SIXTH.

DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.

### I. DESCARTES.

DESCARTES (1596-1650) takes his place along with Bacon as the founder of the Modern Philosophy; and he begins the speculative movement, as Bacon does the empirical movement. They were both driven to their position by a conviction of the uncertainty of all previous knowledge, and their aim was to save the human mind from universal Doubt by a new Method, as the only correct means of renovating science. In this undertaking both of them continued to stand upon the ground of dogmatism, and they did not advance to a critical examination of our knowledge as such. Bacon finds the certain knowledge that is beyond doubt in the observation of nature, or in right experience. Descartes finds it in our own self-consciousness. Whatever I may doubt of, I am always in any case doubting or thinking, and therefore I exist. Hence the proposition, *Cogito ergo sum*, which is the Archimedean standpoint for all further investigation. I am, and, in particular, I am as a thinking being; and I am undoubtedly certain of this, because I have a clear and distinct Idea of it. Hence arises the criterion that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true; and only what I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. Now, in our consciousness we have a multitude of ideas which are partly innate, which have partly been formed in us by ourselves, and which have partly been produced in us from without. In so far as they are ideas and are only in our consciousness, they are entirely true. We go on in our judgment, however, to assert their agreement with external things. The question then arises as to whether we

are justified in asserting this agreement. In order to answer this question we must have recourse to a principle of which the truth is established to us as beyond doubt. This is the principle of Causality; namely, that every effect has a cause, and this cause must contain as much or more reality than the effect. If we apply this principle to our Ideas, then it is plain that the ideas of man, animal, and body may have their foundation in ourselves. The idea of angels is compounded out of the idea of God and that of man; it is only the origin of the idea of God that needs an explanation. We cannot possibly be the originating cause of this idea, for we are far more imperfect than it is. Hence the existence of the idea of God in our self-consciousness can only be explained if God really exists without us as its cause.

This is the Argument for the Existence of God that is peculiar to Descartes. It is to be carefully distinguished from the Ontological Argument of Anselm, but that argument is also turned to account by him. He puts it in the following way. Among the various ideas which we have, we observe the idea of a supremely intelligent, supremely perfect, and supremely powerful Being. This idea far transcends all other ideas, and we know that it includes existence as not merely possible, but as entirely necessary and eternal. Hence, merely from the fact that we know that necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of a being of the highest perfection, we may infer that a most perfect being really exists. For the custom which we have of separating *existentia* from *essentia* in all other things ought not to lead us to a similar procedure in contemplating the highest Being. "Existence can as little be separated from the idea of God as we can separate from the idea of a triangle the fact that the sum of its three angles is equal to two right angles, or from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley; so that it is as absurd to think of God, the most perfect Being, without existence—that is, with the want of a perfection—as it is to think of a mountain without a valley."

We further find the Anthropological Argument in Descartes

in the following form. Whoever knows anything more perfect than he himself is cannot exist of himself, for in that case he would have given to himself all the perfections of which he has any idea in himself. Again, we cannot have created ourselves, because we do not possess the capacity of preserving ourselves. Hence we must have our existence from a Being without us, and in particular, from that Being who bears all perfections in Himself, that is, from God. Hence God must exist.—In both its forms the argument is founded on the fact that we exist as imperfect beings, yet carry in ourselves the idea of the most perfect Being; and in the one connection it is inferred that God only can be the cause of this effect, and in the other connection it is inferred that we cannot be that cause. “If in one of my ideas a reality is represented so great that I am certain that this reality cannot be contained in myself either *formaliter* or *eminenter*, and that I cannot myself be the author of this idea, it necessarily follows from this that I am not alone in the world, but that there exists another being who causes that idea.” “The whole compelling force of the argument lies in this, that I must recognise that I myself, as I exist with the idea of God in me, could not possibly exist unless God really existed; and I mean just that God whose idea is in me as one who has all the perfections which I cannot conceive, but can only, as it were, touch from afar with thought, and who is subject to no want at all.”

*The conception of God* set up by Descartes follows from the arguments thus advanced for the existence of God. He is the most perfect Being and the cause of all existence. God is designated as Substance, that is, as a being who exists in such a way that no other being is required for His existence. In this strict sense there is only one substance, namely, God, while corporeal and thinking substances may be comprehended under the common notion that they are beings that only require the co-operation of God for their existence. They mutually exclude each other, and neither of them can exist without the other. But we cannot apply the idea of substance *univoce* to God and to those other beings; for God is the

infinite substance, whereas they are finite substances. Descartes further seeks to determine the nature of God from the idea existing in us; and accordingly God is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth, the Creator of all things, and infinitely perfect. God is not corporeal, and He is without sensation, for all sensation is a state of passivity; but He has knowledge and will. In general, everything is carefully separated from God that appears in ourselves as a defect or imperfection; and, on the other hand, we are emphatically warned against indulging in subtle investigations regarding the infinite; for as finite beings we are not capable of comprehending or thinking the infinite.

The existence of God is of so great importance to Descartes, because in his view our conviction of the existence of external things rests upon it alone. The perceptions of our senses are deceptive, because it is only what we clearly and distinctly know and think that is true. There exists no relation or reciprocal interaction between mind and body as relative substances, and as beings completely independent of each other. Hence we cannot explain nor conceive from the nature of mind or body how ideas of corporeal things external to us can arise in us. But we have these ideas, and are conscious of the impossibility of not having them; and hence we have them from God. Now God may indeed deceive us, if He so will; but veracity belongs above all things to His perfection, and therefore God will not deceive us. Hence on our conviction of the existence and veracity of God rests our certainty that external things correspond to their ideas in us. This view, however, appears to exclude all error, and thus the difficulty emerges that errors do yet occur, although the truth of our ideas of external things rests upon the veracity of God, and this leads Descartes to a somewhat artificial theory. Our ideas are true as ideas in ourselves; error only enters when the judgment asserts the real existence of external things corresponding to these ideas. The judgment is a matter of the will; the idea is a matter of the understanding. Error is therefore founded on the will, and more precisely on the fact

that the will reaches farther than the understanding, or that we will to know more than we can know. If we *only* will, that is, have the will always guided by rational insight, we may keep ourselves from error.

The existence of external things is thus established. Their essence is defined in sharpest contrast to the essence of mind; the essence of mind is thought, the essence of external things is extension. All the phenomena of minds are only forms or modes of thought; all the phenomena of bodies are only forms or modes of extension. And because bodies are merely manifestations of extension or magnitudes in space, there are no indivisible bodies or atoms, nor is there any limit or interruption of the world; that is, there is only one infinite world. Because all occurrences in the corporeal world are only modes of extension, all the changes of matter and all its different forms are dependent upon motion. The ultimate cause of motion is God, but the quantity of motion in nature remains always constant, and it is communicated by impulse. All the processes in the corporeal world proceed according to mechanical laws; and these laws, in accordance with the theory of vortices, explain the order of the universe.

There is only one fact which cannot be explained under the rigid separation of mind and body; it is the nature of the human passions. They point with necessary force to the fact that man is a unity made up of body and mind. In the pineal gland as its special organ, the soul stands in connection with the body.

## II.

### OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF DESCARTES.

Descartes himself did not wish to advance with his philosophical views too close to Revealed Religion. "We must continually consider that God is the infinite ground of things, and that we are only finite. If God then reveals anything regarding Himself or others that transcends the natural powers of our mind, such as the mysteries of the Incarnation and



Trinity, we are not entitled to refuse to believe in them, although we may not clearly understand them." This expression, as well as his submission to the authority of the Catholic Church, need not be regarded as a mere confession of the lips; the Cartesian Philosophy shows on one side such a decidedly theological character that these expressions may be taken as meant in real earnest. But, on the other side, it shows such a decidedly naturalistic character, and betrays so entirely new a spirit, that the antagonism of Theology to it need not astonish us, especially in view of the fact that the disciples often went farther than the masters. Rome put the writings of Descartes on the Index. In Holland, Synods and Universities combined to combat this dangerous philosophical innovation. In France and England, in Germany and Switzerland, the armouries of the mind and of force were led into the field against it. It does not lie within the purpose of our inquiry to follow the external course of this conflict in its details. We limit ourselves to a brief summary of the most important objections advanced by opponents, and will then proceed to review the most important of the Cartesians.<sup>1</sup>

The objections of the Opponents of Cartesianism were directed not less against the general principles of the new Philosophy than against its individual doctrines. Universal Doubt, which was the starting-point of the thinking of Descartes, at once aroused opposition. Even when it was not mistakenly regarded as Scepticism in principle, it was met by the unquestionably certain axiom, that it is impossible that a thing can at once be and not be. At all events it was held that this Doubt could only be applied to the domain of philosophy; in theology, it would destroy all faith and would

<sup>1</sup> G. Frank, *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie*, Bd. ii. 1875 (rich in interesting details). F. Bouillier, *Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne*, 2 vols. Paris 1854 (the fullest history of the subject).

Of the Opponents of Cartesianism and their works, the following are of most interest for us here:—Jacob Revius, *Methodi Cartesianæ consideratio theologica*, Lugd. Bat. 1648. Petrus van Mastricht, *Novitatum Cartesianarum gangræna*, Amstel. 1677. Samuel Maresii, *Tractatus de abusu Philosophiæ Cartesianæ*, Groning. 1670. Joh. A. Osiander, *Collegium considerationum in dogmata theologica Cartesianorum*, Stuttg. 1674. J. V. Alberti, *Διατριβὴ κατὰ πρῶτον, quod est Cartesianismus et Coccejanismus*, Lipsiæ 1678.



take away all guilt from unbelief. The principle that whatever is clearly and distinctly known is true, and this only, is far from clear, because clear and distinct knowledge is defined most defectively, and it opens the door to all fantastic and fanatical notions. The principle is also rejected on the ground that any one who clearly and distinctly perceived the images of his imagination would thus supersede all objective truth by his mere subjective opinion, and this when applied to theology assumes the peculiar character of an immediate divine revelation. The assertion that Philosophy has the same certainty as Theology, is already suspicious on account of its affinity to Socinianism. It would lead to the view of a double word of God, a twofold divine faith of equal authority and dignity; it would rank the philosophers with the prophets and apostles of God, and promise complete freedom from error as the fruit of philosophy. It is utterly intolerable that the modern philosophy will no longer be the servant of theology. This philosophy protests even against the name "Christian Philosophy," under the pretext that philosophy has only to follow natural reason without regard to a revelation or a positive religion. Thus we should have an utterly heathen philosophy, and a ceaseless conflict between it and Christian theology would be unavoidable. As the assertion of this position rests upon a complete denial of the obscuration of our reason in consequence of sin, it will advance from the equalization of philosophy and theology to the demand that philosophy shall have the unlimited supremacy. This was already claimed with regard to the interpretation of the Scriptures. And on the ground of the assertion that the Scriptures, not only in matters of natural science, but also in matters of morality and faith, speak in attachment to the erroneous opinions of the multitude, philosophy is proclaimed as the only infallible interpreter of Scripture; and yet the Scriptures are entirely clear in themselves, and require to be interpreted by themselves.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The work of the Amsterdam Physician, L. Meyer, *Philosophia Scripturæ interpretæ* (Eleutherop. 1666), is specially attacked again and again, and in the most violent manner.

Of the objections advanced against particular doctrines of the Cartesians, we can only refer to the most important, otherwise we would have to go through the whole of the *Loci* of the ecclesiastical dogmatics. The argument for the *existence of God*, derived from the idea innate in us, was violently contested, but generally without being correctly understood. It was urged that the idea of God is not innate in all men, for there are some men and even peoples without it. Again, it was held to be untenable to infer from the idea in us to real existence without us, as we might in this way assert the existence of a golden mountain. Further, it was held that the assertion of Descartes led to many absurdities, such as that, according to it, Jews, Turks, and Heathen worship the same true God as the Christians; that the ideas of God in us would be vicars or images of God, or even lower gods; and that before Descartes found his ideas, the Church had no certainty for the existence of God.—Again, the attempt to give a *definition of God* was repudiated, as this would only be possible if God were finite, compound, and imperfect.—It is false to make the *essence of God* consist only of thinking, because the same substance is thereby attributed to God as to the angels and men, whereas God is rather to be regarded as Spirit and Life. To say in a positive way that God exists *a se ipso*, to apprehend His universal presence as mere universal activity, or to assert that God can do what is contradictory, and that He can deceive us whenever He will, was declared to be completely absurd.—With regard to *Creation*, the Cartesians excited offence by asserting that God only communicated motion to matter, while chaos had produced everything out of itself alone merely by natural forces; that the creation took place in the particular period of six days of twenty-four hours each; that everything was not created on account of man; and that creation and preservation were the same activity. Of the *physical doctrines* of the Cartesians, the most contested were the theories of the animatedness, the infinity, and the unity of the world, as well as the conjectures that the moon was inhabited and did not shine by its own light, and that the

earth moved as a planet around the sun. The purely mechanical explanation of all the processes in the natural world appeared to the theologians as suspicious naturalism and the nearest approach to atheism.—In *Anthropology*, the Cartesian assertion, that the pineal gland was the seat of the soul, excited opposition; and still more dangerous and, from its disguised Pelagianism, utterly intolerable, seemed the doctrine that error has its foundation in the will, and therefore cannot be completely avoided by us. The *nullibitas* of the *Angels*, or the doctrine that they are not by their substance in any particular place, because their essence consists of pure thought, was also violently contested.

These objections, and the often passionate tone of the extremely violent polemics in which they were urged,<sup>1</sup> show at the same time that the scholastic theology of the Reformed as well as the Lutheran Church did not fail to recognise the strong antagonism of the new mode of thought to that which had hitherto prevailed. Although this scholastic theology did not intermit its attacks, although in many points, especially in certain rash consequences drawn from Cartesianism, it decidedly gained the advantage, and although the secular power and the venerable authority of centuries were on its side, yet it could not prevent the triumph of the new spiritual force. In particular, two fundamental and general thoughts of the new system unceasingly made way; namely, that the investigation of the world of nature must be separated from theology and assigned to natural reason alone, and that knowledge out of clear and distinct principles is to be regarded as the highest criterion of truth. The supremacy of an intellectual rationalism in natural science and in theology was the general result of the Cartesian Philosophy.

Among the oldest representatives of this philosophy, there certainly still prevailed here and there a conservative character. *Christoph Wittich* (1625–1688)<sup>2</sup> held without question the

<sup>1</sup> In this way the palm is perhaps due to Lentulus from his *Cartesius triumphatus et nova sapientia ineptiarum et blasphemiarum convicta*, 1653.

<sup>2</sup> *Consensus Veritatis in Scriptura divina et infallibili revelatæ cum veritate*

most important authority and influence among the theological Cartesians. He declared himself decidedly against the supremacy of theology over philosophy, and against employing Scripture to obtain theories about the system of the world and the simplest corporeal beings. He also teaches that clear and distinct knowledge is the only universally valid criterion of truth, and that the natural freedom of our will is unaffected by sin. At the same time, he takes up an entirely friendly attitude towards theology. He holds that belief is not to be withheld from the revelations of the divine Word, even if our limited intellect is incapable of comprehending them; that the philosophical doctrines regarding the soul, the angels, and the idea of God in us, are extremely useful for theology; and even that the most mysterious doctrines of the Christian religion, such as the Trinity and the incarnation, may be easily understood by the aid of the Cartesian philosophy. To pass over others, it may be mentioned that the theologian Heidanus (1597-1678) belonged also to those who sought to connect the ecclesiastically established doctrine as much as possible with the new philosophy. Some thinkers were carried by the influence of Cartesianism to mystical views. W. Deurhoff of Amsterdam († 1717)<sup>1</sup> was one of these. He held that as what was created by God is in its essence either extension or thought, all men in their real being are the one extension and the one mind which God originally created. What comes into existence in the course of time is but a modification of the one humanity originally created at the beginning. The individual human mind is likewise but a particular manifestation of the one mind. With these thoughts he combines an entirely mystical theory of salvation. —The mystic Friederich Adolph Lampe and the Cartesian Röell come into contact here, and they agree at least on some points. These examples prove that the reproach of enthusiasm urged against Cartesianism was not entirely unfounded.

*philosophica a Renato Descartes detecta*, Lugd. Bat. 1659. *Theologia pacifica*, ed. ii. 1675.

<sup>1</sup> Compare H. Heppe, *Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der Reformirten Kirche*, Leiden 1879.

Far more general and more decided, however, was the tendency of Cartesianism to a sober rationalism and to intellectual criticism, a tendency which was attacked as naturalism and atheism. The point at which its assault upon the previous theology was most sensitively felt was the demand which it raised for a philosophical interpretation of Scripture. This demand was accompanied by inquiries which aimed at the outset only at exposing and condemning the superstition involved in all the heathen religions of the ancient world. The violent and even passionate antagonism aroused by these inquiries can only be explained from the too well-grounded fear that such inquiry might also be directed against Christianity and its holy things.—Antonius van Dale (1638–1708) attempted, in his dissertation *De origine ac progressu idololatriæ et superstitionum* (Amst. 1696), to prove by detailed historical inquiry that the belief in demons and spirits was as old as the human race, and had been transmitted from one people to another, but had been cultivated with peculiar preference by the Egyptians. Most attention was excited by the work of Balthasar Bekker (1634–1698), entitled “The Enchanted World.”<sup>1</sup> The general principles here put forward regarding the relation of reason to Scripture are moderate throughout in their tone. Reason and Scripture are represented as the two sources of truth; the one is not subordinated to the other, but they are co-ordinate, for reason speaks of things with regard to which Scripture is silent, and Scripture teaches something that is not subject to our understanding. Reason stands before Scripture, because Scripture must make manifest to it that it is from God; and again, Scripture stands before reason, because God has revealed to us in it what human reason never comprehends. Nevertheless it happens that the two meet and join hands, yet so that reason as the inferior always gives reverence to the Scripture. In natural things, reason alone is the ground and rule of knowledge; in matters of salvation, God’s Word alone is the

<sup>1</sup> De Betoverde Weereld, zynde een Grondig Onderzoek van’t gemeen gevoelen, aangaande de Geesten, etc., Amst. 1691.



ground and rule of faith. If Scripture, then, does not speak of natural things in a natural way, reason must teach us to interpret it; and if, on the other hand, Scripture speaks of things of faith, reason must subject itself even although it does not comprehend. The investigation of "the Enchanted World" is directed to the question of belief in subordinate spirits and their activity. With an astonishing knowledge for his time of the history of religion, the author first examines the opinions which the heathen peoples entertained regarding spirits, and he comes to the result that they agree in great measure with one another, and that they were led everywhere to the same arts of soothsaying and magic. The opinions of the Jews and Mohammedans were entirely akin, and even Christianity has received from the same source its belief in demons and angels. This circumstance is of itself by no means fitted to recommend that belief, and still less so is the general observation that the belief becomes always weaker the more men advance in civilisation. Reason, however, cannot decide this question. It indeed teaches us that there is only one God, and that the angels and demons cannot therefore be demi-gods or subordinate gods; but, as there are immortal spirits besides God, namely, human souls, reason cannot decide whether there are still other spirits, and how they act. Nor does the Scripture give us much information regarding the origin and nature of the angels; and if it gives us somewhat more information regarding demons, yet it is not communicated in direct doctrinal form, but in occasional and often extremely figurative narratives. According to the Scriptures, the devil appears in a perfection which is equally at variance with the loftiness of God and his own sin. The angels that appear to Abraham and Lot behave themselves like men. The temptation of the Lord is explained by the thoughts of His own heart. Neither Job nor Paul was tormented bodily by the devil, nor did the lunatics need either the devil or the moon, and the demoniacs were subject to a peculiar disease. Christ Himself, in driving out spirits, as also elsewhere, only accommodated Himself to the pre-



judices of the multitude. Most of the passages of Scripture which were applied to the devil are to be understood of bad men, and it is entirely contrary to the truth of the Christian faith and of true godliness to suppose that the devil goeth about in the world, that he appears to men, and administers a great kingdom with power and cunning. The author then turns to the examination of the whole series of histories drawn from the domain of witchcraft and magic, and they are rejected altogether as mere superstition and the delusion of timid hearts.

The attempts to sketch a complete system of Natural Theology purely from philosophical principles, were historically of no great influence, although in principle they had a wider range of meaning. The most important representative of this method was Hermann Alexander Röell († 1718). In his inaugural dissertation as Professor of Philosophy and Theology at Franecker,<sup>1</sup> Röell indicates it as the task of his life to show that the only true philosophy is one which, in examining the things of this world, teaches us not merely their nature and causes, but the cause of causes, a philosophy therefore which shows us not merely the use of the goods that belong to this life, but the way to the highest good. He also aims at showing that the only perfect theology is one which illuminates the too corporeal light of reason by the clearer light of revelation, and which restores their original clearness to the truths that are knowable by nature and are impressed upon our souls but are lamentably obscured, a theology which thereby completes nature. In short, his principle is the unity of nature and grace, of reason and revelation, of philosophy and theology. Revelation without reason is wanting in authority, and reason without revelation is wanting in completeness. Philosophy examines the ground, the goal, and the order of things. The goal of man is happiness, which consists in the possession of the highest good, which is God. The sole way to God is religion, and more particularly it is rational

<sup>1</sup> *Dissertatio de Religione naturali*, ed. 3, Franecker 1695; expanded in his *Dissertationes philosophicæ*, etc., Frankf. 1729.

religion (*religio rationalis*); for it is only through the ideas innate in us, and the inferences obtained from them by thinking, that we are able to attain the true knowledge of God and the right religion. This natural knowledge and the natural striving to apprehend the highest good and to avoid evil, form the basis of every rational religion. In detail, Röell here develops the same thoughts as we already find in Descartes. When he comes also to speak of revelation, its existence is assumed without examination. Revelation, like natural religion, cannot be understood without the aid of ideas; and hence, if there are entirely new elements of knowledge communicated to us in revelation, there must likewise, as at creation, be completely new ideas inscribed in us. In this case it only remains to us to bring the new ideas into connection with the other ideas, and to make ourselves certain of their divine origin. If revelation communicates to us truths of which the simple ideas are already known to us, we can and ought to examine whether these are to be recognised as divine; that is, whether there cannot be found another explaining cause of the alleged divine Word than the omniscience and omnipotence of the first Being. A true divine revelation can contain nothing that is contrary to reason, for reason also comes from God; yet it may very well communicate truths regarding God's nature and works which the natural reason alone is incapable of ascertaining. We must believe such Divine communications even if we are not able to comprehend them, but even then we should seek to make the meaning and the divine origin of Revelation clear to us by means of rational principles.

The least satisfactory point in the system of the Cartesian Philosophy, is undoubtedly the attempt it makes to bring the unity of body and spirit as actually existing in man into harmony with the extreme opposition to each other under which they are represented. This problem gave rise to the first attempts at a further development of the system. Arnold Geulinx (1625-1669) can only explain the reciprocal action of body and mind on each other by a miraculous interference

of God on every occasion. Geulinx divides Metaphysics into Autology, Somatology, and Theology. At the outset of his Autology appears the proposition of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*. This is the strong citadel that has to be maintained against all sceptics, for although I do not know whether things are as I think them, I know at least that I do so think them; that I think and therefore am. Now I find in myself many ideas or modes of thinking which do not arise from myself, for they do not appear when I will them, and they come when I do not will them. These ideas must therefore be excited in me by another, and in particular—and this is the peculiar basis of the Occasionalism of Geulinx—this Other must be conscious of the fact, for without knowing how a thing happens, it is not possible to effect it. This Other excites these ideas *nec mediante me ipso nec se ipso sed corpore*, neither by me as a medium nor by himself as a medium, because we are both simple beings, whereas the ideas are manifold. They are excited by means of the body, and in particular as the ideas are very diverse they arise not from the body as at rest and continuing always the same, but from its movements. The body, however, and its movements are entirely without the capacity to excite thoughts, and hence the body is neither the efficient nor the occasioning, but merely the *occasional* cause of our thoughts. The body, on whose occasion, "*occasione cujus*," those ideas that are independent of me arise in me, is my body. My union with this body is not my work; for birth and death take place without my knowing and willing. It is the work of One who works by means of the body and its motion upon me; and on the occasion of my willing, works in like manner upon body. The Somatology of Geulinx with its explanation of body, of extension, of the three dimensions, of divisibility, etc., may be passed over here. Nor do those points in his Theology interest us in which he proceeds to show that God is the Creator of the world and the powerful mover, and that He is eternal, free, independent, and perfect. His essential position is that it is God who has united us with our body, and He is thus Lord of

life and of death, and in an inexpressible manner, He is our Father. Further, on every occasion, in a miraculous manner, He moves the body on occasion of our thoughts, and He effects the corresponding thought in us on occasion of motion in the body. The miraculous element in this process is not at all denied or concealed by Geulinx. It is no less a miracle, he says, that the tongue in my mouth vibrates when I utter the word "earth," than if the earth itself vibrated. There is, however, an expression found in Geulinx which belongs to an entirely different circle of thought. In conformity with his principle that when one does anything he must know about it, God must know and will, because He works in us, and therefore He must be a Mind. God alone is a true and real Mind, *mens simpliciter proprie et vere*, whereas created minds are only particular and limited minds, because they do not simply think and will, *non sunt mens sed mens eo usque, sed cum certo limite*. This is further explained as meaning that they are to some extent mind, *aliquid mentis*, as also particular bodies are not bodies, but are to some extent body, *aliquid corporis*. These expressions cannot but remind us of Spinoza. Again, it is said that "ideas and eternal truths, such as that two and three are five, are in the divine mind, and in ours only when we see them in God, and consequently contemplate God Himself." Such expressions remind us of Malebranche.

Nicole Malebranche (1638 – 1715),<sup>1</sup> as a priest of the Oratorium or Oratoire, endeavours to combine the philosophy of Descartes with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, and in particular with the fundamental doctrines of Augustinianism. With Malebranche the impelling thought is likewise the question regarding the possibility of knowledge. With Descartes he asserts the dualism of the thinking Substance and the extended Substance; and he maintains with Geulinx that there is no immediate relation or direct interaction between bodies and minds, but that the motion of bodies is only

<sup>1</sup> De la Recherche de la Vérité, Paris 1675, is his principal work. See also his Entretiens sur la métaphysique et la religion, Paris 1688. Cf. Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, i, 2.

an occasional cause of the activity of the mind, and that the thinking of the mind is only an occasional cause of the motion of bodies. Nevertheless there is actually presented in knowledge an effect of bodies upon the mind. Things effect nothing; in truth they are not causes, and are improperly called causes. There is in general only one real cause, namely, God. Nor can God and finite things be distinguished as primary and secondary causes merely by the degree and mode of their working. Things produce nothing, God alone produces all things. God creates bodies with rest in them at one time and motion in them at another; He creates minds with sensation as well as knowledge in them, and He creates the union of body and soul. The existence of the world as well as its continual maintenance and existence rests upon the creative activity of God; for even the preservation of the world is continuous creation. At the same time, however, Malebranche is opposed to all mixing up of God and the world. "The universe is in God." With this formula he indicates his own view, whereas the formula, "God is in the universe," is used by him to characterize the philosophy of Spinoza, which he repudiates as atheistic.

Malebranche holds that by their own nature body and mind, as independent substances, cannot act upon one another. He says even that "God can unite minds with bodies, but He cannot subject minds to bodies." The constant and exact correspondence of the modifications of bodies and minds is regulated by the general laws which God has given to His world. Nevertheless experience convinces us daily that our mental activity is dependent upon corporeal states. God can neither will nor produce this dependence; it cannot therefore be the original state established by God, but has been brought about by our free action in the fall. Even the continued existence of this dependence of the mind upon the body cannot be willed by God, and hence His action now aims only at procuring for us again that independence of the soul from the body which has been lost, or in other words, to redeem us through Christ. Religion and philosophy are there-



fore entirely one. Error, as arising from the senses and the imagination, and therefore from the inconceivable dependence of the mind upon the body, is a consequence of sin; its actual and universal existence in the present is the philosophical proof of the Augustinian dogma of original sin. Liberation from error by being raised from obscure and indistinct ideas to clear knowledge, and liberation from sin through the redemption in Christ, are the same in effect. The former is the goal of philosophy, the latter is the goal of religion.

According to Malebranche, our knowledge cannot have its foundation in ourselves. This follows at once from the general proposition that finite things are not causes; but it also follows from the other consideration, that the knowledge of God does not spring from ourselves, because finite beings cannot produce the idea of the infinite. Hence the presence of the idea of God in us is the surest proof of the existence of God. Knowledge of bodies is only possible through ideas. These ideas cannot possibly be effected by bodies, and just as little can they be produced by the soul, or be possessed in the form of a natural capacity. Nor are ideas innate, because the world of ideas is infinite while our soul is only finite. It is likewise unthinkable that God communicates to us ideas individually at the moment we require them. Knowledge is therefore only possible *in* God. This position is apprehended in the following way. We know bodies by ideas; all bodies are extended, and they are nothing but extension; and hence all ideas may be referred to the ideas of extension or to intelligible extension. This intelligible extension, viewed as the principle of the world of ideas, is the primordial idea (*idée primordiale*), and viewed as the creative ground of finite things it is the archetype of the corporeal world (*archetype des corps*). This idea of extension is at the same time contained in the universal reason; for in spite of all the diversities, all minds are identical in this, that they know or behold that idea. There is in fact only One Reason; as only an infinite reason can grasp the idea of the infinite, and as it is only under this supposition that universal validity can belong to the cognitions



of the innumerable individual men. The Universal Reason and the Intelligible Extension correspond to each other. God is the Universal Reason, and along with it He is the Intelligible Extension; and therefore He is the ground of all individual things. Our clear and distinct knowledge, in contrast to the unclear and indistinct knowledge of sense, is the knowledge which arises from universally valid thinking of reason or from ideas. These ideas are in God, and therefore we are also in God, in so far as we have ideas and know by them; or conversely, we can know things really only in God.—This relation of the finite minds to God is certainly left obscure in the System. Malebranche indicates it at one time by saying that God is the *place* of minds, as space is the place of bodies; and at another time he says that as the particular is a participation or limitation of the universal, all creatures are nothing else but imperfect *participations* of the divine Being. This is the fundamental thought of his remarkable system, when we take it in its essentials apart from his particular views regarding the universal activity of God, and the nothingness of finite things, error being a consequence of the subjection of the mind to the body arising from sin, and true knowledge being a consequence of redemption from sin or elevation to God.

### III.

#### BARUCH SPINOZA.<sup>1</sup>

The Jew Spinoza may certainly be introduced into a History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion without any justification being required for doing so. For although the direction of his thought was strongly influenced by the study

<sup>1</sup> Besides the *Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata*, etc., the principal philosophical work of Spinoza, we have also specially to consider the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, Hamburg 1670, and the *Tractatus de Deo et Homine ejusque felicitate*, etc. The following works may be referred to: Theodor Camerer, *Die Lehre des Spinoza*, 1877. Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte*, etc., *ut supra*.

of the Rabbinical philosophies,—as has been lately shown with much acuteness,—yet his exact knowledge and high appreciation of the New Testament as well as of the person of Christ, taken along with his exclusion from the Synagogue, show that his range of vision went far beyond the limits of Judaism. And as Descartes was his precursor, so we find his successors among the Christian philosophers. Yet even to-day Spinoza is still spoken of in many circles as a godless destroyer of Religion, and still, as in earlier times, Spinoza is to some but a name for the very head and front of all unbelief and all ungodliness, so that a Spinozist is even regarded as synonymous with a pantheist and an atheist. But whoever reads his writings must feel himself beneficially influenced by the breath of the deep religious spirit that permeates all his inquiries. Hence it is easy to understand how not only the kindred soul of Schleiermacher should call upon us “to sacrifice reverently a lock to the manes of the holy expelled Spinoza,” but even how his opponent Jakobi could exclaim: “Be thou blessed of me, thou great and even holy Benedictus! However thou mightest philosophize and err in words regarding the nature of the Supreme Being, His truth was in thy soul, and His love was thy life!”

The *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* already shows this religious character. In order to obtain the true and imperishable good, we must renounce the seemingly certain goods of life, including the pleasures of sense, riches, and honour. This is necessary in order to be delivered by love to God from all selfish desires, and to be purified from all love to ourselves and to finite things. For he says: “Love to an eternal and infinite Being fills the soul with a pure joy that excludes from it every kind of sorrow. Such a state is most fervently to be wished, and to be striven after with all our power.”

In proceeding to Spinoza's views regarding the Philosophy of Religion, the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* first claims our consideration. Avenarius refers the composition of it to the years 1657–61, and therefore shortly after Spinoza's exclusion from the synagogue in 1656. It is also probable, as

Bayle conjectures, that this Tractate has in part embodied the Apology in which, as we know, Spinoza protested against the condemnation of the Rabbins, and contested the right of the Jewish tribunal to deal with him. It is only thus that we can explain how the Tractate, which did not appear till 1670, frequently assumes an apologetic turn, and is specially keen in its attacks upon Judaism. And in entire accordance with this view is the assurance of the author, that he had already reflected long and long ago upon what he had written.

Spinoza himself indicates that the object of his Tractate was to oppose the mixing up of Theology and Philosophy, and to separate religion and science (*fidem a philosophia separare totius operis præcipuum intentum fuit*). The treatise is therefore at the same time an *oratio pro domo*, with the intention of showing "that faith allows every one the greatest freedom in philosophizing." The author accordingly asks the reader to give his attention above all to Chapters XIII. and XIV., and to subject them to repeated reflection, persuaded that he had not written in order to produce something new, but in order to correct what was mistaken. Between theology and philosophy there subsists no connection or relationship, for the two differ *toto cælo* in their aim and foundation. The aim of philosophy is truth; that of faith is obedience and piety. The foundation of philosophy is to be taken from nature alone, and it consists only in universal conceptions or common notions (*notiones communes*), while the foundation of faith is only to be found in history and the holy Scripture. This is the Antithesis which Spinoza opposes to the Thesis of his opponents, who hold that religion is knowledge like philosophy, religion being knowledge derived from supernatural principles; whereas philosophy is knowledge derived from natural principles, and hence they regarded religion as the highest irrefragable authority, even in questions of philosophy. In this view, however, Spinoza holds that the highest aim, the supreme practical end of religion, is not kept in sight. Here, in fact, the two again coincide, for both found our

highest happiness on love to God and communion with Him. Hence the ultimate aim of both is the highest happiness in communion of love with God. But in religion, obedience, and in philosophy, knowledge of truth, are intermediate ends; and the starting-point for religion is in history and Scripture, while that for philosophy is found in the nature of things.

If Religion is knowledge, then the Scriptures, as the main documentary source of Religion, must also contain knowledge, and their purpose must be to teach us knowledge. This view of Scripture requires to be refuted at the outset. Spinoza proceeds to show that the ultimate purpose of the whole of Scripture is to teach obedience. Hence both Testaments demand nothing but that man shall obey God with all his heart, and exemplify this obedience in love to his neighbour. This command of obedience is the sole rule of faith; it is only by it that it is possible to demand faith from all, and not merely from those who have knowledge. Now it is manifest that most of the expressions of a theoretical kind in Scripture are referred to this faith. The aim of these expressions, however, is only "to make such things understood of God as being unknown would take away obedience towards God, and which are necessarily accepted as soon as this obedience exists" (*de Deo sentire talia, quibus ignoratis tollitur erga Deum obedientia, et hac obedientia posita necessario ponuntur*). Hence several consequences necessarily follow. 1. It is not faith as such, or merely holding a thing theoretically to be true, that works salvation, but only faith on the basis of obedience, *ratione obedientiæ* (Jas. ii.; 1 John iv. 2). Hence we ought also to judge of the faith of a man according to his works. 2. The religious value of dogmas is not determined by their theoretical truth, but according as they incite a man to Obedience. The minds of men, however, are so various, that what leads one to piety excites another to laughter and contempt. Hence individual freedom must prevail, in reference to dogmas, according as the individual is led by one or other to obedience. 3. Only a few dogmas can be established about which there can be no

dispute, and which are necessary as a condition of obedience to God. They are limited to such positions as, that God, the Supreme Being, is just and merciful, and a pattern of the true life; that He is one, omnipresent and omniscient, and invested with the highest power over all things; that the right religion consists only in justice and love of our neighbour; and that the obedient are saved and all others are condemned, although to those who repent God forgives their sin.

The claim is set up that the Scriptures contain absolutely true knowledge, and accordingly that they prescribe laws to philosophy; and this claim is founded upon the assertion of an immediate divine revelation. *revelat.* Spinoza likewise asserts a revelation, for the fundamental truth of religion, that salvation depends on obedience to God, does not spring out of our own insight. Our own reflection only leads us to seek our blessedness in intellectual knowledge and the love of God that is connected with it (*intellectualis amor Dei*). This is the twofold ground which gives occasion to Spinoza entering upon a detailed discussion of Revelation. He rejects the claim maintained by his opponents, that Revelation establishes infallible truth and indubitable knowledge, and he explains that religion discloses to us a truth of which philosophy knows nothing.

The Prophets are vehicles of divine revelation. The Jewish people claimed that they alone had prophets; but this claim is unfounded, for divine revelation is found among all peoples. The election and the privilege of the Jewish people do not relate to superiority of knowledge nor to rest of soul, but only to the political commonwealth and its constitution. Our wishes are directed towards three things: *res per primas causas intelligere*; *passiones domare secure*; *et sano corpore vivere*. The first two points depend on the common human nature, and the third on the institution of the commonwealth. Hence it is only to the latter that the special pre-eminence of the elect people can refer. The common idea of election, which rejoices over one's own advantages in contrast to the disadvantages of others, is founded in the human passions of



self-love, of envy, and of malice ; and it has therefore nothing in common with piety and love to God. In truth, the election of the people referred to the external goods of fortune, and these rest upon the right ordering of the civil commonwealth. Laws are specially subservient to this end. Hence the legislation of Moses, in so far as it had no other purpose in the Ceremonial Law than to found the Jewish nation, and to form in it a peculiar and exclusive national spirit, had not a religious, but entirely a political character. On this side, accordingly, the Jewish Religion, having the founding of a national state and the external prosperity of the people in view, is far removed from the true Religion, which sees the means of blessedness in obedience to God, or in the purification of the heart from all selfishness and earthly wishes.

There are therefore Prophets as vehicles of divine revelation likewise among the heathen peoples, just as the Jewish prophets also prophesied to heathen nations. In so far as Revelation is the certain knowledge of something communicated by God to men, natural knowledge may in this sense also be called Revelation, for even our natural knowledge depends on the knowledge of God, or on the fact that our nature participates in the divine nature. It is usual, however, to apply the term Revelation only to what has been supernaturally communicated. Such communication takes place either by words or by visions, or by both words and visions ; and these words and visions are either real or they exist only in the imagination of the prophet. Revelation by real words was communicated to Moses only, who spake with God face to face as a man with his friend. Spinoza says it is probable that God created a voice by which He Himself revealed the Decalogue (*Deus aliquam vocem vere creavit, qua ipse decalogum revelavit*) ; but this is a mystery. A still higher degree of Revelation was communicated to Christ. As God revealed Himself to Moses by the voice in the air, the saving will of God was revealed to Christ without words and visions, immediately by the Spirit, so that the voice of Christ may be called God's voice ; and we are justified in



saying that the wisdom of God has assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ has become the way of salvation.—The characteristic peculiarity of the prophetic knowledge consists in the fact that it was communicated by means of the imagination (*ope imaginationis*). By what laws of nature this took place, Spinoza declares he does not know. He draws, however, several consequences from the fact. 1. The Prophets knew much that goes beyond the limits of our intellect, “for far more ideas can be formed out of words and images than merely out of the principles and conceptions on the basis of which all our natural knowledge is reared.” Unfortunately there is no further explanation or grounding of this principle given, although the recognition of it excludes any criticism of a professed revelation by our natural knowledge. 2. The Prophets knew and taught everything, “*parabolice et ænigmatice*,” and expressed everything spiritual in corporeal images. 3. The Imagination manifested itself in extremely different ways; in the case of very many not at all, and in the case of those who were favoured with it, extremely seldom. Far more important, however, is another consequence drawn by him. The certainty of our knowledge does not follow from the vividness of the Imagination (*potentia vividius imaginandi*), but from the clearness and distinctness of ideas (*clara et distincta idea*). Now, if prophecy rests upon the vividness of the imagination, the prophets themselves—and we still more—would require a reason for regarding their communications as true. In order to become certain of their revelation, the prophets needed an external authentication or a sign (*signum*). This sign might, however, deceive us; and accordingly, in order to be sure of the prophetic testimony, we require above all to be convinced of the good and just habit of mind of the prophet (*animus ad solum æquum et bonum inclinatus*); for God cannot deceive a pious man. Hence in regard to the prophets and the revelations communicated by them, we have always only moral and never mathematical certainty. Our faith is, in this case, founded only upon the twofold moral conviction, first, of the honesty of the prophet;

and, secondly, of the fact that God does not deceive the righteous man.—This sign that is required by every revelation in order to confirm it, is not to be regarded as a miracle in the usual sense, as an operation of divine power to the exclusion of natural laws. On the contrary, Spinoza proceeds to show, under reference both to principles of reason and to Scripture, that nothing happens contrary to nature, but that everything takes place according to an eternal fixed order, and that we know the existence, essential nature, and providence of God not so much from miracles, as rather from the fixed order of nature. Hence we obtain the hermeneutical principle that is to be applied to the interpretation of Scripture, namely, that we have carefully to distinguish between the actual occurrence of a fact and the form in which it is dressed up in the narrative of the writer who records it.

As the sign is given by regard to the prophet whom it serves to certify (*pro opinionibus et capacitate prophetæ*), it obtains a definite, local, and temporal, as well as individual stamp. In like manner, the revelation changes, not merely according to the peculiar character of the different prophets, but even in the case of the same prophet (*pro dispositione temperamenti corporis, imaginationis et pro ratione opinionum quas antea amplexus fuerat*). If the prophet was cheerful, victory, peace, and similar things were revealed to him; if he was melancholy, war, humiliation, and all evils were revealed to him; and thus one prophet was more adapted for one revelation and another for another. If the prophet was refined, he also caught the view of God in elegant language; if he was confused, he rendered it in a confused way. In like manner the images in which the revelation was exhibited changed. If the prophet was a shepherd, we have oxen, goats, etc.; and if he was a soldier, we have generals and armies. The prophesying itself changed; and thus the birth of Christ was revealed to the Magi by the appearance of a star rising in the east, while the devastation of Jerusalem was revealed to the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar through inspection of the entrails. If it be so, then the opinion of those

is quite false who assert that the Scriptures contain truth in all things, and even in those which do not belong to religion. The Scriptures themselves expressly say that the Prophets did not know many things. Only from this connection with the personal peculiarities and human weaknesses of the prophet, can the fact be explained that the Scriptures speak in so many places so improperly of God.

Spinoza specially emphasizes the fact that the human side in the prophetic revelation is to be largely taken into account. This he does when he proceeds to lay down principles for the Interpretation of the Scriptures. He complains that the theologians often try rather to derive their own fantastic ideas from the Scriptures, and to invest them with Divine authority, than to inquire into the true meaning of Scripture. Scriptural interpretation must necessarily be historical, for the true opinion of a writer, and even of a Biblical writer, can only be known if we know who this writer is, and when and under what circumstances, and from what intention he wrote. Quite in the spirit of a Semler, Spinoza already points out that the Biblical writings have to be explained in the spirit of their age and in the sense of their authors; that the question of their authorship must be investigated; and that exact knowledge must be obtained of the historical conditions of their origin, and the moral conditions and modes of culture prevailing among the people in question. Spinoza was thus the founder of a historico-critical investigation and interpretation of the Old Testament. He shows that the Biblical books, from the Pentateuch to the Books of Kings, do not belong to the age and the authors to which they are ascribed. It is probable that Ezra, the collector of the laws, may have composed the history of his nation, in the form we now have it, from various older historical works. In any case, the Pentateuch was not composed by Moses. Before the time of the Maccabees there was no Canon of the sacred writings; it was the Pharisees of the Second Temple who established the Canon.

Nevertheless the Scriptures are the word of God, and this

applies to the whole of Scripture. For although Spinoza puts Christ far above the Jewish prophets, he recognises no material difference between the revelation of the Old Testament and that of the New. The doctrine is the same, only the Prophets preached religion before the coming of Christ as the law of their country, and by virtue of the covenant concluded in the time of Moses; whereas the Apostles, after the appearing of Christ, preached the very same religion as a universal law, and by virtue of the sufferings of Christ. The Scriptures are the word of God; not, indeed, in the sense that God has willed to communicate to man a certain number of books, but because the authors of these books did not teach from the common natural light, but as they were "moved by the Spirit of God." In other words, they taught because they had a special and extraordinary power, and because they cultivated piety with special energy, and received the communication of God. But the Scriptures are called the word of God chiefly because they contain the true religion. The true religion is, at the same time, the highest divine Law. The divine Law relates only to the highest good. As the intellect is the better part in us, our highest good consists in its perfection. And as all our knowledge depends on knowledge of God, our highest good likewise consists in the knowledge of God. But because knowledge of what exists in nature, according to the degree of its being, includes knowledge of God, we therefore know God the more perfectly as our knowledge of natural things is more perfect; and thus does the knowledge of natural things lead to the highest good. The object of Spinoza's *Ethics* is to show the way from natural knowledge to the *intellectualis amor Dei*. The Scriptures teach us how to reach the same goal by obedience. Reason, which is in truth the light of the Spirit, without which it sees nothing but "insomnia et fragmenta," does not go so far as to determine that man can attain the highest good, or be happy by obedience or without knowledge of things. Nevertheless this fundamental dogma of religion is not contested by reason, but is recognised as unquestionable; nay,

when that truth which we cannot know by the natural light is communicated to us by revelation, we are able to use our reason so as to accept it with moral certainty. On this fact the distinction between natural and positive religion rests.

Natural Religion might be called the way that is pointed out by philosophy to reach the highest good by knowledge of truth. This is represented as a "natural law of God," and it is essential to it that it shall hold good for all men, because it is derived from the common human nature of man; and that it shall require no faith in histories, because it can be known merely from observation of human nature, so that it could have been known just as well by Adam as by any other man, whether living in solitude or in society. Histories can only be of use for the guidance of our civil life. Nor can this Natural Law require any ceremonies or actions which in themselves are indifferent, but are called good merely because of their institution, or because they typify a good that is necessary to salvation, or because their meaning goes beyond human understanding. The reward of the Divine Law is to know the law itself, which is God, and to love it with all the heart. This leads to a series of questions, two of which in particular throw more definite light upon the relation of the positive religion in the Scriptures to this natural religion. 1. What do the Scriptures teach regarding the Light of Nature and the Law of God? Spinoza seeks to prove, by a series of passages in Scripture, that the Scriptures and the Natural Light are entirely in harmony with each other. The command of God to Adam not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, already indicates that he was to do the good from love to the good, and not from fear of evil. Solomon declares quite distinctly (Prov. xvi. 22) that the intellect or knowledge is the source of the true life, and that unhappiness consists only in folly (Prov. iii. 13). It is well for the man who has found wisdom and gained knowledge. All this is in the most beautiful harmony with natural knowledge. 2. Of what use is it to know and to



believe the sacred Histories? In considerable detail, Spinoza answers this question somewhat as follows:—There are two ways of bringing men to the conviction and acceptance of things that are not clear in themselves; the one proceeds from sensible experience of what takes place in nature, and the other from axioms that are clear in themselves in the form of intellectual notions (*notiones intellectuales*). The latter way frequently requires long co-ordination of perceptions, great caution, clearness, and persistency of mind, things which are rarely enough found among men. Hence most people will rather be taught from experience. And from this it follows that whoever will communicate a doctrine to a whole nation or even to the whole human race, so as to be understood by all, must confirm it only by experience, and conform his reasons and definitions as much as possible to the intelligence of the multitude. Now as Scripture was destined at the first for a whole people, and afterwards for the whole human race, what it contained required also to be adapted to the intelligence of the multitude, and to be confirmed by experience alone. Thus does Scripture explain from experience even the purely speculative doctrines contained in it, such as that God is; that He has created and preserves all things; that He cares for men; and that He rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked. And although experience may give no clear explanation and establishment of these doctrines, yet it can teach men as much of them as is necessary to implant obedience and reverence in their hearts. Hence the knowledge of the sacred Histories, and belief in them, is absolutely necessary for the people, as their minds are not capable of attaining to clear and distinct knowledge. Hence whoever denies these histories, because he does not believe that there is a God, or that He cares for men, is godless; but any one who does not know them, and yet, in virtue of the Natural Light, knows that there is a God who cares for men, and who, at the same time, leads a correct life, is blessed; yea, he is more blessed than the people, because he has a clear and distinct notion that is above correct



opinions. And, finally, if one neither knows the holy Scripture nor knows anything by his Natural Light, although he may not be entirely godless or intractable, he is not a man, but almost a wild beast. But if the necessity of the sacred Histories is asserted, this does not mean the necessity of all the histories contained in the Bible, for that would go beyond the capacity of the people, and even of all men, to take in. It refers only to those histories which specially put the doctrines referred to into clearer light. Such narratives as those relating to the disputes of Isaac, the counsels of Ahithophel, and the civil wars between Judah and Israel, are superfluous for this purpose. The great crowd, however, from the weakness of their minds, require pastors and preachers to introduce them to the right meaning of these Histories. In short, the belief in historical narratives does not relate to the divine Law, nor does it of itself make men happy, nor is it of any use as regards the doctrine they contain. Hence if any one reads the Scriptural narratives and believes them, and yet gives no regard to their doctrine, and does not improve his life, it is all the same to him as if he had read the Koran, or the fables of poets, or common chronicles. On the other hand, if any one does not know these narratives, and yet has sound opinions and leads a correct life, he is blessed, and has in truth the spirit of Christ within him. The opposite opinion of the Jews is entirely false and also contrary to Scripture, according to which true opinions and the right conduct of life are of no advantage in regard to salvation, so long as he receives them merely from natural light and not as divine revelation.

There is a further proof adduced for this view of Scripture as a remedy for the human weakness that is not able to know the truth by the natural reason. It is founded on the fact that religion was communicated to the oldest Jews in the form of a written Law because they were then regarded as children, whereas Moses and Jeremiah foretold for the future a time in which God would write His Law in the heart.

So much then for the theological views contained in the

*Tractatus theologico-politicus.* A few words may be added regarding its political side. The object of this Tractate was to exhibit the complete separateness of theology and philosophy, or of religion and knowledge. The mixing up of these two necessarily leads to controversy, as they both lay claim to the highest authority. But controversy and wrangling endanger our external well-being, the promotion of which is the chief duty of the State. Hence the State has also an interest in preventing the conflict that arises between theology and philosophy. This conflict, indeed, is never occasioned by internal piety as a sentiment, but only by its outward practice in doctrine and worship. This latter must therefore be subjected to the command of the State; and just because God exercises no peculiar government over men, except by those who exercise external authority. Further, this holds because love to one's country and the well-being of the people is the highest rule to which everything human and divine must be subordinated. This exercise of the power of the State relates, however, only to what is external; it must allow freedom of thought and of speech.

Spinoza obtained his influence upon the future by his philosophical system. This System, presented in a preparatory sketch in his *Tractatus de Deo et homine ejusque felicitate*, was finally expounded in his *Ethica*. The far-reaching influence which this System has exercised upon later thinkers, is frequently accounted for by the strictly logical connection of its principles. And it is true that Spinoza has fulfilled the demand laid down by Descartes, but not strictly carried out by himself, that philosophical investigation must be conducted according to a mathematical method in order to give to philosophical knowledge the certainty of mathematical knowledge. Hence in the *Ethica* we find all the cumbrous mathematical apparatus of definitions, axioms, propositions, corollaries, etc., and it presents an imposing aspect to any one who imagines that the mathematical method can be transferred directly to philosophy. This conceit, however, vanishes as soon as it is seen that in geometry the definitions already

contain everything which is developed in the series of the propositions by the aid of a few axioms. Nor will it escape the critical reader of Spinoza's *Ethics*, that here, too, in the definitions and determinations that are prefixed to the whole, everything is already presupposed that is seemingly derived from them with a magnificent application of methodical auxiliaries.

He is most perfect and most happy who loves the intellectual knowledge of God above all things ; and it is the task of the *Ethics* to lay down the means of attaining to this end. The main thoughts of the *Ethics* are summarised in the following three propositions: (1) That we have the knowledge of God only through the knowledge of things, leads to the immanence-relation of God to the World ; (2) That the *cognitio intellectualis* is the highest stage of knowledge, points to the three stages of knowledge as *opinio*, *ratio*, *cognitio intuitiva* ; (3) That the *cognitio intellectualis* goes along with the *amor Dei*, shows us the close connection of knowledge and the will. Spinoza also stops on the ground of dogmatism ; he gives no criticism of our faculty of knowledge ; and just as little does he give a psychological explanation of the religious process. Of chief importance, however, especially on account of their later influences, are his Definitions of the conception of God and His relation to the world.

The application of the mathematical method already indicates the peculiar character of the Spinozistic System. In mathematics every proposition follows from a former proposition, and all the deductions go back in an ultimate line to a series of fundamental truths, definitions, and axioms. To this there corresponds, in actual reality, the relation of cause and effect ; and hence all things must be the effects of an ultimate cause which is the cause both of itself and of all things. In the relation of the many things to each other and to the first cause, final ends find no place, but there are merely Efficient Causes. Nor is there any Freedom in the sense of " being able also to be otherwise," but there is only necessity, which, however, is designated freedom in distinction to external compulsion as a merely internal compulsion from one's own

nature. The notion of the Efficient Cause is the predominant one in Spinoza's System. Hence God is determined as First Cause (*causa prima*), and the relation of God to the world as that of cause to effect, or of the *natura naturans* to the *natura naturata*. The full contents of these formulæ are only disclosed after the explanation of Substance, Attribute, and Mode.

"By Substance I understand that which is existent in itself and is conceived by itself; that is, it is that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it is to be formed."<sup>1</sup> As an effect can always only be conceived from its cause, the latter definition implies that Substance cannot be the effect of any Cause, or be produced by any other thing. This position may be otherwise expressed as follows. All that is has its being either in itself or in another, that is, it is either Substance or the affection of a Substance or a Mode. For "by *Modus* I understand the affection of a Substance, or that which has being and is conceived in another."<sup>2</sup> Now Substance is earlier than its modes; and hence a Substance cannot be produced by a mode, but at most by another substance. This, however, is also impossible; for things that have nothing in common with one another cannot be one the cause of the other. But two or more Substances can have nothing in common with each other, for they have either the same attributes or different attributes; and in the former case they are only one substance; while in the latter they have nothing in common with one another. "By Attribute I understand that which the intellect apprehends of Substance as constituting its Essence."<sup>3</sup> From this the same consequence follows, namely, that a Substance cannot be produced by any other thing. In other words, Substance is *causa sui*; for "by *cause*

<sup>1</sup> ["Per Substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat."]

<sup>2</sup> ["Per Modum, intelligo substantiæ affectiones sive id, quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur."]

<sup>3</sup> ["Per Attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens."]

*of itself*, I understand that whose Essence includes existence in itself, or whose nature cannot be thought otherwise than as existing." Hence "Existence belongs to the Nature of Substance;" and on this account Substance is eternal. For "by Eternity I understand existence itself, so far as it is known as following from the definition of the eternal thing alone by necessity." Spinoza expressly guards himself from holding the view that this eternal existence can be explained by duration or time. The same Definitions imply that Substance is free. For "that thing is called free which consists solely from the necessity of its nature, and is determined of itself alone to action; that is called necessary or rather compelled, which is determined to existence and action by another according to a certain and determinate reason."<sup>1</sup> All activity of Substance rests not upon external compulsion as the influence of external things, but upon the inherent immanent power and efficiency of the substance itself.

All that has been hitherto said of Substance likewise holds of God; for God falls under the conception of Substance, or as it is otherwise put, as it is asserted that "every Substance is necessarily infinite," it follows that there can be only one Substance, and therefore God Himself is the One Substance. Spinoza's definition of God is as follows: "By God I understand the absolutely infinite Being; that is, a Substance that consists of innumerable attributes, every one of which is the expression of an eternal and infinite Essence."<sup>2</sup> The conception of "the absolutely infinite" (absolute infinitum) is opposed to that of "the infinite in its kind" (in suo genere infinitum). This holds of those things which cannot be limited by things of the same kind, but only by things of another kind. For example, an infinite body cannot be limited by another body, but it may be limited by thinking.

<sup>1</sup> ["Ea res libera dicetur, quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem, vel potius coacta, quæ ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione."]

<sup>2</sup> ["Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit."]



The former expression applies to that whose Essence excludes all negation, and which rather contains in itself all that expresses being. It is implied that God is the sole Substance in this absolute or perfect Infinity; and hence "besides God there can neither be another Substance, nor can another Substance than God be thought."

God is the One Substance; and hence He exists of necessity. This follows at once from the conception of Substance as *causa sui*; and this *à priori* or Ontological Argument for the existence of God is undoubtedly the most important element of the kind in the whole connection of the Spinozistic thinking. Some further explanations, however, are added to it, such as the following. Everything must have a reason for its existence as well as for its non-existence; and a thing exists as soon as there is no sufficient reason for its non-existence. This reason lies either in the thing or out of it. God therefore also exists, unless there is given in His nature or out of it a reason why He does not exist. The latter position would assume a Substance which had nothing in common with God, and yet occasioned His existence; the former would put a contradiction into God, the absolutely infinite and most perfect being. Both alternatives are absurd, and therefore God must exist. The possibility of not existing constitutes a want of perfection, whereas the possibility of existing is a perfection; and hence either nothing at all necessarily exists, or the absolutely infinite Essence or God does so exist. More closely regarded, these arguments are also founded solely on the position that God is Substance, and that existence necessarily belongs to the nature of Substance, and consequently to the conception of God.

God is Substance, and therefore He is *causa sui*. Nay more, God is the only Substance. But nothing exists except Substances and their affections; or to leave the more precise relation of the modi to the substance out of account, it may be said that nothing exists but Substances and their Effects. God is therefore the cause of all things, or the absolutely



First Cause (absolute *causa prima*). All things are Effects of God. With regard to the mode of the action of Substance, it has been already determined that it acts freely, that is, according to the inherent laws of its internal nature, and not as compelled by external things. The same holds true of God. "God acts only according to the laws of His own nature, and He is compelled by no one." "There is no cause which impels God to action, from without or from within, except the perfection of His own nature." "God alone is a free cause, for He alone exists merely in virtue of the necessity of His nature, and He acts merely in virtue of the same." Some call God a free cause, because He can act so that something that is in His power shall not happen; but this is just the same as if we were to assert that God can act so that it shall not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Just as absurd is the assertion that God's intellect reaches farther than His power, and that He has in reality created only a portion of what He could have created. "I believe I have distinctly shown that from the supreme power of God, or from His infinite nature, that which is infinite has flowed (*effluxisse*) in an infinite manner, and all by necessity; or that it always follows (*sequi*) with the same necessity and entirely the same way, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, and from eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Hence God's omnipotence has been active from eternity, and will continue to be active to eternity." (*Quare Dei omnipotentia actu ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum in eadem actualitate manebit.*)

The "Freedom" of God is thus opposed not merely to the compulsion of external influence, but equally so to irrational arbitrariness of mere liking or good pleasure. Arbitrary will can at most occur where there is a mode of action in accordance with ends combined with self-consciousness and free-will. But according to Spinoza, nature has no end set before it, and all final causes are nothing but figments of the human brain. In like manner, neither intellect nor will pertains to God.

(Ostendam, ad Dei naturam neque intellectum neque voluntatem pertinere.) The will is not a free, but a necessary or compelled cause, because it is continually determined by an idea out of itself. Hence neither will nor understanding belongs to the nature of God; they are related to it in the same way as rest and motion are; they are related to it as is everything natural that follows from the necessity of the divine nature, and is determined by it in a certain way to its existence and action. It is therefore entirely erroneous to think of God's nature according to the analogy of human nature. Those who imagine that God consists of body and spirit like men, are not only far from the true knowledge of God, but it is altogether an error to represent God as if He were subject to human passions. "Hence, philosophically taken, it cannot be said that God desires anything whatever from any one whomsoever, or that anything is repugnant or disagreeable to Him; for all these are human qualities, which have no place in the essence of God." Nay more, although we were to ascribe understanding and will to God according to the human analogy, it would still always have to be considered that in spite of the same names, there must exist between the divine and human faculties such a difference as would exclude all agreement, "and so they are as distinct from one another as the dog which is a constellation in the sky, and the dog which is a barking beast." In fact, while our understanding comes later in relation to things, God's understanding is in truth the cause of things, and is the cause of their essence as well as of their existence, "which appears to have been correctly observed by those who assert that understanding, will, and power are one and the same in God." The understanding forms purposes and represents them, and the will acts in accordance with purposes; but God has neither understanding nor will, and therefore He cannot possibly act according to purposes or final ends.

God is therefore the cause of things. He is not, however, an external cause working according to ends set before Himself, but He is the internal cause from which things

necessarily follow, according to the eternal laws of their nature. "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens." "As regards God and nature, I entertain an entirely different opinion concerning them from that which the Christians of the modern stamp are wont to maintain at the present day. I assert, in fact, that God is the indwelling cause of all things, and not the external cause of them." Hence it is likewise said of things, not merely that they cannot either exist or be known without God, but that they are in God (*quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest*).—God is therefore nothing else than the ultimate ground of all things, the eternal, infinite, uninterrupted, active power of nature, from which all that exists proceeds with unalterable necessity, and in which all that exists is contained. Hence His activity is inseparable from His existence, and God and nature are thus often regarded as synonymous. "*Æternum illud et infinitum Ens, quod Deum seu naturam appellamus, eadem qua existit necessitate agit*." The essence of God is identical with His power. His power is nothing but His acting power, or the immanent cause of things; and this cause of natural things is nothing but nature in action; and hence God is the same as nature (*Deus sive natura*). Cause and effect are essentially identical; and therefore the acting (efficient) cause and the effected things, or God and the world, are essentially identical. They are both in fact *natura*, only with the difference that God is *natura naturans*, and the world is *natura naturata*.

Another consequence follows as to Spinoza's conception of God. God is the absolutely infinite Being. This conception at once implies that this Being has numberless attributes. Taking now as valid the proposition that "the more reality or being a thing has, so many more are the attributes that pertain to it," and converting it and applying it to God, it follows that God is the infinite Being; that is, He combines all reality in Himself, or, as the latter terminology puts it, He is the most real Being (*Ens realissimum*).—A further consequence immediately arises in the following way. Every

determination of a thing is a limitation of it. A determination of a thing distinguishes it from another, and shows, not what this thing is, but what it is not. "Omnis determinatio est negatio. Determinatio ad rem juxta suum esse non pertinet, sed e contra est ejus nonesse." God includes all reality in Himself, there is no being which is not in God, and hence there is no determination of God, but as absolutely infinite Being He is necessarily also absolutely undetermined. "If the nature of God does not actually consist in this or that kind of being, but in a Substance which is absolutely undetermined, His nature also demands all the predicates which perfectly express being, because this nature would otherwise be limited and defective." Just because God includes all kinds of being in Himself, He cannot be conceived and named according to an individual determinate kind of being.

In order to represent more exactly the relation of God to the world as it is given in Spinoza's system, we must enter more minutely upon his definitions regarding "Attribute" and "Mode" in their relation to "Substance." There is nothing but substance and its modes. The one substance is God, and all individual finite things are modes; and between the two stand the Attributes. An Attribute is what the understanding knows of the substance as constituting its essence. Now God appears as the absolutely infinite Essence, because He "consists of infinitely many attributes of which each one expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." Every attribute thus expresses eternal and infinite essentiality; and therefore it is also said that "every attribute of a substance must be conceived by itself." The former infinity, however, is carefully to be distinguished from that of the substance; the former is merely *suo genere*, the latter is *absolute*. Hence it is not so absurd as at first sight it appears "to attribute to a substance several attributes;" indeed, there is nothing clearer in nature than that everything must be known under some attribute; and the more reality or being it has, so much the more attributes has it which express necessity or eternity as well as infinity. The Attributes are therefore the several powers

working in the substance distinguished really from one another, subsisting of themselves, entirely independent of each other, original and eternal. The difficulties, then, do not exist for Spinoza at all which mislead his interpreters even now into the rashest explanations, namely, as to how the one indivisible Substance can unite in itself innumerable many original powers that are reciprocally and qualitatively different from each other, and therefore exclude each other; and as to how the Attribute can be conceived by itself without thereby itself becoming the Substance.

In God there are infinitely many Attributes; but we have experience in particular only of two: Thinking and Extension. It is only of these two that we have knowledge; for, in our own nature, there work only two powers, the capacity out of which ideas arise, and that out of which bodies arise, or Thinking and Extension. Hence, "Thinking is an Attribute of God, or God is a thinking Being," and "Extension is an Attribute of God, or God is an extended Being." In this connection Spinoza says not a word about the difficulty which inevitably presses itself upon us, that Substance is represented as having numberless attributes, and yet there are only two taken into account. Do these two Attributes include the others? This would negative the independence of the Attributes. Are these only the two that are active in man? This would be contrary to the view that all the Attributes are active in everything. X

The Attributes are entirely independent as regards each other. There is no transition from the one to the other, nor any reciprocal interpenetration, nor even any reciprocal interaction. "The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine the body to rest or motion or anything else (if there be anything else)." "The special existence of ideas has God as their cause, in so far as He is regarded merely as a thinking Being, and not in so far as He gives Himself His expression in another attribute; that is, the ideas of the attributes of God as well as of individual things have not the objects which form



their contents or the things perceived as their efficient cause, but God Himself in so far as He is a thinking Being." But because the two Attributes are attributes of one and the same Substance, or because thinking substance and extended substance are not two but only one, there is no thinking without extension, and no extension without thinking. Everything as an effect of the one Substance rather participates in both attributes, and is at once Thought-being and Extended-being, or at the same time soul and body. Hence there follows also the parallelism of the two sides. The world of bodies and the world of ideas are both founded in the acting power of the one substance; and hence the world of ideas is the completely faithful image of the world of bodies, and the world of bodies is fashioned throughout exactly as it is apprehended in the ideas.

The Substance with its attributes is God, or efficient Nature. The World or effected Nature falls under the conception of "modus." "By *modus* I understand affections of the Substance, or that which is in another and by means of which it is conceived." Instead of "affection," he also uses the terms "modification" and "accident." The Modes have therefore their being not in themselves but in another, that is, in the substance or in God; and particularly in such a way that their being is contained and included in the being and essence of the Substance, so that in the "modi" the essence of the substance enters into existence in a special way. The Modes are therefore the determinate, finite forms of the existence of the one comprehending, all-effecting power, and hence it is said that things are distinguished from one another not *realiter*, but only *modaliter*. The "Modi" thus arise from the divine causality. God is the cause of things, and not the distant cause, but the efficient cause; things are effects of God, and special representations of His essence. On the other side, the "modi" are finite things, and therefore are always dependent on one another, although everything is only dependent on those things that are homogeneous with it; that is, they are subject to necessity as an external compul-



sion. On the former side, they are grounded in God, and are eternal; on the latter side, they are grounded in the external connection of things, and are finite. Both sides are united in every individual thing; eternity constitutes its conception or essence (*essentia*), finity constitutes its limited existence (*existentia*). The essences of things are eternal truths; but eternal truths do not exist for Spinoza in the human spirit merely, but are distinguished even in this from propositions, such as, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that they exist *realiter*. Finity, on the other hand, consists in the partial negation of the existence of a nature, or in the limitation of one thing by things of the same nature; it is founded in the universal course of nature and its causal nexus. Every finite thing is thus grounded, on the one hand, in the causality of the divine essence, which is in all things as the one Substance; and, on the other, in the causality of finite things. The former constitutes its eternal essence; the latter its finite existence, or its limitedness, quantitatively as having a beginning and end in time, as well as qualitatively in its passivity. The two together, the eternal essentiality and the finite limitedness, do not exclude each other, but actually coincide with one another in the unity of the actually existing finite things; and this has its ground in the fact that the natural causal nexus of finite things is also grounded in God, and thus both causalities, although in a different way, go back to God. But Spinoza does not spend a word on the difficulty as to how the one Substance can work in such a different way, and how this double causality constantly leads to a single result. "Things are conceived by us as real in two ways, according as we conceive them as existing in relation to a definite time and a definite place, and according as we conceive them as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things which are conceived in this latter way as true or real, are conceived by us under the form of eternity, and the ideas of them include the eternal and infinite essence of God in themselves."

Of Spinoza's further views, only those are of importance to

us here which refer to the goal of philosophy as the happiness of man in the intellectual love of God (*amor intellectualis Dei*). In every individual thing there is included an eternal *modus* as its essence; the finiteness of the individual thing consists in the fact that this eternal *modus* is partially limited by external causes, and is prevented from fully unfolding itself. This principle also applies to man, and upon it ultimately rests the goal which Spinoza sets up in his theory of knowledge as well as in his Ethics. The goal of the human mind is that it has to work itself out of its limitation in finiteness to the complete unfolding and the pure existence of its eternal Essence, and that it has to mount up from imperfection and want of reality to more reality and perfection.

Our knowledge rests upon ideas of the affections of bodies, by which the mind perceives the affected as well as the affecting body. A distinction is to be made in everything between its essence and its existence, or between its being grounded in God and its being grounded in the connection of finite things. Ideas refer to both of these relations, and this is the basis of the distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas. Inadequate knowledge is sensible perception (*opinio* or *imaginatio*). Adequate knowledge is partly rational knowledge (*ratio*), which refers to what is common in things and apprehends them as necessary effects of the divine attributes under the form of eternity, and partly intuitive knowledge (*cognitio intuitiva*), which regards the essence of every individual thing in all its features and properties as grounded by eternal necessity in the essence of God, and which therefore contemplates it under the form of eternity. This is the highest stage of knowledge, and upon it rests the immortality of the human mind. The imagination ceases with the existence of the body; "for it is only during the existence of its body that the mind expresses the actual existence of its body, and conceives the affections of its body as existing in reality." Yet "the human mind cannot be completely destroyed with its body, but there remains something of it after, which is eternal." This eternal something is the idea

which expresses the essence of the human body under the form of eternity. The mind is thus only partly immortal; "the eternal part of the mind is the understanding; and that part of it which perishes, as we have shown, is the imagination." Hence "the more things the mind understands by means of knowledge of the second and third stage, so much the greater a part of it remains after the destruction of the body and is not affected thereby." The mind which continues to endure, is therefore no longer the same individual thing that it was during the existence of the body; and the minds that continue to exist, can only be distinguished from each other by the amount of adequate knowledge they have appropriated. Nevertheless, Spinoza assigns to them personal self-consciousness; for the stronger any one is in knowledge of the third stage, so much the better conscious is he of himself and of God.

According to Spinoza, "*intellectus et voluntas unum et idem sunt*," that is, knowledge and will are inseparably united with each other; and hence the ethical life must necessarily develop itself in exact parallelism to the intellectual life. To inadequate knowledge corresponds the dominion of the impure passions; to adequate knowledge there corresponds the control of these passions by the pure self-activity of the mind. Out of the intuitive knowledge there is developed, in the ethical sphere, the intellectual love of God. This love rests on the fact that man rejoices when he contemplates himself and his active power, and that he knows God as the ground of this power and the joy connected with it, and accordingly loves God as the cause of this joy. "From the third stage of knowledge there arises, of necessity, a rational love of God (*amor Dei intellectualis*); for from the knowledge of this stage there arises joy accompanied with the idea of God as its cause; and this is love to God, not in that we imagine Him as present, but in that we rationally conceive the eternal being of God, and it is this which I call rational love of God." This love is eternal, as is the knowledge from which it flows. It may attach itself to all ideas

and to all the affections of the body ; it is identical with the love with which God loves Himself and men ; it is the foundation of the continued striving after perfection. This love is at the same time the highest good of man ; it is true blessedness, and therefore the ultimate goal of our striving. " Our happiness, or our blessedness and freedom, consists in constant and eternal love to God ; and this love or this blessedness is called in the holy Scriptures a glory, and not unjustly so, for it is the true satisfaction of the soul and the highest triumph of the mind." " This love is a part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself. For this love is an activity by means of which the mind contemplates itself and at the same time knows God as the cause of the mind ; it is therefore an activity by means of which, in so far as He gives Himself expression in the human mind, God contemplates Himself, and at the same time beholds Himself as the Cause of Himself."

#### IV.

##### OPPONENTS AND ADHERENTS OF SPINOZA.

The views of Spinoza, especially regarding religion, lay so far from the modes of thought of his time that they could not but excite the most violent antagonism.<sup>1</sup> And it is intelligible, although it is also lamentable in the highest degree, that a correct understanding of his doctrines rarely preceded this opposition. The first assaults were directed against the early *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. Already in 1670, Fredericus Rappoltus, Professor of Theology at Leipsic, in his *Oratio contra naturalistas*, reckoned Spinoza among the deniers of God. Van Blyenburg, in his treatise *De veritate religionis Christianæ* (Amstel. 1674), objects to Spinoza that he even

<sup>1</sup> On the History of Spinozism, see Antoninus van der Linde, *Spinoza, seine Lehre und deren erste Nachwirkungen in Holland*, Göttingen 1862 ; and P. W. Schmidt, *Spinoza und Schleiermacher*, Berlin 1868.

subjects God to necessity, and thus makes Him completely impotent. This objection was met by Cuffelarius in the only apology of that age for Spinoza's views. In his *Specimen artis ratiocinandi*, etc. (Hamburg 1684), it is urged that, according to Spinoza, necessity does not mean the dependence on external things, but the state of being conditioned only by the internal essence of the being in question, and therefore that the necessity attributed to God does not detract from His perfection and power. J. Musæus, in his dissertation entitled *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, etc. (Jenæ 1674), begins with some bitter invectives against the inexpressibly bold man who sees in free philosophical inquiry a remedy for the controversies of theologians, and who even dares to doubt of the divine inspiration of the prophets and apostles. He then proceeds to a fundamental refutation. With far more candour than the men already referred to, he transports himself into the peculiar circle of thought of his opponent, and although his exegetical proof is somewhat weak, and his explanation of natural right and sovereign authority is not always tenable, it deserves attention that he places religion in the inner life of the soul: yet not merely in obedience, but essentially in its proper kind of knowledge. He specially objects to Spinoza that he had left the most important part of Christianity out of account, namely, the reconciliation with God by the atonement. Musæus characterizes his own standpoint by the way in which he defines faith, not as "sentire de Deo," but as "Assentiri propter divinam revelationem."—In point of fact, the polemical writings directed at that time against Spinoza are not worthy of much consideration. The tone in which it was customary to speak of him in learned circles, is shown especially by Chr. Kortholt, who in his *De tribus impostoribus magnis liber* (Kiloni 1680) accused him of completely identifying God with the universe, and putting God as regards finite things into the relation of a whole to its parts; and he reckons Spinoza along with the two other arch-impostors, Herbert and Hobbes, among the most shameless enemies of religion. When the *Ethica* appeared, the philo-

sophers, and especially the strict followers of Descartes,<sup>1</sup> likewise set themselves in opposition to the new philosophy. They take their starting-point from the substantiality of the individual subject or personal ego, which appeared to them to be too much endangered by Spinoza's doctrine of the "all-unity," and this at least indicates their interest. The number of these polemical writings became so great that Jänichen published a special *Catalogus Scriptorum anti-Spinozianorum*.

If these Opponents were not capable of refuting Spinoza's philosophy, neither, on the other hand, were its Adherents competent to obtain for it a more general acceptance. The principles of a historico-critical investigation of the Bible, laid down in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, first exerted an influence upon theology, although it is still undecided as to whether the pioneer work of Richard Simon (1638-1712)<sup>2</sup> in this direction was directly determined by it. The theologians were thus already roused into anxiety lest Spinozism should overthrow religion. And this anxiety could not but be strengthened by the way in which the adherents of the new philosophy, instead of working for its further scientific development, brought some of its positions like a new gospel to the knowledge of the people, a gospel which had certainly hardly anything in common with that of Christ. This antagonism to the prevailing contemporary theological modes of thought was the reason that "Spinozist" came to be regarded as a term of reproach, and synonymous with atheist, naturalist, and similar terms. It is owing to the attitude thus taken up that a just estimate and a scientific appreciation of Spinoza's thoughts only date from the efforts of Jakobi and Lessing.

In Holland, Jacob Verschoor († 1700)<sup>3</sup> of Flushing, after having been refused entrance into the office of the ministry,

<sup>1</sup> We may name two of them, Velthuysen and Wittich (Lambert Velthuysen, *Tractatus de cultu naturali et origine moralitatis*, etc., Roterod. 1680; Christoph Wittich, *Anti-Spinoza*, Amst. 1680).

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament*, Paris 1680.

<sup>3</sup> Compare H. Heppe, *Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der reformirten Kirche*, p. 375 ff., 1879.



gathered a number of adherents around him from 1680. His main doctrines are as follow. All that happens takes place according to unalterable fate and by necessity. God Himself is not free, for His will is necessarily determined by the nature of His essence. There is no distinction between good and evil: and hence man is not obliged to improve his mode of conduct. God is not angry at sin, because His honour is not violated by it. Hence Christ by His death has not made satisfaction to the justice of God, but only shown that God willingly forgives sin. After Christ's death, those ordained to blessedness no longer commit sins of their own; but any one who believes that he has sinned shows only his unbelief thereby. The true belief and the true conversion consist in the man who believes he is a sinner returning from this conceit, attaining an immoveable confidence in the forgiveness of sin that is guaranteed since Christ's death, and consequently being comforted with the sense of his salvation.—In Germany, Matthias Knutzen,<sup>1</sup> the head of the sect called "the Consciencers" (Gewissener), appears unquestionably to have followed the principles of Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. Born at Oldensworth in 1646, where he early lost his parents and was then brought to an uncle in Königsberg, from whom he ran away twice, Knutzen continued for a time to lead the adventurous life of a wandering scholar. We find him at one time acting as a tutor, at another prosecuting his studies at a university, and again roaming aimlessly about and begging for the means of support, but everywhere raising subtle questions regarding philosophy and theology. When he made his occasional attempts at preaching the means of violently attacking the worldly disposition, ambition, and greed of the preachers of the time, the authorities made

<sup>1</sup> Compare Johann Musæus, Ableinung der ausgesprengten abscheulichen Verläumdung, als wäre in der fürst. Sächs. Residentz und gesammte Universität Jena eine neue Sekte der sogenannten Gewissener entstanden, etc., Jena 1674. Knutzen's *Chartaquen* are appended to the second edition (1. Gespräch zwischen einem Gastwirth und dreien ungleichen Religionsgästen zu Altona; 2. Gespräch zwischen einem Feldprediger, Namens Dr. Heinrich Brummer und einem Musterschreiber; 3. Ein lateinischer Brief).

inquiry into the origin of his title as master and licentiate. Knutzen escaped by flight from the discovery of his deception, and in the autumn of 1674 he came to Jena, where he circulated several tractates, after which his sect, called "*the Consciencers*," numbered adherents in all the great cities, there being seven hundred in Jena alone. Knutzen afterwards appeared in Altdorf, and later again in Jena, and thereafter he disappeared without leaving a trace of himself behind.

Knutzen's doctrine, however, is not to be regarded as much more than a freak; it is of some importance as an opposition to the rigid orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, but insufficient as a starting-point for any vital reform. He represents the Bible as being wrongly referred to divine inspiration, for it contains the greatest contradictions (*e.g.* 1 Kings vii. 26 and 2 Chron. iv. 5). In respect of its form, it is wholly confused and without order, having neither grace nor colour in its expression, while assertions that are quite silly may be proved from it, *e.g.* that there are dragons and four-footed beasts in heaven. In short, the ambiguity and indefiniteness of the expressions of the Bible show that this book cannot possibly be regarded as a source of higher knowledge and of correct moral principles. Hence to us who are "conscience-sure," the knowledge, not of one, but of many is available; this is common science or conscience (*scientia, conscientia, conjunctim accepta*). This conscience, which the good mother has implanted equally in all, is, says Knutzen, our Bible; and with us it takes the place both of the secular government and the clergy. If we have done evil, it is more to us than a thousand tortures, whereas it is heaven when we have done good. From it follows the supreme principle of the sect: Live justly and honestly, and give every one his due. Hence there follow these further consequences: (1) There is no God; (2) there is no devil, for according to Luke viii. 33 the devil has been drowned; (3) governments and preachers are useless, and must be got rid of, for Conscience is the only legislative and judicial power; (4) marriage is not a morally necessary institution, and there is no difference between

marriage and fornication; (5) there is only this earthly life; with death all is past.

Among the extremest Spinozists is commonly reckoned Friederich Wilhelm Stosch or Stossius. His *Concordia rationis et fidei sive Harmonia philosophiæ moralis et religionis Christianæ* (Amstelodami 1691) gave great offence, and was suppressed by the employment of harsh measures. The offence is easily understood. It is not only declared that all that is taught in the Scriptures, as in the history of angels and demons, is to be regarded as dreams and visions, phantasies and morbid conditions, inventions and deceptions. It is openly declared that the soul is not a separate substance, but only consists of a peculiar fermentation of the blood and of the secretions, and that the thinking mind consists in the brain and its organs, which are variously modified by the inflow and circulation of a fine matter. The distinction between good and evil appears as a merely relative one, and at the most it is conformed to the utility of man. The supposed freedom is mere deception, and the assumption of a future life is entirely groundless. The Christian religion only prescribes the law of nature.—These expressions do not show a very close connection with Spinoza, and this is even less so in regard to the conception of God that is set up. God is indeed represented as *unica et sola substantia*, and as *infinitum, cogitans, et extensum*; yet He commonly appears as the creator and first mover of the world. Nevertheless, numerous references point to the influence of Spinoza, and reference to the work is accordingly in place here.

Johann Christian Edelmann (1698–1767)<sup>1</sup> was an enthusiastic adherent of Spinozism, in decided opposition to the

<sup>1</sup> With regard to the development of Edelmann we refer to his *Autobiography*, edited by C. R. W. Close (Berlin 1849), and to his *Unschuldige Wahrheiten* (after 1735). For a knowledge of the last phase of his doctrines, the following works require to be considered: *Moses mit aufgedecktem Angesichte, von zwei ungleichen Brüdern, Lichtlieb und Blindling beschauet*, etc., 1740; *Abgenöthigtes, jedoch Anderen nicht wieder aufgenöthigtes Glaubensbekenntniss*, 1746. Cf. also Pratje, *Historische Nachrichten von Joh. Chr. Edelmann's Leben, Schriften und Lehrbegriff*, 2 Auf. Hamburg 1755. Bruno Bauer, *Einfluss des Englischen Quäkerthums auf die deutsche Cultur und auf das englisch-russische Projekt einer Weltkirche*, Berlin 1878.

then generally accepted Leibniz - Wolffian philosophy. But he was too obscure and confused to exercise a permanent influence, and the age was so averse to such views that Edelmann was compelled to move restlessly from one place to another in search of protection and a safe residence. The sale of his *Moses*, which was planned for twelve "views," was prohibited, after the appearance of the first three, by the imperial fiscal, and his writings were burned by the public executioner in Hamburg and other places. Trained in Jena, especially under the theologian Buddeus, who was a bitter opponent of Wolff, Edelmann was at first filled with a "just aversion for the so-called orthodoxy" by Arnold's *Impartial History of the Church and of Heretics*, and was inclined "the longer the more to the side of the Pietists." After a closer connection with Zinzendorf had broken down, and the zealous reading of the writings of Dippel had carried him further in the views of the Pietists, Edelmann went, in 1736, to Berleburg, where he laboured on the Berleburg translation of the Bible, and found protection for several years. But the English Deists always gained more influence upon his mode of thinking, and the more that Pietism degenerated into fanaticism and effeminate sentimentalism. In consequence, Edelmann withdrew himself the more from it, especially after his meeting with the celebrated new prophet, Johann Friederich Rock, in 1737. He then wrote against his former associates a tractate with the title, "Blows upon the fools' back," etc.

He had stumbled accidentally on the proposition of Spinoza, "*Deum essentiam rerum immanentem, non transeuntem statuo*," that is, God is the essence of things in such a way that He is permanently in the most inward presence with them, and is not absent or separated from them. To Edelmann this proposition appeared so conformable to the majesty of God, that he could not conceive how Spinoza could be regarded as an atheist, and he became desirous to know his writings more exactly. On the 24th June 1740, he obtained the wished-for books, and turned himself at once to the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. On the 1st November 1740, he already

wrote the preface to the first part of his *Moses with unveiled face*. This title indicates the unprejudiced examination of the Scriptures, for "to lift the curtain drawn by Moses" means to take away from revelation its unfounded authority. Thus Edelmann says: "I propose to peep under the veil of this famous leader of the Jews, and to give twelve views in succession somewhat more exactly than has been hitherto done." The first "view" or section was to show that we have in our time as little remaining of the true writings of Moses as we have of his natural dead body. With skill and some knowledge of the subject, he proceeds to show that the Bible itself tells of lost parts and narratives, and that Ezra had made an entirely new Bible. But from the fact that the Bible is not unmutilated, it is not to be inferred that the truths it contains are not inspired by God. All truth is inspired by God, whether it stands in Ovid or the Bible; for there is only one Spirit of truth, who communicates of His gifts to every one. "On the other hand, Master Stockfinster (Block-window) and his official brethren pretend that the Holy Spirit has dictated all the words of Scripture to the pens of the Biblical scribes, as the schoolmaster at Rumpelskirchen does to the peasant lads whom he is training to be learned Jackanapes, so that, under fear of punishment, they could not have written a single false word in the Bible; but such men must know little of the spirit of the living God, and they ought therefore to be justly ashamed of lying so shamelessly before people who are better acquainted with this great Being," etc. The word of the living God is not without us, but is nigh to us in our mouth and heart. In so far as the Bible contains truths, it is a token that the spirit of the living God has formerly spoken to men, but it is only fit for fools and unthinking beasts to suppose that it has now crept out of us into the dead letter. What does not run counter to the perfection of God and the nature of things, is truth. It is similar with the Creeds. "The Bible is a collection of old writings, the authors of which have written according to the measure of their knowledge of God and of divine things;" and hence it is neither the only nor the chief



source of our knowledge of God; for the God who entered in earlier times into such confidential intercourse with men, and who wills that all come to the knowledge of the truth, cannot possibly speak to us merely through foreign and entirely unknown languages, or through a multitude of ignorant and divided interpreters. Rather does God speak so distinctly in the conscience of all, that we can know quite infallibly, at all times and in all places, whether we do right or wrong.

The second "view" presents the doctrine of God and His relation to the world. It is entirely the doctrine of Spinoza which Edelmann expresses here and elsewhere; and he also takes up the writings of his spiritual associate Knutzen. He cannot understand how Spinoza can have been stamped as an atheist. "For he expressly makes God the cause of all things, not in the way that an artist produces a work and then afterwards goes away from it and leaves it to the management of others; but, as he distinctly confesses, God has produced His works in such a way that He continues always essentially present in all things, and by His very existence causes it to be that they are what they are. Wherefore Spinoza rightly calls God the being and essence of all things, and our present godless and stupid Christianity could not have better betrayed itself than by its representatives agreeing to make this man an atheist." "We are the brooks, God is the spring. We are the rays, He is the sun. We are the shadows, He is the substance." As the sun, by the effusion of its rays, makes the day, but the day could not be without the existence of the sun; so does the permanent life of our God make creatures without intermission, but so that they could not continue without His enduring essence and existence. Yet just as the sun and the day are different, so are God and the creature.—"Matter is nothing but the shadow of the great Substance of our God." But as the substance of the shadow continually emanates from the being and substance of the body without our yet being made into what is thus but shadowy, so God does not become a material thing by the fact that the substance of matter continually streams and emanates



from His incomparable essence.—God is the all, yet not as that which is subject to inconstancy and transitoriness; He is that which gives and maintains the being and essence of all things. As no one denies that something exists, there are no atheists. God has understanding and will, but only in so far as these are found in the creature. God and the world are eternally identical. The creatures are modifications of God, and in particular the soul is a ray from God and is therefore immortal with Him. There are no supernatural things or miracles, otherwise we would have to assume, either that there is another being besides God, or that the one God is changeable.

The third “view” is turned against the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, with its assertion of a contingent best world among all possible worlds. “A philosophy which does not guide man as to how he may again attain to the forfeited identity with God, but only flatters Him with empty titles, and pretends to him that he lives already in the best world, is a frivolous deception, which it is not worth a rational man lending his ear to.” It is the greatest “Philomory” or Love of folly that has ever been; and they who follow it are poor, bewitched, and deluded people.

So far the *Moses*. We may add some further points from his other writings. “Nothing has been given to me as the rule of my faith and life but my reason; I must judge everything in the world by it, and even the Bible, if I am to draw any advantage from it. I am otherwise worse than a beast, which cannot be compelled by anything in the world to believe that it is eating oats when it gets chopped straw.” Along with reason and nature, internal feeling also appears as a source of our knowledge, for what I feel inwardly cannot possibly be otherwise than I feel it.—Of the positive revelation of God by prophets, it holds true that God cannot speak otherwise to a man than in accordance with the ideas which his heart is capable of forming regarding Him at the time; for otherwise our words would not agree with our thoughts, and God would speak otherwise to us than as He appears to us, which is con-

trary to the immutable truth of God. Our idea certainly never reaches the true conception of God ; for all that men upon the earth can ever think, speak, or write of this great Being is but a fragment. Hence we may indeed mutually explain to each other our views of God, but may never compel any one to accept them without investigation as infallible. For the same reason, we ought not to seek the knowledge of God from other men, but to open the eyes of the soul, and attend to the testimony deposited in our heart and conscience ; we ought thus to see how God manifests Himself in all nature, or in ourselves and in other things. God has not given a positive law ; this would not be worthy of God's majesty, and it would be inconceivable by us and therefore useless. The law of nature binds us, and the practice of it is true religion.—Obedience to the voice of God in the conscience produces a true heaven, and disobedience to it produces an inexpressible hell. As the Spirit continues to exist, this heaven and this hell last beyond the grave.—Christ was a true man as we are : like to us in all respects, but equipped with exceptional gifts and virtues. It is only on account of this excellence that He is called “Son of God.” Christ did not wish to found a new religion, or any external religious ceremonies, but to show the nugatoriness of external religion and the foolishness of hatred on account of a difference of religious opinion. He thus intended to abolish all religious wranglings, to restore universal love, and to guide men to the worship of God in spirit and in truth. Like all other positive religions, Christianity is also a superstition. The Trinity has been constructed out of the fables of the heathen and the Jews. The doctrine of the fall of the first man, of original sin, and of the darkening of reason, is but vain falsehood. There are no devils or angels. The Christian “doctrines” of the order of grace and the operations of grace, are partly fable and partly deception. As the world is eternal, the doctrines of the second coming, of a day of judgment, and such theories are absurd. Marriage cannot subsist along with true moral discipline and chastity. Christ is called Saviour and Redeemer “because He sought to redeem those who could understand and

grasp His doctrines, from the yoke of their oppressors who fattened on their sins." "And this, His inestimable merit, I do in no way deny, but I turn it in such a way to account that all those who tell me the opposite of God, and who undertake to charm one of His own creatures into an offensive and pernicious idol, are confidently regarded by me as ignorant ninnies, and notwithstanding their obstinate orthodoxy, as antichristian belly-slaves, and as anything but servants of my Jesus."—"Christ has not merely risen in the spirit, but He also comes again daily in many thousands of His witnesses to judge the living and the dead. The judgment begins in the case of every man when he begins to know God." "What ignorant priests have hitherto dreamed about their so-called devils, to terrify the rabble, are most absurd and most irrational lies." And these things have been invented to the detraction of the Creator.

## SECTION SEVENTH.

### THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN FRANCE.

THE Eighteenth Century is designated by the French, by preference, as the *philosophical* century. We do not indeed owe independent thoughts or any permanent furtherance of speculation to that age, yet philosophy then controlled the interests of all circles in France as it has never done before or since. From another point of view, it is common to designate the philosophical movement of France as materialism. This is correct enough if the designation is used to indicate the general character of the spirit that dominated the century, but it is wrong if it means to assert the complete homogeneity of all the phenomena that then appeared. For, more exactly regarded, there are four different currents of philosophical thinking that may be distinguished in successive periods as well as by distinct facts. 1. In the first place, we have Scepticism as represented by Bayle. 2. Then comes the Deism that was grounded on Newton's Natural Philosophy and proclaimed by Voltaire. 3. Next, we have the Materialism of De la Mettrie and others. 4. And, lastly, we have the Reaction against it that was grounded on immediate Feeling as represented by Jean Jacques Rousseau.<sup>1</sup>

#### I.

#### SCEPTICISM. PIERRE BAYLE.

Scepticism seems to be the form of philosophical activity that corresponds to the character of the French people. In

<sup>1</sup> In connection with this Section, compare Hettner, *Literaturgeschichte des 18 Jahr.* ii. 1860; and F. A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 3rd ed. 1876. Noack, *ut supra*.

the period of the transition from the ancient to the modern world, it is in France that we specially meet with the renovation of Sceptical thoughts; and even yet, all who have won an enduring place among the French in the History of Philosophy are inclined to this tendency. At first, however, the French thinkers employed their Scepticism in order to bring men to accept revelation as the only certain truth.—François de la Mothe le Vayer (1588–1672) regards all knowledge as uncertain, because neither the perceptions of sense nor the axiomatic principles are free from deceptions. Hence the greatest happiness of our mind consists in an immoveable rest in theoretical questions and in moderation in practical matters. This conviction is likewise pre-eminently fitted to prepare us for the reception of religion. Since we cannot rely upon the Sciences, we are inclined to submit ourselves of our freewill to the divine revelation, and in this consists the meritoriousness of faith.—Pierre Daniel Huët (1630–1721), in like manner, on account of the uncertainty of knowledge, sees the only acceptable philosophy in Pyrrhonism. The insight that we know nothing, is the best preparation for the faith by which we receive the truth that God Himself communicates to us.—Saint Evremont (1613–1703) turns himself against the doctrines of positive religion. Full of wit and satire, he combats the dogmas and the ambition of the Catholic Church, yet acknowledges that Christianity is the purest and most perfect religion, because it preaches the purest and most perfect morality.

Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) was the most important of the Sceptics of his time. He is not, like the earlier sceptics, sceptical as a philosopher; as a philosopher he is essentially an adherent of Descartes. Bayle is a sceptic of his own kind, and of a peculiar mental tendency. He is fond of pointing everywhere to difficulties, and of bringing forward contradictions; yet his object is not to solve them, but to persist in an unsatisfying ignorance, and, in spite of all his acuteness and his astonishing knowledge, he stops everywhere without reaching fixed results. Nor does he employ his

scepticism in order to bring men from the ignorance of natural knowledge to the irrefragably certain truth of the divine revelation: rather is his sceptical thought especially directed upon revelation. Bayle points out again and again that the doctrines of our faith are incompatible with the knowledge of our reason, although always with the assurance that revelation claims to be believed.<sup>1</sup>

The most difficult problem, according to Bayle, is the repeatedly discussed question: How is the belief in an almighty and all-good God compatible with the fact of evil? On the side of Reason, the often repeated result is that the acceptance of two divine beings, one good and one evil, gives a better explanation of the actual relations of the world; but Revelation, which is undoubtedly certain, teaches the existence of only one divine Being. If we start from the conception of God, Reason leads us *à priori* to the acceptance of only one God, but it is otherwise if we would explain the facts presented in experience. Man is undeniably burdened with a multitude of physical evils; and this suffering is completely inconceivable if we assume only one God, who is at the same time all-powerful and all-good. But if we regard physical evil as a consequence of moral evil, the question then arises, whence comes moral evil? To say that God has permitted it, but not caused it, is a mere empty play of words; for, seen in the light, such permitting is nothing else than effecting, as it is only by the entering of a definite efficient cause that a definite reality can arise out of a multitude of possibilities. God also foresaw the danger of sin in any case; and if He did not avert it, He acted as wrongly as a mother would who might allow her daughters to go to a dangerous dance. It is also an untenable evasion to say that God would have injured human freedom by fixing man in the doing of what was good; and the

<sup>1</sup> Besides the *Dictionnaire*, the following of Bayle's writings are taken specially into account here: *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ, Contrain-les d'entrer*, ou *Traité de la tolérance Universelle*, ed. ii., Rotterdam 1713. *Réponse aux questions d'un Provincial*, Rotterd. 1704. Regarding Bayle, see Ludwig Feuerbach, *Pierre Bayle*, 2 Ausg. 1844. Jeanmaire, *Essai sur la Critique religieuse de Pierre Bayle*, Strassbourg 1862.



Church universally teaches that the angels and the saints cannot sin, and that God's grace co-operates in the regenerate without denying freedom in any of these. The assertion is also false, that the good is only known from contrast with the bad, and that it can only be borne mixed up with it; as is also the pretence that evil exists in order that the wisdom of God may shine forth the more. This latter position would be just the same as if the head of a household were to break the legs of all the members of the house in order to exhibit to them his healing art. In short, to our reason, the evil that actually exists is inconceivable if we accept only one God with perfect power and perfect goodness. If we maintain the unity of God, we must think of either His power or goodness as limited. On the other hand, the mixture of good and evil in nature as well as in the actions of men is very simply explained if we regard the world as the work of two powers, one good and one evil, and that they have concluded a compact with each other as to how far the influence of each should extend.

The same contradiction between knowledge and faith is shown by Bayle in other points. In science, it holds as an incontrovertible truth that two things that are not different from a third thing are equal to one another; but the dogma of the Trinity subverts this proposition. It is an undeniable truth of reason that the union of a human and a rational soul constitutes a person; but the dogma of the Incarnation contradicts this truth. In our natural knowledge, the principle holds good that no body can be in more places than one at the same time; but the dogma of the Lord's Supper teaches the opposite, so that we do not know whether we are not at this moment in the most different places.—The same opposition of Reason and Revelation is shown in the sphere of morals. Among the Christian nations, the moral requirements of religion do not at all prevail; on the contrary, the law of honour, regard to public opinion, selfishness, and similar principles determine our conduct. Nay, while many men accused of atheism deserve all recognition on account of their strict morality, there are some of the persons in the Bible that

are held up to us as models who were guilty of the gravest moral offences. Moral philosophy teaches that it is a sin not to prevent an evil deed if we can; dogmatic theology makes it no objection to God that He did not prevent sin. Moral philosophy teaches that no one is guilty of an action that took place before he existed; dogmatic theology makes us all sharers in the guilt of Adam's fall. In order to bring out the opposition between faith and knowledge in the greatest possible sharpness, Bayle sums up the principal contents of theology in seven propositions, and sets over against them nineteen philosophical propositions indicating their incompatibility by the antithetical form in which they are presented.

Theology and Philosophy are thus as contrary to each other as day and night. It is impossible to combine them either by the distinction of a double truth or by the evasion that the doctrines of the faith are not contrary to reason, but only above reason. There is nothing left, then, but to choose between the two, and either to follow natural reason or supernatural revelation. On this point Bayle generally expresses himself as if he regarded the choice as in no way doubtful. He says that a true Christian can only make himself merry about the subtleties of philosophy; for faith raises him far above the regions in which the storms of controversy rage. In matters of religion we ought therefore not to enter at all upon principles of reason, but simply to believe; the more the object of faith transcends the natural powers of our mind, so much the more meritorious it is to believe. Philosophy is never able to lead us to the truth; revelation alone can do this. This revelation is contained in the Scriptures, which have been verbally inspired by God, and hence they are to be respected as the infallible source of truth.

It appears to me, however, to be extremely improbable that this was Bayle's real opinion. In the first place, as has been said, he did not proceed in his scepticism as a philosopher; he despairs of our natural knowledge, less on account of the untrustworthiness of its foundations, than because its clearest propositions are subverted by the definite dogmas of faith.

Again, he shows how to trace out all the instances which speak against a dogma, with an acuteness that can only proceed from the interest of personal conviction. And above all, he expresses himself quite otherwise in the beginning of his *Commentaire Philosophique*. In the first chapter of this work, Bayle undertakes to show generally that the light of nature, or the universal principles of our conscience, are the first rules of all interpretation of Scripture, and especially in matters of morality. It is true that he protests against the view of the Socinians, who interpret the Scriptures only by the light of nature and the principles of metaphysics, and who reject everything that does not agree therewith, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation. But he holds that there are certain axioms which one cannot repudiate, such as that the whole is greater than its part, that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal, that two contradictories cannot possibly be true at the same time, or that the essence of a thing cannot subsist after its destruction. Although the opposites of these propositions were to be found a hundred times in Scripture, or were seen to be confirmed by a thousand miracles, they would not be believed; but it would rather be supposed that the Scriptures spoke metaphorically and ironically, or that the miracles were performed by a demon, than it could be believed that the natural light erred in these principles. Above all in moral questions, reason has the same importance. All moral laws are subject to the natural idea of equity as it is inborn in all men, so far of course as that idea is not darkened by regard to personal advantage and the customs of the country. Adam had certainly the consciousness of good before God spake to him; and after the fall this inner light was necessary as a criterion in order to distinguish the divine revelation from devilish suggestions. All dreams and visions, as well as all appearances of angels and miracles, must be tested by the natural light. So it is with the Law of Moses, for it is only on account of its agreement with the natural law that it could be recognised as a positive law. As in geometry a proportion that has been

proved from unquestionable principles becomes a principle in regard to other propositions, so in like manner the positive law when it was once verified by the natural light could also hold as a rule. Hence before Moses revelation could only be tested by the natural light, but after Moses by the natural light and the positive law. The two must necessarily agree, as they both come from God, who cannot contradict Himself. The gospel is also a rule which is verified by the clearest and distinctest ideas of the natural reason, and it therefore deserves to be accepted as a rule and criterion of truth. At the first glance it appears, indeed, as if many laws of the natural reason were contrary to the gospel, such as the right to defend ourselves when we are attacked, or to take vengeance on an enemy, etc. In truth, however, it is only our natural judgment that is corrupted by self-love and bad habit, whereas Christ lays down for us the true laws of reason, which we must approve on earnest examination.

Regarding *the essential nature of Religion*, Bayle expresses himself in the following way. By the clearest and distinctest ideas we are conscious that an absolutely perfect being exists, who governs all things and is to be worshipped by men, and who rewards some actions and punishes others. In like manner we are conscious that the essential worship of God consists of inward actions or in acts of the spirit. Hence it follows that *the essence of Religion* consists in the judgments which our mind forms regarding God, and in the affections of reverence, fear, and love which our will feels towards Him, so that a man, when alone, can thus without any external action satisfy his duty to God. Commonly, however, the internal condition of the mind, in which religion consists, expresses itself in external signs of reverence ; but without the internal sentiment, such external actions have no greater value than if a complement were made to a statue in consequence of a gust of wind. Briefly, then, religion is a specific conviction of the soul, which brings forth in the will the love, reverence, and fear that are due to the Supreme Being, and the external actions corresponding to them.

An immediate consequence of these positions is the *principle of Toleration*. The one right way of evoking religion can only be by calling forth certain judgments and feelings in the soul. By forcible external measures the external actions in question may indeed be constrained, but the proper sentiments cannot be effectuated. Hence it is not possible to take the words of Jesus literally when He says, "compel them to come in" (Luke xiv. 23). Instead of persecuting those who confess other religions, as is often done in the most cruel way, we ought to practise unlimited toleration towards all. This is not to be done as if all religions were true, but because no one but God has a right to control the conscience. Even an erring conscience has the right to demand liberty and unlimited toleration. History also shows that religious intolerance has had the most dreadful consequences, whereas the State has been found to flourish under the peaceful toleration of different religions.

## II.

## DEISM. VOLTAIRE.

The Spiritual development of France in the Eighteenth Century was influenced by nothing more powerfully than by the increasing acquaintance with England. Buckle asserts in his *History of Civilisation in England*, that at the end of the Seventeenth Century there were hardly five persons in France who understood the English language; whereas, during the two generations between the death of Louis XIV. and the outbreak of the Revolution, there was scarcely a Frenchman of distinction who did not visit England, or at least learn English. In England at that time, however, Deism prevailed as the result of the impulse that proceeded from Newton and Locke, and this deism was forthwith transplanted also to France.

Pierre Louis de Maupertuis (1699-1759) first represented Newton's Natural Philosophy in opposition to that of Descartes.



He also drew from it its logical consequences as regards religion and morals. In his *Essai de cosmologie*, Maupertuis turns himself against those who employ the doctrine of final causes to prove the existence and the wisdom of God from the most unimportant trivialities, such as the folds in the skin of the rhinoceros, as well as against those who deny all final causes and regard the world as a mere mechanism. He seeks the Supreme Being in the primary laws which He has given to nature. The motion of the material world must have a mover as its cause, and this mover must be almighty and all-wise, because the scientific examination of nature shows that, in the economy of nature, only the least possible expenditure of means is applied for every end. In his *Essai de la philosophie morale*, Maupertuis finds the wisdom of life in the attainment of happiness, and happiness in the practice of the love of God and our neighbour, as required by Christianity.

Voltaire (1694-1778), during a long life, by his poetry and prose, and with earnestness and caustic wit, naturalized the philosophical and theological views of the English Deism in France. Poor in thoughts of his own, he gained by the power of his words the widest influence upon his contemporaries; and he has thus been justly designated by his great countryman Comte as the founder of the profession of the Journalist. Voltaire himself summed up his religious convictions by saying, "we condemn Atheism, we abhor Superstition, we love God and the human race,—this in a few words is our creed." The several members of this confession may serve as a guide in the following exposition of Voltaire's views.

1. Voltaire is still regarded by some as an Atheist, and yet he has very decidedly repudiated atheism and repeatedly asserted the existence of God. The attempt has been frequently made to weaken Voltaire's argumentation for the existence of God by the assertion that it was not meant in earnest, but was only occasioned by regard to the utility or indispensableness of a belief in God for the order of the political and social life. His moral argument appears indeed



to support this assertion. Bayle had asserted that a State composed of Atheists might exist, and Voltaire admits this in the case of philosophers; but adds that if Bayle had to govern even but five or six hundred peasants, he would forthwith preach to them a God who rewards and punishes actions, because a retributive God is absolutely indispensable for the common weal. Without such a God we would be without hope in our misery and without remorse in vice.

“ The sacred truth goes still beyond man’s highest thought,  
Yet forms the bond of States, and guides to what we ought;  
It chains the evil-doer, but lifts the righteous head,” etc.

In connection with such expressions the well-known saying of Voltaire is especially noteworthy, that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent Him (*si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer*). This has been interpreted as if Voltaire regarded a belief in the existence of God as necessary indeed from practical considerations, but was himself not convinced of it. Yet he has immediately added to these words, “ *mais toute la nature nous crie, qu’il existe;*” and Voltaire is so firmly convinced of the existence of God from reasons of the understanding, that he declares it is only such as have lost all sound human judgment who can suppose that mere matter is sufficient to produce sentient and thinking beings. Of the arguments then current for the existence of God, Voltaire rejects the *argumentum e consensu gentium*, because he denies the universality of the idea of God. He, however, repeatedly brings forward the Cosmological Argument: I am, therefore there is existence. What is, is either of itself or from another. If anything exists of itself, it is necessary and eternal, and therefore God exists. Does anything exist through another, then this other thing exists by a third thing, and so on, until we come to God. If we will not accept a God as the ultimate cause of all other existence, we have an endless screw, which is an absurdity.—But while this argument inevitably leads to a being who exists of itself, and who is therefore eternal and the ground of all things, it is equally unjustifiable on the basis of this argument to assert the personality of God.

Voltaire prefers the Teleological Argument. This argument presupposes the existence of ends or design in nature. In this connection Voltaire, indeed, with his biting satire blames the way in which many physico-theologians endeavour to prove the existence and the wisdom of God from the most petty and often the most entirely mistaken relations of design in nature; but, in opposition to Spinoza, he represents the ends and purposes of God in nature so decidedly, that he even makes nature complain that she is called "Nature," when in fact she is art. "If we see a beautiful machine, we infer an intelligent and skilful constructor of it. And in view of the wonderful world, will we set ourselves against the acceptance of a creative master of it?" As it would be absurd in the presence of a watch to deny the existence of a watchmaker, so it would be ridiculous not to infer from the constitution of the world a wise maker of it. This inference cannot be invalidated even by evil, as Voltaire either simply denies its existence, as in his early years, or exculpates God from it, as after the catastrophe of Lisbon in 1755.

But although the existence of God is firmly established according to Voltaire, he does not consider himself justified in saying anything regarding the essential nature of God. Philosophy is not able to say what God is, why He acts, whether He is in time and in space, whether He has acted once for all, or acts without intermission, and so on; for in order to know this, one would need to be God Himself. On account of evil, Voltaire is inclined to think of God's goodness as infinite, but His power as limited.—His utterances regarding the nature of the soul are undecided as to whether it is an independent immaterial substance or not. And hence his utterances regarding the future existence of the soul are also undecided. Such a future existence is improbable on the principles of natural science; yet a belief in it is indispensable, not merely for the moral conduct, but also for the inner needs of the heart.

2. "We abhor all Superstition." This is the second article of Voltaire's creed. The struggle against Superstition formed the work of Voltaire's whole life. Almost everything appeared

to him to be superstition which has ever been taught by a positive religion,—not merely the Roman hierarchy, with its meaningless institutions and its oppression of believers, but also the most important dogmas of the Christian Church, as the Trinity, the incarnation, and others. In his *Epistle to Urania* he describes the God of the Church as a tyrant whom we must hate. This God created men like Himself in order to humiliate them the more; He has given us corrupt hearts, that He might have the right to punish us. Seized by a sudden fit of repentance, He makes the waves of the sea destroy the work of His hands; but instead of better men, He only lets a race of horrid robbers, dishonourable slaves, and cruel tyrants arise. Yet the same God who drowned the fathers will die for the children. Among a most wretched people, the byword of the other nations, God Himself becomes man, undergoes the weaknesses of childhood, and after a wretched life, suffers the punishment of a shameful death. And yet His death is without avail; even after He has shed His blood to extinguish our misdeeds, He continues to punish us for sins that we have never committed. Numberless peoples have been lost simply because they have not known that once on a time, on another side of the world, in a corner of Syria, the son of a carpenter died on the cross. In this picture I do not recognise the God whom I ought to worship. God does not need our constant worship. If we can offend Him, it is by doing injustice to men. He judges us by our virtues, and not by our sacrifices.—Jesus is represented as an unknown individual from out of the dregs of the people; he was a man of energy and activity, and above all, of irreproachable morals, and he possessed the gift of winning adherents. The morality preached by him was certainly good, but good morality is always and everywhere the same. The miracles ascribed to him may be partly later inventions and may partly rest upon the deception by which Jesus sought to win the superstitious people to his wholesome doctrine. Jesus was an honest enthusiast and a good man; he had only the weakness of wishing to make himself spoken of, and he did not love

the priests. It never came into his mind to found a new religion. Jesus is used as the pretext of our fantastic doctrines and our religious persecutions, but he is not their author. It was under the influence of the Alexandrian Platonism, and with the help of a whole series of delusions and inventions, that Christianity first arose as a distinct religion. The disciples from being deceived became knaves; they became falsifiers, and maintained themselves by the most unworthy frauds. The foundations of the Christian religion are nothing but a web of the most commonplace deceptions that proceeded from the most wretched of the *canaille*, of which alone the adherents of Christianity consisted for centuries. At first they attempted to carry on with the assertion that God had raised Jesus from the dead. When this coarse piece of jugglery succeeded, a sketch was drawn up of his legendary life, with all its miracles. Writings after writings were invented, and, in short, the first four centuries of Christianity form an uninterrupted succession of falsifications and pious frauds. The whole history of the Christian Church shows us an increasing series of aberrations of the human mind. The massacres and slaughterings which Christian intolerance has exhibited in all ages have cut off about ten millions of men. The doctrine of the Church is distorted with abundance of the crassest superstition which puts the civilised nations deep below the savages. They have even given God a mother, a son, and a supposititious father. It has been asserted that he died a shameful death, and it has been taught that gods can be made of meal and such like. Thus did Voltaire incessantly combat the Christian Church with the terrible weapon of his irony, because he saw in it only the bearer of superstition and fanaticism. It is to the Church that his well-known saying is to be applied, "*Écrasez l'infâme.*"

3. If we now ask, What are the contents of the true religion of reason which the philosopher would put in the place of the corrupt superstition of Christianity? the answer does not include much. The true religion contains nothing but the general worship of God and love to the human race. The

term "Christian," which has now come into general use, may remain; and if it cannot now be otherwise, God may be even worshipped through means of the name of Jesus, but the intolerable burden of unintelligent dogmas must be taken from us. To worship God, the Supreme Being, as the cause of our existence and the rewarder of our actions, and to love men, this is the religion of philosophy. "Leave your monastic prisons, leave your contradictory and useless mysteries of faith, as but the objects of universal laughter. Preach God and morality, and I will guarantee that there will be more virtue and more happiness on the earth."

## III.

## MATERIALISM AND SENSATIONALISM.

Newton and Locke may be regarded as the intellectual leaders of the English Deism. Their thoughts were adopted without any essential change in France, and they gave rise to views which were in the main identical with Deism. What was peculiar in the way in which they were developed in France arose from the conditions of the time. The leading principle of Newton's Natural Philosophy is that motion proceeding according to definite laws is known as an inseparable quality of bodies or matter. This principle does not itself decide as to whether motion is communicated to the material world by a higher power external to it, which is God; or whether it belongs to matter by nature, and therefore indwells in it from eternity. Newton asserted that every moved body points to an immaterial being who has given motion to matter. In England, this view was universally accepted by the Deists with the single exception of Toland, who, as we have seen, asserts that motion belongs to matter by nature, and that thought is but corporeal motion. In France, however, the view that motion is a quality inseparable from matter found numerous adherents; and what Locke had only thrown out as a casual remark, that



whoever asserts that God was not able to give matter the capability of thinking would limit His omnipotence, was accepted as an indisputable fact by the French materialism and atheism.

Locke's theory of knowledge had put an end to the assumption of innate ideas; and the founding of all insight upon sensation and reflection had called in question the universal objective significance attributed in morals to the conceptions of good and evil. The moral elements were thus referred to the various individual sensations of pleasure and pain. The English Deism followed Locke's doctrine, only the attempt was made to restore to the moral conceptions their objective and universal validity, and this was mostly done by the assumption of an innate moral sense. With regard to morals, the French materialism went back to Locke himself; and as to the theory of knowledge, it developed his Empiricism into Sensationalism. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-80) considers it as the fundamental error of Locke that he set up two different sources of knowledge in Sensation and Reflection, instead of recognising that our knowledge rests only upon sensations or the immediate feelings of the senses. Reflection, instead of being an independent source of knowledge, is only the channel through which ideas come into our mind. In his *Traité des Sensations* (1754), Condillac describes, by reference to a gradually animated statue of a human being, which is equipped with all the senses but is yet unaffected by any impression, the gradual growth of our mental activities. Of the senses, touch alone gives us presentations of external objects or ideas; the other senses only give presentations of our own states or sensations. All the mental activities are composed of Ideas and Sensations. Perception is the mere receiving of ideas and sensations. The liveliness of these excites our Attention. Past perceptions leave traces behind, which gives Memory; and if these traces are as lively as were the impressions themselves when present, we call them Imagination. Comparison of different impressions by memory and imagination leads to conceptions,



judgments, and feelings of pleasure and pain. These feelings excite the passions, and consequently the will. Thus the whole mental life is gradually built up out of the simple elements of the immediate sensations. It was only a small step farther on the path thus entered upon, when Cabanis (1757-1808) openly declared that "the development of the organs of the body and the development of the sensations and passions correspond so exactly and completely to one another that the doctrine of bodies, the doctrine of knowledge, and the doctrine of morals, are only the three different branches of one and the same science, namely, the universal science of man."

Among the most important representatives of the French materialism, we have first to mention De la Mettrie (1709-1751). In his two works, *Histoire Naturelle de l'âme* (1749) and *L'homme Machine* (1748), he holds that the senses are the only ways to knowledge. It is absurd, he says, to assume an extramundane God in order to explain motion. Like motion, sensation is also absolutely essential to matter, and, indeed, whatever has sensation must be material. The inconceivability of this assumption should not lead to its rejection. It is only faith that can convince us of the existence of an immaterial soul, whereas science only takes the corporeal organization into its view. The natural moral law knows only the one precept, "Not to do to others what we do not wish them to do to us." It rests only upon the fear of our losing everything were this commandment disregarded. It is probable that a Supreme Being exists, but the necessity of a cultus does not follow from this existence. As regards our own rest, it is absolutely a matter of indifference for us to know whether there is a God or not, and whether He has created matter or not; it is a purely theoretical truth that is without influence upon practice. The world, however, will never be happy so long as it is not atheistic. For it is only under atheism that theological wars and other abominations will cease; and only then will men, following their individual impulses,

attain by the pleasant path of virtue to happiness. Lamettrie develops his moral theory in his *Discours sur le bonheur*. The happiness of man rests upon the feeling of pleasure; and every kind of pleasure is equally justified in principle, although, in accordance with individual differences, one prefers one pleasure and another another. As we are only bodies, the highest mental enjoyments rest upon the sensible feelings of pleasure. The conception of virtue is merely relative, and is only determined by regard to the well-being of Society. The stings of conscience are to be repudiated, because we always act of necessity.—This eudæmonistic morality is further developed by Helvetius (1715–1771), whose standpoint is sufficiently characterized by the cynical thought of his proposing to reward virtue and valour by the enjoyment of the most beautiful women.

One of the most influential advocates and leaders of materialism was Denis Diderot (1713–1784). At first, the representative of a theism that believed in revelation, then an enthusiastic adherent of a deistic religion of reason, Diderot, about 1753, entered the lists in the cause of materialism. He regards matter as existing from eternity and not as created by a God external to it. The whole of matter is filled with activity and sensation; it is universal sensibility. “If faith teach us how all living beings have proceeded from the hand of the Creator, the philosopher rather forms the conviction that nature has had its proper material elements from eternity, and that these combined with each other, because this combination lay in their possibility. This embryo, sprung from the elements, has passed through a series of transformations and forms, and has finally risen through a constant series of stages to motion, sensation, thinking, and passion, to speech, law, science, and art, just as it will, perhaps in the future, pass through other hitherto unknown developments.” The soul is not an independent immaterial substance, but is only the highest product of the incessantly changing mixture of matter. There is no freedom of the will nor immortality. What is advantageous or prejudicial to the advantage of all

is good or bad.—In this spirit the well-known *Encyclopédie* was conducted. It was published from 1756–1766 by Diderot, assisted by numerous collaborateurs holding the same opinions. The *Encyclopédie*, on account of its general circulation, obtained the greatest influence over the thought of that time.

The work which sums up and in a manner concludes this movement is the *Système de la Nature*, 1770, of the German Baron von Holbach (1723–1789). It falls into two parts; the first deals with general fundamental principles and anthropology, the second with theology. We may here pass over the first part, which only sums up, in a final manner, what was advanced by numerous materialistic writers to explain the world and man, nature and morals, from matter and its motions. The second part, consisting of thirteen diffuse chapters, combats the conception of God and religion as the main source of all corruption.

If men had the courage to subject their religious opinions to an exact examination, they would find that they are void of all reality, and are nothing but phantoms which owe their origin to ignorance, and are rooted merely in a morbid phantasy. As soon as man enters into life, wants begin to make themselves felt, and all passions and strivings, all thinking, willing, and acting, are the necessary result of the stimuli given to us by these wants. It is these wants of human nature that have also given occasion to the origin and development of the idea of God. Were man always contented, he would give himself up to the undisturbed enjoyment of the moment; but along with his regularly returning wants, there are also innumerable evils and misfortunes which make him feel his impotence. The more the experience of man increases, the more he learns to protect himself against such evils, and the more do his courage and security grow. But where the clearness of his thinking is obscured, and the impulse to action is compelled to fruitless striving, then is he mastered by his imagination which magnifies all things, and his ignorance and weakness then become the foundation of all superstition. When man saw

himself exposed to destructive forces whose starting-point he could not find on the earth, he turned his look to the heavens, as if the residence of these hostile powers must be there. Fear and ignorance thus brought men at first to the idea of a Deity ; and as all national cults fall into times of general oppression, the individual likewise created the unknown powers under whose influence he believes he stands in moments of pain and fear.

Now man always judges of what he does not know by what he does know ; and thus he attributes to that unknown cause human intelligence and understanding, human designs and purposes, and human desires and passions. He then invokes these supposed powers in prayer, seeks to win their goodwill by self-humiliations and the presentation of gifts, builds them temples and surrounds them with everything which appears to them valuable and precious ; and thus does worship arise. The supervision of worship was usually assigned to the elders among the people. They added all sorts of formulæ and ceremonies, sacred legends and institutions, and thus with the priesthood there arose a fixed order of worship and doctrines of faith. As the idea of the Deity is rooted in ignorance of nature, the study of nature leads to the destruction of this idea, and it is to be hoped that in the future all superstition will give place to a better understanding of principles, to insight, and to experience.

The elements of nature, according to D'Holbach, were the first gods. All nature and its several parts were raised into personal beings by the help of poetry, and thus mythology arose. The people did not see through these allegories, but worshipped mere personifications as real persons. Later thinkers then separated nature from her own internal power, and raised this activity to a separate being which they called God, yet without having any clear ideas of such a being. An unknown power was thus preferred to one that was known ; for man does not heed what lies at hand, but rather turns away to the mysterious, which gives a welcome employment to his imagination. And now men vied with each

other in decorating this self-created Being with the most inconceivable attributes, but they could only excogitate mysterious words without meaning. As man knows nothing except nature, he was compelled to transfer the qualities of nature, and especially of man himself, to God, only that these were increased to infinity. As man believes that the principle moving his body is a spirit or an immaterial substance, he likewise thinks of God as a spiritual or immaterial essence. The perception of opposite effects in nature leads to the assumption of different gods; and, in particular, the opposition of the useful and the prejudicial leads to the assumption of a good and an evil Deity. On the other hand, the view that God is the soul of the universe leads to the unity of God; but even then it is imagined that God has distributed the cares connected with the government of the world among a whole series of lower gods. And because it is believed that man cannot soar to the Supreme Being without intermediate connecting members, the assertion is made of a whole series of divine beings. In order to escape the difficulty that the one God, who is equipped with infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, brings forth the most contradictory effects, certain hostile powers are assumed, which, although subordinated, are yet capable of destroying God's purposes and plans.

This conception of God is found to be absolutely untenable. But then came the theologians who interdicted the use of reason and withdrew God always more from the intelligence of men in order that they might alone interpret the will of this inconceivable Being. The theologians persuaded men that the right faith consists in the humble acceptance of mysterious and inconceivable religious truths, and that the denunciation of reason is the most agreeable sacrifice that can be brought to God. The universal inclination to regard the inconceivable as venerable, is the root of the fantastic properties with which theology decorates the nature of God. All these qualities are merely negations, and ought to raise God above the sphere of human comprehension; they are only negations of the qualities which man perceives in him-



self and in the beings that surround him. Hence God is called infinite, eternal, unchangeable, and immaterial, without its being considered that nothing positive can ever proceed from a union of negative attributes. Now, as such a process of abstraction always volatilizes the idea of God more and more, and withdraws it from man's circle of vision, the attempt is made to bring God nearer to us in another way, namely, by His moral qualities. These are all derived in reality from the human modes of being and acting, although men thereby fall inevitably into contradiction with the metaphysical qualities already attributed to God. As the human perfections are further transferred in the highest degree to God, the most incompatible predicates are put together, and a conception of God is obtained which is refuted every moment by experience. "O foolish rashness which arbitrarily creates a Lord of nature and equips Him with human qualities, impulses, and inclinations in order to mirror itself in this self-created being!" The most powerful objection to the theological conception of God is the actual existence of evil. This compels us either to assume two opposite principles, or to admit that God is alternately good and bad, or that He acts by necessity. An exact examination shows irrefutably that the moral qualities can just as little be united with each other as with the metaphysical qualities. God is not omnipresent, if He is not also present in the man who sins; He is not almighty, if He admits evil into the world; He is not infinite, if a nature different from His can exist along with Him; He is not unchangeable, if His sentiments can change. Revelation likewise contradicts the justice, goodness, and unchangeableness of God. For it presupposes that God for a long time reserved the knowledge necessary to salvation; that, full of partiality, He directs His communication only to a few men; and that He conceals His will at one time and communicates it at another. The traditional Arguments for the existence of God prove nothing. In expounding them, the author shows a certain acuteness, although he rarely rises above a shallow reasoning, and he is



not without skill in pointing out the difficulty of a convincing demonstration. In his view an appeal to the order and harmony of the universe appears the weakest argument of all; for this order and harmony are the necessary result of the laws of matter itself. If it is said that a creature cannot be without a creator, it is overlooked that nature is not created, but has existed from eternity. The internal self-active power of the elements is the properly formative principle in nature, and along with it a special ordering and moving principle is neither necessary nor admissible.

As the Deity thus exists merely in the phantasy of man, the colouring of his individual character must naturally be communicated to this object. Man's God will accordingly undergo all the changes of his organism and of his internal states; He will now be a cheerful, benevolent, philanthropic being, and again a gloomy, misanthropic, cruel being, according to the momentary mood in which man finds himself. But is not that a strange God which must feel every moment the changes of our organism? Again, if men will fall back upon natural religion or the empty belief in the existence of God, they commit the greatest inconsequences. If it is believed at all that God exists, then everything must also be believed that His ministers say of Him, and the worst superstition is not more incredible than the God in whom this superstition is rooted. What is thus devised is as little capable of degrees as the truth itself; and hence the most superstitious among the superstitious is more logical than those who first assume a God and then are unwilling to draw the necessary consequences of that assumption. For is there a greater miracle than the creation out of nothing? or a more inconceivable mystery than a God whom our knowledge cannot reach, and who would yet be recognised? or a greater contradiction than an all-wise and almighty architect who only builds in order to pull down?—But although the existence of the theological God and the reality of the attributes assigned to Him were to be recognised, nothing would follow therefrom to justify the worship of God which is represented as our

duty. What cause have we to fear God, if He is infinitely good? What reason have we to be concerned about our fate, if He is infinitely wise? Why should we storm Him with prayers and inform Him of our wants, if He is all-knowing? Why should we erect temples to Him, if He is omnipresent? Why should we present Him offerings and gifts, if He is the Lord of all things?

Like all other opinions and institutions, Religion must also be judged in the last resort by its practical utility. Regarded in this light, Religion falls under a still severer condemnation. In particular, it has completely undermined morality; it has founded the moral laws upon the will of God, and thus subjected them to all the variations of the divine caprice; it has represented actions which should be reprobated, as directly commanded by God; it has called forth the cruellest persecutions and slaughtered numberless men in bloody wars. The priests, instead of being models of morality, have always distinguished themselves by their rapacity, ambition, intolerance, and similar qualities. In politics, religion has also produced the most pernicious effects, and it has strongly hindered the progress of the human sciences. Hence it is an indispensable duty to remove delusions which are only fitted to destroy our rest and our peace. But although there are atheists, and although atheism is absolutely unprejudicial to morality, it is still improbable that whole nations will make it their confession. The idea of God is rooted too deeply in our whole manner of thinking for the majority of men ever to get rid of it. The continuance of the customary notions suits the convenience of most men better than passing into a new mode of thinking; and hence atheism is as little suited to the people as would be the pursuit on their part of philosophy generally.

#### IV.

##### THE OPPOSITION OF RELIGIOUS FEELING. ROUSSEAU.

The last remark and others of the kind, such as that men prefer the most incredible fables to the clearest utterances

of reason in matters of religion as by an irresistible necessity, might well have led the author of the *Système de la Nature* to the conjecture that religion is founded more deeply and more certainly in the nature of man than merely on fear and ignorance. At all events, his hope that the advancing enlightenment would put an end to religion has not been hitherto fulfilled. On the contrary, there arose among his contemporaries one who enthusiastically proclaimed the truth that Religion lived in his heart and could not be set aside by any cold reasoning. This was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). The same course was taken here as appeared repeatedly in the case of the German "Enlightenment." The first opponents of the empty Enlightenment and naturalistic rejection of religion did not go beyond the immediate feeling of the religious life in the individual himself. Positive religion, both in its origin and its special value, still continued to be unintelligible to them.

Rousseau, starting from humble and limited circumstances, and rising to literary celebrity after long hard struggles and not without many aberrations, is known as the enthusiastic Apostle of Nature. He wished for himself a life in and with the beauty of nature, undisturbed by the noise of cities and by the showy glitter of modern civilisation. He saw in the secular sciences a dangerous enemy of natural morality; he regarded property and civilisation as the first foundation of social inequality and its lamentable consequences; and he recognised in nature the only sure guide in education. He thus went back directly to what is of nature, and his view of religion as we find it especially expressed in the *Confession of the Savoyard Vicar*, an episode of his *Emile*, corresponds to this position. As the Vicar is not led by scientific criticism to his doubts about the doctrine of the Church, but by the contradiction of his celibacy to the law of nature, he will not found his newly-won conviction upon scientific principles but upon the infallible voice of his heart. This position separates him from the natural religion of a Voltaire, with whom he in fact essentially agrees, but his conflict is hardly

less against positive religion than against atheism and materialism.

The Vicar, led to doubt by the reason indicated, could, however, not remain in this state; for it is intolerable to doubt of things the knowledge of which is of importance to us. The philosophers, however, proved themselves to be incapable of giving help. Proudly and peremptorily they assert everything without proving anything whatever. The human mind is entirely inadequate to understand the world, and it is only our pride that makes us obstinately defend our own opinion as true. Hence it is necessary to limit our inquiries to what immediately concerns us, and instead of external authorities, to follow the internal light and the immediate conviction connected therewith. The first truth to which I cannot refuse my assent is this, that I exist and have senses by which I become affected. I feel that the objects of my sensible perception are external to me, and hence the existence of an external material world, when I reflect upon the objects of my sensible perception, is as certain to me as my own existence. I become conscious of myself in the process of judgment as an active and intelligent being. This power of thinking, however, is entirely different from sensation; for while it is not in my power whether I will feel sensations or not, it entirely depends upon myself as to whether I will investigate more or less what I feel. Whatever philosophy may say, I lay claim to the honour of thinking. No material body can move itself and think; but because I think and am free in my actions, I am animated by an immaterial substance.

In external material things I observe motion and rest; and rest appears as their natural state. Motion is partly communicated and partly voluntary. I am immediately certain of voluntary motion, because I feel that the motions of my body depend merely on the will. Inanimate bodies again have motion, not of themselves, but from a will which moves the system of the world. How a will produces a corporeal action is to me inconceivable, but that such takes place I learn

by experience in myself. I know the will as a moving cause, whereas to conceive of matter as a producing cause would be to conceive an effect without a cause, or to conceive nothing. —If moved matter shows me a will, then does matter when moved according to certain laws show me an intelligence or an intelligent being. The final end of the universe is concealed from us, yet everywhere I find order and harmony; the part subserves the whole, and the whole again serves the part. It is not possible that this harmoniously ordered world can be the last result of accidental combinations in which matter moved by blind forces makes trial of itself; it necessarily points to an intelligent cause. This Being, who moves the system of the world and arranges things in order, I call God. It is rash to rationalize about the nature of God. A wise man will never enter on such thoughts but with trembling, and in the assurance that he is not in a position to fathom them. I do not even know how God has created the world, for the idea of creation goes beyond my understanding; but I believe it in so far as I apprehend it. Without doubt, God is eternal; and although my mind cannot grasp the idea of eternity, yet I conceive that He has been before all things, that He will be so long as they exist, and that He will still be when everything has passed away. If I thus discover the various attributes of God, of which I have no definite idea, it is done by necessary inferences or through the good use of my reason. If I say that God is such and such, I feel it and prove it to myself; but I do not therefore conceive any the better how God can be so.

If I now consider the position which is assigned to us as men in the universe, I find that we unquestionably occupy the first rank, and that everything is made for us and is related to us. In view of this there then arises in my heart a feeling of thankfulness and praise towards the author of my being, and from this feeling springs my first homage to the beneficent Deity. I invoke the Supreme Power, and I am moved by its benefactions. It is not necessary that I be taught this worship; it is prescribed to me by nature herself.



Is it not a natural consequence of self-love to honour what protects us, and to love what wishes our well-being?—But the more I strive to contemplate God's infinite being, so much the less do I conceive it; and the less I conceive it, so much the more do I worship Himself. I humble myself and say: "Being of all beings, I am because Thou art; I rise to my source when I unceasingly meditate on Thee. The worthiest use of my reason is to annihilate itself before Thee. It is the rapture of my mind, it is the very stimulation of my weakness, when I feel myself oppressed by Thy greatness."

God who can do all things can only will what is good. Goodness and justice are therefore the two attributes which we must necessarily assign to God. Evil seems to speak against goodness, but the principle of evil lies in man, who, by his freedom, chooses what is bad, and thus draws evil as a punishment upon himself. It is urged against Justice, that the just man has so often experience of what is bad on earth, while what is good happens to the unjust. This fact, however, only shows that there will be a compensation in the future life. Although I had no other proof of the Immortality of the Soul than the triumph of what is bad and the suppression of what is just in this world, this alone would keep me from doubting of it. Above all, however, I feel by my very vices that I now only half live, and that the life of the soul only begins with the death of the body. In the life beyond, the remembrance of what we have done here will constitute the happiness of the righteous and the torture of the wicked, although it is hard for me to believe that the tortures of the godless will be eternal.

The fundamental rules of my conduct I likewise find inscribed by nature with indelible lines in the depths of my heart. All that I feel as good is good; and all that I feel as bad is bad. The conscience never deceives us, but is to the soul the same as instinct or natural impulse is to the body. We feel not merely what promotes our own happiness to be good, but also what conduces to the happiness of others.



This is the notion of the good that is everywhere the same, and which history shows us, in spite of the vast variety of manners and characters among all nations and at all times.

"Oh, conscience! conscience! Divine impulse! Immortal and heavenly voice! Sure guide of an ignorant and limited but intelligent and free being, infallible judge of good and bad, making man like to God, Thou dost constitute the excellence of man's nature, and the morality of his actions. Without Thee I feel nothing in myself which raises me above the brutes, except the melancholy privilege of straying from error into error by means of an understanding that is without a standard, and a reason that is without a principle!"

This emphatic struggle against atheism and materialism, and this decided testimony for religion as immediately felt in the heart of the individual, are accompanied with a hardly less earnest opposition to every positive religion.

They see,—Rousseau thus makes his Vicar speak,—they see in my preaching only Natural Religion; it is but seldom that any other is required. No foundation for any other requirement is seen; for it is not possible that I can be punished if I serve God according to the knowledge which He gives to my mind, and the feelings which He inspires in my heart. It is impossible that I can get a purer morality and a purer faith from a positive doctrine than from the good use of the powers of my soul. Revelations only lower God by giving Him human passions. Instead of purifying men's ideas of the great Being, they only confuse particular doctrines, add absurd contradictions to the inconceivable mysteries which surround Him, and make men arrogant, unbearable, and cruel. The diversity of religions, instead of being removed by revelation, rests upon it; for as soon as it occurred to men to make God speak, every individual made Him say what he wished. If, on the contrary, men had only listened to what God says to the heart of man, there would never have been more than one religion on the earth.

The various revealed religions all raise the same claim. Every one claims that it alone possesses the truth, and that

all the others are false; and yet they all ground this claim upon the authority of their own priests and fathers. In support of the belief that something is a divine revelation, I am always presented only with human testimonies. Men inform me what God has said; men give narratives of the accompanying miracles; but as miracles are far less suited to lead us to God than the inviolable order of nature, so does the irrationality of the revealed doctrines encumber their acceptance. Reason teaches that the whole is greater than the part; revelation teaches that the part is greater than the whole. Ought I then to assume that God contradicts Himself when He says something in revelation that is different from what he says in reason? And yet the proclaimer of revelation would move one to accept it by grounds of reason. Further, it is to be noticed that revelation can only be communicated by books to the after generations; nay more, by books written in dead languages. Does it correspond to the goodness of God to make the knowledge of the true religion so difficult, and to make it dependent on accident? But although I cannot admit that the Scriptures are an infallible and necessary revelation, yet I confess that their majesty astonishes me, and that the holiness of the gospel speaks to my heart. The books of the philosophers, with all their pomp, how small are they when compared with it! Can He whose history the gospel relates be a mere man? Can a book which is at once so sublime and so simple be indeed the work of men?

I worship God in the simplicity of my heart, and only seek to know what is important for my conduct. In regard to those doctrines of faith which have no influence upon actions, I give myself no trouble. I look upon all the separate religions as so many sacred institutions which prescribe in every country a uniform mode of honouring God by a public worship, and which have their foundation in the climate, in the form of government, in the characteristics of the people, or other local causes. I regard them all as good, if God is worshipped in them in a becoming way, but the

essential worship is the worship of the heart. The true duties of religion do not depend on the institutions of men. An upright heart is the true temple of God; and in every country and in every sect, to love God above all things, and one's neighbour as oneself, is the sum and substance of the law.

## SECTION EIGHTH.

### LEIBNIZ AND THE GERMAN AUFKLÄRUNG.

AUFKLÄRUNG ("Intellectual Enlightenment" or "Illuminism") is the term which is used to designate the leading characteristics of the spiritual life of Germany about the middle of the last century. But it is difficult to settle the precise meaning of this expression<sup>1</sup> with which at that time the related expression *Aufhellung*, or sometimes also *Aufheiterung*, was used as interchangeable. Moses Mendelssohn describes the aim of *Aufklärung* or "Enlightenment" to be "rational knowledge and the capability of rational reflection upon the things of human life, according to the proportion of their importance and their influence on the destination of man." According to Kant, "Enlightenment" is "the issuing of man from a pupillage which is due to himself." And this pupillage is "the incapability of using his understanding without the guidance of another." The essential nature of Enlightenment or Illuminism accordingly consists in the liberation of the understanding from the sway of authority when it has become certain of itself. The authority to be got rid of is that of the ecclesiastical dogma,

<sup>1</sup> [It is practically impossible to give an exact and adequate rendering of the German term *Aufklärung* by any one available English equivalent. It is usually represented by "Enlightenment," or "Illuminism," or "Illumination;" but none of these terms carries the historical connotation of the original, and any one of them by itself would be occasionally misleading. In these circumstances it has been thought advisable to retain the German term where it is important to indicate precisely the historical movement described in this Section, and only to use "Enlightenment," or "Illuminism," or "Intellectualism" as its equivalent when it is sufficiently accurate. The term *Aufklärung* (literally, a "clearing up") is now commonly adopted in the literary usage of English writers on this phase of German thought. It will be evident from what follows that, in connection with the Philosophy of Religion, the term may be taken generally as a technical designation for the intellectual, and mainly negative, stage of the German Rationalism of the 18th century before Kant.—TR.]

and it has to be set aside by the unlimited supremacy of the natural reason or of the sound human understanding.—This definition must here suffice. Anything more precise would not give room for the various currents that are found within the period of the *Aufklärung*. It at least indicates the two most important characteristics of the movement, namely, that religion and theology entirely control the interest of the time, and that intellectual reflection is brought into the field against them.

This "Enlightenment" or "Illuminism" is thus in brief the German parallel to the English Deism and the French Materialism. The movement appears in Germany later than the English and the French movements, because the German people were then behind the other nations in all departments of the spiritual life, mainly in consequence of the thirty years' war. Accordingly, if the ultimate principle of the *Aufklärung* lies in the universal advance of the mind as it ripens to independence, the question as to its causes need only take primarily into account the occasions that come into view. Among these, we consider that too little importance is commonly laid upon the dissolving influence of Socinianism. Although Socinianism was persecuted by the Church and the State with equal zeal, its intellectual and juridical conception of religion, and its cold rational criticism, found not a few friends in Germany, some of whom belonged to the learned circles. That elements akin to it were at least not entirely wanting, is shown by the work entitled *De tribus impostoribus*,<sup>1</sup> and the "Correspondence regarding the nature of the soul,"<sup>2</sup> a purely materialistic production which was much discussed in its time. Nor is the influence of other countries to be under-estimated. France was regarded at that time by the higher classes in Germany as the model that was worthy of imitation in all questions of the spiritual life. Hence not only were French *savants* attracted by Frederick the Great to his Court, but their writings were also much read in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Genthe, *De impostura religionum*, Leipzig 1833.

<sup>2</sup> *Briefwechsel über das Wesen der Seele*. Cf. F. A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 3 Aufl. i. 319.

aristocratic circles. The English Deists worked more upon the learned circles. Their writings were numerously diffused in the original, as well as in French and German translations, and they were incisively discussed in the widest read reviews, such as the Leipsic *Acta Eruditorum* and Löscher's *Unschuldige Nachrichten*. They were also violently attacked in special treatises, and especially in academic disputations and programmes, and were even made the subject of special lectures in several Universities. In the Netherlands, partly in consequence of the toleration of all ecclesiastical parties prevailing from the time of the Reformation, partly on account of the weakening of the ecclesiastical orthodoxy that arose with Arminianism and Coccejanism, and partly under the influence of the speculations of Descartes and Spinoza, there sprang up an earnest but unbounded criticism, which exercised no small influence upon the German theology. In Germany itself, the ecclesiastical orthodoxy had already lost its supremacy, less from the isolated efforts of mystics or fantastic doubters, than from the influence of Pietism. Slowly yet constantly and generally, had this process of dissolution advanced during the course of the Seventeenth Century, so that, in the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, the supremacy of Pietism was universal, and the last really orthodox dogmatic—that of Hollaz—appeared in 1707. But the cold intellectual Enlightenment that empties religion of its peculiar contents and the deeply inward Pietism are direct opposites, and their irreconcilability soon enough showed itself. They found their common enemy, however, in the ossified orthodoxy of the Seventeenth Century; and in overcoming this orthodoxy, Pietism did no little to prepare for the *Aufklärung*. In another way it also contributed to call forth this movement. The principle of Spener, that piety ought to be a principle of life permeating all things, was carried by its later advocates to the extreme of a contempt for all science. Francke, who made it the object of his scientific activity to make the theologians Christians rather than to make the young Christians theologians, expresses his principle by saying that "a grain



of living faith is to be reckoned higher than a hundredweight of mere historical science, and a drop of love is to be regarded as higher than an ocean of the knowledge of all mysteries." According to the known law of development, this onesidedness could not but call forth a counter onesidedness. Laying stress merely on piety thus led to laying stress merely upon intellectual insight. The repeated attempts to bring about a union of the different confessions, although without success, may also have co-operated in preparing for this movement. At least it is a fact that the violent attacks of the time were directed against *Indifferentism* as well as against Naturalism, Atheism, Deism, and Pantheism. The most dangerous representative of this tendency appeared in Ericus Friedlieb,<sup>1</sup> who asserted that faith does indeed demand a science of the understanding, but only a little is required, and that need not be according to any definite formula. In order to be saved, he held that we must indeed confess the Christian religion, but it is not necessary to belong to a particular sect, or to accept its brain-formulas; it is enough to know that Christ is the saviour of the world, and that God, for His sake, forgives us our sins, and bestows power to be good. Above all, a distinction must be made between brain-belief, as a mere acceptance of certain doctrines, and the true faith of the heart, which is known by love to God and our neighbour and the denial of oneself.

As the English Deism was determined more precisely by the philosophy of Locke and the natural science of Newton, as the Dutch Criticism was determined by the speculations of Descartes and Spinoza, and as the French Materialism was led by the dissolving scepticism of Bayle, so does the German Illuminism receive its characteristic stamp from the system

<sup>1</sup> Under the name of "Ericus Friedlieb" there appeared in 1700 an "*Untersuchung des indifferentismi religionum, de man für hält, es könne ein jeder selig werden, er habe einen Glauben oder Religion, welche er wolle.*" The real author was the jurist Jakob Friedrich Ludovici. Cf. Walch, *Einleitung in die Religions-Streitigkeiten ausser der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche*, Th. v. The same position was combated in England under the name of "Latitudinarianism."

of a philosopher who preceded it. This philosopher was Leibniz. The philosophy of Leibniz may appropriately be regarded as a grand apology or speculative construction of the Christian religion; and in my opinion, the strictly logical connection and the profound movement of thought that characterize the Leibnizian system is overlooked when its undeniably Christian character is referred to mere accommodation. In consequence of this influence, the German *Aufklärung*, in so far as it stands under the influence of the philosophy of Leibniz as popularized by Christian Wolff, presents a character that is throughout friendly to religion. Certainly its distinguishing character is not supra-naturalistic. For although the possibility of revelation remains uncontested, yet every alleged revelation is subjected to the test of a series of criteria; and in fact all religious utterances are referred as regards their origin to reason, and as regards their contents to natural religion, and consequently to the principles of natural morality. Naturally men were not wanting who went beyond this position; but as they were combated on all sides, they may be regarded as mostly attaching themselves to the foreign influences. This may suffice as a preliminary sketch of the course of the following exposition.

## I.

## GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ.

We find the key to the philosophy of Leibniz<sup>1</sup> in his definition of the conception which stands in the foreground of the philosophical inquiry of the time. This conception was that of Substance. The Materialists asserted that there were only corporeal substances. Spinoza asserted a single substance with infinitely many attributes, of which, however, thinking and extension are the only two that are known to

<sup>1</sup> Leibniz's works, as referred to here, are edited in 2 vols. by Erdmann (1840). Cf. Zeller in his *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie*, 2 Aufl. 1875, and Kuno Fischer, *ut supra*. A. Pichler, *Die Theologie des Leibnitz*, 2 Bde. 1869-70.

us. Descartes assumed an infinite substance which is absolutely independent and is the ground of all things, and two finite substances that are entirely independent of each other, but are established by the infinite substance, namely, body and mind, or extended and thinking substance. Leibniz, however, recognises that as Materialism is refuted by the undeniable fact of self-consciousness and thinking, so is Descartes refuted by the circumstance that bodies and their phenomena, especially resistance, impenetrability, and inertia, cannot possibly be explained by extension alone. He accordingly goes back to the conception of Force. Immaterial force is the only thing that is real and truly essential in all things; this force, however, is active, constantly and unceasingly active, and matter is only the appearance or effect of immaterial force. The rigid opposition between thinking and extension is thus set aside, and in contrast to the dualism of Descartes a single principle is gained for the explanation of the world. If, with Spinoza, one substance only is asserted, we would have to conceive of individual things as entirely without power and without effect. In order to escape this consequence, Leibniz asserts, on the contrary, that every individual thing rests upon a force that is special to it, and that it is a distinct substance; for as many things as there are, there are just as many forces or just as many substances. But it must be well understood that it is not the compound things as we find them in complexes of more or fewer parts that are thus regarded as substances. On the contrary, every simple thing that is not compound, and which is therefore no longer divisible, is a force or substance; for whatever is active is as such properly a substance. And if everything is a substance, the diversity of things (meaning, of course, simple and not compound things) can only rest upon the diversity of substances. Hence there are not merely infinitely many substances, but there are also infinitely diverse substances, equipped with their individual characteristics. For substances as thus defined, Leibniz introduces the expression "monads." Monads are single substances,

and they are infinite in number; they are not compound but simple, and they are therefore real unities. They are points, but they are not physical points as corporeal and divisible magnitudes are: nor are they mathematical points without real existence; but they are metaphysical, or substantial and essential points. They accordingly approach the nature of atoms, but they are distinguished from atoms, partly by their quality as points being actually indivisible, and partly by their active forces. Further, they are not indifferent as regards their form, but are essential or substantial forms; and hence they are specially determined in themselves as distinct individual things. These Monads form the fundamental principle of the metaphysics of Leibniz.

Monads are immaterial forces. Such Monads are presented immediately in our own consciousness, in the percipient operations of the mind. Now we have to choose between two views: either the mind alone has perceptions, and then we have the rigid contrast of mind and body as in Descartes; or we assert the essential identity and the thorough analogy of all things, and then all substances must be conceived as percipients. Leibniz can only accept the latter view. He is led to the same result by another consideration. Everything is an *individuum*, that is, it has a distinctive form founded in its unique connection of the manifold into unity. But every form points to a perception, it being all the same whether this is realized as conscious in us or as unconscious in things. For "the passing state, which embraces and apprehends a plurality in unity, or in a simple substance, is just what is called Perception, and it must be distinguished, as afterwards becomes clear, from Apperception or Consciousness. And here lies the main error of the Cartesians, that they have reckoned the Perceptions of which there is no Consciousness, as nothing."

The Monads are thus percipient beings. If Perception constitutes the essence of the Monads, their individual differences can only be founded in the differences of their perception, that is, in the different degrees of its distinctness. The most important distinction is that between Perceptions

and Apperceptions, or between unconscious and conscious ideas. The latter are the special prerogative of minds, but it is at the same time erroneous to ascribe to minds none but conscious perceptions. Apart from this, the perceptions are clear at one time and obscure at another, according as they avail to cognise the object, and to distinguish it from other objects, or not. The clear perceptions again are either distinct or confused, according as we can distinguish the several marks in them or not.

The object of this perception is not the percipient Monad alone by itself, but every Monad embraces in its perception all other individuals, or the whole universe as well. For no Monad can exist alone, and its individuality just consists in this distinguishing relation of it to all other Monads. Hence every Monad is a representing thing; it is a mirror of the universe, not as if the universe entered into it through windows from without, but in virtue of its own essential power of representation.

“This bond or this accommodation of all created things to everything, and of each thing to all the rest, brings it about that every simple substance has relations which express all the other substances; and it is in consequence a perpetual living mirror of the universe.” The individuality and perfection of the Monads are thus determined by the degree of the distinctness with which they represent or mirror the universe in themselves. It is only by means of this perception and representation that any influence of the different Monads upon each other becomes possible. It consists in giving regard to the rest of the universe in the activity of the Monad; for things as substances are entirely independent of one another; and hence can they neither by external influence nor by external assistance exercise an influence upon one another.

Monads are active forces or efficient powers. At the same time, every Monad is individual; and it is thus limited self-activity. A Monad is therefore a union of active force and of limitation or passive force. Activity is the ground of all

perfection, passivity is the ground of all defect or imperfection. Matter rests upon passive force or passivity. The form or the soul rests upon active force or activity. Hence as we distinguish in every Monad active and passive force, so also do we distinguish in it soul and body. Their reciprocal relation rests therefore neither upon immediate influence nor upon the immediate guidance of God, nor upon the pre-established harmony, but on the fact that every Monad has, according to its peculiar individuality or the degree of its perfection, a definite measure of active force and an exactly corresponding measure of passive force, so that it is a determinate union of soul and body. If the active force or the soul changes, there results *eo ipso* a change of the body. Now, in the sphere of bodies, the mechanical explanation, from the conception of causes, holds good; and in the sphere of soul, the teleological explanation from the conception of ends holds good, because the soul is in fact a self-active force, and every self-active force proceeds by setting before it ends. If body and soul are immediately one in a single body, or if every Monad is an animated body, the dualism of efficient and final causes, and of the mechanical and teleological explanation of nature, is thus removed and their unity is immediately given.

The same position becomes clear from a consideration of Monads as representative beings. Every Monad represents the universe, and with a degree of distinctness that is peculiar to it. Excepting God, a perfectly clear and distinct representation of the universe is proper to no Monad; but to all there is only a more or less confused or obscure representation. This want of distinct representation is the principle of matter or of body, whereas distinct representation is the principle of form or the soul. Both distinctness and indistinctness of representation come together in a quite definite way in a definite degree of perfection; and hence the mysterious harmony of soul and body.

The same holds true of organic bodies as complexes of Monads. One Monad in fact determines others in so far as in it there is a clear and distinct representation of what these



obscurely and indistinctly represent. Now, if there is in a Monad a clear and distinct perception of what takes place in more imperfect Monads, they form together a complex of Monads, or an organism. The Monad with the clearest and distinctest representation forms the Central-Monad or Soul; while the Monads with obscure or confused representations, which are only connected with each other through their relation to that Central-Monad, form the body. In these organisms, and particularly in man, the relation of body and soul is, of course, entirely the same as in the simple Monads. A corporeal mass therefore exists only as a confused representation, yet not existing merely in our representation; but, as the confused or obscure representation is as such the foundation of what is material, material bodies are likewise a "*phenomenon bene fundatum*."

Monads are active forces or efficient powers. As a constantly operating power, a Monad is in a process of perpetual change or in perpetual development. According to its internal characteristic, it is engaged in a continuous striving to exchange its present state for another. This striving is called by Leibniz "*Appetition*." "The action of the internal principle which effects the change or transition from one perception to another may be called *Appetition*." Perception and *Appetition* thus constitute together the characteristic nature or the individuality of the Monads.

These two elements, however, do not stand in an exclusive relation to one another. Every development is directed towards a goal; every striving will attain a purpose. Such goal and purpose, however, only exist as they are perceived, and thus can only operate as perception. In the perception, there must therefore be already present in the beginning of the development what the Monad becomes in the course of it. It is not indeed present as a conscious or distinct perception; for, as the essence of the Monad consists in perception, its development is only a development into always clearer and distincter perception. But as unconscious obscure perception, or as capacity or disposition, the goal of the development is

already contained in the beginning. The conception of development accordingly now becomes clear. It is not merely a change of the Monad, but a perpetually advancing change. It is not founded on external causes, which in general cannot work upon a Monad, but in an internal principle. Besides this principle of change, there must, however, also be "un détail de ce qui change, qui fasse pour ainsi dire la spécification et la variété des substances simples;" that is, some particular thing which changes, and which, so to speak, constitutes the specification and the variety of simple substances. "This particular thing must include a plurality in unity or in simplicity." In other words, development is nothing but the unfolding of the specific nature of the Monad realizing itself through a series of regulated actions; or it is the realization of its original endowment. "Every Monad contains in its own essence the law of the constant succession of its actions; it contains in itself its past and its future." Every form of manifestation or stage of development is the result of all the earlier and the cause of all the following forms or stages. "As every present state of a simple substance is the natural consequence of its past, the present is pregnant with the future."

Here again we have the same unity of the mechanical and the teleological explanation. Development is continually directed to an end, and it is therefore always a working in accordance with purpose; it is an activity that strives towards a goal. At the same time, however, the development is founded entirely in the specific internal condition of the Monad, that is, in its constitution or obscure perceptions; and thus it is also sufficiently explained causally. There is therefore no opposition between efficient causes and final causes, or between a mechanical and a teleological view of the world; in the immanent development the two are immediately one.

According to the degree in the distinctness of their perceptions, we have to distinguish as the most important classes of Monads, Bodies, Souls, and Spirits. Spirits are Monads

with self-consciousness; they are Monads that know and will. But although this is the distinguishing prerogative of Spirits, unconscious perceptions are not to be denied to them, as Descartes does. Between these main classes, however, there are again found stages of transition; and, as the inventor of the Differential Calculus<sup>1</sup> teaches, they occur in infinitely small differences, for nature is not inclined to make a leap; she forms a continuous series. The members of this series may be far from one another, and they may also be very different from one another, as their differences are merely quantitative and not qualitative, and they are besides connected by a series of intermediate members. But however this may be, there yet exists between them the highest harmony and a thoroughgoing analogy. Analogy and continuity are thus the two great laws which govern the graduated realm of the Monads or the Universe. The former law establishes the unity, the latter the variety of things, and both together constitute the Law of Harmony, which, according to Leibniz, governs all things in the universe. Harmony is the expression which Leibniz uses for the highest Order that embraces the world. It implies a fulness of beings entirely independent and individually different, which by their powers and actions stand in a universal harmony. This view is essentially different from that of Spinoza. Spinoza establishes the order of the world *realiter*. According to Spinoza, individual things without any independent significance and power all proceed from the one substance as the cause that effects everything; according to Leibniz, the order of the world is an ideal bond which embraces all the fulness of self-active individual things into a universal harmony. This harmony appears in the system of Leibniz under a twofold point of view. It is regarded first as a natural order, indwelling in the Monads, founded in their immanent natural constitution and the advancing development which is founded thereupon, as a

[<sup>1</sup>This designation suggests a celebrated controversy, with regard to which reference may be made to Ueberweg's careful and candid summary in his *History of Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 98-100.—Tr.]

"parfait accord naturelle;" and, in the second place, it is viewed determined and arranged beforehand by God, or as a divine Law or Pre-established Harmony (*harmonie préétablie*). It is false, however, as we shall afterwards see, to designate this double mode of view as an opposition. Leibniz has even been blamed on the ground that what in the spirit of his system necessarily appears naturalistic as immanent order of nature, has been introduced by him by mere accommodation to the ideas of his contemporaries in a teleological form as a divine arrangement or pre-established harmony. To him such an opposition has no existence; on the contrary, the harmonious order of the world, in so far as and because it is natural law, is at the same time also divine arrangement and predetermination.

Such is a brief outline of the Metaphysics of Leibniz. Only a few points may be further noticed from the several departments of science, especially such as bear upon the treatment of the religious questions.

With regard to Physics, it follows from the definition of the Monads as original substances that they can neither be derived from natural elements nor be resolved into such elements. Apart from the fact that they are called by God's creation into existence from nothing and return into nothing by His annihilation, they are eternal. Further, all Monads exist together from the origin of the world, or, in other words, the sum of the forces contained in the world continues eternally the same. Along with the Law of Continuity, this is the second of the two laws upon which Leibniz's dynamic explanation of nature rests. The philosopher thus set up that law of the Conservation of Energy which plays at present so great a part in natural science, only he did not yet clearly distinguish between elasticity and vital force, and he wanted the means of verifying the law by experiments.

In the theory of Knowledge, Leibniz could not but oppose the empiricism and sensationalism which were advocated at the time, especially by Locke. If the mind be a complete *tabula rasa*, and if all knowledge comes only from external

impressions, then the direct and immediate influence of external bodies upon our mind must be presupposed as an indisputable fact. Leibniz, however, rejects this supposition. He emphatically opposes the view that a monad, such as the soul, is capable of receiving external influences, and he holds that everything is to be explained from its internal development. Accordingly Leibniz found it necessary to return to "innate ideas;" but he was compelled to admit to Locke that these are not present in our mind as clear conscious ideas or as real facts, and he seeks the solution of the difficulty in the view that innate ideas are in us as virtual knowledge or as unconscious ideas, but become developed into clearly conscious ideas with the general development of the soul. It is no difficulty to our philosopher that this capacity must realize itself without the influence of external things, and yet realize itself in some and not in others. For he holds that this distinction is grounded in the different degree of appetite which dwells in the individual monads. The denial of external influence does not, however, at all involve denial of the distinction between sensible perception and thinking. The difference between these two is also recognised by Leibniz, only he does not make perception either the efficient cause of thinking or the elaborated object of thinking. Perception is the preliminary stage of thinking, and hence it is *prius* in time; the two are distinguished only as the more imperfect and the more perfect perception, or as confused and distinct representation, and the continuity of the development demands this gradual transition as necessary to knowledge. Hence Leibniz agrees with Empiricism in accepting the well-known Aristotelian maxim, *nihil est in intellectu quod non erat in sensu*, "there is nothing in the understanding which was not in the sense;" but he adds very significantly, *nisi intellectus ipse*, "except the understanding itself." Although sensible perception in the usual sense, as the receiving of an impression produced from without, is thus denied, Leibniz distinguishes between rational truth and empirical truth, the former being necessary and the latter contingent. At first this may appear as a contradiction, but it is



explained by the following consideration : We are not a single monad, but a complex of monads ; and our soul, as a self-conscious mind, first knows itself and then all the things with which it stands in connection, although but darkly or confusedly. The former knowledge gives the rational truths, which are founded in pure thinking, and which form universal and necessary cognitions ; the latter gives the empirical truths, which rest upon perception and relate to individual and contingent cognitions. This distinction may also be derived from the essence of the individual monad. Every monad, as has been already shown, is a limited self-activity, a combination of activity and passivity. The agreement of the thing with itself, or its ideal and merely possible existence, rests upon the active force of the monad ; while the agreement of the thing with other things, or its real existence, rests upon its passive force. For each of these two classes of truths, Leibniz lays down a universal proposition as an ultimate principle : the rational truths rest on the principle of Identity, the empirical truths on the principle of Sufficient Reason. The axiom of Identity says nothing more than that everything must agree with itself, and therefore that nothing can unite contradictory marks in itself, and that no proposition can be true which includes a contradiction. By its very nature this axiom can only serve for those judgments which express in the predicate the same thing as is contained in the subject ; and these are identical or analytical judgments. These judgments, however, say nothing regarding the existence of the thing, but only that if the subject exists, it has this or that predicate ; for example, if a triangle exists it has three angles. Such judgments therefore assert only the abstract logical possibility of things. On the other hand, the second axiom refers to actual things, and states that each of these has its sufficient reason, and must therefore be known from the principle of causality. The conception of causality, however, is itself prior to experience. " Our inferences are grounded upon two great principles, the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. There are thus two classes of truths, rational and real ; the rational truths



are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; real truths are contingent, and their opposite is possible."—These theoretical principles of knowledge, as we will afterwards show, are important in relation to Leibniz's Theology. The knowledge of God rests upon actual truths or truths of fact; for "the ultimate ground or cause must consist of a necessary being, from whom, as its source, the stream of things arises, and this is the being we call God." Upon this distinction of rational and real truths, rests the further distinction of doctrines that are contrary to reason and doctrines that are above reason. Whatever contradicts a rational truth is contrary to reason, and is therefore impossible; whatever contradicts a real truth is above reason, and is therefore possible.

Leibniz also founds *Æsthetics* upon his own special principles. Our ideas relate, at the highest, to the form, order, and harmony of things. If these ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, they constitute philosophy; but if they have not yet risen to consciousness, we are still living in crude desire and in the enjoyment of sense. Between these two stages there is a clear-obscure point of transition; and here arises the Form-feeling of the æsthetic ideas.

With regard to *Ethics*, Leibniz, in accordance with his principle of the universal analogy, cannot possibly put the subject in rigid opposition to physics. All monads are in a condition of perpetual development and continuous striving. Now there is no striving without a goal, or without an idea of this goal, only the distinctness of this idea may vary. If the idea is unconscious as a mere form of nature, the striving is a blind force. If the idea is conscious, but is only obscurely felt, the striving is obscure instinct. If the idea is conscious, and if it is clearly and distinctly conceived, the striving is will. These are all only variously complete stages of the same universal development. Hence it is at once seen to be impossible that there should prevail in one sphere that necessity of causes which is without exception, and in another the groundless arbitrariness of self-chosen ends, or freedom, in the usual sense of free-will for choice. Again this is not possible

from another reason. Active striving, and consequently the will, is always determined by its idea; but this idea is not arbitrarily received from here or there by groundless choice, but is necessarily grounded in the natural capacity of the monad or in its degree of perfection. In short, the development in question, and consequently the will, is in no way caused by external influences or even at all influenced by them; it is nothing but the immanent evolution, or the realization in detail of what is already contained in germ in the natural individuality of the monad. Hence the will is never to be regarded as empty, but is always determined and directed to a determinate object; and hence there is no freedom of will in the sense of an absolute indifference, as if we could have wished and done just as well something else instead of what we actually will and do. Our will is rather constantly and wholly determined, and is specially determined by internal inclination, which is founded in the natural condition of the particular individuality. This is the decided view of individuality which appears in Leibniz. When he protests against holding the view that our will is subject to necessity, he is so far right in that he thus decidedly separates his position from the determinism of Spinoza. For he does not, like Spinoza, make the will be determined by the mechanism of nature and be therefore externally compelled; he sees the ground of its determination only in the nature of the willing subject itself. But when he proceeds to argue that various decisions are possible in themselves, and that the actual decision has only become a reality by the act of choosing out of the possibilities, this is mere word-fencing. These possibilities in fact, only exist in so far and because there is a possibility, according to the principle of identity, that my nature might be different from what it is. This particular nature, however, has no possibility to will or to act otherwise, but it must necessarily so will and act.—It is well known how the representatives of the German Enlightenment, intelligibly enough from the point of view of the wisdom of the sound understanding, gave up determinism, and keeping

to the phrase, freedom of the will, raised it to one of their fundamental truths.

Along with the question regarding the freedom of the will, there stands in the foreground of ethical investigations the other question as to the supreme Principle of Morals. This principle, according to Leibniz, is of course innate in man, although it slumbers in us at first as an unconscious capacity, and only gradually enters into consciousness. Hence it must be that idea which the will always follows, or what excites the strongest inclination in it; for "the will always follows the greatest inclination." Now an agreeable idea works more strongly upon the will than one that is disagreeable, and a higher degree of agreeableness is stronger than a lower degree. That inclination therefore is the strongest which is attracted by the idea of the highest persistent joy or by happiness. The striving after happiness is the fundamental innate tendency of human nature, and it rules all our inclinations. "That is good which ministers or contributes to our joy, and an evil is what prepares us pain." The highest good is what prepares happiness as lasting highest joy. — This purely eudæmonistic and individualistic moral principle receives, however, higher and more universal contents. Joy and pain are thus defined: "Joy is a feeling of perfection, and pain a feeling of imperfection." The striving after happiness is therefore nothing else than a striving after our own perfection. The degree of perfection is determined by the distinctness of the perception and the perfection itself, as the perfection of our being consists in perfectly clear and distinct perception, or in the perfect illumination of the mind. The striving after happiness is therefore a striving after a perfect mental development. Thus the true freedom is given at the same time, as the will that is conformable to reason is truly free; for "to be determined to the best by reason is the highest degree of freedom." — The more the mind is illuminated, so much the more perfect a mirror of the universe it is. A wholly illuminated mind will clearly and distinctly mirror the whole universe, and be clearly conscious of its connection with all other beings. For this

perfect being there is no longer any joy or pain egoistically referred by it only to itself; the happiness of such a being consists wholly in sympathetic joy at the happiness and at the perfection of all other beings, and especially of men; or, in a word, it consists in love. For "to love means to rejoice at the happiness of another; or what is the same thing, it is to regard the happiness of others as one's own." Thus does the originally eudæmonistic and egoistic principle of morals become a comprehensive principle of enlightenment and universal philanthropy.

As we regard Leibniz as pre-eminently the founder of the German Enlightenment, we may also here sum up his views regarding immortality as being in place beside the theory of freewill and happiness. At the outset, it may be mentioned that Leibniz adduces some arguments for immortality which stand in no relation to his own system, but are almost even inconsistent with it. The desire after happiness and the disinclination to unhappiness, are implanted in our nature. Happiness is nothing but lasting joy; but our joy here below is not lasting, because we are exposed to many accidents. The existence of God, however, makes it enough to be virtuous in order to be happy; for if the soul follow reason and the commandments given by God, it is sure of its happiness, although it cannot be found in this life. The greatest happiness here below consists in the hope of future happiness.—Further, in the case of most men, it is only the thought of eternity that is able to keep them faithful to virtue, if regard to the life in time does not incite them to it. It is only the fear of punishment that can keep many from crime, and only the hope of reward that can strengthen them to struggle for right and truth.—It is also inconceivable that the wise and just God will not reward goodness and punish evil in a future life, seeing that in the present world there remains so much that is unequalized.—The consideration that the immortality of the soul is an innate idea, already corresponds to the spirit of this system. It is represented as the foundation of all theology. Without it even the doctrine of Providence would

be useless; all natural theology would be vain; and nothing could be done against atheism.

It is only by proceeding from his conception of the Monad that we obtain a correct insight into Leibniz's doctrine of Immortality. It is an essential characteristic of substance that it does not perish. Descartes had also maintained immortality in the sense of the imperishableness of substance; but as he teaches only two substances, body and mind, and makes individual things, and consequently individual bodies and minds, arise out of these substances, he does not thereby exclude the view that things pass through numberless transformations; that matter which now forms a human body perhaps belonged earlier or will belong later to a block of stone or a plant; and that the soul which now constitutes my ego, has perhaps already belonged to a thousand others or will belong to thousands more. Not so Leibniz. To him every monad is a substance, and every monad has at the same time a determinate individuality of its own. Hence in his view the imperishableness of substance implies at the same time the continued existence of this determinate definite individuality. —Every monad, as we have seen, is an ensouled body; and hence souls cannot exist without bodies, nor bodies without souls. Every monad is an individual thing, that is, a determinate soul with a determinate body; and hence the direct passage of the soul out of one body into any other, or a metempsychosis, is impossible. "As regards the transmigration of souls, I am far from holding this doctrine of Pythagoras, which van Helmont the younger and some others have wished to revive; for I maintain that not merely the soul as such, but the very same *individuum*, continues to exist." The Monad, however, is engaged in passing through a perpetual development. Because of the inseparable unity of soul and body, this development can only be a development of both, including the body. In other words, the soul, when developed to a higher degree of perfection, must necessarily obtain a more perfect body; it cannot attain this by metempsychosis, and hence it can only be through gradual transformation of the body.



Both these points of view demand a perpetual metamorphosis of the body.—And hence death is not the separation, nor birth the union, of a soul and a body. They are severally but “the going out of and the entering into a special form of this advancing matamorphosis; death is the assumption of the chrysalis form and is decrease, birth is unfolding and increase.” Hence in the strict sense of the term there is neither a complete generation nor a complete death, such as would consist in a separation of the body from the soul. What we call generations are developments and enlargements. What we call death are chrysalizations and diminishings.—If there is no first birth, either by way of the origination of an individual nor of a union of body and soul, the whole individual must have existed from the beginning. It did not indeed exist in the form of its later development, but as a capacity or preformation. In this capacity the individual itself exists; and by means of generation it is only made capable of a great metamorphosis of form. Outside of the order of generation we see similar things: as when worms become flies, or caterpillars butterflies. This capacity, however, itself constitutes a living body; and thus Leibniz, under reference to numerous authorities, assumes “that the souls which once on a time become human souls, have existed in the seed like those of the other species, and that they have always existed in the form of organized bodies in ancestors up to Adam, or from the beginning of things.” He found this view confirmed by the contemporary discovery of the so-called spermatozoa by Leuwenhoek.

This is the so-called natural immortality, or as Leibniz puts it, imperishableness (*indefectibilitas*), from which the so-called moral immortality, that is alone called immortality (*immortalitas*) by Leibniz, is strictly distinguished. The former belongs to all beings, the latter only to men. This is not to be taken as if a new principle came in here; it holds because the monads last and persist in their special individuality, and because men as persons or moral beings are essentially distinguished from the lower beings. The immortality of man is therefore also entirely of a special kind. Man is a being with self-conscious-



ness and memory : and these prerogatives of his spiritual personality remain after the natural death. With the identity of the self-consciousness, the moral identity is also immediately given. The continuity of the development of itself excludes the idea that any state or activity can ever be entirely without subsequent effect, or be as it were completely extinguished. Hence it is also impossible that the guilt of our sin and its consequence in the consciousness of guilt and its internal torment, can cease. And thus Leibniz, quite in the spirit of his system, comes to the assertion of the eternity of punishments. These indeed are not external, corporeal punishments, but it is inexplicable how Leibniz, from any other reason than too great an accommodation to the doctrine of the Church, could say regarding Purgatory, to which the reference is limited : "I do not give up the view that a certain temporal punishment after this life is very rational and probable." The good also obtain a heavenly reward : and as goodness consists in the enlightenment of our mind, the heavenly reward consists in the blessed vision of God, who is Himself the light of our soul and the only immediate object of our knowledge. Our happiness hereafter will consist in making constant progress to new joys and perfections, of which the joy and the satisfaction which arise from earnest scientific investigation of the works of God in this life are only a foretaste. For "we know not how far our capacities and our cognitions may be extended in the whole eternity that awaits us." At the same time, however, it is declared that as God is infinite and we are always but finite, our knowledge of God can never be entirely perfect.—On account of the necessary connection of the soul and the body, the continued existence is naturally related also to the body. "The soul always retains even in death an organized body." The possibility of the continued existence of the body is founded upon the view of a "seed" already referred to. Or, as Leibniz also says, every body of men and of animals, no less than of plants and of minerals, has a germ of its substance which is so subtle that it remains even in the ashes of things that are burned, and contracts as it were

into an invisible centre. Or, as he says again, there is in every body a sort of substance-blossom which is given in birth and remains always preserved without increase or diminution. Even a cannibal contains within him only his own substance-blossom, as he whom he eats retains his, without there being any mixture of them. And as death is in general but the laying aside of a particular phenomenal form of the body and at the same time the unfolding of a new form, so it is with the death of man. Leibniz, however, is too reserved and sober in his expressions to give more precise statements regarding the state of this body which must correspond naturally to the perfection of the soul belonging to it.

Thus far we have not yet mentioned the Theology of Leibniz, not because we agree with those who make his theology directly contradict the monadology, or at least allow only a loose connection with it; but, on the contrary, in order to make the close connection and the exact correspondence of both come closely into view. We will begin with the Arguments for the existence of God; then we will consider his doctrine of the nature of God and His relation to the world; and finally, we will take up his views regarding the essence of religion and the relation between revelation and reason.

The knowledge of God, according to Leibniz, is of the greatest importance. This holds not merely in reference to religion, but generally because it is impossible to love God without knowing His beauty. This knowledge is of the greatest value for science. "The knowledge of God is not less the principle of the sciences than His being and will are the principle of things. It amounts to a consecration of philosophy when its waters are made to flow from the fountain of the attributes of God." The happy life is also conditioned by this knowledge. So far from its being the case that "the thought that there is no God has never made any one tremble, but the thought that there is such a Being has done so." Leibniz regards it as the loss of a great good if there is no God, as we can only find true happiness in love to Him.—Of

the Arguments for the Existence of God, Leibniz regards the Ontological Argument of Descartes as incomplete. It infers from the idea of the most perfect Being to His existence; for if He did not exist He would not be perfect; and hence His existence is necessary. In this, however, it is assumed that an absolutely perfect being is possible; if this possibility is admitted, the argument stands, but if it is denied, it falls. This defect Leibniz seeks to get rid of by completing the Ontological Argument by the Cosmological Argument, which, however, under his hand passes into the Teleological or Physico-theological Argument. Individual things can only be explained by the conception of causality, which is the principle of all empirical truths. Everything must have its sufficient reason; and guided by this axiom we are led at last to a Being who is the cause of all things, and who is therefore not caused by another, but exists merely of Himself. If we start from the contingency of finite things, we come to a necessary Being; and if we take their unity of design into account, we come to a single and all-wise Being. Upon this turn of the argument, which closely coincides with the idea of the pre-established harmony, Leibniz lays the greatest importance. "It is clear that the harmony of so many beings which exercise no mutual influence upon each other, can only spring from a general cause which directs all things, and which must combine infinite power and wisdom in itself to predetermine their harmonious orders." The argument from the eternal truths, set forth by Leibniz, is only a special application of this argument. There are eternal truths; these can only exist in the understanding of an eternal and necessary Being; therefore this Being or God must exist.—His most characteristic argument for the existence of God lies, however, in the position that the doctrine of monads necessarily implies it. The law of continuity rules in the world of monads; and in infinitely small differences the graduated realm of the monads advances from lower forms to higher. Every monad is involved in a process of development, and is thus striving after a higher monad. It is therefore wrong to regard man

as the concluding member of the series of stages in this realm, although he is the most perfect of the beings given to us in experience. In like manner, our soul, far from being the last of all, finds itself rather in the middle of things, from which position we can descend and ascend. There would otherwise be found, in the realm of things an error "that some philosophers call a *vacuum formarum*." These higher beings we certainly cannot know distinctly, but we must postulate their existence on the ground of the law of continuity; and we may also infer by the law of analogy that they are more perfect individuals, more finely organized beings, higher spirits, more transparent bodies. In short, they are "genii." Leibniz only indicates as possible the view that after death we are transformed by the process of metamorphosis into such genii and ascend to always higher perfection; but the representatives of the German Enlightenment were fond of dwelling upon this idea. With the very same necessity, according to the law of continuity, we must conceive the graduated realm of the monads as closed by a supreme power, which no other power transcends; that is, by a supreme Monad which is the last end and the highest goal of the universal striving of all the other monads. This Supreme Monad is God.

Those positions already contain the most important determinations given by Leibniz regarding the nature of God. As a Monad, God is a simple, independent, individual Being; that is, there is only one God, and He is absolutely distinct from the world. "It is absurd to assume only a single active principle as the world-soul, and only a passive principle as matter." Let us remember that every monad is a limited self-activity, a union of activity and passivity, and that perfection rests upon activity, and imperfection, and particularly matter, rests upon passivity. The more perfect the monad is, so much the greater is its active power, and so much the less is its passive power. In the highest monad or God, there is therefore only activity and no passivity; He is without limit and without matter. "God alone is a substance truly free from matter, because He is pure activity (*actus*

purus), and without any passivity, such as everywhere constitutes the nature of matter." Hence God is immaterial; He is pure thinking; He is without limit; He has therefore nothing out of Himself that can be independent of Him; He is the sum of all realities; in short, He is the absolutely perfect Being, "For perfection is nothing but greatness of positive reality taken in the exact sense, without any of the limits and bounds of things. But where there are absolutely no limits as in God, there the perfection is absolutely infinite."

As the absolutely perfect Being, God is elevated far above all other beings, including the human mind. Yet God is a monad. He is not therefore exempt from the law of analogy; and although Leibniz declares that "the idea of the infinite is not formed by an extension of the finite idea," yet the attributes of God are to be known by our raising the powers of our soul to the highest potency, although it may only be by an analogy widened to the utmost difference. Every monad is an active power, and in the form of perception and striving we have this active power in man as understanding and will. When these are potentiated to the highest perfection, we get the divine attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness. "In God there exists the Power which is the source of all things, and the Knowledge which embraces the world of ideas down to its least parts; and, finally, the Will which produces changes or creations according to the principle of the Best. And this corresponds exactly to what constitutes the fundamental powers in the created monads,—namely, the power of perceiving and striving." Of these attributes, however, in correspondence with the whole character of the system, it is wisdom which is mentioned most.

The relation of God to the world is determined primarily to be that God has created the world. This groundedness of things in God goes so far that even the possibility of things is grounded in God; for if God did not exist, nothing would be possible, as even what is possible from eternity is included in the ideas of the divine intellect. God is thus as the Supreme Monad, and not merely the end and the goal of all finite



monads. He is at the same time as highest Power their ultimate sole-sufficient cause; and in this relation lies the highest union of final causes and of efficient causes. Things do not arise by emanation from the being of God, nor are they to be regarded as a product of His development. Such a development is excluded in the case of the highest Monad; for development consists in a capacity, or in merely obscure and unconscious perceptions being worked out to greater clearness, but the highest Monad is clear and distinct perception through and through without any obscure capacity. Things are therefore created by God, and they are created out of nothing. Accordingly, the creation of things is not necessary, but free. This, however, is not to be misunderstood. Leibniz expresses himself frequently to the effect that God, before the creation of the world, viewed as present in His understanding all the innumerable possible worlds, and out of these He chose the most perfect. This free choice, however, does not imply that God might just as well have created another world. This very God must create this very world, and could create no other world; this is the main argument for the philosopheme of "the best world." But this necessity was not a metaphysical one; that is, the creation of another world would have included no contradiction, and therefore would not have violated the axiom of identity. It is, however, a moral necessity; that is, it would have contradicted the laws of the divine will, that act according to ends and always carry out what is best and perfect, either to create no world or to create another world. On this moral necessity rests physical necessity, or the fact that in nature everything must have its sufficient reason. The world created by God likewise needs to be preserved by Him. Leibniz decidedly opposes the opinion that nature can develop herself in virtue of indwelling forces, and that she does not need the assistance of God. Rather do all monads depend on God as they have their origin in Him; and although we do not comprehend *how* this is in detail, yet the scholastics have very correctly understood that preservation is nothing but a constant



creation. The preservation of things is conceived as a constant divine influence upon the creatures. Leibniz, however, protests decidedly against the view that God is to be regarded as thereby making from time to time a correction on His work, and that such had become necessary.

It seems as if there could be no place for Miracles along with the Pre-established Harmony, but it is only apparently so. Leibniz indeed emphatically exhorts us not to assume a miracle without reason when the natural explanation involves difficulty; and he cannot recognise the wonderful facts recorded of the angels as true miracles, because these are naturally explained by the higher perfection of the genii. How much importance Leibniz puts on the reality of miracles is clear from his question: "Would it not amount to making God the soul of the world, if all His actions are natural like those which the soul performs in the body? God thus becomes a part of nature." Miracles, although they are contrary to physical necessity, are possible, because the moral order of nature stands higher than its physical order. God has also instituted the physical order, and not without reason; but the universal reasons for the good may in certain cases be outweighed by more important reasons of a higher order. As the higher order is also comprehended in God's plan, it is not correct to speak of arbitrariness on the part of God; for "miracles also belong to the universal order, are conformable to the plan of God, and are contained in the conception of this universe which is the result of the divine plan." Miracles, instead of being opposed to the order of the world, are thus included as possible in God's plan of the world; and God had resolved to perform them when He chose this world. These miracles indeed are not subservient to the preservation, or even to the correction of the work of creation, but only to redemption. "If, then, God works miracles, this does not arise from the requirements of nature, but those of grace. To judge otherwise would be to have a very poor idea of the wisdom and power of God." It is further to be noticed that miracles do not contravene physical,

but metaphysical necessity; and they are thus only above reason, but not contrary to reason. It is clear that the whole justification of miracles rests upon the distinction of physical, moral, and metaphysical necessity.

The actually existing world has been chosen with moral necessity out of the innumerable possible worlds, and it has been realized by God; and hence it is completely dependent on God, and it is also the best world.

Determinism necessarily follows from the pre-established harmony which does not allow the least deviation from the plan that has been established. "Out of numerous possibilities God has chosen that which He knew to be the most suitable. But when He has once chosen, everything is comprehended in His choice, and nothing can be altered; for He has foreseen everything and arranged everything once for all."

Optimism is a necessary consequence of determinism. The world rests upon God's decree, and God's will is perfect, that is, it involves essential union of the highest power and the highest wisdom; and hence the world must be perfect, or at least be as perfect as possible. In other words, the world must be the best of possible worlds. This is shown *à priori* in two ways: from the conception of God and from the conception of the world. God's power is sufficient to perform what He wills; His perfect understanding excludes all deception as to what is truly good; and His perfect will is always determined by what is perfect or best. Hence, in accordance with His own nature, God must necessarily have created a perfect world, or at least the best possible world. If we start in our reasoning from the world as the sum-total of all things, then viewing it merely as real, it is contingent, and other worlds than it are possible. But the fact can only rest upon an act of choice that of numberless possible worlds just this one has become real; this choice must be occasioned by a sufficient reason; and this reason can only lie in the superior excellence of the real world, or in the fact that it is the best of all possible worlds.

This assertion, however, seems to be contradicted *à pos-*

*teriori* by the fact that there is in this world so much imperfection, evil, and sin. How is this undeniable fact to be reconciled with that assertion of the best world? This question has earnestly occupied Leibniz from the beginning to the end of his philosophical career, and his *Théodicée* is specially devoted to the solution of it. The result of his examination of this question shortly is, that the evil in the world can detract so little from its perfection that, in spite of all its evils, this world is more perfect than any other world would be even though it contained less evil, because it would also as regards perfection necessarily stand below the existing world. Evil is distinguished into metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfection or want; and this imperfection is absolutely inseparable from the nature of finite things, so that whoever would require God to call creatures without imperfection into existence, would demand from Him nothing else than that He should create no creatures at all. Of metaphysical evil it is to be said that it has no *causa efficiens* but only a *causa deficiens*, because it consists in a deficiency, and it is necessary in an unconditional or metaphysical sense, because no creature by its very idea can be without deficiency or want. Physical and moral evil follow as necessary consequences from metaphysical evil. Acting and willing follow from power, and from a limited power there can only proceed limited action and limited will. Physical evil is limitation of action, and moral evil is limitation of will, and they are both accordingly conditioned, or physically necessary.—Imperfection is therefore only a want of perfection; pain, as a feeling of imperfection, is only a want of joy as the feeling of perfection; and the bad is only a want of the good. In short, evil is not opposed to good as an independent power, but it is subordinated to it as mere defect, and it stands continually under the supremacy of the good. Nay more, evil appears even as a necessary condition of the good, as in a musical composition dissonances are often requisite to bring about a satisfying impression on the whole; or as in a picture what appears a dull and artless daubing of

colours in detail is conducive to the harmonious effect of the whole. The perfection of the world consists in nothing else than in the perfect harmony of the universe, and in the universal progress to higher perfection. Harmony requires that there should exist beings of the most various degrees of perfection, and therefore also such as are affected with imperfection. Development consists in the gradual stripping off of imperfections in order to rise to higher stages. Hence no objection can be made to God because of evil, for "the creatures have their perfection from God, and their defects from their own nature, which cannot be without limitation. And it is just in this that they are distinguished from God." God Himself, however, cannot change metaphysical necessity, that is, He cannot think things otherwise; and as the will is guided by wisdom, neither can He will them otherwise than as their perfection allows. As their idea includes imperfection or evil, He can only think and will them along with this. —The same holds also of moral evil or the bad. We have already seen that Leibniz decidedly denies human freedom in the sense of a groundless or irrational choice. Responsibility for what is bad is not thereby taken away from us; but as freedom is as decidedly affirmed in the sense that all compulsory external influence is repudiated and the grounds of our actions are found merely in our own proper nature, man is thus alone responsible for his sin.

Such is a brief outline of Leibniz's system of philosophy, which is religious through and through, and the question now comes as to how he judges regarding Religion itself. As already stated, all monads are viewed as going through a constant development, and every development has a determinate goal set before it. Development is thus a striving towards a certain goal. We have seen that God as the supreme Monad is this goal. All monads thus represent God and strive towards Him.<sup>1</sup> This representation and striving, however, come first to consciousness in man; they are first

<sup>1</sup> This view is at least the logical consequence of the system, and is in correspondence with it. Leibniz says in the *Monadologie* (§ 83) "that souls in

felt and consciously present in him. Now, as has been already shown, all conscious perception of another being leads to love, and thus the conscious perception of God and the striving after Him lead to love of God. And this love to God, which consists in the felt striving after God, and which, from the essential connection of willing and knowing, can never be without knowledge of God, is the simple element which forms the psychological foundation of all religion.—As in all monads, according to the degree of their perfection, there is more or less actual perception of God and striving towards Him as the highest end, and as this first comes into consciousness in man, religion is to be regarded as a prerogative of man above all the lower creatures. Hence God stands in a much more inward relation to man than to these creatures. God stands related to the lower creatures or the corporeal world as the former and architect of the world (*inventeur et architecte*). On the other hand, minds or spirits enter into a certain communion with God; He stands related to them as a prince to his subjects or as a father to his children. Spirits feel themselves, on the one hand, subject to God, because they are finite while He is infinite; and, on the other hand, they feel themselves related to Him, because both God and man are spirits, and men as intelligent spirits are created according to the will of God. “Spirits are capable of entering into communion with God, and God is related to them, not only as an inventor to his machine (which is his relation to the other creatures), but also as a prince to his subjects, or better still, as a father to his children. The assembly of spirits therefore constitutes the city of God, or the most perfect State that is possible under the most perfect monarch.”—According to this distinction between the relation in which God stands to the lower creatures and the relation in which He stands to spirits, Leibniz contrasts the “moral world” or the “kingdom of grace” with the merely “natural world” or

general are living mirrors or images of the universe of the creatures, but the spirits are also images of the Divinity Himself, or of the very Author of Nature,” etc.



the "kingdom of nature." "This city of God, this truly universal world, is a moral world in the natural world. It is the most sublime and divine of the works of God, and in it God's glory truly exists; for there would be no glory of God at all were not His greatness and goodness known and admired by spirits." "And as we have already established a perfect harmony between the two kingdoms of nature, known as that of efficient causes and final causes, we must here also bring into relief another harmony between the physical kingdom and the moral kingdom of grace, or between God as the architect of the machine of the world and God as the monarch of the world of spirits."

Religion is love to God resting upon correct ideas of God. In this Leibniz comes into contact with the mystics, yet his agreement with them is not so great as some expressions of the work *Theologia Mystica* might lead us to suppose. The "internal light" of which he speaks is not a supernatural illumination, but is natural reason. Love to God is the highest joy and blessedness of man, and religion in this love comes into contact with morality, the highest goal of which is happiness. All love is happiness, because it is joy in the happiness of another. Now God is the most perfect object of our love, and hence love to Him is the greatest happiness. Everything else must accordingly be sacrificed to this happiness and to this love. "Every act by which we prefer our enjoyment to that which corresponds to the honour of God and His good pleasure, as reason and faith teach us to know them, is actually a real union with God, even although there may be a thought inexpressly of its revocation!" Love to God leads by necessity to true love for oneself and one's neighbour, because the kingdom of His spirits cannot be separated from God. Religion in its exercise or practical application thus leads necessarily to morality. "Can it be believed that Christians have actually imagined they could be devout without loving their neighbour, or be pious without loving God?" Here we find the scientific establishment of the assertion which we have already met with in the



English Deists, and which constitutes one of the most essential principles of the German Enlightenment, that true religion cannot, in fact, be contrary to morality.

Leibniz does not express himself regarding worship and ceremonies in connection with natural religion. The thought does not appear to have occurred to him that love to God requires another external representation than moral action. Nor is there anything more implied by the statement in the *Systema Theologicum*, that "every religion requires that God be worshipped in an assembly of men (in cœtu hominum)." The form of worship established in the Catholic Church is assailed in the strongest terms. Leibniz sees in it merely a support of superstition and a means of leading the people at will by the aid of their easily excited phantasy and of turning them away from what is essential. Ceremonies appear to him a bad substitute for the fulfilment of real moral duty, and they are therefore extremely pernicious. "Piety has, contrary to the intention of our divine Teacher, been reduced to ceremonies, and His doctrine has been burdened with formulas. These ceremonies were often little fitted to serve virtue, and the formulas were often very obscure."

Religion is love to God, and love is not possible without knowledge. Hence religion is not possible without knowledge of God; and the more perfect the knowledge of God is, so much the more perfect also is religion. It is upon this that the confidence of Leibniz and the early Enlightenment rests, that religion and culture, theology and philosophy, are in no respects opposites, and hence their demand for the enlargement of knowledge even in religion. The idea of God is felt within us in consciousness, and thereby it becomes faith. The knowledge of God belongs to the ideas that are innate in us; it is always present in us, but it is developed gradually according as our knowledge in general or our nature is developed. The thought is approached that this is the basis of the agreement and the difference of many religions, and that in so far as the consciousness of God lies at the basis of them all, they are identical; while in so far as the conscious-

ness of God lies at the basis of each of them at a special stage of its development, they form the different positive or historical religions. This thought is at least approached and almost touched by Leibniz, but it was not clearly expressed till much later.

Our knowledge of God is partly grounded in ourselves, and thus religion is natural; and it is partly realized by external communication, and thus religion is historical or positive. Regarding this communication of the knowledge of religion, a distinction must be made between the first communication on the part of God and its conveyance through other men, or between immediate and mediate revelation. "Revelation is an extraordinary communication of God. But a man inspired by God can communicate to others no new simple idea, because he can only employ the words, or external signs, or their combination, which awaken in us simple ideas such as are ordinarily connected with them. Whatever may have been the new ideas that the Apostle Paul may have received when he was carried into the third heaven, all that he could say of them is that they were things which no eye had seen, nor ear heard, and which had not entered into the heart of man. Suppose there were creatures in Jupiter with six senses, and that God conveyed to one of us in a supernatural way the idea of their sixth sense, he could not convey it by words to other men. We must therefore distinguish between original and traditional revelation (*révélation originelle et traditionnelle*). The former is an impression which God immediately makes upon the mind, and to which we can set no limits; the other only comes by the usual channels of communication, and cannot give new simple ideas."

An immediate revelation is declared by Leibniz to be entirely possible. Its possibility rests upon the essential relationship of the nature of God to the nature of man, which makes the reception and the understanding of divine communications possible to the latter. This question, however, is not discussed in detail. On the other hand, Leibniz expresses himself several times at length to the effect that prophecies do

not at all contradict the pre-established harmony that is asserted by him. Indeed he has always said that the present goes pregnant with the future, and that however distant things may be from one another, so complete a connection subsists between them, that whoever might be acute enough might read the one in the other. As there may perhaps be in another world dogs with so fine a nose as to scent their game thousands of miles away, so there may perhaps also be in the universe a planet where prophesying is more common than on ours.—Regarding visions and revelations, we ought not to decide cavalierly, but if we meet persons endowed with such powers, we ought to preserve them like a curiosity or an object for a cabinet, and to admire the nature of the human mind, all the powers of which we do not know.

Revelation, however, attaches itself to the nature of the prophet. Visions stand in relation to the natural disposition of the persons to whose spirit God accommodates Himself, because He does not work superfluous miracles. This was also the case with the actual prophets, so that we must almost imagine that Ezekiel had studied architecture, and had been a court engineer, because he sees such fine buildings in his visions. On the other hand, a prophet belonging to the country, like Hosea or Amos, sees only landscapes and rural images; whereas Daniel, who was a statesman, expresses the regulated order of universal monarchies. But notwithstanding this, the great prophets, and especially those who teach the detail of the future, need supernatural gifts; for it is impossible that a human mind, however acute, should be here sufficient of its natural power, because every particular event of nature depends on the co-operation of an endless number of causes.

Mediate revelation specially requires to be tested in order that we may not fall from easy credulity into unbelief, or take the illusion of an evil genius, or our own false apprehension, for the will of God. Revelation must therefore carry certain marks in itself, and these are usually called motives of credibility. If it is without these, we may with a good right refuse to give credence to it, only if a command neither con-

tradicts reason nor another revelation it is safer to follow it. The miracles of the teacher of the religion and the holiness of his doctrine, are regarded as such marks; and the possibility of any revelation is specially in its favour.

The relation of Revelation to Reason is such that the principles of reason should determine us to a believing reception of the revelation, and that the contents of revelation can never be contrary to reason, although they may be above reason. To believe a thing is not merely to repeat it and to adopt it without reflecting earnestly upon it; and hence intelligent men have always rightly regarded those with suspicion who asserted that they did not need to trouble themselves in matters of faith about reasons and proofs. Whoever is in favour of this blind belief has no reason for preferring the Bible to the Koran, or to the ancient books of the Brahmins.—The contents of revelation are not contrary to reason, but they are above reason. They cannot be contrary to reason; for one truth can never contradict another truth, and therefore the truth of reason can never contradict the truth of revelation. Further, our conviction can have no firmer ground than demonstration, and if a revelation is contrary to the truths resting on demonstration, it can never reckon upon being accepted with full conviction. Revelation may well go beyond reason. The truths of reason are of two kinds. Some of them are the eternal truths of geometry, of logic, and of metaphysics, which are absolutely necessary, and which accordingly can never be contradicted by faith. The other truths of reason are the positive truths, or the laws which God has given to nature, and which He can also dispense with. Revelation may contradict such truths. Further, right reason is to be distinguished from perverted reason; the former forms a chain of truths, the latter is altered by prejudices and passions. Reason, however, has to avoid and to correct such errors and deceptions by its own power.

Leibniz believes that he has thus proved that Theology and Philosophy do not all stand in antagonism to each other. "To renounce reason in matters of religion is, in my eyes, almost a

sure mark either of a wilfulness which borders on fanaticism, or what is still worse, of hypocrisy." Philosophy, however, has no right to set itself in opposition to religion and its revelation. There is a whole sphere that lies between what is necessary and impossible, or between what must happen according to a logical necessity and what cannot happen according to the same necessity, and this embraces the whole of the region of facts which depends only on physical necessity. Here reason cannot refute revelation. This distinction between what is against reason and what is above reason became the shibboleth of the whole of the German *Aufklärung*. Leibniz reckons the most inconceivable Christian dogmas among those things which are merely above reason, such as the Trinity, transubstantiation, incarnation, etc. The German *Aufklärung* always contracted the boundary of this sphere, until the whole distinction was dissolved, and the inherent spirit of criticism historically carried itself out to completeness.

Religion, as love to God, leads to action as well as to knowledge. This action coincides with what is required by morality, and the knowledge leads to certain theoretical principles or dogmas. The doctrines of natural religion relate to the divine nature and to man. The belief in the existence of one God and the immortality of the human soul constitutes the whole sum and substance of natural religion. Knowledge and moral action are the purer forms in which religion is found in a select few. The great crowd, however, always pervert the true fear of God into formalities. These formalities are likewise of a twofold kind: formulæ of faith corresponding to knowledge, and external ceremonies corresponding to conduct. If these formalities were of such a nature that they were conducive to the knowledge of the saving truth and the practice of right conduct, they would be quite good, and the striving of Moses and of Christ, who was the founder of the purest and most enlightened religion, was directed towards them. The heathen had only one kind of formalities, namely, religious ceremonies, while they had no articles of faith.



They did not know whether their gods were actual persons or mere signs and symbols of natural powers; their mysteries consisted only of secret institutions, which were often ludicrous and absurd. Abraham and Moses established among the Hebrews the belief in one only God as the origin of all that is good and the creator of all things. For although among other nations wise and prudent persons spake in a similar way of God, they did not succeed in making men follow them and receive their doctrine as law. Moses, however, did not bring the doctrine of immortality into his law, although it accorded with his opinions, and was virtually taught. Jesus Christ first took away the veil and taught that the immortal souls enter into another life, and there receive rewards corresponding to their deeds. Christ turned natural religion completely into a law, and gave it the authority and validity of a public doctrine. He alone did what so many wise philosophers had laboured in vain to accomplish; and the religion of the wise became the religion of the whole people. Even Mohammed did not depart from these important doctrines of natural religion, but brought them to the distant peoples in Asia and Africa, who, in their heathen superstition, were opposed to the Christian truth. In regard to the knowledge of God, Christianity stands higher than Judaism. Christ has brought to perfection what was begun by Moses. He has made God not only the object of our fear and reverence, but also of our love and heartfelt affection. This true religion, which is natural religion made into a universal law by Christ, was afterwards again corrupted and falsified. "Godliness has been turned into ceremonies quite against the opinion of our divine Master, and doctrine has become encumbered with formulæ."

These are essentially the views expressed by Leibniz regarding the several positive religions. That his statements are defective is evident enough. We are left in the dark as to whether in the beginning of history natural religion prevailed purely by itself, so that heathenism is to be regarded as a corruption; or whether the law of development



rules here also. Nor do we learn anything as to whether and where a divine revelation has actually taken place. Moses and Christ, although divine prophets, are still represented only as founders or rather renovators of natural religion. It thus naturally became the task of the German Enlightenment to shell out natural religion in its greatest possible purity from the later corrupted form of Christianity. As regards the historical mode of viewing religion, the German *Aufklärung* did not advance essentially beyond the position of its founder until the time of Lessing.

## II.

### WOLFF AND THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

Leibniz continued throughout his life to be an aristocrat even as a thinker. His thoughts, indeed, found a response in a small circle of select spirits, but were not able to become a universally ruling power. His views, however, came to be a power after his death in consequence of their being popularized by Christian Wolff (1679-1774).<sup>1</sup> Wolff himself zealously asserted the independence of his philosophy, and was indignant at his scholar Bilfinger because he used the expression "Leibniz - Wolffian philosophy." An impartial historian, however, must acknowledge that Wolff "has not established one new point of view of general importance," but that he borrowed all the important thoughts of the philosophy of Leibniz. His systematizing, however, is mainly his own, and it is not to be reckoned as a slight merit. Leibniz, as is well known, has expressed his thoughts without systematic order in a series of letters, and in treatises that are often of small extent, and not without repetitions in one place and lacunæ in another. The application of his principles to the several sciences is also wanting. Wolff, possessing only a logically

<sup>1</sup> Of Wolff's writings we have specially to consider here his *Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata*, 1737, and his *Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen*, 3 Aufl. 1725. Cf. Zeller, *ut supra*.

clear and dry mathematical understanding, but without any original faculty of his own, has arranged the fragmentary thoughts of his master into a system, and constructed a formal whole out of them. He has also cultivated the several sciences, with the exception of *Æsthetics*, from the point of view of this system. He defines philosophy to be "the science of the possible, as regards how and why or wherefore anything is possible;" and he thus again sets up philosophy as the all-comprehending and universally-established queen of all the separate sciences. Moreover, Wolff wrote mostly in German, and he thereby introduced philosophy to wider circles of readers.

It is not possible to systematize, and especially to popularize, a philosophy in detail for wider circles of readers, without adopting a correspondingly superficial treatment of it. We find this in Wolff, yet it is to be remembered at the same time that the profoundest work of Leibniz, his *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement*, was not published till 1765, after Wolff's death. We have seen how Leibniz, along with the clear and distinct knowledge in which he sees the foundation of all theoretical and practical perfection, likewise attributes great importance to obscure and confused knowledge. Wolff speaks only of the former, and thus intellectual enlightenment is the high goal to which his whole striving is devoted. Hence he demands nothing more urgently than distinct conceptions and fundamental proofs; for philosophy ought to deduce all its principles by correct inference from irrefragable principles, or in other words, it must proceed according to the mathematical method. Within this intellectual enlightenment there is, however, a certain dualism which distinguishes Wolff in a manner that is not to his advantage.

Leibniz likewise recognises the promotion of happiness by knowledge, but to him the two are identical and immediately one. With Wolff, science has to serve the external end of making men happy, and what he misses in the previous philosophy is not only evidence, but above all practical utility. Leibniz distinguishes empirical knowledge from

rational knowledge, but it is Wolff who on this basis first carries out the separation of rational and empirical science, as in rational and empirical psychology and theology. Leibniz finds the essential nature of all things in the activity of perception, the limitation of which by individual determinateness gives the matter or the body of all monads. Wolff distinguishes in things as two different elements: (1) the matter which gives body extension with its power of resistance, and (2) an active power which is not exactly percipient, or matter, substance, and moving force. Leibniz everywhere refers the harmonious combination of individual things into a universe to the pre-established harmony; Wolff only applies the doctrine to the union of soul and body, while with regard to the lower corporeal beings he has recourse to physical influence. In Wolff the harmony of the world appears no longer as the natural immanent order of the world, but as an order introduced into the world externally by God. God foresaw into what sort of circumstances every body would come, and He constituted the human soul so that it would bring forth of its own essential power all its sensations and perceptions in the corresponding order. God likewise foresaw what external movements of the body man's soul, in virtue of its freedom, would desire, and He constituted the machine of the human body so that it would perform of itself at the right time the corresponding motions. The end which controls everything is no longer the immanent end or purpose, but a purely external one; and in place of the immanent conformity to design, there comes in the common external utility. The highest that man now experiences is the useful; and therefore the value of all things is measured by the direct or indirect advantage which man draws from them as that which most appeals to the "sound human understanding."

This is the general character of the Wolffian system in its relation to the philosophy of Leibniz. The system itself falls into Pure Philosophy and Applied Philosophy. The former has to do with the Deity, the human soul, and the corporeal world, and it is thus divided into Theology, Psychology, and

Cosmology, to which Ontology is prefixed as an exposition of what belongs to existence generally. Applied Philosophy lays down precepts for cognition in Logic, and for action in Practical Philosophy, which is subdivided into Ethics, Politics, and Economics.

Wolff carefully distinguishes Natural Theology from the revealed knowledge of God. The former is founded merely upon our natural knowledge, while the latter is exclusively based upon Scripture, but the former serves as a preparation and introduction to it. Natural Theology has to prove the existence of God, and to develop His attributes. In doing so it pursues a twofold way. Proceeding *à posteriori*, or from experience, Wolff infers the existence of God by the Cosmological Argument, and in such a way that the contingency of the world is specially accentuated. Hence this Argument as presented by Wolff is commonly designated the *Argumentum e contingentia mundi*. It proceeds as follows. If anything exists, it must have its sufficient reason; now we at least exist; and therefore we must have a sufficient reason. This reason does not lie in us, but out of us. This other being may also have its sufficient reason out of itself. But if we go on farther, we must at last come to a Being which has the sufficient reason of its existence in itself, because otherwise everything would be without ground or reason. This ultimate Being is the *Ens necessarium*, which does not need for its existence the power of another being, but exists of its own power, and is sufficient of itself for its existence; it is *Ens a se*. This necessary Being is not the world, nor its elements, nor the soul, but an extra-mundane Being, which is the ground of the existence of the world, or God.

Wolff proceeds *à priori* to prove the existence of God by the Ontological Argument from the conception of the most real being. The most perfect Being, *Ens perfectissimum*, is that Being in which all realities dwell in the highest degree. Such a Being is unlimited, unchangeable, infinite, and without any want. Whereas in a finite being the various states of which it is capable by its nature can only arise one after the

other, an infinite Being can only have necessary and unchangeable determinations; that is, its states are all present in it at the same time. This most perfect Being is God, and hence all realities are in God. And as this also implies necessary existence, God necessarily exists. Because God necessarily exists, His existence is not dependent on another being; He exists merely of His own power. Hence God is *Ens a se*. Here the *à priori* investigation of the second part of natural theology flows wholly into the *à posteriori* result of the first part, and the further details of both are essentially the same.

The *Ens a se* has not arisen and cannot perish; it has no beginning and no end of being; it is *Ens primum et ultimum*, that is, it is eternal. It is not compounded nor corporeal, for all that is compounded and corporeal arises and perishes; it is "*Ens Simplex et corporeus esse nequit*." The visible world and all its parts have not their being of themselves, and hence the *Ens a se* must be distinguished from these things. In this Being all other things have the sufficient ground of their existence, and therefore all those attributes must be ascribed to it in which the sufficient ground for the existence of the world lies. This is the most important canon for obtainment of the attributes of God. God is thus the *Ens a se*, and contains the sufficient ground for the existence of this world and of our soul. Hence He is constantly active power, whence He is also called living, and life is ascribed to Him. In this power the ground must lie for the fact that this world is, instead of its not being, as well as the fact that it is just this world that exists and not another. The reason of this latter fact cannot lie in those points in which the various worlds are like each other, but only in those in which they differ from each other. Hence God must have represented all possible worlds to Himself, and have chosen out of them the one that has become real. Accordingly reason and freewill belong to God, and thus God is a spirit (*spiritus independens*). All realities that belong to us as spirits must also be ascribed to God, only not with those limitations that follow from our

finiteness. This is the second canon for obtaining the divine attributes.

In wearisome detail Wolff then treats of the attributes which constitute the being of God as a spirit. These attributes are reason and will. God's knowledge, as distinguished from that of man, is not merely a capacity, but it is *actus*. It is not obtained by senses and imagination, but is purely rational, and consists in the contemplation of the ideas that are eternally and unchangeably present in God as the *mundus intelligibilis*. God knows not only what is real, but all that can be known. He knows everything at once. In the least part of the world He knows at the same time the whole world. He knows what is most individual, and also the *veritates universales*. In short, the manner of the divine knowledge is elevated above all our conception.

The power of God is the capability of making real what is possible in itself. For as the knowledge of God is limited to what is knowable in itself, so is the divine nature limited to what is possible in itself. God can neither will nor realize anything that is impossible, but this is no limitation of His omnipotence. As regards what is possible, there must also be a definite reason why God wills anything, or does not will it. Of the many possible worlds, God has willed and realized this world only because it is the best. The evil in the world is not an objection to this fact. A distinction must be made between what is absolutely bad and what is relatively bad; the former cannot be avoided in a finite world, the latter does not exist in the actual world. God's power, which is limited only by what is impossible in itself, therefore extends much farther than God's will, which is constantly put into activity by some particular reason. God can likewise make all the other worlds real, etc.

This external relation between divine power and divine will forms, according to Wolff, the basis of the possibility of justifying miracles and immediate revelation. God can perform miracles to whatever extent He may will. God can do what goes beyond the power of all nature. He can



annul the order of nature whenever and as often as He will. The question as to how a miracle is compatible with the order of nature, is explained by Wolff, in his cosmology, in a somewhat unsatisfactory way. By miracles, he says, are meant those changes of bodies which cannot be explained by the way in which their parts are connected with each other, or by their qualities and laws of motion. A miracle does not contradict the nature of that body in which it takes place, for in that case it would be impossible. If a miracle takes place, its occurrence is possible according to the nature of things, but natural causes, or the so-called *causæ efficientes sufficientes*, are not capable of realizing it. Hence every natural effect would be a miracle if it took place without a sufficient natural cause; and therefore we know a miracle primarily from the want of a natural cause. A miracle goes beyond the powers of nature, and must therefore be effected by a Being external to the world; but as nature is controlled, not by an absolute, but only by a relative necessity, such a miracle is impossible. The whole point is that God likewise receives miracles into His eternal world-plan.

On this position is also based the possibility of an immediate revelation, for such a revelation is only possible by a miracle. The further consideration also comes in, that it is not impossible that God should reveal His will to men. God knows by what words His will must be made known, and He also knows with what words or signs He must represent it in order that the recipient of the revelation may know what God wills.—But Wolff endeavours to establish various criteria by which every alleged revelation ought to be tested. Divine revelation must have certain contents which it is necessary for man to know, but which it is impossible to know in another way. This follows from the fact that God never does anything superfluous; but it would be superfluous to reveal things of which the knowledge was either not necessary to man, or attainable without this means. It is, however, tenable that there may be certain things contained in a divine revelation as concomitants of it, such as we may know even by the

right use of reason. Besides, every revelation desiderates a miracle; a miracle is a great change of the material world; and hence God has recourse to this means only from entirely special reasons. Hence revelation must contain mysteries, as things which go beyond reason, but which are nevertheless possible. Nor is an alleged revelation to be regarded as such so soon as it can be shown that the recipient has come to it by the natural powers of his mind. Further, the divine revelation may not contradict the divine attributes; for God wills what is becoming to Him, and hence, in His attributes, there must lie the reason why He wills this and not that. The divine revelation can relate only to what is knowable, and hence it cannot contain contradictions; and just as little can it contradict necessary truths, although it may contradict contingent truths. It can contain nothing which contradicts reason or experience, or propositions which are demonstrated from the principles of reason, or facts that are established by trustworthy experience. The knowledge that is founded upon reason and experience is raised above all doubt; but God cannot possibly plunge any one in error; and hence such knowledge and revelation must harmonize with each other. The divine revelation can prescribe nothing that is contrary to the law of nature, or to the essence and nature of the soul. For what corresponds to the right of nature corresponds also to reason; and as revelation cannot be opposed to the latter, neither can it be to the former. The nature of the soul, again, is unchangeable; and hence it is impossible to command anything that is opposed to it, such as that food and drink which taste agreeably shall not taste agreeably. In the divine revelation the individual things must be said with words or exhibited in signs, so that the receiver of the revelation may know that the opinion of God is really contained in it; and hence neither more nor fewer words may be employed than are necessary to know God's judgment, and only those that are subservient to this purpose. Hence in revelation God cannot presuppose that other conceptions are connected with the words than the man addressed himself has. Where-

fore God in His revelation must employ the ideas that are taken from present things, and observe the rules of grammar and rhetoric.

We do not find in Wolff any application of these criteria to the positive religions. He indeed supports the affirmations of his natural theology point after point by statements of Holy Scripture, but all that was accomplished afterwards by the *Aufklärung* in the way of a shallow and emptying criticism of Christianity rests in principle upon these criteria. This is the reason why they have been reproduced here in such detail.

In his views regarding the relation of God to the world, Wolff also attaches himself essentially to Leibniz, but he strongly externalizes his doctrine. God has created the world out of nothing, so that all being, as regards its internal possibility, depends on the intellect of God; as regards its external possibility, it depends on His will; as regards its existence, it depends on His power; and as regards its future duration, it depends on His unalterable decree. God perceived all worlds, chose out of them this world as the best, and by a miracle created it and the order that prevails in it. In his determinism as in his optimism, Wolff agrees entirely with Leibniz, yet he speaks at times as if God could not have created the world, and he recognises innumerable miracles as well as divine permission and assistance. The manifestation of the divine glory appears as the final purpose of the world, to which everything else is subordinated as a means, and yet this conformity to design is quite externally apprehended. This is seen, in the first place, in reference to the ground of the world; for instead of referring to immanent order and harmony, Wolff lets us see divine purposes in everything that arises from the nature of things. Again, this holds regarding the goal of the world; for although it is said "that God has not made everything in the world merely to please us," yet usefulness for men and animals is to be regarded as an accompanying purpose in the divine plan of the world. And indeed the ultimate end of the world lies only in man, because

God can only reach through him His purpose to be known and worshipped as God. This thought is beaten out till it becomes trivial in his "Rational Thoughts on the purpose of natural things,"<sup>1</sup> so that the whole constitution of the earth appears as nothing else than "a means arranged by God to attain all that is necessary for our wants, our convenience, and our delight." Thus the interchange of day and night is lauded because men and animals can refresh themselves at night by sleep, and because the night is subservient to certain pursuits, such as the catching of fishes and birds, which cannot be well carried on by day.

The allusions of Leibniz to the nature of religion are in no way taken up by Wolff, to say nothing of their not being further developed. To Wolff, as to the theology of his time, Religion is simply a "modus Deum cognoscendi, colendique."

The soul is a simple substance, and can therefore only have arisen by creation; and as the creation of all things happened at the same time, it could only have come into being at the creation of the world. Souls have existed from that time in an imperfect unconscious state, until they attained to human existence. In death, human souls are not annihilated, but continue to be immortal with full consciousness of their former state, whereas the souls of animals come to an end. Practical philosophy is likewise founded entirely upon the natural being of man. It is only when we act according to the natural destination of our bodily and spiritual powers that we can attain the end of our existence, which is advancing perfection combined with always increasing happiness. This moral law also springs from God; but God could give no other law of action than what is an eternal, necessary, and unchangeable condition of the furtherance of human nature.

Along with the Wolffian philosophy, there was another movement which co-operated in promoting Enlightenment. It embodied the tendency which was averse to all profound inquiries, and especially to the syllogistic procedure of the

<sup>1</sup> *Vernünfftige Gedanken über die Absicht der natürlichen Dinge.*

school with its mathematical demonstrative method, and it worked out a universally accessible *Popular Philosophy* on the basis of the utterances of the sound human Understanding. This movement first showed itself in the department of Natural Law. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) had already led the way in this direction, and he was also known as a theologian by the philologico-historical exegesis of his *Annotationes* to the Old and New Testament, and by his widely-circulated apologetic work, *De veritate religionis Christianæ* (1627). In his *De jure belli et pacis libri tres* (Paris 1625), Grotius endeavoured to make the knowledge of right independent of the precepts of divine revelation. The preservation of society in conformity with human reason is the source of natural right; for as society rests upon a social impulse peculiar to man, so does the natural right of society rest upon principles which man carries internally in himself. But it is expressly recognised that these natural principles are implanted in us by the will of God, and thus is right also indirectly referred to him. The chief follower of Grotius in Germany was Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694). His conflict was mainly carried on with the “peripatetic knights” or the learned “school-foxes,” who wished to judge of everything in a scholastic way by their infallible master Aristotle, and who fell into the greatest embarrassment whenever his schematism left them in the lurch. In like manner, he is zealous against the demand of an exclusively Christian philosophy. He holds that this demand rests upon an unjustifiable mixing up of theology and philosophy; for the predicates of orthodoxy and heterodoxy should have no application to philosophy. Pufendorf distinguishes Natural Law, Civil Law, and Moral Theology. All the three sciences have to deal with the knowledge of Right and Law, but each of them draws its knowledge from a special source, and deals with a particular form of duty: Natural Law, on the basis of natural reason, deals with the duty of sociality; Civil Law, on the basis of the ordinances of the legislator, deals with the duties of the citizen to the State: moral theology on the basis of the



divine revelation, as contained in the commandments of Holy Scripture, deals with the duty of the Christian towards God. Natural Law is therefore not opposed to the injunctions of theology; but there are certain of its demands, however, which it does not take into consideration. But so far as we can know the existence and the will of God by the powers of natural reason, the natural law of Right also leads by itself to certain duties towards God. On account of these positions, Pufendorf had to undergo many attacks; but such a work as that of his contemporary Valentin Alberti, entitled *Compendium juris naturæ, orthodoxæ theologiæ conformatum*, etc. (Leipsic 1678), still entirely shows the spirit of the Mediæval jurisprudence. The source of the knowledge of Right is here referred to the remains of the divine image, or rather the orthodox dogma of the state of innocence.

Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) likewise started from juristic studies, but he proceeded to take up the struggle in all the departments of the spiritual life against old traditional prejudices and unjustifiable authorities. He began his career at Leipsic with lectures upon Grotius and Pufendorf, but according to his own confession the latter had brought him to the conviction that the theologians unanimously maintain many things that belong to ethics or to jurisprudence. Being thus liberated from the oppressive anxiety of being condemned for heresy, he proceeds to liberate natural right from the bonds of theological authority. The light of nature and the light of revelation are different sources of truth. Theology draws from Scripture, philosophy from reason; philosophy aims at the earthly well-being of men, and theology at his heavenly well-being. In like manner, right and morality must be sharply distinguished. What is right or just (*justum*) consists in our doing to no one what we do not wish that he should do to us; what is becoming (*decorum*) consists in our manifesting to others what we wish to be done by them to us; and what is moral (*honestum*) consists in our doing ourselves what we find laudable in others. What is right therefore relates to outward peace,



and can be constrained; what is moral refers to inward peace, and cannot be constrained. This reform of jurisprudence led Thomasius farther. The greatest evil in this connection was that the "school-foxes" compelled everything to go into the strait-jacket of the syllogism, and that they would determine everything according to the empty schematism of Aristotle. In order to break its supremacy, he laboured to introduce a universally intelligible and useful philosophy, which would be available, not merely for the school, but also for the higher life of business. Thus arose his *Introductio in philosophiam aulicam* (Leipsic 1688), with his directions to think rationally, to live rationally and well, and such like. Its philosophical value is very small, but it was highly conducive to its purpose, which was to "enlighten." Averse to all logical rules and to all scholastic formalism, Thomasius in his struggle against tradition and prejudice appealed only to the utterances of "the sound human understanding" as to that which enlightens every one whose understanding is not led too much astray by alien knowledge. "What agrees with reason is true, what does not agree with it is false." This is given as the extremely simple criterion of truth. A philosophy of the sound human understanding naturally strives after the widest diffusion that is possible. Hence it is not surprising that it was Thomasius who broke down the barrier which then separated the learned circles from the unlearned in the Latin language, by his giving lectures in the German language, and by the founding of German scientific periodicals. —In his religious views Thomasius shows considerable variations. At first he attached himself warmly to the Pietists, but less from internal affinity to them than because they both saw their common enemy in the ecclesiastical orthodoxy. "Devoted to the religion which the Apostle strives to impress upon his Corinthians in the passage in which he so greatly glorifies love and so highly estimates good works," Thomasius demands from the State toleration of the various religious communities. He also shows considerable insight in his relations to Mysticism, but afterwards, under the advancing

influence of the empiricism of Locke, he turned more and more towards Naturalism.

This eclecticism of the sound human Understanding was specially influential in opposing the universal diffusion of the views of Wolff. For although Thomasius also reckons the Ramists, Philippists, and Cartesians with the "School-foxes" or the old Aristotelians, it was only the latter that really came into consideration, and they had long since lost their former authority. Hence but a few decades passed until the struggle—which specially turned about the question as to whether the theory of pre-established harmony or that of physical influence was to be received—tended decidedly in favour of Wolff. Ludovici, the historian of the Wolffian philosophy, by the year 1737 already knows of one hundred and seven literary Wolffians.<sup>1</sup> All the universities and all the schools were dominated by them; the whole of the sciences were cultivated in accordance with the mathematico-demonstrative method, and according to the criterion of the principle of the sufficient reason. Such a wide diffusion of a system is, however, always connected with a corresponding superficiality of treatment, and from the Wolffian philosophy there was thus developed about the middle of the century that eclectic Popular Philosophy which chiefly characterizes the German Enlightenment.

The relation of the Wolffian Philosophy to Theology still remains to be considered. In theology there were then two Schools: the Orthodoxy which was dying out, and the Pietism which was striving to obtain the supremacy. The Wolffian philosophy had points of contact with both. With orthodoxy it represented the strictly scientific method against the mere pectoral theology of pietism; and with pietism it demanded the liberation of the subject from the fetters of the ecclesiastical authority. At the same time, however, its thoroughly rational character separated it from Orthodoxy as

<sup>1</sup> A more detailed exposition of this subject would be out of place here. Reference may be made to Zeller (*Op. cit.*) and Benno Erdmann's *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit*, 1876.

well as from Pietism. It is no wonder then, notwithstanding a transitory friendliness, that it ultimately fell out with them both.

The Orthodoxy of the beginning of the Eighteenth Century can hardly be compared with the powerful ecclesiastical Theology of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, which ruled without limit. Rather is the coarse remark of Edelmann not entirely without truth, when he says that "the Lutheran sect must have rotted in its own dung, had not the Wolffian philosophy taken pity on this pig-sty, and brought the sin-filth which these swine had now deposited for two hundred years in their common dunghill, among the necessary things in the best of worlds." It is only from this internal decay of ecclesiastical orthodoxy that we can explain how, in its struggle for existence against Pietism and the Naturalism that was always gaining ground in consequence of the Socinian reaction of the English and French influences, it laid hold of the Wolffian philosophy with its mathematico-demonstrative method, as a sure anchor of safety. Wolff had indeed left supernatural revelation unaffected, and hence a series of theologians laboured more or less to prop up a moderate supranaturalism upon the Wolffian rationalism, and to prove the doctrines of the Church by means of the principle of the sufficient reason. Religion appears in them, as to Wolff, wholly as a "*modus Deum cognoscendi colendique*." Revelation is shown to be necessary from the limitedness of the human faculty of knowledge, or as springing from the divine omnipotence and compassion. A series of rational criteria serve to test true revelation, and to distinguish it from merely alleged revelations. The conception of the suprarational serves to remove the antagonism between reason and revelation. The universal principles, the introductory inquiries regarding revelation and reason, the propositions regarding God's existence and nature, and regarding providence and anthropology, all gain in range and depth, while the specifically Christian doctrines retreat considerably into the background.

We may now approach the most important of the theological Wolffians somewhat more closely. Gottlieb Canz († 1753) of Tübingen<sup>1</sup> sought to prove the agreement of philosophy with the fundamental truths of the Christian religion point by point; for grace does not annul the powers of Nature, but improves them by furnishing a new light in holy Scripture. To subordinate the truth communicated to us by God through the instrument of reason to that which is directly presented to us by Revelation, would be the same as to make the water dug out of the earth a servant of the water that falls as rain. In this spirit Canz wrote a continuation of Reinbeck's "Contemplations on the divine truths contained in the Augsburg Confession,"<sup>2</sup> a work consisting originally of four parts. This continuation is of wearisome length. By a popular mode of rationalizing, Canz labours to make the Biblical doctrines at least probable. Köthen, a Protestant preacher at Geneva, published, in 1736, a treatise on "the excellence and the usefulness of the Wolffian philosophy in the confirmation and practice of the Christian religion." It professes to furnish the best means of refuting Scepticism, Materialism, Idealism, Spinozism, Fatalism, Deism, "the common religion of people of a worldly disposition and of sensualists," Manichæism, Rationalism, Fanaticism, Predestinationism, Socinianism, and Freethinking. Jakob Carpov of Jena († 1768) proceeds in a thoroughly scholastic way to maintain revealed theology on the foundation of natural theology.<sup>3</sup> He argues that it is possible in itself that God reveals or immediately communicates definite truths to men. In virtue of His omniscience, God knows all the words and signs by which things must be brought to human cognition. In virtue of His omnipotence, He is able to produce sounds in the air like those by which we speak, or motions in the ear such as the voice excites, or to produce immediately in our mind perceptions of the things

<sup>1</sup> *Usus Philosophiæ Leibnitianæ et Wolffianæ in theologia*, 1733. *Philosophiæ Wolffianæ consensus cum theologia*, 1735.

<sup>2</sup> *Betrachtungen über die in der Augsburgischen Confession enthaltenen göttlichen Wahrheiten*, Frankf. 1733.

<sup>3</sup> *Theologia revelata dogmatica methodo scientifica adornata*, 1737.

that are to be known. The reality of an immediate revelation may be also inferred from principles of reason, at least with great probability. Moved by pity, God's will was to rescue men from their guilt, but He could not do this otherwise than by Himself becoming man, and doing satisfaction for men. Our natural reason perceives this, but does not recognise the time and the other circumstances of this divine satisfaction. It is extremely probable that God has come to the help of this defect by the aid of immediate revelation. As God generally can do nothing without a reason (*sine ratione*), certain rational criteria for revelation may be also set up. Revelation must communicate to us truths which it is necessary for us to know, but which it is impossible for us to know in any other way. The former condition holds only of the means of reconciling man with God, the latter only of suprarational truths, which, however, cannot be in contradiction with themselves nor with the truths of natural reason. And because these truths go beyond reason, they can only claim to be received when they are accredited by miracles. Above all, however, they must correspond to the divine perfection. Carpov, at the close of his inquiry, enumerates ten criteria by which a revelation must be tested. Tried by these criteria, it results indubitably from rational grounds that the holy Scripture is in truth a divine revelation. Having attained to this position, Carpov then moves pretty much in the traditional paths of the ecclesiastical orthodoxy, although not entirely without some softening of certain doctrines that were especially repulsive to intelligent thinking. Reusch, who also belonged to Jena († 1758),<sup>1</sup> proceeds in an entirely similar way, only that in dogmatic theology he brings the regard to happiness into play. There is no happiness without

<sup>1</sup> The title of his principal work is of itself characteristic. It runs in full as follows:—*Jo. Petri Reuschii Introductio in theologiam revelatam seu theologie revelatæ pars generalis, quæ necessarius religionis veræ ac felicitatis nexus, dogmatum Christianæ religionis concordia cum veritatibus naturaliter cognitis atque religionis electio rationalis ad Christianam determinata in luce ponuntur itemque libri canonici religionum quæ perhibentur revelatæ recensentur.* Jenæ 1744.

religion, and hence there must exist a necessary connection between them. Revealed religion is not contrary to natural religion, but is rather supported by rational principles, as all rational criteria show Holy Scripture to be a true revelation. On the other hand, one of the most important sources of our happiness, the reconciliation of man with God in the atonement, is known to us only through revelation.

Some of the Wolffians even ventured to apply their mathematical method of proof to the profoundest mysteries of the Christian religion. Carpov thus deduced the satisfaction worked out by God become man. But these attempts were mainly directed to the doctrine of the Trinity. Darjes († 1791) of Jena, at the first a zealous Wolffian, though afterwards alienated from the school, attempted in 1735 to prove the "*pluritas personarum in Deitate ex solis rationis principiis methodo mathematicorum*," but the theologians found no fewer than twenty-two errors in his treatise. Reinbeck deduces the Trinity from the idea of the supreme good as inclined to communicate itself. Reusch seeks to comprehend it by a comparison with the three grades of human cognition and will, the first of which comprehends all possibilities, the second brings these possibilities into definite order, while the third chooses one possibility as the best.

Along with these Wolffian theologians, there may also at least be named Ribow († 1774), who, at Göttingen, applied the Wolffian method to the art of preaching; and Joh. Ernst Schubert († 1774), who, in a more popular way, tried to make the doctrines of the Church acceptable by at least probable arguments. This alliance between Orthodoxy and Wolffianism was utterly contrary to nature. Even if the several doctrines remained unaffected in their expression, they yet lost, not only their supernatural character, but even their religious character. With a correct instinct Kappelier protests against this in his Epistle directed against Darjes, where he says: "*Nunquam concedemus, mysteria ex solis rationis principiis demonstrari posse, quod nec concessit unquam nec*



concedere potest verus philosophus aut theologus, ne dicam, verus Christianus." History also showed very soon that this alliance was untenable. In spite of its temporary apologetic value as against the naturalistic views which were always coming more forward, the alliance only formed a transition to the "enlightened" evisceration of the Christian religion in the popular theology.

The Wolffian philosophy fell very soon into conflict with pietism. This was inevitable, for the antagonism between the immediateness of faith and the trustworthiness of knowledge, according to the demonstrative mathematical method, could not be concealed. The external course of the struggle is well known. Wolff was compelled by an order of the Government in 1723, under threat of the halter, to leave Halle and the Prussian territory within forty-eight hours; but seventeen years afterwards, in 1740, he was recalled in the most honourable manner. Our attention may be briefly turned to the questions discussed in these controversies.<sup>1</sup> The objections to Wolff's philosophy rested partly on a complete misunderstanding of it, and the controverters of it everywhere kept to details, without entering upon the proper spirit of the system. These objections in essential were such as the following:—It was objected that the simple elements of the world and the souls of animals, as well as of men, and even God Himself, were designated as essentially the same, and as differing from each other only in degrees, and particularly as percipient substances. This definition of God as a substance that always perfectly perceives the world, was objected to as far from exhausting the nature of God, and as putting Him too much on the same stage as other things. The best and most current arguments for the existence of God were said to be laid aside as insufficient by this system; and as

<sup>1</sup> As regards the controversial writings then published, reference may be made to Joachim Lange, *Ausführliche Recension der wider die Wolffianische Metaphysik auf 9 Universitäten und anderwärtig edirten sämtlichen 26 Schriften: mit dem Erweise*, etc., Halle 1725. Carl Günther Ludovici, *Sammlung und Auszüge der sämtlichen Streitschriften wegen der Wolffischen Philosophie*, etc., 1737, 1738.

the argument brought forward by it instead of these was not at all demonstrative, it was alleged that this only abetted atheism. Again, it was said that atheism was advocated by the assertion that it was only its abuse that was dangerous to morality. Further, the eternity of the world was taught in the system, and, instead of divine Providence, it maintained the necessity of all things, doctrines that destroyed religion from its foundation. As the soul had no power to work upon the body, and the body was incapable of communicating influences to the soul, man thus became a double machine, so that even the speaking of the mouth and the writing of the hand go on of themselves without being guided by rational thoughts of the soul. And, in general, the fanciful notion of a pre-established harmony was the source of all the errors of the Wolffians. As the actual world, with its evil and its sin, was designated as the best of worlds, God was thus made the author of sin. Miracles were spoken of in such a way that they might just as well be denied. Morality was completely undermined, partly by the denial of human freedom, partly by the assertion that the moral law rests upon its own internal truth, and would therefore exist without a belief in God, and partly by the setting up of false ethical principles.

Such is an anthology of the most important objections that were raised against the Wolffian philosophy. Every one sees how truth and falsehood are here largely mixed together, and at the same time how great was the bitterness of the opponents of the system, and how correct was their instinct (for it can scarcely be called insight) as to the antagonism between their mode of thought and that which was now coming up. Nevertheless, the new system triumphed, and even Pietism was not able to prevent the advance of the popular theology.

## III.

## THE AUFKLÄRUNG AND ITS CHIEF REPRESENTATIVES.

The Wolffian Philosophy had also to yield to the process which has repeatedly shown itself in history, according to which a philosophical school, when it has universally prevailed for a considerable time, begins to lose its scholastic exclusiveness and its strictly scientific character. It is thus that a philosophical system gradually becomes mixed with heterogeneous elements that were at first zealously combated, until it loses its peculiarities in the practical application of its principles to the special questions of science and of life. It was thus that the *Popular Philosophy* of Germany arose about the middle of the last century.<sup>1</sup> Its special character may be defined both in a formal and material relation. In the formal relation, its character was manifested in a disinclination to all scholastic or rigidly scientific modes of proof; and in the material relation, its character was exhibited in its giving constant regard to human happiness as the ultimate practical end of life. The cumbrous garb of the mathematico-demonstrative method is completely stripped off, and the most difficult questions of science and of life are explained in the elegant form of an easy-flowing, and often even aphoristic reasoning. It is not speculative principles, but current opinions and the natural judgment of the sound human understanding, that are recognised as the highest criteria of truth. In short, a philosophy, not for the school, but for life and for the world, is striven after, or rather it is no longer a special philosophy, but a universal wisdom that is desired.<sup>2</sup> Viewed as to their contents, all subjects of investigation are determined by regard to their usefulness, and as such human happiness appears to be the highest good. Hence it was that the consideration of the personal ego came so strikingly into the foreground, as

<sup>1</sup> A brief characteristic is sufficient for our examination here. But see the detailed exposition of Zeller, *Op. cit.* 248 ff.

<sup>2</sup> In this relation the title of Engel's work, *Der Philosoph für die Welt* (Leipzig 1775), universally read at that time, is of itself characteristic.

was seen in relation to life in the innumerable self-examinations, confessions, and confidential correspondences of the time. The same characteristic is shown in the sphere of science by the preference for psychological investigations.<sup>1</sup> In the study of nature purely physical inquiry falls into the background, and everything is measured by its usefulness to man. Thus Sulzer, in his "Moral reflections on the works of Nature" (2nd ed. 1750), in this way finds the advantage which is furnished by the contemplation of natural things in the encouragement they give to praise the Creator and to grow in virtue. He will not speak of the physical foundations of nature, but only of final causes. "The will of the beneficent Creator was to furnish men with nourishment and pleasure; and therefore He commanded nature that she should not bring forth all the plants at once, but in succession; for the former method would not have been suitable to any of the purposes mentioned." The vegetable kingdom has been constituted as it is "in order that men and animals might have nourishment, and that along with nourishment men should also have as much pleasure and delight as possible."—Socrates was the model and the shining example of these lovers of wisdom, and they felt anything that derogated from his fame as an attack upon themselves.<sup>2</sup> Nicolai was specially identified with the efforts to carry on this literature, and in his "Universal German Library"<sup>3</sup> he made the whole German literature pass for several decades before his judgment-seat. Like every philosophy that is directed to life, this system also matured a Pædagogic of its own. Its leading expounder was Basedow (†1790), a man who, like Rousseau, was forced to a consciousness of the value of a good education by his own want of training. Happiness is regarded by him as so certainly the

<sup>1</sup> We only refer to the following, giving their works: Karl Franz v. Irving, *Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen*, 4 Bde. Berlin 1772-1785. Tiedemann, *Untersuchungen über den Menschen*, 3 Bde. 1777. Nicolaus Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur*, 2 Bde. 1777. J. G. H. Feder, *Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen*, 4 Bde. Berlin 1779-93.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Eberhard, *Neue Apologie des Sokrates*, Berlin 1772.

<sup>3</sup> *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*.

goal of human life, that he maintains that all are obliged to accept as true all propositions which are so closely connected with human happiness that it could not exist without them. Such truths appear to him to be the existence of God, the divine providence in the government of the world, and the immortality of the human soul; and it is a "duty of belief" to accept them.

Moses Mendelssohn (1728–1786) is unquestionably the noblest representative of the German philosophy of Enlightenment. The son of a poor Jewish schoolmaster of Dessau, he went to Berlin, and there, impeded by poverty as well as by his nationality, he yet acquired the scientific culture of his time under indescribable difficulties. Even then he remained in the humble position of a book-keeper, yet he won the universal esteem of all Germany, not less by his mild and estimable personality than by his literary activity.<sup>1</sup> As a philosopher he belongs entirely to the popular philosophy of the German *Aufklärung*. He starts indeed from the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, but the cumbrous scholastic terminology is replaced by an extremely flexible and easily intelligible language. The sound understanding and the reason are expressly declared to be one and the same, and they are only distinguished in that the human understanding makes rapid steps by means of feeling, and goes quickly forward without any fear of falling, whereas reason feels about as it were with its staff before it ventures a step. Both of them may turn into side paths, but as reason finds it far more difficult to get right again, the wise thinker will not trust reason when it falls behind the sound understanding or diverges from it, but will rather follow the sound human understanding itself. With regard to the subject of philosophical inquiry Mendelssohn says: "This is the way which philosophy, as universal wisdom, should always take. It should begin with an examination of external objects; but every step it takes, it must turn its look to man, towards whose true happiness all its efforts should be aimed."

<sup>1</sup> His collected works have been published in seven vols., Leipzig 1843.

The truths of natural religion are especially subservient to this end; for "without God, providence and immortality, all the goods of life have, in my eyes, a contemptible value. What is more wretched than a man who sees annihilation approach him with strong steps?" Mendelssohn's philosophizing is therefore directed in the first line to the establishing of these truths. In the form of a Dialogue and in the spirit of Plato, he seeks in his *Phädon* (1767) to prove the Immortality of the Soul on philosophical grounds. The soul is a simple substance, and as such it cannot cease by dissolution, but only by annihilation. An annihilation of the soul would only be possible by the direct interference of the Deity, or by a miracle; but it is inconceivable that God should perform a miracle for this purpose. Besides, the future duration of the soul is also supported by the striving after ceaseless perfection implanted in men, as the hindrance of this striving would be incompatible with the goodness and the wise providence of God. On the same ground, it is also impossible that souls should fall after death into a sleep-like state; but if the soul continues to exist, it must continue to think and to will. During the last years of his life Mendelssohn devoted the first hours of the day—which was all the time that a violent nervous disease left him for literary work—to the composition of his *Morning Hours*.<sup>1</sup> Along with metaphysical explanations, he here enters upon a detailed examination of the question as to the existence of God. The idea of an absolutely perfect and necessary Being must be developed with mathematical strictness. In doing so, we may by inferring from the conditioned to the condition, and from the actual to the necessary, start either from the external sensible world, or from our own Ego. The former procedure is objectionable, as the objective reality of a material world is called in doubt. The latter leads to the conviction of the existence of God, as the contingent changes of the Ego can only be conceived as the effects of a necessary being, to whom knowledge and the faculty of approbation, or reason and will,

<sup>1</sup> *Morgenstunden*, 1785.



belong in the highest degree and without limitation. Besides, we may also venture to infer from the conception of mere possibility to the reality and necessity of the corresponding being. A most perfect being is possible, for it is only affirmations and negations that contradict each other, and it contains no contradiction to say that all realities are affirmed of such a being. Now, this being cannot have the ground of its existence in another being, because it would then be contingent, and therefore not perfect; and hence it must exist of itself or necessarily.

Theology was also seized with this spirit of enlightenment and popularization. In consequence of the predominantly teleological contemplation of nature, physico-theology flourished at that time in a way in which it has never done before nor since. On the basis of the principle of the sufficient reason, an argument was advanced for the existence of an almighty, all-wise, and all-good God, borrowed from a thoroughly external study of nature in every one of its smallest departments. There thus arose about the middle of the Eighteenth Century numerous works in the department of physico-theology, such as Petino-theologies, Ichthyo-theologies, Acrido-theologies, Testaceo - theologies, Insecto - theologies, Phyto-theologies, Litho-theologies, Hydro-theologies, Pyro-theologies, Astro-theologies, Bronto-theologies, Chiono-theologies, Sismo-theologies, and Melitto-theologies. Of the writers of such works, we may only mention B. H. Brockes, who, in the nine volumes of his *Earthly Pleasure in God*,<sup>1</sup> sets forth in truly prosaic verses his "physical and moral contemplations on the three kingdoms of nature." It is not so much the conformity of the internal constitution of the individual things of nature to design as their usefulness to man that inspires him to a deep-felt praise of the divine power and wisdom. Thus—

"In the bodies of the chamois God hath put such organs good,  
That they fear no plunge or fall, and go where'er they would."

---

<sup>1</sup> *Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott.*

But the main thing here too is—

“That they to us so useful are :

Good for phthisis is their tallow ; for the sight their gall is good ;  
And chamois flesh is good to eat, they heal the dizzy with their blood ;  
Nor less of use their skin. Does not this beast show clear,  
With His wisdom and His power, the love of the Creator here ?”

The universal striving after popularity led in theology as well as in philosophy to a phenomenon peculiar to that time in the so-called popular or practical Dogmatics, which not merely in its form of exposition, but also in its contents, evacuated the substance of what was hitherto known as Dogmatics. Thus Griesbach<sup>1</sup> defined the popular dogmatic theology as the sum of the truths which have an intimate bearing upon the moral improvement and happiness of men, as these are to be realized by the religion of Jesus, but with the exclusion of all learned speculations. Reason already tells us that there is a God who governs the world in order to promote the virtue and happiness of His rational creatures. We realize happiness in the feeling of increasing perfection, but moral goodness without religion continues to be extremely defective and inconstant. The voice of reason is the voice of God in nature, yet an immediate revelation is not merely possible, but is even probable ; for experience teaches that if reason is left to itself, the truths of religion fall short of completeness, correctness, certainty, and universal effectiveness. An alleged revelation, however, can only be regarded as true if it does not contradict natural religion, if it is conformable to the dignity of God, if it is conducive to the ennoblement and the happiness of men, and if there is no ground for suspicion of fanaticism or fraud against those who first proclaimed it. Judged by these criteria, the doctrine of Jesus is shown to be true.

The importance laid upon practical utility is clearly enough expressed even in the title of the work of the venerable

<sup>1</sup> *Anleitung zum Studium der populären Dogmatik, besonders für künftige Religionslehrer*, 4 Aufl., Jena 1789. Similar works are the following :—Less, *Christliche Religionslehre oder Versuch einer praktischen Dogmatik*, Göttingen 1779. Niemeyer, *Populäre und praktische Dogmatik*, 1792. Ammon, *Entwurf einer wissenschaftlich praktischen Theologie nach den Grundsätzen des Christenthums und der Vernunft*, Göttingen 1797.

Johann Joachim Spalding († 1804) "on the usefulness of the office of preaching."<sup>1</sup> Religion, in his view, is virtue and joy on account of God, and virtue is represented as the necessary condition of this joy. The ethics of Christianity is just the same as that of the pure reason and of the original nature of man, only it possesses greater definiteness, is more easily understood, and makes a more living impression. Now the preacher is, in the first place, a servant of his religious society, he teaches religion and spiritual happiness, and is a friendly guide to rest of heart and joyous hope. The preachers likewise serve the State; for they are the proper depositaries of public morals, and without morals no State can subsist. In another work, entitled "Religion a concern of man,"<sup>2</sup> the same author answers the question as to whether religion belongs to those things that relate to the essential nature of man and its original unalterable purpose, and whether on this account it is of much concern to a thinking man? Exact self-observation shows us, in the first place, the desire after happiness, and then, as something higher, the fundamental feeling of morality. Our nature itself thus shows us that morality is to us the best means of attaining to happiness. Religion, with its thought of an omnipresent and omniscient Lawgiver, and of the wise government of the world and the beneficent providence of God, serves in a high degree to support the only worthy purpose of humanity, that is, to heighten the activity of the moral feeling and to satisfy the desire of happiness. On account of this intimate and important relation to the highest purposes of humanity, religion deserves the utmost consideration, only we must be on our guard against profound speculations as well as sensational faith; for both of these are without value as regards the promotion of Christianity. Wilhelm Abraham Teller († 1804), starting from the idea of the perfectibility of Christianity, in his "Religion of the Perfect,"<sup>3</sup> distinguishes the three stages of

<sup>1</sup> *Von der Nutzbarkeit des Predigtamtes*, 1772.

<sup>2</sup> *Religion eine Angelegenheit des Menschen*, 3 Aufl., Berlin 1799.

<sup>3</sup> *Religion der Vollkommenen*, 1804.

absolute historical belief, of the belief of reason, and of the purely rational Christianity. This last stage, the comprehensive alliance of the virtuous sentiments, alone corresponds to the destination of man, as it fills the soul with agreeable emotions and sensations, and furnishes the means of strengthening ourselves to the practice of all the virtues. It was the object of his "Dictionary of the New Testament" (1772) to guide to this religion of the perfect as it is in Scripture; and by the aid of a very arbitrary exegesis this work naturally explains in a very rationalizing way, or rather sets aside, everything that is inconceivable, from the demoniacs up to the Trinity. Sack († 1786) was connected with these two authors by similarity of opinion, as well as by his position as a consistorial councillor in Berlin. He likewise represented virtue as the essential element of religion, and divine revelation as a confirmation of natural religion.

The most distinguished among the popular theologians of that time was the Abbé Joh. Friedr. Wilhelm Jerusalem († 1789). His "Meditations on the most important truths of religion" (1744) were much read as a book of edification, and they were translated into almost all the European languages. Natural or rational religion is likewise, in his view, what is essential, and its essential parts are constituted by our rectitude and God's assurance of His grace, especially regarding eternal salvation. Revelation is not denied, but it is only an extraordinary instruction given by God regarding natural religion; it is an assisting and promotion of reason, a more rapid bringing of it to a goal which it would either not have attained at all by itself alone, or would only have done so after long round-about ways. Of the narratives of Scripture, some are treated as useful; others, like the taking away of the golden and silver vessels by the Israelites, are excused; and others, such as the speaking of the ass, are regarded as untrue.

This popular literature gives us a better knowledge of the spirit of the theology of its time than can be got from the more scientific works on dogmatic theology. In these works

a peculiar method was generally observed. The old dogmatic theology of the Church was retained as a framework or as a basis, and where its definitions were too much in contradiction with the author's own views, they were silently passed over, as in the case of the dogmas of the Ubiquity and the Descent into hell; or they were emptied of their mysterious contents by intellectual interpretation. Thus the fall was explained as the eating of a poisonous fruit; original sin was rendered as defective disposition, and the doctrine of satisfaction was brought down to a morally meritorious sacrifice. At other times the ecclesiastical dogmatics were got rid of by going back to Scripture. Great arbitrariness prevailed in the interpretation of Scripture. Inconvenient doctrines were explained away on the ground of ignorance of languages, misunderstanding of words, or accommodation to contemporary prejudices. No attempt was made to comprehend dogmas that appeared unintelligible. Religion was regarded throughout in an entirely intellectual way. And because the sound human understanding appeared to be the highest power in knowledge, yet as its one-sided intellectualism was unable to grasp the darker side of the life of the human mind in feeling and sensation, the dogmas had also to give way. It was only a certain unintelligent awe, the natural effect of the long supremacy of the ecclesiastical doctrine, that restrained a decided assault upon them and the open rejection of them.

Nor was this entirely wanting, although it proceeded less from the Wolffian, or the Popular Philosophy, than from the influence of the English and the French freethinkers, or from the influence of such men as Dippel and Edelmann. Yet it borrowed from that philosophy not a few of its weapons, and especially the universally-applied principle of the sufficient reason. It would indeed have been inconceivable if only the supernatural possibility, and not also the thoroughly rational reality, of the Wolffian system had been brought into application. The first product of this movement was the so-called *Wertheim Bible* (1735). The author, Johann Lorenz Schmidt

(† 1751), undertook to translate the Bible and to explain it according to the principle that in revelation only that can be accepted as true which does not contradict reason. Instead of transporting himself into the thoughts and the poetical spirit of the Bible, he treats it as a text-book of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, renders it in the dullest prose of a cold intellectuality, and puts general intellectual conceptions into the place of its images and similes. Johann Heinrich Schulz, known as the "pigtail" preacher of Gielsdorf, Wilkendorf, and Hirschfeldt, has embodied his thought in a systematic form in his "Philosophical meditation on theology and religion in general, and on the Jewish in particular" (1784).<sup>1</sup> According to Schulz, the first fundamental rule of the understanding is that all that exists must have its cause. Thus arose the belief in a supreme Being who is the universal cause of all things in the world, an idea which men borrowed from themselves and from their own operations. A series of lower gods was added to this highest God, and they were quite different in different countries. Moses, probably the child of the first innocent love of an Egyptian princess, reared in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and intimately acquainted with the conditions of the wilderness, took advantage of the ignorance and credulity of the Jewish people to impose upon them a religion invented by him, and to procure for himself the position of the highest and only mediator. The character of Jehovah appears always just as the passions of Moses would make and have Him to be, full of the desire of revenge, bloodthirstiness, and the lust of murder. From the butchery of men that was usual among the Jews, all the human sacrifices of the other peoples have taken their origin. By this conception of Jehovah the character of the whole Jewish nation was determined to the most inhuman cruelties, so that their history is a register of deeds of violence and inhumanity. Jesus of Nazareth was shaped upon the formative wheel of nature into the happiest genius, but His doctrine does not contain a single clear con-

<sup>1</sup> Philosophische Betrachtung über Theologie und Religion überhaupt und über die Jüdische insonderheit, 1784.



ception of the nature and being of God. He says, indeed, that God is a spirit; but a spirit is only a chimera, because it is never the object of our sensible perception. His instruction aimed only at awakening the conviction that all the wants of all the beings existing in the world, are provided for in the best way. And yet we cannot know from whence this beneficent and necessary connection between causes and consequences takes its rise. The conception of Jehovah must be given up. If you would form an idea of the Supreme Being for your own consolation, conceive of Him rather as a Father who knows the wants of His children, and who is as willing as He is able to help them with the wisest goodness. Yet is this but a figurative idea which we make for ourselves, because our phantasy will positively have a certain goal.—The only rational conception of the word “God,” is that of the sufficient ground of the world. In this strictest sense, no man is an atheist. In comparison with one another, however, all are atheists; for on account of their individual differences, they all diverge from one another in their special ideas of the Deity. Whereas the universal reason leads only to the general conception of the sufficient ground or principle of things, it is the different phantasies of individuals that first lead to particular ideas of God. Hence it is completely absurd to blame or to persecute any one on account of atheism or his divergent idea of God, while at the same time Religion as distinguished from natural morality leads partly to useless ceremonies, and partly to actions that are most pernicious and most prejudicial to human society.

Andreas Riem, preacher at Friederichswald and then at Berlin, likewise showed his zeal in several works against the foolish and unintelligent doctrines of the religions which prudent priests have devised for their own advantage. “No class of men has ever been so pernicious to the world as the priesthood. There were laws at all times against murderers and bandits, but not against the assassin in the priestly garb. War was repelled by war, and it came to an end. The war of the priesthood against reason, has lasted for thousands of years,

and it still continues to go on without ceasing." George Schade, in his "Immutable and eternal religion of the oldest investigators of nature and of the so-called adepts,"<sup>1</sup> etc. (1760), also proceeded to show that natural religion is sufficient, and he declares that all who assert a supernatural revelation are godless impostors.—We may pass over other representatives of this view, as they are of no importance with regard to the solution of the problem of the Philosophy of Religion. But reference has still to be made to the theologian who was, as it were, the *Enfant terrible* of the German *Aufklärung*, and whose changeful life passed through its various transformations. This was Karl Friedrich Bahrđt (1741–1792).<sup>2</sup> Endowed with remarkable gifts, Bahrđt at first attached himself in philosophy and theology to Crusius, and in spite of his youth he became a distinguished teacher and preacher in Leipsic, working as an opponent of the Wolffian philosophy and a zealous defender of orthodoxy. But the public offence which he excited by his dissolute life compelled him to leave Leipsic. In 1769 he became Professor of Biblical Antiquities at Erfurt, and two years later Professor of Theology and Preacher at Giessen. Bahrđt himself says he would have continued faithful to orthodoxy all his life, had he not had to endure so much hostility from the theologians. It was in consequence of these attacks that the destruction of positive religion became the remaining purpose of his life. On his entering upon his office at Giessen, Bahrđt did not hesitate to remove the scruples about his orthodoxy by delivering a "Christful" sermon in the style of Lavater, with frequent invocations of Christ and a loud unimpeachable confession of the chief doctrines of Lutheranism.

<sup>1</sup> Unwandelbare und ewige Religion der ältesten Naturforscher und sogenannten Adepten, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Bahrđt has given an account of his life and efforts with great frankness in the *Geschichte seines Lebens*, 4 Th. Berlin, 1790–91. His writings fill 120 volumes. We may only mention: *Die neuesten Offenbarungen Gottes in Briefen und Erzählungen*, 1772–75. *Briefe über die Bibel im Volkston*, 1782. *Ausführung des Plans und Zwecks Jesu in Briefen für wahrheitsuchende Leser*, 1784–86. *Katechismus der natürlichen Religion*, 1783. *Kirchen und Ketzer-almanach*, 1781.

He certainly declares that at that time he was still very orthodox. "My belief in the divinity of revelation, in the immediate mission of Jesus, in His miraculous history, in the Trinity, the operations of grace, natural corruption, the justification of the sinner by laying hold of the merit of Christ, and especially the doctrine of satisfaction, seemed still unshaken. My reason had only been arrested and occupied by the thought of how Three persons could be in one God." Bahrdt, however, made progress in Giessen, in the way of "Enlightenment." The doctrine of the Trinity fell; Christ appeared as a mere man immediately endowed with divine wisdom, and called God because God worked in Him and by Him; the Holy Ghost was regarded as a mere power of God. He then threw overboard the doctrine of the Atonement, and especially the view of an angry God and an external satisfaction of Christ for us, under the influence of a naturalist who was travelling through the district. When he had come to see this doctrine as a most pernicious and damnable error, Bahrdt says he felt himself as if new-born. From this newly-gained knowledge flowed his treatise entitled "*The Latest Revelations.*"<sup>1</sup>—In consequence of the persecution thereby excited, he withdrew from Giessen, and in 1775, following the invitation of Herr von Salis, he undertook the supervision of a *Philanthropin* at Marschlinz in Graubünden. Next year we find him acting as General-superintendent at Dürkheim in the Hardt, in the Principality of Leiningen-Dachsburg. On this occasion he gives instructive directions as to how a preacher may obtain matter when his reason has happily rejected all positive truths,—such as the Trinity, the Atonement, supernatural Grace, Original Sin, and eternal punishment in Hell,—and when he only still maintains the immediate mission of Jesus, the divinity of the Scriptures, and the truth of the Biblical history. At the request of his patron, Bahrdt set about establishing a *Philanthropin* in the Castle of Heidesheim, and in order to obtain foreign pupils he made a journey to Holland and England. During his absence the

<sup>1</sup> Die neuesten Offenbarungen.

Imperial Chancellor, on the 27th March 1779, prohibited him from publishing books regarding religion, or teaching and preaching, under the threat of heavy penalty. Bahrtdt then wrote his "Confession of Faith," which was delivered to the Imperial Diet at Regensburg, but saved his person by going to Hallé. Here the theological Faculty, with Semler at its head, opposed his admission. This has wrongly been made a ground of reproach against Semler. What separated the two was not a difference of theological opinion, but the matter of morals. The excellent Semler, a man of irreproachable purity of character and scientific earnestness of investigation, and the frivolous Bahrtdt, a man without principles in science and life, licentious and scandalous in his conduct, could not be friends. Bahrtdt obtained the right to deliver Lectures in Halle on philosophy and *Humaniora*; and he lectured on everything possible with much applause. But the Minister Zedlitz had vainly reminded him "that you must now be extremely cautious in your conduct in order not to make it be believed that the free mode of thinking has not sprung more out of the desires of the heart than out of the conviction of the understanding." In 1787, Bahrtdt bought a vineyard at Halle, and became an innkeeper. Having been punished by imprisonment as the author of a pasquil against Wöllder's religious Edict, Bahrtdt lived dissolutely to his end, and died of the consequences of his excesses,—a worthy conclusion of such a life.

In Halle, Bahrtdt lost the last remains of belief. In his "Letters on the Bible in a popular tone," he seeks to prove that all that is miraculous and supernatural in the Bible is a mere colouring of the narrative, and that it comes from the remains of the Jewish superstition of the narrators. At the same time, he touches on the thought which afterwards became so important, "that such miraculous circumstances, even in the case of Christ, had been invented out of enthusiasm for the most sublime teacher of mankind, and especially the circumstances regarding His coming and His superhuman origin." Naturally, Bahrtdt was not able to appreciate the

full value of this thought. Christ, "the greatest and most venerable of mortals," had planned, "by the founding of a secret society, to preserve and propagate among mankind the truth that had been suppressed by priests and priestcraft." The whole of His sufferings was a well-devised plan, a part which Jesus carried through dexterously and happily with the greatest sacrifice, up to the time of His reawakening. By this means the disciples were to be cured of their hope of an earthly Messias.

Bahrddt's "Catechism of Natural Religion" may undoubtedly be regarded as the coarsest product of the platitudes which were matured by the German *Aufklärung*. Religion is practical knowledge of God; theology is only a theoretical knowledge of God. The Trinity and similar doctrines merely belong to theology. If religion is founded upon a rational contemplation of our own mind, and of the other things in the world, it is called *natural*; if it falls back upon immediate revelation, it is *supernatural* or *revealed*. Such a revelation is, however, improbable, whereas reason leads by necessity to the acceptance of God, especially because it is only by accepting the existence of God that the authority of the moral law becomes compatible with the impulse towards happiness. Christ pursued no other end than to restore the suppressed reason to its rights against the claims of the priests, and to advance men in their happiness by proclamation of the truth. The most fruitful sources of this truth are nature and history; the former teaches me the wisdom, love, and veracity of God; the latter shows me human actions with their consequences. In both, I know the providence of God as it pursues wise and beneficent purposes with the creatures. The bad are not bad, but are poor sick creatures. Evils are inevitable consequences of the imperfection of the finite, and are not to be referred to the wrath of God, because God as pure love is never angry. On this fact is founded our love to God as the conviction that God will always give us what is for our happiness. This belief gives me rest even in death, as I expect from my Creator, beyond the grave, a more perfect

life and a higher degree of felicity. Besides this knowledge of God, knowledge of ourselves and knowledge of men are likewise conducive to happiness.

Happiness consists in contentment and cheerfulness of mind. It is founded upon the consciousness of those actions which gain the approbation of God and the approval of our fellow-men. Its foundation is health of soul and body. The health of the body rests especially upon regular evacuations and perspirations. Hence Bahrdt does not shrink from the coarseness of laying down the rule that we should accustom the body to evacuate itself early in the morning, and that we should not take cold drinks when full of sweat, nor go into a current of air. In this way rules are given about food and drink, fresh air, cleanliness, sleeping, calling in the physician, etc. The two hundred and fortieth question of this section runs as follows: Does inoculation with the pox belong to the duties towards thy children? This question is affirmed, and a number of reasons are assigned for the view. Virtue is the means of happiness, especially as justice and common usefulness. Only fanatics and imbeciles have doubted that the virtuous man may enjoy sensible pleasures; but the question is, how to enjoy pleasures rightly? Hence Bahrdt gives the exhortation to scan all possible pleasures and not to enjoy them too precipitately, to heighten all enjoyments to the utmost, and to accustom oneself to all the joys that God supplies to men. Such is the gospel of the theological public-house keeper of Halle.

It is more pleasing to turn our attention to the man who may be regarded as the culmination of the German *Aufklärung*, and who, with all the keenness of his criticism, wins the affection of his readers by the irreproachable purity of his moral character and the profoundly religious earnestness of his investigations. We refer to Herrmann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768).—In his much-read treatises “On the chief truths of Natural Religion,”<sup>1</sup> Reimarus moves entirely in the

<sup>1</sup> *Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion*, Hamburg 1754. The first sentence of this work gives the best characteristic of



thoughts of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. Men and animals do not owe their origin to themselves nor to the corporeal world. The corporeal world is lifeless in itself, and has therefore received its existence and its qualities in time from an independent eternal Being. It does not exist for the sake of itself, but only on account of living beings.

"Whoever would know the world as to what sort of thing it is, must take into account its use for living beings as a part of its explanation, and of its essential conception." With well-known prolixity, Reimarus then proceeds to show how everything in the world, the greatest as well as the least, is subservient to our advantage.—The independent necessary Being that has created the world is God. We know His attributes by rational inferences deduced from the conception of God, and by experience from the works of God. Among these attributes wisdom and goodness are conspicuous, as they appear in the wise constitution and perpetual guidance of the world. Here Reimarus combats the materialistic Atheism of Lamettrie and Maupertuis, as well as the pantheistic atheism of Spinoza. In like manner, he combats the naturalism of Rousseau, in connection with his consideration of man and his special prerogatives; and he refutes the objections of Bayle, in his consideration of the most perfect world. Immortality is taught with special emphasis, and it is founded partly upon the essential nature of man as a simple immaterial substance, and partly upon the purpose of God in the creation, His providence over men, His justice, our desire of happiness, and other grounds. In considering Religion, prominence is also given to the condition that it is conducive to our happiness. It is only Religion that leads parents to take upon themselves the burden of rearing and training their children. Religion alone makes the existence of human society possible. Religion

it: "Whoever has a living knowledge of God is justly regarded as having a religion; and in so far as this knowledge is obtainable by the natural power of reason, it is called a natural religion." "Such a knowledge of God will be living in itself, that is, it will be active, and will bring about a pleasurable insight into the connection of things, a willing impulse towards virtue, and undisturbed contentment of mind."

heightens our joys by limiting sensual enjoyments and introducing higher pleasures; it alone brings satisfaction to our natural powers in accordance with their laws and ultimate purpose, and creates true lasting contentment.

On the basis of these presuppositions Reimarus, however, comes to an entirely different judgment regarding miracles and revelation than his masters did. The assumption of a miracle in the once created world, is at variance with the moral necessity that is founded upon the providence of God which is strongly emphasized. It is also at variance with the divine intentions, which can have created nothing without a purpose. "The divine insight is at the same time a constant motive for the divine will to keep the world unaltered in all its reality and permanence. For if God's decree were changed by actual events and their means, He must also have other motives for this than He had at the beginning. Consequently He would thereby Himself declare His previous knowledge and decrees to have been not good and wise. He would thus have erred and chosen badly, either at the first or at the last; and this is contrary to the infinite perfection of God."—"The ordinary maintenance of nature cannot be such a (miraculous) effect of divine power; rather would it be contradictory of it." "If, then, God did everything directly and by miracles, He alone would do everything; and why should He then have undertaken a creation of finite things? If He checked every moment the energies of created substances and the laws of their nature, why should He have given them these energies and laws? The more miracles He did after the creation, so much the more would He again overthrow nature, and He would thus have created it in vain, and would not be maintaining it. In performing miracles, He would make it appear either that He had not comprehended the natural means that were possible for His purpose, or He would be often changing His purpose and working against His own influence in the maintenance of nature."

Without miracles, no Revelation! We already know this principle from Wolff. If Reimarus, then, being on the whole

a decided disciple of Wolff, denies miracles, will he be able and willing to hold by Revelation? How he really thought on this question, none of his pious readers could certainly divine; for his "Apology for the rational worshippers of God"<sup>1</sup> only became known after his death. It was a work to which Reimarus had devoted the earnest reflection and the strenuous industry of his leisure hours during the lifetime of a generation, and he explained his views with regard to positive religion in it without reserve.

The substance of this work may be indicated in brief as a criticism of the Biblical revelation. As a Christian, Reimarus indeed accepts it. But on what ground is he a Christian? It is really only because his fathers and grandfathers had believed this or that. A rational man should not found his belief and the hope of his salvation upon such an accident. He must examine with his reason and without prejudice this paternal religion, which being purely accidental may just as well be false as true. It is, however, declaimed from the pulpit that Reason, being corrupted by the fall, is, as it were, thoroughly incapable of judging about divine things. Yet those theologians themselves contradict this principle when they declare that the doctrines of other churches are contrary to reason, and support the doctrines of their own churches as much as possible on grounds of reason.—In proceeding to examine divine revelation, Reimarus first points out with emphasis that there is no immediate revelation, but only a mediate revelation given to us, the credibility of which we must exactly investigate according to all the rules by which the truth of any human testimony is investigated. For the rest, he holds entirely to the criteria of revelation which had been already set up, although not applied, by Wolff. We can only

<sup>1</sup> *Schutzschrift oder Apologie für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes*. It is well known that the first fragments of this work were published by Lessing in his *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Literatur aus den Schätzen der Herzogl. Bibliothek zu Wolfenbüttel*. A complete reprint of the work was begun by W. Klose in Niedner's *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, 1850–52. A comprehensive analysis of the whole work is given by D. F. Strauss in his *Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes*, Leipz. 1862 (*Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. v.).

recognise, as the messengers of a divine revelation, such men as agree in their discourse and action with its purpose, and not such as show impure human purposes, or even act immorally. We can only accept as divine doctrines and precepts such as correspond to the nature of God and are subservient to the perfection and happiness of man; and we cannot accept such doctrines and precepts as contradict themselves or other revealed truths, and especially the divine perfections and the laws of nature. What cannot be accepted as divine revelation according to these principles, cannot be accredited either by the assertion that it is divine revelation or by a miracle. For "what is contradictory cannot be resolved by any miracle, nor can vices be miraculously transformed into virtues." And "what is in itself impossible and absurd, and what, in any other history, would be called falsehood, deception, violence, and cruelty, cannot become rational, honest, permissible, and right, by having added to it the words: 'Thus saith the Lord.' "

When these principles are applied to the representatives of the Old Testament revelation, the patriarchs before Moses by no means appear as messengers of revelation. They do not at all think of how to propagate a saving religion, but attend to their cattle and their fields. In the history of Noah and of the flood there are found innumerable contradictions and impossibilities, such as natural history, architecture, and other circumstances show us in connection with this narrative. In the history of Abraham we find innumerable divine manifestations, miracles, commandments, and institutions, but they have all worldly things as their subject, and are without influence as regards a saving religion. Nor is this history without its contradictions and moral offensiveness. In this way the whole of the Old Testament is examined as to whether it indeed contains divine revelation. The answer does not turn out very favourable. There is no history in which miracles are so accumulated and so carried to excess; nor is there any history "which is so full of contradictions, or in which the name of God has been so frequently and shamefully abused;

for all the persons who are here brought forward as men of God cause utter offence, repulsion, and aversion by their conduct, to a soul that loves honour and virtue." "There is not found any one whose 'proper and earnest purpose had been to propagate a true knowledge of God, virtue, and piety among men; to say nothing of the fact that we seek in vain for a single great, magnanimous, and beneficent action in the whole of it. The history consists of a tissue of utter follies, infamies, deceptions, and cruelties, of which selfishness and ambition were mainly the motives.' What is said in it about supernatural inspiration, revelation, prophecy, and miracles, is mere delusion, deception, and abuse of the divine name."

Nor can the doctrines of the Old Testament be regarded as springing from divine revelation. The doctrine of God and our duties, is crushed into the background by the mass of ceremonial commandments, whereas in the communication of a true religion there should have been explained the nature, existence, and attributes of God and His works and purposes in the creation. Hence it will astonish no one to find that the Scriptures of the Old Testament arose gradually, came accidentally to higher authority, and were only afterwards made divine. The Scriptures of the New Testament, even though their origin from apostles and the disciples of apostles were to be admitted, have no claim to divine inspiration, but were written in an entirely human and occasional way, and were not recognised till afterwards as canonical. Hence they require to be historically interpreted. The doctrine of Jesus is to be carefully distinguished from that of the apostles. The sum-total of the doctrine of Jesus was shortly this: Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. The preaching of repentance contains great, noble, and even divine doctrines that are valid for all times and peoples. But, Jesus connected it with the intention of establishing a kingdom of heaven, that is, a worldly kingdom with eternal power and glory, such as the Jews expected. Jesus did not mean to introduce any new religion. The original plan of Jesus was frustrated by His death. His

resurrection was devised by the disciples. The testimony of the Roman watchers was invented, the testimony of the disciples regarding the appearances of the risen Christ comes to nothing on account of its contradictions, and the testimony from the Old Testament prophecies is untenable, like the old Jewish interpretations of Scripture. From mere necessity, and on account of their disappointed hopes, the disciples worked out a new system. With the minority of the Jews, they now read out of the Old Testament that Jesus had come to atone for the sins of the whole world by His sufferings and death. They stole the dead body, and asserted that Jesus had risen again, and that after forty days He had ascended to heaven, from whence He will soon come again to hold judgment and to establish His kingdom. They retained the beautiful rational morality of their master; but, accommodating themselves to the characteristic weakness of men, they added all sorts of unfathomable mysteries and miraculous aids. In addition to the great enthusiasm of the apostles, the propagation of Christianity was specially promoted by the introduction of the community of goods, by chiliasm, and by the so-called miraculous gifts. Paul then brings the apostolic doctrine to a close. "See now," says Reimarus, "whether the whole doctrinal system of the apostolic Christianity does not rest from beginning to end on utterly false positions, and specially upon positions which constitute the foundation and essence of this religion, and with which it must stand and fall."

As in the case of the history and doctrines of the Bible, the doctrinal system of the Protestant Church is likewise subjected to a sharp criticism. The original perfection and the fall of man are contrary to the divine nature. The doctrine of original sin, is "but intelligible words in which nothing can be thought without manifest contradiction." The doctrine of the work of Christ and the imputation of His merit, appears to Reimarus to be just as incomprehensible; and, above all, the eternal damnation of unbelievers appears to him to be entirely contradictory of the goodness of God and His purposes with men.



Reimarus, however, is not even satisfied with applying the criteria of a divine revelation set up by Wolff to the revelation presented in Christianity, and thus dissolving it. He further proceeds to show the impossibility of such a revelation at all. A revelation which all men could believe in a well-founded way, might, in the first place, be immediately communicated to all men; but this would be a constant miracle, and as such it would be opposed to the divine wisdom. In the second place, such a revelation might be addressed to individual persons among all or among some nations; but in that case the divine revelation would have to be accepted upon human testimony, and such testimony is uncertain. Hence this method is also contrary to the divine wisdom. In the third place, one people only, at certain times and through certain persons, might have received the revelation. This hypothesis has some advantages in its favour. But it maintains the idea of miracles, and such revealed knowledge is necessarily obscure and inconceivable, and it also becomes uncertain on account of false prophets and the human testimony of tradition. The universal diffusion of it is also impossible on account of the diversity of languages, the limited diffusion of true religion, and the difficulty of independently examining Scripture. Hence it is entirely incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God, that the acceptance of this revelation should be the necessary and only means of salvation. The revelation in nature, or natural religion, is much rather to be regarded as constituting the necessary and sole means of salvation.

## SECTION NINTH.

### THE OPPOSITION TO THE AUFKLÄRUNG.

LESSING. HERDER. HAMANN. JACOBI.

THE German *Aufklärung* was strongly influenced by the Philosophy of Leibniz. This influence, however, did not proceed directly from the genuine expositions of Leibniz himself, but from the form his Philosophy assumed as popularized by Wolff. This popular form of the system, when compared with the original exposition, was, from the outset, defective in two respects: it under-estimated the value of History, and it ignored the importance of Unconscious Feelings. In both of these relations we find certain other currents flowing along with and supplementing the philosophy of the *Aufklärung*, although they were not important enough to be able to change the general characteristic of the age. In relation to the Christian Religion, one of these currents of thought laid the beginnings of a historico-critical investigation of the documentary sources of our Religion, in order to incorporate them generally from a wider point of view in the connection of the historical process of growth and event. The other current, that flowed in opposition to the negative treatment of the Christian doctrines by the emptying method of the intellectualism of the German Enlightenment, brought forward the immediate Feeling of the pious soul; and in the consciousness of this certain and inalienable possession, its aim was to reject all intellectual examination of religion by reflective thought. The former method is essentially based upon the intellectual principle of the *Aufklärung*. It was from this movement that the critical method obtained the degree of freedom in relation

to revealed Religion that made a criticism of its sources possible; and with it, it shared the conception of religion as a moral doctrine, and its high estimation of the so-called Natural Religion. In the course of time, however, this historical method of inquiry gradually, yet constantly and necessarily, passed beyond the standpoint of the *Aufklärung*. The latter method of appeal to immediate Feeling stands higher than the critical method, inasmuch as, having a profound sense for the essential nature of religion, it is decidedly opposed to mere intellectual Enlightenment; but as it stops at what is immediately felt, and sees in every effort of thought an attack upon the inviolable sanctuary of religion, it is likewise incapable of understanding Religion, and of doing justice to its historical forms and development.

The historico-critical movement found its first representatives in the theology of Holland and of England. In Germany, Wettstein († 1754) first began to restore the original text of the New Testament from a vast number of various readings that had been handed down, and this effort came into hard collision with the old ecclesiastical notion of inspiration. He was followed by Griesbach († 1812), who declared that a supernatural revelation was not merely possible, but probable and desirable, and only desiderated that it should not contradict any truth of natural religion. By a classification of the manuscripts of the New Testament, he turned the lower criticism into new paths, and, at the same time, founded the criticism of the synoptic Gospels, the traditional harmony of which appeared to him to be impossible. Eichhorn († 1827) then began to subject the New Testament Scriptures to the same unprejudiced historical criticism as the products of the profane writers. The same thing was done for the Old Testament by Joh. Dav. Michaelis († 1791), the learned founder of a systematic Textual Criticism, and in his work on the Mosaic Law,<sup>1</sup> also the beginner of an unbiassed and purely historical examination of the Old Testament history. In contrast to the hitherto

<sup>1</sup> Mosaisches Recht, 1770.

common dogmatic exegesis, Joh. Aug. Ernesti (1707-1781) became the founder of the historico-critical method of interpretation. He was essentially a philologist, and in his *Institutio interpretis N. T.* (1761) he defines interpretation as the art of exactly and completely communicating the thoughts, of others as contained in any discourse. The interpreter should never aim at anything else than to receive completely into himself, and to correctly reproduce the meaning which may lie in the given words according to the intention of the writer. The relation of the words to the ideas and things is mediated by language, but this finds its proper application in every passage according to the relations of its origin and its purpose. Interpretation must therefore be not merely grammatical, or determined by the general rules of the language in question, but it must also be historical, that is, it must take into consideration the historical origin of the writing that has to be explained.

JOHANN SALOMO SEMLER (1725-1791) is the most important name in this series of critics. Praised by some as the father of the modern theology, condemned by others as the man with whom the falling away from the faith of the fathers became universal, honoured as an individual by all who strove for a rational view of religion, and regarded in his old age with distrust on all sides, Semler presents two aspects which it is difficult to reconcile with each other in an objective estimate. From his pietistic training he retained a living internal religiousness, but the acuteness of his critical understanding made him give up many of the objective doctrines of the Church as soon as his personal piety no longer depended upon them. An indefatigable worker, yet without a sense for system, he produced no fewer than 171 works. His works are entirely wanting in form, being in part mere extracts or summaries of books interpolated with critical remarks; but he thus gave the impulse to new inquiries in almost all the departments of theology, although he has nowhere produced anything complete in itself. In his criticism of the text and his judgment of the canon,

Semler attaches himself wholly to the writers just mentioned. The canon is not original, but is a product of history, and should not therefore be regarded as the basis of the Christian faith. A book of Scripture is not divine because God has composed, written, or inspired it, or because it stands in the canon; but it stands in the canon because men held the judgment that this book served to promote their perfection and happiness. This is properly what is divine in Scripture, yet all the Biblical writings contain many things which have a purely historical and accidental significance, and contribute nothing to the promotion of human perfection and happiness. This historical view makes the Biblical Scriptures appear as occasional writings which were written at a particular time, under particular circumstances, and for a particular purpose. The books of the New Testament arose out of the original opposition and the later reconciliation of a more Jewish and a more heathen, or more liberal, party in the primitive Christianity. Hence arises the demand for a historical exegesis in the interpretation of these books. In the department of Church History, Semler strove mainly to reach an understanding of the original Christianity from the relations of its time, and to attain a more correct appreciation of heretics. In the History of Dogmas, he wanted the power of recognising what was always permanent and everywhere the same, while he is fond of pointing out the external changes in the dogmatic definitions, and the influence of the private opinion of a conspicuous teacher of the philosophic views of the age, and of local and temporary circumstances. Dogmas have merely a local value to the Christian Church, as a means of distinguishing the members of one local religious community from those of the others. In Dogmatic Theology, Semler's weakness lay in the want of a philosophical view of the religious material, and it shows itself plainly. Usually he only contrasts the dogma in its historical form with his own divergent "mode of expression," and leaves the reader to choose between the two. The only point that specially deserves attention is his distinction of public and private

religion, an obscure anticipation of the distinction between theology and religion. At the basis of both lies the historical religion, or the history and doctrine of Jesus in its literal form. Public or social religion is the local and temporal representation of it as it is expressed in the particular dogmas of the creeds, and as it must be taught and believed by the members of a particular church, or ecclesiastical community, for the sake of external order. Moral or private religion is determined by the different moral development of the individual, in accordance with which the application of the Biblical doctrines to his heart is different. Social Religion requires dogmas and the external agreement of all its members, whereas Private Religion requires the greatest liberty.

It may appear strange, yet it is a fact, that along with the universal striving after Enlightenment, there moved by its side an obscure dreamy fanaticism of a fantastic kind, such as had rarely been seen before. Semler himself made attempts at gold-making, especially towards the end of his life. Alchemistic studies, searching for the philosopher's stone, intercourse with spirits, and the mysterious cultivation of secret societies, were then quite in vogue. All this reflected the natural reaction of the life of feeling in man from the dry cold reasoning of the understanding. This movement manifested itself in relation to religion in such a way that the inward life of feeling directly exhibited itself, without being misled by the criticism of the understanding. Thus Gellert († 1769), in spite of all the defects that attached to him as a poet, cannot be denied the merit of having, as an apologist of Christianity in word and life, brought close to his time the religious and moral thoughts that constituted his own inmost life. With a far grander poetical flight, Klopstock († 1803), in his *Messias*, sang the reconciliation of man, and carried away his contemporaries in rapturous enthusiasm. Matthias Claudius († 1815), as the "Wandsbeck Messenger," in a soberer way gave his testimony to the revelation that spoke in nature and history to his receptive



soul, and not without some keen slashes at the philosophy which had remained strange in him. The pious Gerhard Teerstegen († 1769), by profession a weaver of silk ribbons, also worked upon wide circles and showed many the way to Christ by his quickening "Hours of Edification." In like manner, Jung-Stilling († 1847) exercised a kindred influence, and his rock-fixed confidence in divine providence gave occasion to the remark of Goethe, that "the wonderful man believes he only needs to throw the dice and our Lord God must set them for him." To this circle Joh. Caspar Lavater († 1801) also belongs. To him Christianity was real communion with God, realized inwardly in the heart of man; the Bible was the record of the divine revelation; and Jesus, the first incomparable Son of the eternal invisible Father, the most direct revelation of God. Along with this religious inwardness, Lavater, however, possessed an openness for all secular relations and sciences, and this enabled him also to enter into connection with circles that were indifferent to religion.

Each of the two movements thus described, produced two distinguished men who prosecuted reflection about religion so far that they demand consideration in detail. LESSING and HERDER were the chief representatives of the historico-critical school, while HAMANN and JACOBI represent the inward feeling of the heart in relation to religion.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pfeiderer's History may be compared with what follows in this Section. (Otto Pfeiderer, *Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage*, Berlin 1878.) [The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History. By Dr. Otto Pfeiderer, Professor in the University of Berlin. Translated by Alexander Stewart, M.A., and Allan Menzies, B.D.; vol. i. 1886; vol. ii. 1887.] Pfeiderer puts Lessing beside Kant as a representative of the Critical Philosophy of Religion. This appears to me as unintelligible as that Herder is brought in between Hamann and Jacobi as a representative of the Mystico-intuitive Philosophy of Religion, and that Fries was only mentioned [in the First Edition] in an appendix to Jacobi, and dismissed in a few lines. The more I owe to the penetrating and clear exposition of Pfeiderer, so much the greater was the temptation to state at every point wherein I differ with him. Nevertheless, keeping faithfully to the principle observed in the whole of this work, I have avoided all special assent or polemic, although the expression of my expositions is frequently determined by agreement with Pfeiderer or by opposition to him. The order of my arrangement, as well as the divergence of my exposition in detail, must be left to vindicate itself.

## I.

GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING (1729-1781).<sup>1</sup>

*Was Lessing a Spinozist?* This question, as is well known, was keenly discussed soon after Lessing's death, between Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn, and it cannot be passed over even yet. Jacobi, referring to a conversation which he had had with Lessing, in connection with Goethe's *Prometheus*, regarding the relation of God to the world and the freedom of the human will, asserted that Lessing was a Spinozist. Mendelssohn, who saw in this statement a grave charge against his friend, wished to save him from this reproach, and so he hit upon the idea of a "purified Spinozism." If, however, we remember how little knowledge Mendelssohn had of Spinoza, and how much Jacobi was inclined to identify all the systems of philosophy that were based on reflection, notwithstanding their wide differences, with Spinozism, we shall be inclined to give little importance to that controversy, without doubting the fidelity of the statement or the scientific character of the conversation. However, let us look at it somewhat more closely. The conversation turned around two points: the acceptance of an extra-mundane personal God, and the freedom of the human will. Jacobi believes in an intelligent personal Cause of the world; Lessing confesses that the orthodox conceptions of the Deity are unpalatable to him, and that he knows nothing but *ἐν καὶ πάν*. Lessing will have everything worked out naturally, and cannot conceive an extra-mundane personal Deity otherwise than as affected with dreadful weariness. Jacobi feels himself free,

<sup>1</sup> The philosophical and theological writings of Lessing that we have to take into consideration are contained, in greater completeness than in any of the former editions, in Hempel's Ed. of Lessing's Works, xiv.-xvii. These volumes are also published separately. "Lessing as a Theologian" has become an extremely favourite theme for Essays and Lectures; but notwithstanding the enormous number of such productions, we still want a purely objective exposition of the subject, equally just to it in the way of praise and blame.

but notwithstanding this immediate feeling, cannot suppose that our thoughts only proceed side by side with the emotions without determining them. Lessing, on the contrary, desires no freewill, but, as an honest Lutheran, will hold by "the error and blasphemy, more brutal than human, that there is no freewill." These are the several points that are touched. Every one knows, however, that the denial of a personal extra-mundane God, and of the freedom of the human will, is identical with Spinozism only in the view of Jacobi, who also declared in this conversation that he knew no doctrinal system that agreed so much as the Leibnizian with that of Spinoza.—In order to determine Lessing's philosophical standpoint, we must therefore necessarily go back to his own writings.

And, at the outset, it must not be overlooked that Lessing was a critic and not a systematizer. No systematic thinker could say with Lessing that "it is not the truth in the possession of which a man is, or supposes himself to be, but the honest effort which he has put forth to come by the truth, that constitutes the value of the man. For it is not by the possession of truth, but by the pursuit of it, that the powers are enlarged; whereas the possession makes a man quiet, inactive, indolent, and proud." No systematic thinker can so greatly doubt of the capability of our human knowledge that revealed religion becomes by him most suspected just on account of that by which it knows itself most, that is, on account of its undoubted possession of the truth of immortality. One of Lessing's well-known utterances was, "If I should call myself after any one, I know no other" (that is, no other than Spinoza); and his repudiation contained in these words, of being the scholar of any one, is to be accepted. Herder has rightly remarked that Lessing was "not created to be an —ist of any sort, whatever letters might be prefixed to this termination!" In philosophy, Lessing was also but a "Fragmentist;" and he was so on a double ground—*materially*, because to his practical and active mind purely speculative investigations appeared to be superfluous; and *formally*,

because, notwithstanding all his logical acuteness, his lively intellect wanted patience for methodico-schematic thinking. The most important thoughts of Lessing, however, undoubtedly point to a relationship with Leibniz, and to dependence upon him.

Lessing early applied himself to the study of Leibniz, and with great zeal. In order to defend Leibniz against the covert attack of the Berlin Academy, he wrote, along with Mendelssohn, the treatise entitled "Pope, a Metaphysician."<sup>1</sup> He holds that every page written by Leibniz is, as such, worthy of publication. He speaks of Leibniz in terms of the greatest respect, and says that if Pope had followed Shaftesbury in the explanation of evils, he would have come incomparably nearer the truth and nearer Leibniz! Leibniz is defended from the objection that he has accommodated his system to the most heterogeneous doctrines and prejudices, while he is praised on account of his grand way of thinking and his art of striking fire from every stone.—The most important of Lessing's thoughts point to Leibniz, as may be seen by referring merely to his "Christianity of Reason."<sup>2</sup> Here it is held that the one sole perfect Being has from eternity contemplated what is most perfect, that is, Himself. In the case of God, thinking, willing, and creating are one; and hence God likewise creates what He conceives. Now God may conceive things in two ways: first, He may conceive all perfections at once, and Himself as their sum; that is, God created from eternity a being to whom none of His perfections was wanting. This is the Son of God or God Son. This Being is an identical image of God, and hence there is the greatest harmony between God and His Son; and this the Scriptures call the Spirit which proceeds from the Father and from the Son. This harmony is likewise God, and all the three are one. Again, God thought of His perfection as divided; that is, He created beings, every one of them having something of His perfections. These beings together constitute the world. Because it is created by a most perfect God, this world is the

<sup>1</sup> Pope, ein Metaphysiker.

<sup>2</sup> Das Christenthum der Vernunft.

most perfect of worlds; that is, it is an infinite series of members in which, in infinite degrees of more and less perfection, all the members are arranged in a series without leap or gap. God only creates simple beings, and there exists among them a comprehensive harmony which explains all the processes in the world. With the different degrees of perfection these beings also possess different degrees of the consciousness of this perfection, and of the capacity of acting in accordance with it. Hence the latter are moral beings whose law of action is just this: "Act in accordance with thy individual perfections."—Apart from the attempt to construe the Trinity, all the fundamental thoughts here remind us of Leibniz. All created things are simple beings, and, in particular, simple percipient beings. Finite things are different according to infinite differences in their degrees of perfection. God is the highest and most perfect Monad. The world, and all that happens in it, is held together by harmony; and the striving after perfection is the principle of our actions.

Lessing also agrees with Leibniz in accepting the theories of determinism and the perfection of the world. In losing freedom, he believes we lose nothing that we can use for our activity here, or for our happiness there. "Compulsion and necessity make the idea of what is best operative; how much more perfect are they to me than a bald faculty of being able to act under the same circumstances, in one way at one time, and in another way at another time. I thank the Creator that I must, even *must* do what is best!" In regard to the perfection of the world, it remains doubtful in the system of Leibniz, whether the perfection of the world advances or remains identically the same; or, in other words, whether the highest perfection is the ultimate goal of its development, or this exists from the beginning. Lessing decides for the view that the world was as perfect from the beginning as a world can be. He does not, however, undertake to show this perfection in detail, nor to establish it against all objections by a Theodicy.

As regards the Soul and its Immortality, he also attaches himself closely to Leibniz in the fragment, *That there may be more than five senses for man*. The soul is a simple being which is capable of infinite perceptions; yet as a finite being it is not capable of these infinite perceptions at once, but only gradually in an infinite succession of time. Now it is not conceivable that this capacity should have been given to us without its also becoming developed. Hence it is absolutely necessary to accept the doctrine of a future life. In order that we may obtain more ideas in that life, we shall perhaps receive another organization, or more senses. We have now five senses, but as we have only gradually come to them, there is nothing to prevent our receiving still more. And as, in fact, the whole material world is animated, the particles which serve the soul in any one sense constitute homogeneous combinations of original materials, and every sense corresponds to a particular collection of matter; and so there are as many senses possible as there are homogeneous masses in the material world. There are, however, more than five of these. —With the establishment of the doctrine of Immortality, there stands in close connection his defence of the eternity of hell punishments, in the treatise entitled “Leibniz on eternal punishments.” Not as if Leibniz, and Lessing along with him, represented the ecclesiastical doctrine, according to which there is in the future world a final twofold state, that of the blessed in heaven and of the damned in hell, while they are both separated in space by an impassable gulf. But in contrast to the shallow view of an equally blessed state of all in the world to come, Leibniz sees in the ecclesiastical doctrine, albeit in the sensible form of an exoteric dogma, a profound truth, which is thoroughly related to his esoteric doctrine. In attachment to Leibniz, Lessing represents the same view in opposition to Eberhard’s *Apology of Socrates*, which on the basis of illuminative eclecticism asserted the salvation even of the heathen, in opposition to the ecclesiastical orthodoxy. The great esoteric truth, in respect of which Leibniz found it advisable to support the common doctrine of eternal damna-



tion, is that there is nothing insulated in the world, nothing without consequences, nothing without eternal consequences. Hence moral conduct, or good and bad actions, cannot be without their consequences. This is certainly not held in such a way as to mean that in the other world there are two separate places, one for the blessed and the other for the damned, but it means that the good which every one has in himself is his heaven, and the evil is his hell. Nor is there between the two an absolute separation; but as there are infinitely many degrees of perfection, so are there also infinitely many stages of happiness passing gradually into each other, from the heaven of the blessed to the hell of the damned. And even if, by a gradual development, all ultimately attain to perfection and consequently to happiness, yet the eternal punishment of sins consists at least in this, that they delay the attainment of this end.—With so much of agreement, not much is to be laid on the fact that Lessing conceives of this immortality more under the form of the metempsychosis, holding that our soul has already been several times on the earth in different bodies and under different circumstances of life, and that in the future it shall also pass through similar transmigrations.

Lessing is thus essentially a follower of Leibniz, but not of that Leibniz whom Wolff had made current in the language of his time. Lessing returns to the genuine Leibniz whom he discovered in his own writings, making an exact distinction between Leibniz's exoteric and esoteric forms of doctrine. But even here he is not a mere reproducer. This is seen when we look away from minor points. Thus it is that Lessing makes individuality (the high estimate of which he had learned from Leibniz) to be the highest criterion of action in the practical sphere, and that he does not recognise Leibniz's distinction between truths that are above reason and truths that are contrary to reason, but, in accordance with the rationalism of the *Aufklärung*, he subjects everything to the decision of the human understanding. The main difference

between the two turns upon the *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*. Leibniz commonly apprehends God as the first and most perfect monad. The finite monads are independently by themselves out of God; and it is only incidentally that another view is indicated when he designates God as the central monad, and thus as the soul, while all existing things are regarded as the body. Lessing, in his essay "On the reality of things out of God," already declares that he can form no conception of such reality. If things are called the complement of possibility, there may or may not be a conception of this in God. No one will assert the latter alternative, but if it is admitted that there is a conception of things in God, this implies that all things are really in Himself; for as soon as God has a conception of the reality of things, they are no longer really out of Him. Or if it is said that the reality of a thing is the sum of all the possible determinations which may belong to it, this sum must necessarily also be in the Idea of God. Nor is the distinction between things and God done away with, if the conceptions which God has of real things are these real things themselves. Even as such they continue to be contingent, while necessary reality belongs to God.—While decidedly repudiating an extra-mundane personal God after the manner of the human personality, he always lays emphasis upon the *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*, but in doing so he is still very far from the genuine Spinozism.

This sufficiently indicates Lessing's relation to the *Aufklärung*. He stands wholly upon the ground of the *Aufklärung*. This was due not merely to personal friendship with the chief leaders of that enlightenment, but the whole character of his own efforts brought him to it. Hence arose his incessant struggle against all the prejudices that were consecrated by age, and hence his tendency to investigate everything critically and to put it into a new light. Yet because Lessing did not stop at the exoteric wisdom in Leibniz and its representation in Wolff, but pressed into its esoteric elements, he took up two thoughts which had been completely lost by the German Enlightenment: the idea of Individualism and the idea of

Development. Whatever exists has already, as such, a claim to be examined with care; and Lessing, like few of his age, understood how to transport himself into other thoughts and times, and correctly to appreciate other kinds of manifestations, however strange they might be.

In entire correspondence with this position is Lessing's attitude towards the religious Enlightenment of his time. From his youth Lessing had zealously studied theological controversies, and even when theology was given up as a professional study he retained a living interest in it, so that he could afterwards justly say of himself that he had not wished controversy, and yet did not need to shun it. He was completely at one with the *Aufklärung* in the rejection of Orthodoxy. "What are the orthodox to me? I despise them as much as you do," Lessing writes to his brother. Yet he respects the orthodox system on account of its complete logical connection, and in certain dogmas, notwithstanding their untenableness before the understanding, he even divines a deeper hidden truth, but without making any attempt to explain this irrational investment of such higher truths, or to represent it as a universal law. Hence the modern theology of the Enlightenment is still more repugnant to him. "What is our new fashionable theology compared with orthodoxy, but liquid manure compared with dirty water? A final understanding had been, thank God, very much come to with orthodoxy; a separating wall had been drawn between it and philosophy, behind which each of them could go its own way without hindering the other. But what is done now? This partition is torn down, and under the pretence of making us rational Christians, they are making us extremely irrational philosophers." "We are agreed on the fact that our old religious system is false; but I should not like to say with you that it is a patchwork made by dabblers and half-philosophers. I know nothing else in the world, in which the acuteness of the human mind has been more exhibited and practised. A patchwork made by dabblers and half-philosophers is the religious system which they would now put in the place of the old

one, and with far more influence upon reason and philosophy than the old system pretended to." If we ask, however, for the new system that Lessing would substitute in place of orthodoxy and of the Enlightenment, the answer cannot satisfy us. It is possible that Lessing kept silent on much which his age did not yet seem mature enough to receive; it is also probable that his power went only the length of criticism, and soon found its limit in the attempt to create what was new.

The earliest theological writings of Lessing are very tame. His *Saving of Cardanus* (1770) aims at showing how weak were the grounds on which Cardan had been accused of atheism. His *Saving of the "Ineptus Religiosus"* shows that the said work directed against Syncretism was entirely satirical, and therefore was not a bad, godless book; and his *Saving of Cochlæus* discusses the suggestion that the schism of the Reformation was merely a consequence of an accidental jealousy between the Dominican and Augustinian orders. The *Berengarius Turonensis* seeks, by reference to a manuscript discovered in the Wolfenbüttel Library, to prove that Berengar completely expounded the later Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper. His *Thoughts on the Moravians*<sup>1</sup> (1750) lay stress upon a practical Christianity; man was created for action and not for rationalizing, but on that very account he inclines more to the latter than to the former. From this perversion of what is essential, arises the decay of philosophy as well as of religion. This explanation, however, is not accompanied by any exact definition, and therefore it remains without value as regards his conception or apprehension of the nature of religion. Moreover, this treatise, with some others to be afterwards mentioned, remained unprinted till after Lessing's death.

All the more violently, however, was the controversy kindled when Lessing published, in 1774-78, a series of "Fragments of an anonymous (writer)" in the "Contributions

<sup>1</sup> Gedanken über die Herrnhuter.

to History and Literature."<sup>1</sup> It is now universally recognised that these were fragments from the "Apology for the rational worshippers of God"<sup>2</sup> by H. S. Reimarus. We may refer to these writings, as far as regards the contents of the "Fragments." They relate to "the Toleration of the Deists;" "the decrying of reason in the pulpits;" "the impossibility of a revelation that all men could believe in a rational way;" "the crossing of the Israelites through the Red Sea;" "that the books of the Old Testament have not been written to reveal a Religion;" "the history of the Resurrection;" and the "purpose of Jesus and of His disciples." Lessing did not entirely agree with the author, and accordingly he added his "counter-positions." The numerous attacks upon the work were, however, for the most part directed as much against Lessing as against the unknown author. Lessing then took up the conflict, and in particular he turned upon Göze.<sup>3</sup>

We may pass over the details of this controversy and examine its ultimate results, or more properly, the general theological propositions which Lessing propounded and represented.—The question first treated turned upon the correct relation between religion and the book of religion, or the relation between Christianity and the Bible. Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment were at one in regard to this general question. Reimarus and Göze so completely identify the two, that every attack upon the Bible was also regarded by them as an attack upon Religion. On the basis of this common assumption, Orthodoxy starts from the position that Christianity is true, and infers from it that the Bible is true;

<sup>1</sup> Fragmenten eines Ungenannten.

<sup>2</sup> Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes.

<sup>3</sup> Johann Melchior Göze was the Senior Pastor of Hamburg. Poor Göze, as represented by Lessing, was "held up as the bearer and type of all narrowness of mind and hostility to science." But Göze has also found his "Saving" (cf. Rope, *J. M. Göze, zur Rettung Goezes*, 1860). However, as long as the excessive over-estimate of the merits of Lessing in relation to the Philosophy of Religion lasts, his often more rough than real polemic, and the empty evasions with which it turns away from the main question, "What Religion does Lessing understand by the Christian Religion, and to which he confesses himself to belong?" will be too much admired in a one-sided way, for justice to be done to his opponent.

whereas the Enlightenment starts from the position that the Bible is for many reasons, or at least in many points, not true, and it infers that Christianity is therefore likewise untrue, or at least is incredible. Lessing seeks to shift the position of the whole controversy by calling in question the common assumption. The book of religion, he says, is not religion, the Bible is not Christianity; and therefore attacks upon the Bible are not, *eo ipso*, also attacks upon Christianity. Lessing was well aware of the bearing and range of his assertion. Religion is in his view the palace in which mankind have lived from of old in comfort and undisturbed; the religious book is the ground-plan according to which the palace was built. At present this ground-plan is so much over-estimated that, in case of a conflagration, the attempt would not be made to extinguish the fire, but only to save the plan. Lessing would make a distinction between the Bible and Christianity. He would rather not acknowledge the Bible as the sole foundation of our most holy religion than give up religion to irresolvable difficulties.

Lessing has briefly summarized his thoughts on this subject in the following ten axioms:—"1. The Bible manifestly contains more than belongs to Religion. 2. It is a mere hypothesis that the Bible is equally infallible in this 'more than Religion.' 3. The letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not Religion. 4. Consequently, objections against the letter and against the Bible are not on that very account likewise objections against the spirit and against religion. 5. Further, there was a Religion before the Bible existed. 6. Christianity existed before the Evangelists and the Apostles had written. It was a good while before the first of them wrote, and a very considerable period passed before the Canon came into existence. 7. However much may, therefore, depend on these writings, yet it is not possible that the whole truth of the Christian Religion should rest upon them. 8. If there was a period in which the Christian Religion was already widely spread, and in which it had already won so many souls, but in which, however, not a letter was yet



written of that which has come down to us, it must also be possible that all that the Evangelists and the Apostles have written might again be lost, and yet the Religion taught by them would still subsist. 9. Religion is not true because the Evangelists and Apostles taught it, but they taught it because it is true. 10. What has been transmitted in writing must be explained by its internal truth, and all the writings transmitted to us cannot give any internal truth to a thing if it does not possess such truth!"

The Bible then is not religion, and this is historically proved by the fact that Christianity existed before any of the Evangelists and Apostles had written anything. The first summary of the Christian faith was the *Regula fidei*. The writings of the New Testament arose afterwards, and quite gradually. We may here, however, pass over the hypothesis of Lessing regarding the origin of the Gospels.—Christianity is thus shown to be older than the Bible; and hence it is not Christianity that is dependent on the Bible, but the Bible that is dependent on Christianity. In other words, the Bible is not the foundation of Christianity, but its original documentary record. The Biblical Scriptures are occasional writings, composed under particular circumstances and for definite purposes, and they thus contain very much that is accidental and indifferent as regards religion. Hence the Bible contains more things and other things than belong to religion, and for these it does not possess the same authority as for what properly belongs to religion.

The controversy between Lessing and Göze, turned around the relation of the Bible to Christianity; whereas the controversy between Lessing and Schumann, turned upon the significance of Miracles and Prophecies for the truth of the Christian religion. The treatise "Concerning the proof of the Spirit and of Power" was directed by Lessing against Schumann. Lessing here starts from the point of view that a distinction must be made between prophecies of which we ourselves experience the fulfilment, or miracles which have been seen with our own eyes, and narratives of fulfilled

prophecies or miracles that have already taken place. If I had lived in the time of Christ, and if I had seen how prophecies of undoubtedly ancient origin were fulfilled in His person, or how He performed miracles Himself, I would at once have subordinated my understanding to His. Or, if prophecies regarding the Christian religion were still fulfilled at present, and if miracles were done by Christians as in the time of Origen, I would at once recognise the proof of the Spirit and of Power. But in the present day this proof has neither spirit nor power, but has sunk down into human testimonies as to spirit and power. Seeing that the truth of the miracles is no longer established by current miracles now, and seeing that we have only narratives of miracles, although these may be completely consistent as narratives, they cannot oblige one to believe in other doctrines; for if a historical truth cannot be demonstrated, neither can anything be demonstrated by historical truth. In other words, *contingent historical truths can never become the proof of necessary rational truths*!<sup>1</sup>—Further, what is meant by believing a historical truth? It means nothing else than to recognise this truth, and to raise no objection against another person building another historical proposition upon it. If I have nothing to object historically to the statement that Christ raised a dead man and rose Himself from the dead, I am quite willing to believe that the disciples regarded Him on that ground as the Son of God; these truths belong to one and the same class. This, however, cannot oblige me to believe that God has a Son of the same substance with Himself, and that Christ is this Son. That would amount to deriving the obligation to believe something against which my reason rebels, from the inability to raise any strong objection to the testimony of some one; and this is accordingly a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Nor does an appeal to the inspiration of Scripture give any help, for even this is only historically certain. It is

<sup>1</sup> This principle is still proclaimed in the present day as the highest wisdom, and yet Lessing might even then have advanced from his view of history as a development, to a more correct appreciation of historical facts,

thus always necessary to leap from a historical truth over to an entirely different class of truths, and by reference to the former to transform all my metaphysical and moral conceptions. "This is the broad foul ditch over which I cannot pass, however often and earnestly I may have attempted the leap." Thus miracles and prophecies, of which I have only historical information, cannot oblige me, although their historical truth is quite indubitable, to accept doctrines of another kind. The doctrines themselves can only lead me to accept them.

The Book of Religion is thus not the foundation, but the documentary record of Religion. Miracles and Prophecies, or, in short, historical facts, are no sure proof of the truth of a religion. The religion must be founded upon itself; the truths of religion are internal truths or truths of reason. This negative characteristic leads beyond the distinction of Religion and the Bible and the repudiation of the historical proof of the Spirit and of Power, to a distinction between the Christian Religion and the Religion of Christ. And this positive determination leads to inquiries into the nature of Religion.

The distinction thus referred to, is discussed in the Fragment entitled *The Religion of Christ*. Whether Christ was more than man, is a problem; but it is made out as a fact, that He was truly and really man. Hence the Religion of Christ and the Christian Religion, are entirely different things. The Religion of Christ, is that religion which He himself, as a man, recognised and practised, and which every man must wish more and more to have in common with him, the higher he thinks of the man, Christ. The Christian Religion is that religion which accepts the position that Christ was more than man, and which makes Him as such the object of worship. It is inconceivable that these two religions can exist in Christ as in one and the same person, since the doctrines and principles of both are hardly to be found in one and the same book. The Religion of Christ is contained in clear and distinct words in the Bible; the Christian Religion

is so ambiguous that hardly two men are agreed on the meaning of a passage.—Lessing, however, does not go beyond these allusions. He does not state, either definitely or precisely, what belongs to the Religion of Christ, nor does he explain on what grounds accidental or necessary, and in what way the Christian Religion has entered into the place of the Religion of Christ.

The explanations of Lessing regarding the essential nature of Religion, are in like manner unsatisfying. He says that the truths of religion are eternal truths, or truths of reason. This position is regarded by him as established beyond doubt. It follows necessarily from the fact that religion is neither based upon the religious book, nor upon miracles and prophecies, and that I must therefore accept it because it is true in itself and because its truths are evident to my reason. This follows from the fact that Lessing aims at spreading the Christianity of Reason; and he lays stress upon the fact that what all the religions have in common cannot be without a foundation in Reason. But the question then arises as to what sort of truths these truths of religion are. Are they theoretical truths or practical truths? There is much to be said for the latter alternative. Lessing himself breaks a lance for the Moravians, because they turn away from the commonly-trodden path of rationalizing, to the only correct way of action. He wishes "that all whom the Gospel of John separates, may be again united by the Testament of John."

By the "Testament" of John is meant the words which the Apostle, towards the end of his life, was in the habit of speaking in the assemblies of the Church. "Little children, love one another." This alone appears to him to be enough; it is sufficient if it is carried out. "It was this Testament of John by which formerly a certain salt of the earth swore. Now this salt of the earth swears by the Gospel of John; and it is said that it has become a little musty in consequence of this change." Lessing decidedly rejects the view that the Christian doctrines of faith must necessarily be added to true Christian love, in order that any one may be a Christian. And

if we think of his *Nathan the wise*, it appears entirely beyond doubt that in Lessing's view the true religion is identical with morality. On the other hand, if we consider his *Education of the Human Race*, there are certain truths of reason, or theoretical truths, which are of main importance to religion, and the universal and unmistakeable publication of them constitutes the chief significance of Christianity; and, in particular, such are insight into the unity of God and the immortality of the soul.—So little does the question regarding the psychological nature of religion come into the circle of Lessing's inquiry, that he puts these statements side by side with each other without even indicating any mode of combining them.

True religion, according to Lessing, is therefore eternal rational truth. Hence there arise two questions: first, Does religion rest merely upon reason without revelation? and, secondly, How do the positive religions with their contents, in part undeniably contrary to reason, arise?

Leibniz, in entire consistency with the connection of his system, distinguished between propositions that are *above* reason and propositions that are *contrary* to reason. A Revelation may not contain the latter, but it will contain the former. Wolff then proceeded to determine in detail the distinguishing marks of what should be regarded as revelation. According to this canon, the representatives of the Enlightenment, in accordance with their personal predilections, struck out at one time more, and at another fewer of the positions of the Christian revelation as contrary to reason, without, however, in principle denying revelation itself. Here, too, Lessing goes farther, by calling in question the assumption of the supra-rationality of Revelation that lay at the foundation of the discussion. Revelation certainly goes beyond the natural knowledge of its recipients, but it does not go beyond reason as such; it communicates knowledge to men which they certainly would not have had otherwise at that time, but it is knowledge which they could attain to by their natural reason in the course of time. Revelation is thus entirely rational. Lessing proceeds to show this; and, using

a figure already found in the church fathers, he represents it as the Education of the Human Race. All education is education to something which is its goal, and it is therefore a development. This is the chief thought of Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*.

Education is revelation happening to the individual man; and Revelation is education which has happened and still happens to the human race. Education gives man nothing that he could not have of himself, only it gives it quicker and easier. In like manner, Revelation gives nothing to the human race to which human reason would not come if left to itself, only it gives it the most important things sooner. As is the case with parents and teachers in connection with education, so must God likewise have observed a certain order and proportion in connection with Revelation. The first man was indeed already furnished with the conception of one only God, but human reason when left to itself divided the single, incommensurable One into several more commensurable individuals, and thus sank into polytheism and idolatry. In order to bring men again to the right way, God chose a single people to be the subjects of His special education, and He particularly chose the Israelites as the people that was most unpolished and barbarized. To this people, God made Himself known at the beginning merely as the God of their fathers, authenticated Himself by miracles as a God who was more powerful than any other, and thus accustomed the Israelites to the conception of the one God. This conception of God as one only was, however, based entirely upon the idea of His being the most powerful, and it was still far removed from the true transcendental conception of the one only God. In this lay the foundation of the frequent apostasy of the Israelites, when another God appeared to them as the most powerful God. In moral respects, such an uncultivated people could only be educated by immediate sensible punishments and rewards. It would have been a pædagogic error if God had at once proceeded to reveal to the people the immortality of the soul and a future life, as their reason was not yet sufficiently grown for



these truths.—Meanwhile the other nations of the earth had advanced upon their own way by the light of reason. Most of them stopped behind the chosen people, and some outstripped them: which, however, proves nothing against Revelation. Nor does the fact that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of rewards and punishments in a future life, is not contained in the Old Testament, prove anything against its divineness. An elementary book for children may well pass over in silence some important parts of science and art, only it may not contain anything that bars the way to them. During the exile the Jewish people came into contact with the wise Persians, and as they measured Jehovah with the Being of all beings, there resulted the first mutual service between Reason and Revelation. Hitherto Revelation had led Reason, now Reason enlightened Revelation. In the light of the Persian Religion, with its pure conception of God, the Jews saw in the Jehovah of the Old Testament no longer merely the most powerful national God, but in truth the one and only God. The Jews were also made acquainted with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul among the Chaldeans and Persians, and especially in the schools of the Greek philosophers in Egypt. And now they found in the Old Testament at least prefigurations, allusions, and indications pointing to this faith. But every elementary book exists only for a definite time, and the Old Testament too had its time. Then came Christ, and He plucked the exhausted book of elements out of the hands of the child.

The Jews had come so far in the exercise of their reason, that they required for their moral actions nobler and worthier motives than temporal rewards and punishments. And so Christ became the first trustworthy practical teacher of the immortality of the soul. The disciples faithfully propagated this doctrine, spreading it among all nations, but mixing it up at the same time with other doctrines, the truth of which was less evident, and the advantage of which was less important. The New Testament Scriptures were the second and better

elementary book written for the human race. As we can now dispense with the Old Testament in reference to the doctrine of the unity of God, and as we begin to dispense even with the New Testament in reference to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, may there not be likewise contained in it other truths which we may wonder at as revelations, till reason teach us to comprehend them? For example, the doctrine of the Trinity may perhaps tell us that God cannot possibly be one in the sense in which finite things are one; that His transcendental unity does not exclude a kind of plurality; and that God has a most perfect representation, or an equally perfect form, or a Son-God. In like manner, the doctrine of Original Sin, may perhaps tell us that man on the lowest stage is too little master of his own actions to be able to follow moral laws. Similarly the doctrine of the Atonement may teach that God might, nevertheless, give man moral laws, and, instead of excluding him from all moral happiness, would pardon all transgressions by reference to His Son as the independent sum of all perfections, in which relation every imperfection of the individual disappears. We should not be prevented from speculating about such mysteries of religion. They are, in short, like the arithmetical example which the master puts down for his pupils in order that they may be able thereby to be guided in some measure in their calculations; such speculations are fitted as means to raise the human race to the highest stage of enlightenment and purity. This stage we have not yet attained, but we shall attain it. All education has a goal, and so has that of the human race. This goal of the race, is the age of a new eternal gospel which is promised to us by the elementary books of the New Testament. Its nature consists in this, that men will do the good because it is the good, and not because arbitrary rewards are attached to the doing of it. And though it may perhaps still be long till this goal is reached, yet, "Go on Thine own unsearchable way, Eternal Providence! Only let me not despair of Thee because of this unsearchableness! Let me not despair of Thee, even although Thy footsteps should appear to me to go

backwards! It is not true that the shortest line is always the straight one!"

Thus does Lessing express himself, but it may be questioned whether this is his real opinion. He does not enter upon any inquiry into the possibility and the manner of a Revelation. Again, Lessing, entirely in the spirit of the *Aufklärung*, finds the nature and significance of Christianity in nothing else than in insight into the unity of God and the immortality of the soul, with retribution in the other world for the actions done here. Further, in his view Christianity is not the goal of the religious education; it is not the perfect religion, but is destined to perish like the Jewish religion. It may be asked, Is all this only exoteric truth, and has Lessing kept the esoteric truth to himself? Has he perhaps himself acted in accordance with the rule which he lays down thus: "Beware, thou who art more capable, thou who dost tread on the last page of this elementary book and art aglow, beware lest thy weaker fellow-scholars may mark what thou scentest from afar or already begin'st to see!" The latter view appears to us the more probable, yet who can assert it or prove it? In that case, he could not speak literally of a revelation. It would only be rational insight and knowledge to which at first only certain individuals, and then the mass, attained by means of it; Judaism and Christianity would thus be grounded only upon human reason and not upon a divine activity in revelation; the human reason here only struck into a different path. Whence then could come the pretence of a divine revelation and the belief in such a revelation?

However this may be, Revelation, according to Lessing, contains, in any case, only what is essentially rational. But the religions as they actually exist, or the so-called positive religions, contain much that is indifferent to religion as arbitrary prescriptions for belief and action. What is the relationship between these two things? Lessing again and again, and always more sharply, blames men for commonly putting too much value upon these externalities. Many a one

is a Christian who is not called such, while many only assume the very easy confession of religious doctrines as a matter of conscience, instead of the fulfilment of the more difficult duties. In his dialogue entitled *Ernst und Falk*, he shows that what is essential in Freemasonry, is founded on the nature of man and of civil society, and may therefore be discovered by our own reflection, but that the peculiar words and signs and usages are not Freemasonry. It appears to be the ideal task of Masonry to show that those who in every positive religion have risen above the prejudices of the crowd, may unite in order to get rid to the utmost of the separations by which they become so alien to each other. Accordingly, tolerance is an always recurring demand of Lessing, but it is founded not so much upon a relative estimation of every positive religion as upon non-estimation of all the positive religions. The value of the positive religions is therefore small; and all the statements of Lessing regarding them tend to depreciate their value, and none of these to establish them positively. Whence then did the positive religions arise? In his introduction to the *Education of the Human Race*, Lessing puts the question, "Why will we not rather see in all the positive religions nothing but the order of march in which the human understanding in every place could solely and alone develop itself, and is still to develop itself further, than either smile or be angry at any one of them?" It thus appears as if he regarded the positive religions as necessarily founded in the nature of man and its development. In the treatise itself, however, we find this thought carried out only in regard to the religious truth in Judaism and Christianity, and therefore by reference to the various degrees of natural religion, but not in respect of what is properly positive. This treatise at least cannot lead us to suppose that Lessing afterwards gave up the view which is expounded in an Essay *On the Origin of Revealed Religion*, written from 1755 to 1760.

The sum-total of the contents of Natural Religion, according to this Essay, is to acknowledge one God, to form the

most worthy conceptions of Him, and to give regard to these in all our actions and thoughts. Every man is bound to follow this natural religion according to the measure of his powers; and as these powers are different, so likewise is the natural religion of the man. For the purposes of the civil union, instead of this diversity, unanimity must be introduced, and men must come to agreement with regard to certain things and conceptions, and attribute to them the same importance and necessity as the religious truths which are naturally known possess in themselves. This Positive Religion received its authority, as revealed, from the person of its founder; it is indispensable, and it is inwardly true in so far as Natural Religion is modified in it by the accidental conditions of the State to which it may be subservient. Hence all Positive Religions are equally true and equally false. The best Positive Religion is that which contains the fewest conventional additions to Natural Religion.

## II.

JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER (1744-1803).<sup>1</sup>

Of the contemporaries of Lessing, there was hardly one so closely related to him as Herder. The relationship between them, however, left room for wide diversity in their views. The difference between them comes out clearly at the outset, as we are accustomed to see in Lessing the acute logical critic, and in Herder the refined congenial interpreter of popular poetry. The affinity between them, however, relates mainly to their general philosophical view of the

<sup>1</sup> Of Herder's writings the following come specially into consideration here: "Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts," 1774-76. "Vom Geiste der Hebräischen Poesie," 1782-85. "Briefe über das Studium der Theologie," 1785. "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," 1784-87. "Seele und Gott," 1787. "Christliche Schriften," 1797. "Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität," 1793-97. Cf. A. Werner, *Herder als Theolog*, Berlin 1871.

world. Herder's main efforts were directed towards tracing out the first stirrings of the human mind in the oldest monuments of history and poetry. With rare intelligence, he can think himself into the circumstances and the modes of thought of long past ages and of the most different peoples, and he knows how to bring their oldest monuments in poetry and history near to his own time and people. Thus does Herder renew the stress laid by Leibniz upon individuality and the appreciation of the dim knowledge in the sphere of feeling, in contrast to the all-levelling and extremely un-historical view of history characteristic of the *Aufklärung*. And thus does he open up to his age, in the *Voices of the Peoples*,<sup>1</sup> the means of understanding the most distant products of poetry, including the Bible. For it was Herder who—along with the non-dogmatic criticism of the Neology and the historical criticism of Ernesti, Michaelis, and Semler—pointed emphatically to a historico-aesthetic appreciation of the Bible.

Turning to Herder's philosophical view of the world, we should not be led astray by his expressions of attachment to Spinoza. For even Herder did not advance to an objectively correct understanding of Spinoza, but rather represents a "purified Spinozism," the main features of which were borrowed from Leibniz.

At first we find Herder standing in the closest relation to the *Aufklärung*. In 1767 he writes full of friendship and esteem to Nicolai, saying that Berlin was the first place in which he wished to be, because the spirit of the Berlin *savants* worked sympathetically upon him. In the same year, he writes entirely in the sense of the *Aufklärung* to Kant, telling him that he had undertaken the office of the ministry because he knew, and daily experienced, that it was the best means of bringing culture and intellect to the excellent part of mankind that we call the people. And even afterwards, when this friendly relation was dissolved, Herder continued to retain from the *Aufklärung* the position, that all the

<sup>1</sup> Stimmen der Völker.



development of man, including religion, was put at its highest in its relation to happiness.

With his friend Jacobi, Herder finds himself at one in opposition to the empty intellectual philosophy of the *Aufklärung*, which believes that it can derive everything from conceptions and demonstrations. In sharp words, he turns against the appeal to the common human understanding, as when he says: "If any one, when his shoe presses upon his corn, refers at once to the common human understanding and human feeling, he does not truly honour the genius of humanity which he transforms into his own corn." In like manner, he says that human understanding and human feeling "are something else than your own nightcap." In his *Metakritik* he decidedly opposes "that human cognition which is apart from and before all experience, and those sensible intuitions which are apart from and before all sensible perceptions of an object," etc. If we overlook the excited and unworthy tone of this production,—remembering that in his "Letters on Humanity" the same Herder speaks of the same Kant in terms of the greatest reverence and esteem,—a correct estimate of it is only possible by rigidly separating Herder's own views from his attacks upon Kant. In the former there is much that is valuable; in the latter there is wanting even the first indispensable condition of such an attack, namely, a correct understanding of his opponent. A single glance at Herder's discussion of Kant's Deduction of the Categories and of his Idealism, leaves no doubt of this. In regard to the function of philosophy, Herder is also at one with his friend Jacobi. Philosophy has to unveil existence, or to teach us to know what there is in qualities and relations, and how it exists. Metaphysics is *After-physics*; in other words, Metaphysics ought continually to hold on by Physics, and not to go beyond its discoveries. Actuality, reality, or active existence, is the chief conception; philosophy has to investigate this and to keep by the things of nature.

But this agreement does not go further. Herder protests decidedly and above all, against the view of an extramundane

God. "I do not understand," he says, "what you good people would have with this 'existing out of the world.' If God does not exist in the world, everywhere in the world, and even everywhere without bounds and whole and indivisible, then He exists nowhere. There is no space out of the world; space only arises in so far as there arises a world to us as an abstraction of the phenomena. Limited personality is as little applicable to the infinite Being as that personality arises in our case only by limitation. In God this illusion falls away; He is the highest, most living, most active One." "With the personal supramundane and extramundane God, I can get on as little as Lessing does. God is not the world, and the world is not God; this is certain. But neither with the 'extra' nor the 'supra,' as it seems to me, is there anything indicated. When we speak of God, we must forget all the idola of space and time, or our best effort is in vain."

Even the personality of the world-cause is rejected. None of the meanings of the word "person" (as mask, or as personal status, or as delineated character) can be applied to God. As little as God looks upon the person, so little does He play the part of a person and affect personality, or have a personal mode of thinking that separates and contrasts Him with others. He is. No one is as He is. A negative answer is also given to the question as to whether "the highest intelligence requires the term 'personality,' so that unity of self-consciousness should constitute personality!" And to his friend Jacobi, Herder objects, "You will have God in a human form as a friend who thinks of you. Reflect that He must then also think humanly or limitedly of you, and if He is partial in favour of you, He will be partial against others."—Against such a separation of God and the world, Herder always returns again to Lessing's confession, *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*; and Spinoza's Philosophy appears to him the only philosophy which is completely at one with itself. It is certainly a very purified Spinozism that is proclaimed by Herder. According to Herder, Spinoza is not an atheist; for "the Idea of God is to him the first and last, and even the

only one, of all the ideas to which he connects the knowledge of the world and of nature, the consciousness of himself and of all things around him, and of ethics and politics." Spinoza is not a pantheist; "for his infinite and most real being is as little the world itself as the Absolute of reason and the Endless of the imagination are one;" and the accusation against him is wrong, "that he encloses his God in the world, and identifies Him with the world." Spinoza is not a fatalist; for he does not speak of a blind external compulsion, nor does he subject God to a fate, "but I think that everything follows as necessarily from the nature of God as any one can think it follows from the nature of God that God knows Himself." Spinoza does not teach a God that works blindly without insight, but among all perfections, thinking and wisdom also belong to Him. Spinoza does not attribute extension to God, but, compelled by the mode of expression adopted by Descartes, he only chooses an unsuitable expression for the thought that the corporeal and the spiritual worlds are both representations and unfoldings of one and the same Divine Being.

Herder's philosophical views may be reduced to the following thoughts. God is power or force, as all that exists; but God is the Primary Power, the All-power of all powers, the Organ of all organs. Finite things are also powers or forces, but only as effects, as limited manifestations or representations of the One infinite Power. Thus "the highest Existence has given to His creatures what is the highest; He has given them reality, existence." Hence Herder will know nothing of a demonstration of the existence of God; but in existence or what is itself real—even though it were only a stalk of straw—the existence of God appears to him as given with immediate certainty. In like manner he repudiates the comprehending of God as an act of conception; we do not even know with regard to finite power what it is in its inmost nature, to say nothing of the divine primary Power. As it is impossible for us to think anything as nothing, it is in like manner impossible for us to think that God is not; for His existence forms the ground of all things. God is

thus the first and the most original of all that is. This is specially evident in the case of our soul. For even without taking into view the origin of the powers which think, act, and work in the soul, their connection is already proof enough of an essential ground of an inner truth, harmony, and perfection included in its very existence. Because there is a reason, or a connection in what is thinkable according to unchangeable rules, there must likewise be an essential ground of this connection. This self-subsisting truth dwells in everything that exists, whether it is viewed objectively or subjectively. God is thus the inner necessary being in all real existence.

God is the primary Power; He is the All-power; and hence He is not a transitory, but an abiding and immanent cause of all things. But it does not follow from this fact that the world is equally eternal with God. The eternal might of God freely creates, has created, and will create, because, as an eternally working might, it can never be idle. The existence of the world, however, rests upon a succession, and although this succession is endless, the world is not on that account eternal. Endless succession and eternity are too frequently confounded with each other, and it is forgotten that all things in the succession of time are conditioned as being dependent on one another and entirely dependent on the cause which produced them, so that none of them can be compared with the eternal existence of God.

God is thus primarily power or might. This might, however, is not without wisdom. The rules in our soul, according to which we perceive, separate, conclude, and combine, are divine rules. There are pure truths only if "that Being, which is the cause of my reason and every reason, knows these inner laws of thought in the most eminent way, and this could not but make His operations fundamental laws of existence." God possesses all perfections in the most perfect way; and hence He cannot be without thinking, which is the most excellent perfection. This is to be taken indeed with the distinction that the derived understanding can only understand what is given to it, whereas nothing is given to

the original thinking power, but everything proceeds from it. Further, God is not a mere collective name for all the powers of understanding and thinking that only really exist and think in the individual creatures. God is therefore as essentially an infinite and original power of thought as He is the infinite power of action. The highest power is necessarily also the wisest. The norm for this wisdom can only be given in goodness; and hence power, understanding, and goodness are inseparably united in God.

The highest power, goodness, and wisdom being thus one in God, He therefore works with necessity, that is, according to the eternal immanent laws of His nature. Spinoza accordingly is right in his polemic against final purposes, for these are nothing but weak reflections and modes of representation, arbitrary conceptions, and capricious choices of will (*velleitates*). God is not to be considered as first deliberating and choosing with reference to what He does; His working has flowed forth as an effect from the nature of the most perfect being; it was unique of its kind, and nothing else except it was possible. And hence the world is not the best because He, as it were, chose it from among worse worlds, but because He could produce nothing bad according to the inner necessity of His essential nature. The many anthropopathies are also a defective element in the Leibnizian philosophy. In Leibniz himself, this was indeed only too strong an accommodation to the weak understanding of the multitude; but his followers afterwards made this mere vesture of the idea the chief matter. While Leibniz himself, by the system of moral necessity, excluded all arbitrariness from God, his followers constructed a multitude of empty physico-theologies, teleologies, and theodicies. God, however, works according to inner necessary laws of His existence, that is, according to the most perfect goodness and wisdom. In the whole universe, which down to its least connections forms only one system, the wisest goodness is manifested according to immutable inner rules; and in this whole we may indeed inquire after wise purpose. But if this purpose is sought in

individual things, we necessarily fall into absurdities, or we must have recourse to secret decrees of God. In the sphere of individual things, it rather holds true that "every real law of nature that is discovered is a discovered rule of the eternal divine understanding, which could only think truth and only realize reality."

According to this view of things, there is no room for Miracles as interruptions or violations of the connection of nature. On this point we must not be misled by the fact that Herder deals with the conception of miracle as the *mirabile*, or the object of the faith of earlier ages and peoples, and that he thus treats of it with deep penetrating intelligence, and with a certain predilection and indulgence. The Deity manifests Himself in infinite powers or forces in an infinite way; that is, He reveals Himself organically. The expression "organic powers" indicates that the inner and the outer, the spiritual and the corporeal, are always together; there is no power without an organ, no mind without a body. The whole world is nothing but an expression, or an exhibition of the reality of the eternally living and active powers of the Deity. In all things there are such living organic powers; and in every point of the creation they work in accordance with the most perfect wisdom and goodness. The simple laws, in accordance with which all the living powers of nature form their thousandfold organizations, are reduced to the following three:—1. Persistence of being, or the internal continuance of every being; 2. Union with its like and separation from its opposite; 3. Assimilation with itself and reflection of its being in another.

The Powers which rule the universe, when exactly regarded, are one; for they are all nothing but reflected expressions, exhibitions, or modes of manifestation of the one divine Power. Hence, in Herder's view, all the sharp contrasts which are seemingly found in the finite world disappear. He knows nothing of the question how God works upon and by dead matter. For matter is not dead; it lives; and manifold living powers work in it, in conformity with their internal



and external organs. "In the matter which we call dead, there are at every point not less and not smaller divine powers at work." As the partition wall between the inorganic and the organic is thus broken down, so do the sharp separations raised between the different kingdoms of life fall away. "Only one principle of life appears to rule in nature: it is the ethereal or electrical current which in the stalks of the plant and in the veins and muscles of the animal is elaborated finitely, and always more and more finely in the nervous structure, and which at last kindles all the wonderful impulses and psychical powers whose working in animals and men fills us with astonishment." It is only from this fundamental thought that we can get to a right understanding of Herder's "Ideas for a History of Mankind;"<sup>1</sup> for it is only from this principle that we are justified, in the consideration of Human History, in starting from the position of our earth among the other celestial bodies, from the changeful history and finite formation of our planet, and from the influence of the condition of the soil and climate, and of the flora and fauna, upon the development of men. In this principle also lies the basis of the scientific grounding of Physiognomies, as indicated by Herder; it is the ground of the demand that every Psychology must be at the same time a physiology; it also justifies the rejection of the definition of the soul as an immaterial substance, and it gets rid of the difficult question as to the reciprocal action of the soul and the body. It is likewise upon this principle that Herder's special theory of knowledge had to be reared. Further, it is on this ground that Herder rejects the Pre-established Harmony of Leibniz, which he seems, however, only to have known in Wolff's externalized representation of it; and it is on this standpoint that he teaches the so-called Physical Influence.

Notwithstanding this general identity, however, all things are essentially different from one another. Each individual thing is a special exhibition or production of the divine

<sup>1</sup> Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit.

Power; everything has an entirely unique individuality. At every point of the creation, in the essential nature and properties of everything, the whole God is indeed manifested, but yet only in so far as He could become visible and energetic in any particular symbol or point of space and time. "Every power is by its nature an expression of the highest might, wisdom, and goodness, according as this could exhibit and manifest itself at that position of the universe, that is, in connection with all other powers." For every being is what it is; and we are modes of existence or individualities. "Every one has and is a special mode of being, or has a peculiar individuality of his own." The principle of our individualization lies deeper than the understanding penetrates; it lies as conception and as feeling, involved in the very word "Self." Self-consciousness, self-activity constitutes our reality, our existence. This holds not merely of us as men, but all things like us, are "various modes of existence with various kinds and degrees of self-consciousness; they are modifications of reality, going deeper and deeper downwards, and higher and higher upwards."

In the world there are innumerable degrees of perfection from the lowest up to the highest. There is thus found, in fact, through the whole series of all the creatures a gradually ascending progress of organization, from the stone to the crystal, from the crystal to the plant, from the plant to the animal, and from the animal to man. We thus find everywhere an ascending series of powers which exhibit themselves in an ascending series of organized forms. As men we occupy the highest stage, because there dwells in us with inner consciousness a living expression of the three highest divine Powers: might, understanding, and goodness. Here, however, at this highest stage, there is no dualism of body and soul, but in our whole being and nature we are only power and activity; and as there is here everywhere one and the same life, and therefore imperceptible transitions, no psychology is possible which would not be at every step also a determinate physiology. Our whole life rests upon the

stimulus of external things. However, we do not experience by it the internal states of nature, but only how we animate them with our sensations; and thus this, at least, human truth is the highest of which we are capable. The senses take in what is external; the nerves guide and combine it in the inward sphere. Thought is the power of forming unity out of the manifold that streams into us. Cognition and will are one and the same power; and hence there is no room for the freedom of the will in the usual sense of a faculty of choice.

What once exists, cannot cease; for existence is an indissoluble conception. All the efficient and living powers in the world of creation, continue to exist. No power can perish. We have no example in nature of the perishing of a power; nor have we a conception of it in our soul. "If it is a contradiction that a thing should be or become nothing, it is still more a contradiction that a living active thing in which the Creator Himself is present, and in which His divine power is manifested as indwelling, should turn itself into nothing." In the created world there is therefore no real death, no ceasing or vanishing of what has once existed. Visible death is indeed undeniable, because it is presented in our daily experience; but it is in reality nothing but a transformation, and this transformation is a necessary condition of life. Moreover, because only living powers or forces work in the world of creation, there is no rest in it; for a power ceases as soon as it rests. Powers, as forces, thus continue always to work; and this continuous working is at the same time a continuous advancing according to inner eternal rules involved in the process. The more a power works, so much the more does it expand its limits, and at the same time impress upon others the form of its own power and beauty. The universal progress of the universe therefore involves the fundamental law that order rises out of chaos, and that active powers spring from slumbering capacities. Hence there exists nothing in the Kingdom of God that is really bad; there is only limitation or opposition. But as limitation is insepar-

able from every existence in time and space, what exists as opposite must help and further itself; and even the errors of men must, in the view of an intelligent mind, be conducive to what is good, according to laws of reason, order, and goodness.—Universal progression to higher stages of organization, is thus the law which rules the universe. This progress is only possible through seeming death, by what appears again disappearing; and every limited being, considered as an appearance or manifestation, already brings with itself the germ of destruction. But although the visible organ is annihilated, the invisible power or force is not thereby destroyed. The apparent death is only the effect of an eternally-young, restless, yet lasting power, which passes from one organ into another, and which shows its activity in this very transformation. If the flower dies, the internal living power which produced it, shrinks into itself, in order to show itself yet again in young beauty of the world. To be changed thus means to press on to new life, and towards the power of new youth and beauty. This change, however, is at the same time an onward movement out of chaos into order; it is an inward increase and beautification of the powers that exist in new enlarged bounds, according to rules of harmony and order which are always more and more observed.

On this principle, our hope of immortality is grounded. The belief in a future life is necessary and natural to men. It is necessary, that they may not sink down altogether and in despair, or become in their abominations worse than the beasts; it is natural, because they cannot but think of themselves as continuing to exist in their operations and powers. The hope of immortality, is connected with religion; yet religion, too, gives only hope, confidence, and belief, but no demonstrative proofs. Such proofs cannot be based upon the simple immaterial nature of the soul, for physics knows nothing of such a nature; nor can it be founded upon Bonnet's "germs," for no one has discovered in our brain a spiritual brain as the germ of a new existence; at the highest it is supported upon the analogy of nature. All the working

powers of the world continue to exist. It is impossible, then, that our soul alone should cease: that soul which is the purest and most active power, the power which can know God, and love Him, and imitate Him. All things transform themselves into higher stages of perfection; it is impossible that our soul alone can be excluded from this development. On the contrary, the progress towards true humanity, which begins here below, must continue to go on after death. When the present circle of the activity in which the soul now works, is destroyed, it cannot fail to obtain a new organ, new thinking powers, and a new connection with the world for new activity. And as thus a continuous progression must be assumed, Herder decidedly rejects Lessing's hypothesis of a transmigration of souls. Such an hypothesis is the idea of men who are still confined to the mere conditions of sense.

Herder's conception of Religion, rests upon these general philosophical views. "We are men, and as such, methinks, we must learn to know God as He has really given and exhibited Himself to us. Through conceptions we receive Him as a conception, and through words as a word; through perception of nature, through the use of our powers, through the enjoyment of our life, we enjoy Him as real existence full of power and life." This proposition presents us Herder's view in its briefest expression; for to become aware of the power of God working in us, and to feel ourselves in the inmost recesses of the heart as a member of the divine order, is religion. Religion is the inmost consciousness of what we are as parts of the world; it is the consciousness of what we ought to be and have to do as men. Hence religion is neither an empty service of ceremonies, nor an indifferent repetition of doctrines or prayers; it is an inward light, a conviction of the heart; and in Christianity as its highest form it is humanity. Hence Revelation is not external and supernatural, but is a purely immanent education of mankind. And hence of the religions, we are not to consider one as true and the others as false, but all are true as corresponding to the stage of the spiritual life of man at its time.

It is erroneous, with the *Aufklärung*, to regard the essence of Christianity as contained in the enlightenment of the system and in speculation; Christianity is more than this, or rather it is something different from this. Herder devotes a special treatise, entitled "Of Religion, doctrinal Opinions and Usages,"<sup>1</sup> to the refutation of this error. Religion is a thing of the soul, or of the inmost consciousness; it is the marrow of the sentiment and disposition of a man, even as a citizen and a friend; it is the most careful conscientiousness of his inner consciousness; it is the altar of his heart. Religion is conviction; it demands belief, builds upon belief, produces belief; it has therefore nothing to do with doctrinal opinions, regarding which conflicts and disputations can be carried on. To impose doctrinal opinions upon a man as a religious duty, amounts to jesting with the words belief, faith, religion, and even to annihilating religion itself. An appeal to divine revelation does not alter this position; for religion is only a real thing if it becomes my conviction and binds my heart and conscience. The Old Testament, Christ Himself, and the Apostles know nothing of such over-estimation of doctrinal opinions, and such opinions only arose when Christianity became a State religion. Such doctrinal opinions have indeed their value, as evidences of the progressive striving of the human mind and as explaining the opinions of a teacher,<sup>2</sup> but they can never become Religion.

As regards Christianity, Herder then attempts to separate the true religion from the mere doctrinal opinions, and this separation assigns even the most of the Apostles' Creed to the sphere of dogma. He sums up the result of a detailed examination in the following terms:—"The Christian creed, when freed from doctrinal opinions, thus confesses the following points as irrefutable and indestructible. 1. The great Rule of Natural Religion: Follow faithfully and willingly the laws of creation, preservation, and providence; they are the

<sup>1</sup> Von Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuchen.

<sup>2</sup> This explanation of the genesis of Dogma from explanatory reflection on what is felt in the heart, is frequently found indicated in Herder, but it is nowhere expounded in detail.



laws of an almighty, wise, and beneficent Father. 2. The highest Rule of men and of the religion of the nations: Work and overcome with love, even to death. Sacrificing love brings salvation to the human race, for it is a whole and you belong to the whole. 3. The inmost Rule of the religion of experience: Be faithful to thy conscience, the Spirit of God speaks in it. Follow every leading towards what is good, and never despair of a communion that strengthens thee; believe in a rising out of weakness, even out of death; believe in a never-interrupted march of progress; believe in an ever-increasing salvation for the good; believe in consequences eternally rewarding every one that is good." Everything else, including all the definitions about the nature of God, as to how He is present in space, whether He is within or external to the world, what He did before the creation, and how He created out of nothing, with all the formulæ as to how Jesus was the Son of God, whether He was eternally conceived or generated, whether He was spoken or born, along with all the determinations regarding the Spirit as a divine person and His mode of working,—all this belongs to the class of doctrinal opinions that are without value. "Religion is a thing of the conscience, of truth. Who is not ashamed before himself, when he appears with a quasi-satisfaction before God and feels himself as a hypocrite and a formalist?" Herder makes the very same distinction between religion and the symbolical usages; indeed, it is in these actions that what is alien, misleading, and oppressive in the doctrinal opinions which have been devised, first becomes rightly observable. He regards it as certain without further proof, that religion is not identical with any mode of worship that is void of thought and of soul.

Herder accordingly holds a very poor opinion of Dogmatics and of the theological system. With bitter irony he refers to the most varied attempts that have been made in the course of time to bring the Christian doctrine into a closed system, from philosophical points of view. How many empty images of the human phantasy have thus penetrated into the

Christian religion! And how was anything else possible? Philosophy oversteps its own boundaries when it undertakes to establish *à priori* a history which is authenticated by written documents. Dogmatic theology steps into the foreground as soon as religion is intellectually apprehended. It was therefore in the closest connection with this opposition to intellectualism, that Herder was the first to assign again to the Bible its proper position. The Bible ought to form the starting-point in the learned studies, as well as in the practical activity, of the theologian. Thus far Herder is a Biblical theologian.

The Bible is not regarded by him as a code of doctrine communicated by God to men in a supernatural way, and hence as infallible throughout. At the outset, Herder explains that he entirely agrees with Lessing in holding that *Revelation* is older than the Scriptures. Although he puts the origin of the Scriptures into a very early period, he yet makes the basis of our Gospel — the *regula fidei* — precede the Scriptures of the Old as well as the New Testament. Further, he decidedly repudiates the current assumption of a supernatural inspiration of the Scriptures. It is a low mode of the thinking of later times that regards the individual who was moved by the Spirit as having been an “organ-pipe through which the wind blew, or a hollow machine from which all proper thoughts were taken away.” “It is difficult to think of anything else in human nature than itself; indeed, this state is hardly thinkable even as a solitude,” for every life shows itself only by the working that is natural to it. In the songs, and, above all, in the enterprises and deeds that are ascribed to sacred inspiration in the Old Testament, we therefore also see the powers of the inspired individuals in their most joyous play. The word “inspiration” is thus referred quite irenically to the salutary conception that the Deity has caused men to be born with pre-eminent gifts and with distinguished powers as men of God. The assistance which the Deity vouchsafed to them was no wild ferment, no unnatural excitement and exaltation, and still less any checking or

maiming of their powers. On the contrary, it was an awakening, a furtherance, a stimulation, or an animation of these powers, whatever might be their kind. The power of God worked through their spirit, yet not by exciting disturbance or uproar in their minds.

It was impossible for Herder to judge otherwise about inspiration, as he neither knows nor will know anything of an external revelation, any more than of an opposition between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man, or between revelation and reason, or nature and grace. This was quite natural according to his views; for where on the one side all the powers and operations of nature are divine, and on the other side there are no operations of God outside of nature, there is no room for such a distinction. Moreover, it would conflict with the providence of God, which does not relate to individual things, but consists in the constant co-operating presence of God in our life, and of which we become aware in conscience and reason.

Revelation and reason are related to each other as mother and child, and hence it is not possible that they can contradict each other. Reason is the natural use of the powers of our soul. The formed reason, however, does not fall from the heavens, but reason needs guidance and instruction by positive communications. God taught us to use it; for from the first moment God watched over His darling, giving him opportunities to test and to form his powers. To these first beginnings of a training by God the relationship of the oldest traditions undeniably refers.

Afterwards, Revelation attached itself to the history of a single people. Here then reason and revelation separate, yet not as hostile powers, but in the way of abstraction and history. Abstraction, however, has no laws for history, for no history of the world stands upon abstract grounds *à priori*.—Moreover, nature is also a Scripture, a very legible writing of God to men. But although nature is the work of God, yet there is much required to understand this work, and to find its author in it. Hence revelation serves for the interpretation and

explanation of nature. This voice of God came and created wise men of God, holy and pure souls, who received it and communicated it to others. Thus the book of sacred nature and of conscience was gradually deciphered, elucidated, and explained from page to page by the commentary of tradition. Thus did it happen among all the peoples, but chiefly among the elect people of God.

The position is emphatically affirmed and repeated by Herder, that Christianity and its preparation in the Old Testament do not rest upon conceptions and principles *à priori*, nor even upon poetical inventions and mythologies, but upon history and fact. This is not to be understood as if the miraculous in this history could convince us of the truth of religion. Belief is conviction, whereas miracles, being at the same time long past and only announced to us as such by others, can effect nothing in the way of conviction. "The miraculous ought not to become thy religion." Just as little, however, may the miraculous in history make that history appear incredible; for the probable is not always the sign of the true. In regard to the resurrection of Jesus, Herder makes an effort, in roundabout and very obscure expressions, to maintain the fact, holding that if the resurrection were an illusion or a deception, Christianity would be so too, without, however, decidedly recognising the miracle. The ascension he puts upon a level with the taking up of Enoch and Elijah, but he leaves the *how* entirely *in suspenso*.

Herder proceeds to show that Revelation is not an external communication of doctrines, but immanent inworking upon the whole spiritual powers of man. This he does in his treatise "Of the spirit of Christianity." The powers of nature are primarily the breath of God, yet not as if God were the soul of the world, but they are so as His word of power. And because man unites in himself the noblest powers of the creation, he appears as animated by the breath of God. Further, as the noblest powers of man, namely, his understanding, wisdom, and will, are revealed by discourse, the discourse of the prophets and sages was designated the word of

God. All the pre-eminent powers of the soul are called gifts of the Spirit of God, and the Gospels designate by the term Spirit of God the sum of all powers, including the noblest gifts and talents. It is therefore diametrically opposite to the Biblical view to regard the Spirit of God as opposed to all the natural talents. The Spirit of God is a life that communicates itself. The miracle of Pentecost did not consist in the gift of speaking in foreign tongues, but in the fact that the disciples with inspired enthusiasm proclaimed that what the Old Testament promised had now appeared. All so-called miraculous gifts, are resolved into a divine intensification of the natural powers and capacities of man. Instead of assuming supernatural operations of grace, before which we are merely to stand still, it is more correct to apply the natural powers in joyous activity. The result will not fail to show itself; and yet it is the Spirit of God that animates and heightens all natural gifts.

Religion, then, is purely human. This is clear from the facts that the beginnings of religion coincide with the beginnings of the spiritual life of man; that the various religions correspond as stages of educative revelation to the degrees of the human development; and that Christianity, which is the highest religion, coincides throughout with the highest blossom of the natural human development, or in a word, with humanity.

Religion is the oldest and holiest tradition of the earth. However different the external manifestations of religion may be, its traces are found among the most uncivilised peoples. It was not invented, but tradition is the propagating mother, not only of their speech and scanty culture, but also of their religion and sacred usages. The symbol is the means of tradition; and in his treatise on the "Oldest Record," Herder gives us an example of how he believes that he can discover such a symbol in the oldest religions. The priests were the original sages of the peoples, but when they lost the sense of the meaning of the symbol, they became dumb servants of idolatry and speaking liars of superstition.—The divine rules

of humanity lie already at the basis of all development of human nature.

With regard to the first beginnings of religion, Herder emphatically combats the derivation of it from fear, and refers it instead to the reverential awe before nature, and to wondering inquiry after a cause. A sort of religious feeling of Powers working invisibly in the whole chaos that surrounds us, must necessarily precede the formation and connection of abstract rational ideas. This feeling, however, rests upon the recognition of the one in the many, and upon the idea of the invisible in the visible through the connection of cause with effect.—The chief gift of man is the understanding, and its function of tracing out the connection of cause and effect. Even the most savage peoples sought for a cause. Where they found no visible originator, they believed in an invisible one; and although they kept more to the occurrences than to the essence of nature, and more to its terrible and transitory than to its joy-giving and lasting side, and although they did not subordinate all causes to a single cause, yet this attempt was religion. “Thou didst raise man so that he, even without knowing and willing it, did search after the causes of things, did guess out their connection, and did thus find Thyself, Thou great connection of all things, Thou Being of all beings!” Herder, in his *Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry*, accordingly tries to derive the Old Testament narrative of the creation from the reverential and wondering contemplation of the dawn.

At the beginning, the whole of nature was thus filled with gods, and all individual things were referred to divine influences. Further questions regarding the origin of things led to a Cosmogony and Anthropogony, and to a Philosophy regarding the evil and the good in the world. The first crude Religion was accordingly followed by a sort of historico-physical philosophy. This philosophy was necessarily mythical, as the answer to those questions could only be taken from the doctrines of the older tradition. Every nation thought of the origin of the world and of the human race in the conceptions



of its religion, and at the same time these theological traditions were entirely national. "The world, and the human race, and the people, were thus construed according to the ideas of the time, of the nation, and of the culture of each particular people; in the least and in the greatest, their ideas were national and local. The Scandinavian built his world out of giants. The Iroquois made tortoises and otters, the Indian elephants, and lastly, the negro a cow's horn full of dung, into the machines of what he wished to explain to himself." All nations form documentary records according to the religion of their country and the tradition of their fathers, and they compose them according to their own ideas in poetical language. From this point of view, Herder has opened up new paths for the understanding of the Old Testament. He likewise made valuable contributions for his time towards explaining the historical origin of the Gospels.

Religion is purely human; it is the highest humanity. On the side of the understanding, Religion shows itself in so far as it seeks the cause for effects, and the invisible one for the visible many. At the same time, however, Religion is an exercise of the human heart, and the purest direction of its capacities and powers. "True Religion is a childlike service of God; it is an imitation of what is highest and most beautiful in human form; and it is consequently the most inward contentment and the most active goodness and philanthropy." This is also the reason why there is found in all religions, more or less, a resemblance of God to men; for either man is elevated to God, or the Father of the worlds is brought down to man. "The purest Humanity can alone be thy religion, and the religion of man; and it is given to thee in this religion as what is highest,—*summum humanum, rectum, pium*,—as the highest tendency and destination of thyself and of human nature."

Herder gives but few indications of his views regarding the different Religions. Revelation is education, partly in nature and partly in history; and hence the distinction of natural and social religion, or of the Religion of nature and

the Religion of society. Of the individual it is said, that "in order to enjoy the Deity in Christ, thou must thyself be a man of God; that is, there must be something in thee that becomes participative of His nature. Thou enjoyest God always only in accordance with thy inmost self." This principle, however, is not applied to the historical religions. Where Herder mentions these, he seeks to find the identical and common element in their variety. The leading and fundamental thoughts for a contemplation of these as stages in the process of the development of humanity, are stated, but they are not carried out in detail.

Christianity, as the complete and perfect religion, is true humanity. Christ is wholly like the Old Testament prophets; He was a man animated by the spirit of God. Among all the noble forms of the men who have been the organs of God, he is truly the organ of organs, yet God speaks through him "only as an organ in so far as He was a mortal man." Nature left man standing half way; then Christ appeared and brought what other sages had already taught as true of religion, into one human and universal religion that binds heart and conscience together. Christianity is humanity; for humanity is nothing but the full vigorous unfolding of all the noble impulses and powers of human nature. And as the spirit of God constitutes this better divine part of man and animates all natural powers, Christianity is likewise nothing but the simple pure religion of man. The doctrine of Jesus is simple. It is this: God is your Father, all ye are brethren to one another. This involves the imitation of God as an ideal of righteousness and justice, and as universal goodness and magnanimity. At the same time, it connects men together as brothers of a noble race, divine in nature and kind. The question is put as to whether any one can be an upright man without religion? Herder answers this question by saying "genuine religion cannot be without uprightness; the inmost uprightness is religion, and in religion it is manifested." "The pure religion of Christ is the same as conscientiousness in all human duties, with pure human

goodness and greatness of soul." "How did Christ name himself? He called himself the Son of man, by which he meant a simple, pure man. When purified from dross, his religion can be called nothing but the religion of pure human goodness, or the religion of man."

Herder's historical position and importance have thus been briefly indicated. His merit, as compared with the transcendent intellectualism, lies in his having been in earnest with the immanence of the divine activity in religion, and in his having emphasized the fact that the whole man in all his powers and impulses is animated and elevated by that activity. His limitation lay in the fact that, in order to maintain the unity of human nature, he rejected even the conceptual distinction of the different powers of the soul, and thus shut himself off from a deeper insight into the psychological character of religion.

### III.

#### JOHANN GEORG HAMANN.

It is extraordinarily difficult to form a correct judgment regarding Hamann (1730-1788).<sup>1</sup> At the outset his life makes an unsatisfactory impression. His youthful training was guided with more zeal than intelligence by his father, a burgher of the olden school, a man of a simple, honourable, pious, and solid nature. At the university, Hamann studied all possible science from "a sort of magnanimity and sublimity, and not for bread, but as inclination led him and for amusement." He failed in an engagement as a tutor from the difficulty of the circumstances, and not from his own fault. The inclination "to try my freedom in the world" made him suddenly go to London as a merchant in connection with the business of his friend Berens. Notwithstanding the obscurity

<sup>1</sup> We use the works of Hamann in the edition of Moritz Petri (Hannover 1872), but we must confess that the accompanying explanations do not seem to us to be always clear.

which rests upon this enterprise, we know that Hamann neglected his business and gave himself up to a wild life. On the very brink of the abyss he retreated into himself and was converted. Having returned to Germany, he spent the leisure of several years in the house of his father, and gave himself to the strenuous reading and study of an astonishing multitude of books. He looked with contempt upon office or position, till want drove him to accept the post of the manager of a warehouse. Under oppressive relations "he shoots forth like a palm tree," and notwithstanding constant cares and frequent sickness, he found strength and time for engaging in literary work, and for carrying on a refreshing interchange of thought, both written and oral, with all the important men of his time. Yet even on this picture, pleasant though it be on the whole, there falls a dark shadow. That Hamann, who knew how to discourse so finely and profoundly on marriage, lived with his father's nurse—an honest but uneducated woman—as the mother of his four children in so-called "conscience-marriage," or in other words, in open concubinage.

In the course of his life there thus lie certain elements unmixed beside each other, some of which invite us to the highest estimation of his personality, while others draw us to severe condemnation of it. In like manner, the style of Hamann's writings may easily lead us into confusion. He writes an extremely obscure style that can at times hardly be unravelled. He confesses himself that he was no longer able to understand some of his own earlier writings, because the allusions to his reading at the time were no longer present to him. He himself calls his style a "locust style," and desires to have readers "who can swim," that is, who can catch the right connection between apparently unrelated thoughts. Such obscure writings, however, have naturally a twofold fate, according to the readers who take them up. Some shrink from the effort required to trace out the hidden passages of thought in the author, perhaps consoling themselves with the foolish declaration that the writer did not well understand

himself, and then laying the matter that has not been understood aside as a book that is without meaning. Others, by incessant efforts of thought, advance at least so far as to understand something, and then conclude to what has not been understood; and although they do not understand it, they read what is finest and best at their command into the author, and extol him to the skies. As Goethe says, "there is much profundity thought in here." It is only in this way that the entirely opposite judgments regarding Hamann can be explained.

In truth, none of these extremes is correct. Hamann is indeed a prophet of something better, but he is only a prophet. He is a genius, but he is without clearness; he shows a dark fermenting of thought, a mysterious reference to what is higher and better, but he is without the capacity of definitely grasping it and bringing it forth in clear expression. He turns away with repugnance from the *Aufklärung*, with its shallow sobriety and empty platitudes, and he points to the only sources of truth; but it is impossible for him to present them to himself or others in a clear, intelligible form.

Hamann completely understands the emptiness and jejuneness of the mere enlightenment of the understanding. He recognises the great deficiency of Nicolai in his being entirely incapable of historical investigation, and of distinguishing the different periods of history. He reproaches the Enlighteners for that in their superficial intellectuality they recommend us to believe in nothing but what can be heard, or laid hold of with the hands. "The soundness of reason is the cheapest, most arrogant, and most brazen self-glorification, by which everything is already assumed which was to be proved, and by which all free investigation of truth is excluded more violently than by the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church." Hamann directed his treatise, entitled "A little Essay on great problems," against the way in which the sound reason was glorified in a French production entitled *Le Bon-Sens*. The last fruit of all philosophy is the recognition of human ignorance and weakness.

Our reason is given to us, not in order to bring us knowledge, but to bring us to the conviction of how unreasonable our reason is, and to show us that our errors do increase by it as sin increased by the Law ; in short, reason is a "schoolmaster unto Christ."—The main error of the Understanding consists in this, that it is the great alchemist that tears asunder what necessarily and inseparably goes together, or that it insists on merely considering the individual dead members, which only in their original order constitute a living organism. With sovereign contempt, Hamann gives his judgment about all the philosophers. According to his own confession, indeed, he stands before Spinoza like the oxen before the mountain, and he tortured himself with him for years in vain ; and yet Spinoza's philosophy is regarded by him as a Dead Sea apple, as a lying system, as an outgrowth of our corrupt nature. In the same depreciatory way he pronounces judgment on Lessing and Voltaire ; and even Hume and Kant find only a partial grace before his judgment-seat.

Hamann holds that the enlightenment of the Understanding has no right to judge particularly about Religion. Its much vaunted toleration is nothing but unlimited indifference towards the Gospel. Its endeavours to find the chief truths of Natural Religion already contained in the heathen mysteries, and on the other hand, to explain everything else in Christianity as pure nothing or mere ambiguity, recall the passage 2 Macc. i. 20, where it is related that Nehemiah sent out the descendants of the priests who had concealed the sacred fire to fetch it again, but they found only thick water. Hamann satirically calls the religion of the strong intellects an oven of ice. He blames the exegesis of his time for exposing the spirit of prophecy pitifully and shamefully covered with the rags of the old local prejudices of the old Jewish orthodoxy, while in a Draconian style it breaks the rod upon every prejudice of our ecclesiastical orthodoxy that lies in its way. While Christianity is divested of all its specific and characteristic marks and doctrines, and is reduced to mere morality, or to the universal truths of natural religion



it is emptied of its true and sublime contents, so that no one can conceive how such a Christianity can have produced the effects that lie before us in history. "A reason which confesses herself to be the daughter of the senses and of matter,—lo! that is our religion; a philosophy that reveals to men their calling to go upon all fours, is the nourishment of our magnanimity. The denial of the Christian name is a condition without which no one may venture to lay claim to the title of a philosopher." The illuminative theism, with its argumentation to this effect: "Something is made, consequently there is a something which is not made, and consequently this something has made that other something!" makes God a mere something, and divests Him of all the attributes that are of value for us. "In general, Religion has been more desecrated than built up by the Exchange-Bank of reason; and the usury which is driven by a transposition of words—from which no one without a hocus-pocus can draw any more meaning than he is in a position to put into them—enriches indeed the dealers in doves, but at the cost of the spirit which is the Lord."

This opposition to the *Aufklärung* will only become fully intelligible to us, when we observe what Hamann himself would make the principle of all philosophy and religion. His objection to the intellectual Enlightenment is that it separates what should necessarily go together, that, like a chemical reagent of the very highest strength, it resolves into their ideal vanity all the metal of the profoundest and sublimest matters in sciences whose unity intuitively and naturally forms the maximum of all mysteries. Hence he will verily contemplate this coherence of things; he will take as the starting-point of all thinking the human individual viewed as an original microcosm, as an immediate unity of all opposites, and as an actual union of all contradictions. For it is only this unity of opposites that constitutes life; it is only the knowledge of this unity that is true knowing; it is only the "coincidentia oppositorum" that is the tenable foundation of all philosophy. Truth aims at apprehending life; life is the unification of

contradiction, and hence truth is also conditioned. The Philosophy of the Understanding, with all its striving after empty abstractions, cannot apprehend this, and for this very reason it is not truth. Such a philosophy is either spiritualism, or materialism. Man, however, includes both of these philosophies; he is body and soul, sense and reason, in one. Language is an incontestable evidence of this unity; it is at once sensualized thought and embodied mind. These contradictions are united in the human individual. This position explains the stress laid by Hamann upon genial intuitiveness as contrasted with the strict rules and prescriptions of the understanding. "What is it in Homer that makes up for ignorance of the rules of art which have been thought out after him by Aristotle? and what is it in a Shakespeare that compensates for ignorance or transgression of those critical laws? The unanimous answer is that it is Genius." This principle of genius was what made Socrates ignorant without harm, for he had in him the right knowledge; this genius elevates a man even above the strict precepts of the cold doctrines of ethics, for it is a higher law in the heart of man.

The human individual as an actual unity of contradictions and opposites, is defined by Hamann as the principle of philosophy. Jacobi calls him the Pan of all contradictions, and writes of him as follows: "It is wonderful in what a high degree he unites all extremes in himself. Hence from his youth he has had a dislike at heart to the *principium contradictionis*, as well as to that of the Sufficient Reason, and he has always gone after the *Coincidentia oppositorum*. He enjoys with equal rapture, the most different and heterogeneous things—whatever is only beautiful, true, and whole of its kind, whatever has a life of its own, and whatever betrays fulness and virtuosity. To him *omnia divina, et humana omnia*." Hamann himself writes to Herder: "*Jordani Bruni principium coincidentie oppositorum* is in my eyes of more value than all Kant's Critique." To him Kant was nothing but a "great analytical chemist." The most important of his objections to the Kantian Critique is the following: If

Understanding and Sense both belong to our natural history, and have perhaps grown out of one common root, we ought not so to separate and isolate them. Hamann writes further to Reichardt: "Ah, if you knew what a world of *ergos* lies, according to my taste, in the phrase *homo sum*!"

The same human individuality, as a unity of all opposites, is also, according to Hamann, the foundation of religion. And because the emptying of religion by the *Aufklärung*, rests upon its one-sided relation to our cognition, Hamann's view of religion is likewise determined by this opposition. "The ground of religion lies in our whole existence, and it goes beyond the sphere of our powers of cognition, which, taken all together, constitute the most contingent and most abstract mode of our existence. Hence the mystical and poetical vein which is found in all religions, and hence their foolishness and offensive form in the eyes of a heterogeneous, incompetent, icy, beggarly philosophy, which is not ashamed to attribute to its pædagogic art the higher destination of our lordship over the earth." Hamann can therefore designate an old fanciful idea often heard of by him, as "*incredibile sed verum*." Lies and romances must be probable as hypotheses and fables; but not so the truths and fundamental doctrines of our faith! Wherefore he can also say: "The theory of true religion is not only conformable to every child of man, and is inwoven in his soul, or can be restored again in it, but it is as insurmountable to the bold giant and stormer of heaven as it is unfathomable by the deepest digger and miner of thought."

What has already been stated, contains Hamann's principle of knowledge. Mediate knowledge through the understanding, is repudiated, because it separates what coheres, and hence it cannot grasp life as the unity of contradictions. Thus there remains only immediate knowledge, or the direct apprehension of what is presented to us in the inmost sphere of our being, or in feeling. Hamann uses for this cognition the expression "belief," and in this relation he regards himself as at one with Hume. But whereas Hume will apprehend by belief only the actual reality of external objects, Hamann uses the term

"belief" without distinction to designate entirely different convictions. Our own existence, and the existence of all things out of us, must be believed, and can be made out in no other way. What is more certain than man's end, and of what truth is there a more universal or a more authenticated knowledge? No one, however, is so prudent in believing such a truth—so Moses gives us to understand—as he who is taught by God Himself, to consider that he must die. What one believes, does not therefore necessarily need to be proved, and a proposition may be ever so irrefutable without on that account being believed. "Belief is not the work of the reason, and it cannot therefore succumb to any assault of reason, because belief is as little produced by reason as are tasting and seeing." "As belief belongs to the natural conditions of our cognitive powers, and to the fundamental impulses of our soul, every universal principle rests upon a good belief, and all abstractions are and must be arbitrary," etc. Belief is thus an immediate conviction resting upon the feeling of our Ego, and it relates to the reality of external things, as well as to the correctness of the general utterances of the understanding, and to moral as well as religious truths, all in and with each other unseparated.

Every belief points to a revelation; for belief is a living experience, and we experience given facts. Such facts must be given by some one who reveals himself through them. Belief thus leads by necessity to divine Revelation. And as Belief is related without distinction to very different things, the same holds true of the revelation of God; and Hamann does not at all attempt to distinguish the revelation of God in nature, in history, and immediately in ourselves. "Experience and Revelation are one and the same; they are the indispensable wings or crutches of our reason, if it is not to continue lame and to crawl." "According to the ideas of Klopstock, physical waking consists in the state of a man who is conscious of himself. This, however, is the true sleep of the soul. Our spirit is only to be regarded as awake when it is conscious of God, and thinks of Him and feels Him, and

when it recognises the omnipresence of God in and around itself, in the same way as the soul of a waking man expresses its supremacy over the body, and the body expresses the impressions of a spiritual will." Our understanding can think nothing that has not been formerly in the senses; but all sensible experiences are designated as divine revelation. God, in fact, reveals Himself to man in nature and His word. The two revelations explain and mutually support each other, and they cannot be in contradiction, whatever may be made of them by the expositions which are given by our reason. Hence the knowledge of nature and history, forms the two pillars upon which true religion rests. On the other hand, unbelief and superstitious belief are founded upon shallow physics and shallow history. A Newton will be as strongly moved *quâ* physicist, by the wise omnipotence of God, as a historian will be by the wise government of God. God reveals Himself. "The Creator of the world is an author." God has willed to reveal Himself to men, and He has revealed Himself by men. Hence in accordance with His wisdom, He has founded upon the nature of men the means of making this revelation useful to men, and of diffusing and propagating it among them. It corresponded to His wisdom to give this revelation at first to a single man, then to a race, thereafter to a people, and only in the end to all men. "In our belief there is united only heavenly knowledge, true happiness, and sublimest freedom. The sciences of the reason, of spirits, and of morals, are three daughters of the true science of nature, which has no better source than revelation." Hamann sees no other distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion than "between the eye of a man who sees a picture without understanding the slightest thing of painting and drawing, or of the history which is represented, and the eye of a painter; or between the natural hearing and the musical ear." Hence it is a mere prejudice when we limit God's working and influence to the Jewish people. God has merely made clear to us by their example, the secret, the method, and the laws of His wisdom and love. At the same time we find in the



histories, laws, and usages of all peoples, the *sensus communis* of religion. "Everything lives, and is full of allusions to our calling and to the God of grace." Paul likewise teaches that God has given the heathen as good a witness and testimony of Himself, Acts xiv. 17. He gave them good things, and not merely rain and fruitful seasons, but the influences of the spirit which communicates to us good thoughts, motions, and counsels, and which are ascribed in a pre-eminent manner to the Jews. Even the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, is put by Hamann on entirely the same line with the universal activity of God in the creation and preservation of the natural world. Thus in his second "Mite to the latest German Literature," he says: "For the hairs of our head, even to the changing of their colour, belong to the date of the divine Providence. Why then should not the straight and crooked dashes and lines of our symbolical and typical, though not hieroglyphical, manuscript be the counter forms of a Theopneustia (2 Tim. iii. 16), of an unknown central power in which we live and move and have our being, of an ethereo-magnetic electricity which penetrates to the simplest substances of the whole universe?" Hamann expresses his judgment regarding the Canon in the fourth of his "Hierophantic Letters." "As little as the translation of the LXX. Interpreters can become canonical by the passages quoted from it by the Evangelists and Apostles, just as little do I entrust this power to canonize a book to the church Fathers and Councils." Christ Himself refers only to the testimony regarding Him which is contained in the Scriptures. And so the Spirit He promised, does not need the testimony of the oldest nor of the latest church Fathers.

God thus gives revelation in Nature, History, and Scripture. Our function is to decipher and to read it. For it is the greatest contradiction and misuse of our Reason, if its object is to reveal itself. In fact, the merely human reason is not in a position to grasp and to judge the divine revelation. It is a foolish presumption to make our limited taste and our own judgment the test of the divine Word. This presumption was quite common in the *Aufklärung*, and it led to the rejec-



tion of revelation and to the emptying out of all positive religion. But "the subject here discoursed of is not a revelation such as a Voltaire, a Bolingbroke, or a Shaftesbury would find worthy of acceptance, and which at the most would give a satisfaction to their prejudices, their wit, or their moral, political, and epical caprices; but we speak of a discovery of truths whose certainty, credibility, and importance formed a matter of interest to the whole human race." From the presumption referred to, there flowed an entirely false view of the Bible. Is it not otherwise incredible that men should have sought in the books of Moses for a history of the world! It is forgotten that the books were to be received by Jews, and accordingly that many circumstances must be in close and special relation to that people. It is ridiculous for any one to demand that Moses should have explained himself regarding nature in accordance with Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Newtonian conceptions, or that God should have revealed Himself in the universal language of philosophy. It is always difficult to transfer the figures and idioms of one language into another. How much more difficult is it, then, to make things intelligible and conceivable by us when they lie far beyond the sphere of our conceptions!—The revelation of God in Nature, History, and Scripture, can only be understood by a kindred mind. With regard to all other writings, it is admitted that they must be read with and in the spirit of their authors, and why should not this hold with respect to the Bible? As our religious books lay claim to the highest inspiration, they ought also to be read in the spirit of that adorable God who is hidden from us. As Julius Cæsar can only be properly read by a mind that has been so taught that it can say of itself, "I am a soldier;" so only he can read the Scripture who can discern in himself something of the breathing of the divine spirit.

From his conception of belief and of revelation, as constitutive factors belonging to one another and exactly corresponding, Hamann reaches an understanding of the nature of religion, with regard to which he stands entirely alone for his time. God is the cause of all effects, be they great or small; and hence every-

thing is divine. But, in like manner, everything divine is also human. "This *Communicatio* of divine and human *idiomatum* is a fundamental law, and is the chief key of all our knowledge and of the whole visible economy." On the basis of this universal union of the divine and the finite, there is realized in man an entirely special participation in the divine nature as a coming down of God to man and a raising of man to God. This fellowship or communion, as a divine incarnation and a human deification, is the essence of all religion; and it is realised at the highest in Christianity. Union with the Deity is the essential element in all religions, and it is what is common to heathenism and Christianity. They both represent it in a symbolical way, under the image of the corporeal union of the sexes. The theism of the *Aufklärung*, from its not understanding "the eternal, mystical, magical, and logical circle of human deification and divine incarnation," cannot therefore embrace the two. "The first syllable and ray of the gospel mystery of the destination of man to *συνθροονισμόν*, or a participation of the divine nature, which is not merely figurative but corporeal," was put by God even into the mouth of Lucifer, the preacher of lies. But the means by which we come near to the heavens, is "not a tower of reason," but is the "coming down of God to the earth." "God will Himself be near to us, and He comes into our heart, not only to make a paradise out of it, as out of the waste and empty earth, but even to erect there the tabernacle of heaven itself." This mystery of the real communication of God to man, is symbolically represented in a thousand mythological names, idols, and attributes. The revealed name of this mystery, is the one unutterable secret of Judaism. Even the unbelief of philosophical knowledge has still a dim presentiment of it in the striving to be like God. This striving, however, from its neither knowing nor wishing to know anything of a coming down of God to us or an incarnation, leads to "the oldest bosom-sin, that of self-idolatry." Lucifer uses reason and Scripture to work against the purpose of Jesus and His disciples, when man assigns divine attributes to the oily idol Reason, and

makes himself equal to God. The heathen, even the wisest of them, are men who go backwards; that is, they have no knowledge of God according to the depth of the misery into which human nature had fallen. For "polytheism had turned the temple of nature, and the mysteries had turned the temple of the body, into the sepulchre or murderer's vault" of the mystery of the union of God with men. Mystagogy is a necessity; and it is grounded "in the nature of man and his relation to the *Ens entium*." "But because this is also an *ens rationis*, the revealed name of the thing, κατ' ἐξοχήν, became the one mystery of Judaism, and the πρόληψις of His concealed name became the thousand-tongued mystery of Heathenism." "This unity of the head, as well as this division of the body in its members, and its specific difference, is the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, from its genesis up to its apocalypse; it is the focus of all the parables and types in the whole universe; it is the *Histoire générale* and *Chronique Scandaleuse* of all epochs and families." Hence Hamann determines the relation of Judaism and Christianity far more correctly than his contemporaries. Judaism is a preliminary stage of Christianity; for Judaism is prophecy, hope, and longing for a coming time of salvation in the kingdom of heaven, whereas Christianity consists in fulfilments and sacrifices done and accomplished by God for the best interest of men, in the highest good bestowed by Him, and in the performance of divine deeds and works, and in institutions for the salvation of the whole world. Christianity is fulfilment and completion. What lies at the basis of all religions, and as a dim presentiment even in heathenism, is fulfilled and completed in Christianity. The incarnation of God has been realized; the Deity has taken flesh and blood to Himself, and thereby the possibility has been given for realizing the longed-for union of man with God. "The mustard seed of the Anthropomorphosis and Apotheosis hidden in the heart and mouth of all the religions, appears here in Christianity in the greatness of a tree of knowledge and of life in the midst of the garden. Every philosophical contradiction and the whole

historical riddle of our existence, with the impenetrable night of its *terminus a quo* and its *terminus ad quem*, have been resolved by the record of the Word become flesh."

But although Hamann thus endeavoured to attain a deeper conception of the nature of religion and the peculiar essence of Christianity, he was far from receiving and holding the ecclesiastical doctrines just as they were. Not as if he stood in conscious opposition to them and had partly, or even entirely, rejected them. As he does not separate in revelation the natural from the supernatural, or what is revealed in nature from what is given in history, and as to him the most unimportant element in Scripture accordingly appears as eternal truth, although he can well distinguish them at other times, Christianity in consequence is to him absolutely the truth. In the zeal of his opposition, he even designates the most incredible doctrines as the highest truth. But as the letter of Scripture and historical faith in it can neither be the key nor seal of the spirit, in like manner the letter of doctrine, or the dogma, is to him of little authority. For "the pearl of Christianity is a hidden life in God, a truth in Christ the mediator, and a power which consists neither in words and usages, nor in dogmas and visible works, and which in consequence cannot be estimated according to a dialectical or ethical standard of sight." On account of this high estimation of the inner life, Hamann could not lay much value upon what was external. Accordingly he was able even to say that sound reason and orthodoxy were at bottom, in reality and even in etymology, synonymous terms; and that our salvation depended as little on the stages of rationality and orthodoxy as genius does upon industry, or good fortune upon merit. Jacobi accordingly says of him: "To him, as to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the true faith to which he appeals is *hypostasis*. Everything else, as he audaciously says, is but the holy excrement of the Grand Lama." Hence Hamann can even reckon dogmatics among the institutions of the public education and administration, which as such are subject to the will of the magistrate. But these are neither religion

“nor are they the wisdom which cometh from above, but they are earthly, human, and devilish, through the influence of Roman Cardinals or Romanic Ciceroni, of poetical father confessors or prosaic belly-priests, and from the alternating system of a statistical equilibrium and preponderance, or of armed tolerance and neutrality.”—We seek in vain for a further development of this thought in Hamann.

## IV.

## FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI.

Jacobi (1743–1819)<sup>1</sup> was from childhood “a visionary, a fantastic dreamer, a mystic.” Even when a boy, he took more delight in the exercises of prayer with a pious maid-servant of the family than in playing games with his comrades; and working on difficult religious problems, he then reached certain peculiar views of eternity and endless duration from which, according to his own confession, he never entirely detached himself again. In his early years he was somewhat alienated from the sciences, and it was not till afterwards in Geneva that he made a closer acquaintance with philosophy. Geneva was at that time one of the most important nurseries of the French sensationalism and materialism; and it was only from this side that Jacobi learned at first to know philosophy. Both of these impressions remained; and as Jacobi did not find in himself any way of reconciling the conflicting wants which he felt in the desire and longing of his pious soul and the intellectual striving after clear knowledge, he gave in his philosophy a scientific grounding of this discord. To himself personally, however, the stirrings of the pious soul were of far more importance than the cognitions of the understanding; and hence his philosophy decided this conflict between faith and knowledge, or between feeling and insight, in favour of faith or of feeling. For philosophy continued to be the chief employment

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Heinrich Jakobi's *Werke*, 5 Bde. Leipz. 1812–20; and Eberhard Zirngiebl, *Fr. H. Jakobi's Leben, Dichten und Denken*, Wien 1867.

of Jacobi's life ; and as the duties of his calling left him leisure, he devoted to it his quiet peaceful life at Pempelfort in the circle of dear friends, until in 1804 he removed to Munich as the President of its Academy. At the same time his philosophy was a representation of his purely personal conception of life, to a degree that holds of hardly any other system.

Before passing to the exposition of Jacobi's views, we must direct attention to a change in the terminology employed by him ; for if it be not observed, his writings may appear to be quite confused. In his earlier period, extending to about 1800, attaching himself to the terminology in common use, Jacobi called the Understanding the faculty of abstraction, which is inseparably connected with perception, while Reason was represented as "the mere faculty of conceptions, judgments, and inferences, which hovers over the sphere of sense, and which can reveal absolutely nothing directly from itself." While, therefore, the Understanding elaborates the impressions of the senses into representative ideas, the Reason seeks to cognize the particular in the universal by conceptions, or to deduce the particular from the universal. Accordingly "he called what is not Reason by the name of Reason, and what is truly and really Reason—the faculty of the assumption of what is true, good, and beautiful in itself with full confidence in the objective validity of this assumption—was represented by him, under the name of the 'power of belief,' as a faculty above Reason." Then came Kant. He vindicated the ideas of Freedom, Immortality, and God as belonging only to the Reason, but in such a way that the theoretical Reason is incapable of reaching the knowledge of them, and it is only the practical Reason that demands their acceptance. From that time, or from about 1800, Jacobi calls Reason the faculty of "rational intuition," by which the knowledge of the supersensible is immediately given to us. Reason and the senses are the two sources of knowledge, and between the two stands the Understanding, as a mere faculty of abstraction and reflection.

In order to estimate Jacobi's position correctly, it is neces-



sary carefully to separate his opposition to the previous Philosophy of Reflection from the attempt to found a special Philosophy of Belief or Feeling of his own. It is in the former relation that his enduring merit lies, although his polemical effort—as often happens—shot somewhat beyond its mark. Jacobi was the first to bring the opposition to the limited enlightenment of the understanding to scientific expression, and to formulate it precisely. On the other hand, as regards the tenability of the positive assertions of Jacobi, it is possible that opinions will long continue to be divided.

The function of Philosophy, according to Jacobi, is “to exhibit in the most conscientious way humanity as it is, be it explicable or inexplicable.” This involves two things. In the first place, philosophy has primarily, and even exclusively, to deal with man and his being. Nature is of no importance to Jacobi and his philosophy. He does not go further than the assertion of the reality of the external world, in opposition to the purely subjective idealism; and even this is done mainly with the view of liberating man from the incessant doubts of the truth of his ideas. From the reality of external things and their connection with us, the objectivity of Space and Time is maintained against Kant. Nature does not further interest Jacobi; for “Nature conceals God, because she everywhere reveals only fate or an uninterrupted chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and end, and never producing what is from God alone, and what presupposes freedom, namely, virtue and immortality.” A second and more important point also follows from the above definition. It is the function of philosophy to reveal Existence, that is, to make it known; it has to show forth existence, not to demonstrate it. “The greatest merit of inquiry, is to unveil and to reveal Existence. Definition is its means—the way to its goal—its proximate, not its ultimate end. Its ultimate end is that which cannot be defined, the insoluble, the immediate, the simple.” “Philosophy must begin with measure and number, or generally with what is determinate; for it is only the determinate that can become determining for what is indeterminate. Our

conceptions are purely reciprocal conceptions: Unity presupposes totality, totality plurality, and plurality unity. Unity is therefore the beginning and end of this eternal circle, and it constitutes individuality, organism, object-subjectivity." "We live, think, and feel as individual things." This existence is presented to us primarily in man, in our own self-consciousness. Hence follow two consequences: first, that all the Existence which we accept must be given or involved in our existence, or in self-consciousness, — on which position Jacobi gives his special grounding of the reality of God as well as of external things; and secondly, that everything which we find posited with or given in our own Existence, or in self-consciousness, is also regarded and known as existing, — and hence Jacobi's decided repudiation of the Philosophy of the Understanding or of Reflection.

The faculty of Reflection, or the abstracting Understanding, is found in man. Upon this faculty, as the ultimate and sole principle, the Philosophy of the Understanding or of Reflection is founded. Since Aristotle, the endeavour has arisen to subordinate immediate knowledge to mediate knowledge, the faculty of perception to the faculty of reflection, the archetype or ideal to the ectype or copy, the essence to the word, the reason to the understanding. "It was held that nothing should thenceforth pass as true but what could be demonstrated or twice shown: alternately in perception and in conception, in the thing and in its image or the word representing it; and in this word only, the thing was regarded as truly lying and as really known." Almost all the philosophers down to Kant, then attempted to produce the system of Metaphysics out of Logic by the aid of mere logical forms. Even Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff sought to obtain philosophical knowledge from definitions, inferences, and demonstrations.

But this Philosophy of Reflection comes to nothing. It is the function of philosophical knowledge to make existence manifest, and in particular and specifically to reveal original existence. On both of these sides, the Philosophy of Reflection

is incapable of solving its problem. It can neither apprehend nor demonstrate existence as objective reality, and it is incapable of grasping what is original, individual, and positive in existence.

The Philosophy of the Understanding can neither apprehend nor demonstrate existence, that is, objective reality. The understanding is the faculty of abstraction and reflection; it only elaborates the material which is furnished to it by the senses. It is beyond all doubt—and no one requires any proof of it—that we have sensations, that is, that things appear to us as external to ourselves. The understanding, however, never gets beyond these sensations, and it is impossible for it to grasp the things themselves, that is, to reach objectively real existence. Further, what justifies us generally in asserting such an existence? What justifies us in assuming that things are not mere phenomena in ourselves, and are not at all ideas of something external to us; or in assuming that phenomena relate to real external beings that have actual existence in themselves? Doubts may be brought forward against this view, such as it is impossible to refute by rational principles. Nay more, this assumption is founded upon an unjustifiable interchange of the *principium generationis* and the *principium compositionis*; or in other words, of the objective conceptions of “cause” and “effect” with the subjective conceptions of “principle” and “consequence.” For it is only because of this that the subjective act of becoming conscious of the manifold in a representative idea, or the production of a conception, is identified with the production of the things themselves. Kant has proved with irrefutable clearness that a demonstrative proof of the existence of an objectively real world outside of our representations, is entirely impossible; and he shows the same with regard to the existence of God. It is impossible to prove existence by a demonstration because of the nature of demonstration itself. To demonstrate cognitions, is in fact the same as to deduce them, or to refer them to something which is still more valid and more true than themselves; for the ground of any

demonstration is necessarily above what is proved. If, then, real existence, or the objective reality of things, is to be demonstrated, something would have to be found outside of it by which it could be tested, as the conception with the thing, or by which it could be covered as one figure does another in geometry; and therefore there would be required "a real thing external to the real thing in question, which would have to be more real than this real thing, and which yet at the same time would only be—the real." And if the existence of a living God were capable of being demonstrated, "then God Himself must derive Himself from something which we could become conscious of as His ground, and thus He would be capable of being evolved out of His principle. For the mere deduction only of the idea of a living God out of the conditions of the human faculty of knowledge, does not lead to a demonstration of His real existence. So little is this the case that, on the contrary (even its complete success being assumed), such a deduction necessarily destroys the natural belief in a living God, for the increase and confirmation of which the philosophical demonstration was sought; for it makes it be seen with the greatest clearness how the idea in question is an entirely subjective product of the human mind. It is a pure mental formation which it necessarily constructs by its own nature, and which therefore perhaps,—but only perhaps at the highest,—is a representation of the truth, and consequently no mere figment; and it is perhaps even still more but a mere subjective formation, and consequently it may really only be a figment." The result of such arguments is entirely negative; and the ultimate consequence of all the demonstrations of the understanding, comes to be: Denial of the objective reality of the world, Idealism, Nihilism, and the Denial of the existence of God, or Atheism.

Further, the Philosophy of Reflection cannot grasp what is original, or what is singular in existence. It is incapable of doing so, because the Understanding advances to identity, and accordingly dissolves all that is singular or peculiar, and because it rests upon the principle of Sufficient Reason, a

principle which leaves nothing that is inconceivable and original.

The Understanding is the organ and principle of the Philosophy of Reflection. The Understanding is the mere faculty of conceptions and of the process of again becoming conscious of perceptions in conceptions. The senses do not, in fact, receive what is original, as it is in its own singular existence. But the simple, unchangeable nature of the understanding, is at the same time opposed to the manifold and changing nature of what is given by the senses. The understanding seeks to cancel and annul all plurality and manifoldness; it is the faculty of connection by which all things are identified with each other, and by which the manifold is minimized and simplified, or, if possible, obliterated and annihilated. The senses by themselves are aroused by external objects, whereas the understanding tends to return into its own homogeneous nature, or to pure consciousness. It is only from the counter-movement of the simple nature of the understanding, in opposition to the manifoldness of what is sensible, that conceptions arise. The understanding does not occupy itself with what is sensible in order to arrange, to co-ordinate, or even to determine it—which, indeed, would be to cause it, or to bring it forth originally; “the understanding proceeds only towards undetermining, un-individualizing, de-essentializing, and de-realizing.” The understanding thus seeks to comprehend the manifold details of the sensible in ever wider circles of conception, and, if possible, to ascend even to the widest conception of all which embraces everything individual under it, but which, on that very account, is an empty nothing. The activity of the understanding exhausts itself in positing pure unity—an empty *idem est idem*—in the formation of identical judgments. But identity is destruction of what is particular; it is the removal of what constitutes diversity. Hence we have singular conceptions only of figure, number, position, motion, and the forms of thought. Qualities are therefore entirely inconceivable and unknowable by us. We assert that we know them



when we have reduced them to figure, number, position, and motion; but in thus reducing them, we have dissolved the qualities as such.

The knowledge of the understanding, rests upon the principle of Sufficient Reason as its ultimate principle. "The Law of Causality resolves itself into the proposition: Nothing is unconditioned. There is nothing that is highest, supreme, and first; there is no starting or absolute beginning." Hence the understanding, which operates with the law of causality, can neither reach the Unconditioned upwards, which is God, nor that which begins downwards, or the positively given, the singular, or the original.—We conceive a thing when we can deduce it from its proximate causes, that is, when we can see into its immediate conditions in a series. It is thus that mechanical connection is established; as the mechanism of its origin in the case of a circle, and the laws of their validity in the case of the syllogistic formulæ. But in this process the essence of the things, their qualities, and their inner real being remain as unknown to us as they were before. On these points, there does not fall the slightest light from the principle of Sufficient Reason.

In this rejection of the Philosophy of Reflection, Jacobi saw an ally in Kant; but it has to be carefully observed that he so regarded him only in this negative relation, and he considered him only as an ally. Kant overcomes the Dogmatic Philosophy by means of his Critical Philosophy; Jacobi protests against the emptiness of the Philosophy of the Understanding on the basis of his living feeling, which showed him the supersensible in man as real. Kant proceeds to demonstrate; Jacobi merely exhibits those facts which are real in the living personality of man, although they are inexplicable to the Philosophy of Reflection. Jacobi's view was firmly established before Kant's critical works appeared,<sup>1</sup> and was only influenced by them in its expression, but not in its matter. This is the twofold material and

<sup>1</sup> Jacobi's *Allwill* appeared in 1775-76, and his *Woldemar* in 1777-79; Kant's *Kritik d. r. V.* (*Critique of the Pure Reason*) appeared in 1781.



chronological reason for putting Jacobi before Kant, and not after him.

Kant's attention was mainly directed to a critical examination of our faculty of cognition. This faculty consists of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. The Sensibility believes that it perceives external objects, yet in truth it does not reach to the thing-in-itself, but phenomena only are given to us. The Understanding, according to laws immanent in it, elaborates the material which is furnished to it by the sensibility. Accordingly, the Understanding can never go beyond or transcend what has been given to it by the sensibility. In like manner, the pretension of Reason, that it can obtain new cognitions by further elaboration of the conceptions of the Understanding, and in particular that it can rise to the knowledge of the unconditioned, or to the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, is entirely groundless. Sensible being is nothing but the result of the common activity of the senses, of the imagination, and of the understanding; it is produced by continuous action, that is, it arises without subsisting, and its subsistence is an illusion. On this very account, however, the individual is compelled to imagine the subsistence of things before they thus arise in himself; and this constitutes the birth of the idea of the Unconditioned and the Absolute. But these ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, although we form them inevitably and necessarily, and even ascribe them to a special faculty of Reason, have no objective reality at all, and are rather full of contradictions and unrealizable. By the Practical Reason, and as its postulates, and therefore on the basis of a rational belief, Kant afterwards brings in these ideas again.

Jacobi entirely agrees with this dissolution of the Philosophy of the Understanding, which had thought to attain the highest knowledge merely by demonstrations. And in this respect he expresses himself in the strongest manner regarding the philosopher of Königsberg, recognising him as the greatest thinker of his time. This, however, does not hinder him from exercising on other points a sharp, and often also an acute,

criticism. In the first place, he finds fault with Kant for having assumed with regard to sensible things that at least their existence external to us, is taken as incontestably certain. It is entirely against the spirit of the Kantian system to say that objects make impressions upon the senses, that they thereby excite sensations, and that in this way they produce representational ideas. But at the same time it cannot be seen how without this assumption Kant's Philosophy can find an entrance to itself, and yet it is flatly impossible with this assumption to remain in it. The transcendental Idealism of Kant, with its assertion of an unknowable thing-in-itself as the ground of our sensations, is entirely inconsequent. The formation of conceptions, according to the system, is also called in question. It proceeds from three qualitative infinite unities and numerical identities: Space, Time, and wholly pure Original Consciousness. The third of these is to be viewed as containing synthesis without antithesis, the former two as containing antithesis without synthesis. From their union conceptions are formed. Hence everything rests upon the intellectual synthesis, which stands wholly alone *per se*, independent of the imagination and perception. It is therefore "nothing but the copula in itself; it is a mode of connection that is independent of subject and predicate, and without anything that has to be connected; it is an "is," "is," "is," without beginning and end, and without "What," "Who," and "Which." Pure conceptions cannot be represented in thought by themselves alone, and hence it is not possible that they can condition empirical conceptions or make them possible, and it cannot be discovered how they can grasp the finite or receive it into themselves.—Further, Kant's establishment of the Ideas as practical postulates, is not left unobjected to by Jacobi. After it has been shown to us by Kant himself that these Ideas are formed by ourselves, that they are only formations or products of our freely creating phantasy, nay, that they are even unthinkable, he cannot possibly be justified in requiring us to suddenly regard these Ideas on practical grounds, as objective realities. And this

can the less be so, the weaker the foundation of the whole practical philosophy is, as soon as one goes with Kant in denying Freedom. Even according to Kant's own view, practical philosophy is "an impossible hypothesis, an unthinkable, chimerical, and merely subjective object." Kant, in demanding that the ideas which had been dissolved as theoretical cognitions shall be accepted as practical postulates, overlooks the fact that "Reason, as certain as it is reasonable, can learn to think nothing that is unthinkable, and that the greatness of the need does not remove the impossibility of bestowing objective existence upon certain Ideas when their subjectiveness has been put beyond all doubt." Kant has therefore dissolved all objective certainty in his theoretical philosophy, and in his practical philosophy he only reaches life again by falling away from his principle. This appears to Jacobi a new proof of the fact that we must seek a new faculty of cognition, for even Kant only reaches the Ideas by a rational belief which rises above all the knowing of the Understanding. Accordingly we must either perish in mere subjective illusion, "or knowledge must be obtained in contrast thereto from a Faculty to which what is true in and above phenomena, makes itself known in a manner that is inconceivable to the Senses and the Understanding."

Jacobi thus finds an inconsequence in Kant's assumption of an unknowable but objectively real Thing-in-itself as the ground of phenomena; and hence Fichte's thoroughgoing Idealism could not but appear to him to be the only logical outcome of the Kantian Philosophy. He praises Fichte's system as the one which was complete above all others, and as irrefutable on account of its internal consistency. On the other hand, the "Ideal-Materialism" of Schelling appears to him to be only a falling back into Spinoza.

Spinozism is regarded by Jacobi as the model system of a logical Philosophy of Reflection. It is an undeniable merit of Jacobi that he again called attention to Spinoza; and he understood him at least better than most of his contemporaries, such as Mendelssohn and Herder. According to Jacobi's view,

Spinoza started from the ancient principle *a nihilo nihil fit*, and hence he knows no creative transition from the infinite to the finite, no *causæ secundæ*, no emanating, but only an immanent "Ensoph," no extramundane, but only an immanent and externally immutable cause of the world, which is also one and the same with all its effects. Being, the sum-total of finite entities, or substance, is God; this is the only real "*Ens reale præter quod nullum datur esse*," and hence it is *Deus* or *Natura*. God, according to Spinoza, is the identity of what is not distinguishable; He is without understanding and will, which belong only to finite beings. The will is not free, but all finite things are completely and perfectly contained in God.—The personality of God, the freedom of the will, and final causes, are the three points with respect to which Jacobi takes decided objection to the philosophy of Spinoza. But, at the same time, he asserts that there is no understanding that is faithful to itself and proceeds with correct sequence, that can come to any other result. "With pure metaphysics we can never gain the advantage over the reasons advanced by Spinoza against the personality of God, freewill, and final causes." "There is no other means of safety from the steep heights of Metaphysics than to turn our back upon all philosophy, and to throw ourselves overhead into the depths of faith." Hence it suits Jacobi to see in the various systems of philosophical reflection chiefly their affinity with Spinozism. Even the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, with the Enlightenment that was founded upon it, was to him at bottom Spinozism, and it was only on this account that he could deceive himself with regard to the Spinozism of Lessing.

Spinozism is the same as Atheism. This identification of these systems was early maintained by Jacobi. It was the interest he had in examining the ontological argument for the existence of God that led him to the study of Spinoza, and he soon recognised that Spinoza did not hold God to be extramundane, but only regarded Him as the sum-total of all things, or as the universe. Hence, according to Jacobi, Spinozism is Atheism or Cosmotheism; for a God who is not

personally outside of the world is as good as no God. The existence of God cannot be reached from this point of view; for the conception of the cause can only coincide with that of nature herself, and the understanding can only apprehend the unconditioned as the indeterminate or as the *ἐν καὶ πάν*. All Philosophy of the Understanding is thus atheism. At the same time, it is fatalism; for every logical philosopher of the Understanding, who everywhere applies the principle of the Sufficient Reason, must, like Spinoza, deny freedom. "Every way of demonstration leads on to fatalism."

Spinozism is therefore the completest system of the Philosophy of the Understanding. But Fichteism is also designated as such, although it is Idealism, while Spinozism is Materialism. How, then, is this possible? It is very simple; for the one is but the converse of the other. The Philosophy of the Understanding puts all its notions in the intellectual Ego. The choice, then, is presented of either regarding the Ego as what exists and the notions as merely subjective productions of it, or of ascribing being to things and considering them as the principle of thinking. The former view gives idealism, the latter gives materialism. Each is incontrovertible within its own sphere; they both, however, belong to the reflective Philosophy of the Understanding.

This Philosophy of the Understanding, or of Reflection, is not in a position to explain or define real existence. How, then, is such a philosophy possible? A twofold illusion deceives the demonstrators. In the first place, they are misled by the belief that by continued abstraction of the understanding we can really reach the conception of the Unconditioned. In the process of abstraction the particular is let go and the universal is kept, and it necessarily appears to be more unlimited; and thus the conceit is formed that the conception of the Unconditioned must result by abstracting from all limits. In truth, however, we only thus obtain a whole that is void of material, and is therefore without limit; it is completely indeterminate; it is pure negation or pure nothing. This Unconditioned is then apprehended as the ground of



things, and from the All, which is without any distinguishing quality, the real world with an infinite manifoldness of determinate qualities, is made to proceed.—This first illusion is forthwith supported by a second. In sensible perception we always see what is complete and perfect preceded by something that is incomplete and imperfect; we see formlessness precede form, heedlessness precede reflection, desire precede law, and crude want of morals precede moral practice. Being deceived by this, it appears to us as possible that a determinate being may arise out of that nothing of the understanding.

The Philosophy of the Understanding does not satisfy the mind, for it cannot explain personal existence. But, as we have seen, it is the function of Philosophy to unveil existence, and in the last resort it has not to do with logical truths, but with historical truths. "Truth is clearness, and it is related everywhere to reality, to facts." The most immediate reality is our personal existence; and the person is at the same time the subject of knowledge. Hence no knowledge is of value which is prejudicial to the personal Ego; for "it is a thought of high and pregnant meaning that development of life is alone development of truth, and that truth and life are both one and the same." "The Originator of the world must have given to every being as much truth as He assigned to it of life." It is the business of philosophy to exhibit the individual life. But individual life rests upon two factors: upon consciousness or the ideal, and upon the real or actual object of the Ego; by the former we exist for ourselves, by the latter we exist in ourselves. Each of these factors may be made the starting-point of philosophy. If we start from the ideal, or from intelligence, we come to Spinozism. If we start from the real, or from life as it specially expresses itself in free action, we come to Platonism. The decision as to which of these two philosophies is chosen, is not made by the understanding on the ground of principles, but is only determined by the peculiar character of the philosophizing individual, according as the energy of life or the power of the understanding controls him. In other words, it depends on the man's whole



soul; for philosophy does not strive after truth in general, but after a definite truth that will satisfy the head and the heart. Truth is loved and sought, not as something alien and disproportionate to man, or as destroying him and his spiritual existence, but it is sought and loved for the sake of what it contains, because of this being something that is decided, most specific in itself, and tending to elevate the spiritual existence of man. Man can neither seek nor love a truth that slays him, that even annihilates him.

Hence Jacobi is clearly conscious that the principles of the understanding, or demonstrations, are not capable of showing the truth of one system in preference to another. For himself, however, he can only choose Platonism in accordance with his own peculiar personality. He cannot let go his hold on independence, self-subsistence, and freedom; he cannot be consoled with a God who would only be a blindly working Nature; he cannot let go the conviction that a breath of this free Ruler of the world dwells in us with the free personality, and that having this breath in us we are more than mere nature. And hence Jacobi cannot be the friend of a science for which personality, freedom, and the revelations in the soul of a supramundane God have no importance, a science whose goal is that there is no God, and which even declares virtue to be incompatible with itself, or even denies it altogether. With this conviction, he would of necessity have to give up everything that lends substance and value to his life; he would have to surrender the "I am," "I act, produce, bring forth;" he would have, in a word, to give up free personality and his own reality. Therefore he turns his back upon this philosophy in spite of the systematic, firmly closed, and rounded form in which it appears in Spinozism. And as Spinozism bears itself as if it alone possessed the right knowing, and complete and all-comprehending knowledge, Jacobi often designates this turning away from it as a turning away from science generally. Accordingly, it is the proud boast of Jacobi that he does not shrink from the *Salto mortale*, but calmly flings himself headlong out of the sphere of science

into that of faith, and that he always finds the courage to oppose his Nescience, or Not-science, to the false science of the time.

But what is to be said for this Not-science in opposition to Science, for this Platonism in opposition to Spinozism, for this Philosophy of Feeling in opposition to the Philosophy of Understanding or Reflection? This question still remains for us to answer.

The Understanding is not capable of grasping reality, either on the side of its existence or on the side of its originality and specific nature. If we are not to be entirely cut away from reality, there must therefore be another faculty of our mind which makes it known to us. This is the faculty of Perception, for to perceive is to take something as true, or to hold it as real. This perceptive faculty is twofold, according as it is sensible or rational. The sensible faculty of perception has for its object sensible things; it is, in a word, the senses. The rational faculty of perception has for its object the supersensible, and — according to Jacobi's later terminology — it is Reason. Both of these faculties are in us, and do not go out of us; but both the sensible and the supersensible are given to us in ourselves or in our self-consciousness.

According to Jacobi, the definitions laid down regarding the mutual relations of Sense, Understanding, and Reason are of little interest to us. Sense and Understanding are never without each other. The former furnishes the material, in impressions received from without and in sensations; the latter supplies the form, in the innate conceptions of the Understanding; while from the co-operation of the two, the particular or empirical conceptions of the Understanding arise. "There is necessarily understanding along with sense; a sense which were only sense, is not a thing at all, just as a knowledge that were mediate through and through, is likewise a nonentity." The two are as necessarily together, as the soul and the sense together constitute a *unum per se* or an individual. The Understanding as the universal is the same in all men, and hence our individual characteristics by nature

rest merely upon the peculiarity of our faculty of sense; or in other words, the individual peculiarities of our thinking depend upon sensible perception.—The characteristic superiority of man over the lower animals is constituted by self-consciousness, or by what he expresses as the Ego. We attain the expression of the “I” and “Me” through the faculty of perceiving ourselves; that is, through a sense by which we perceive not merely the qualities of things, but also our own qualities in relation to the senses. This faculty of self-perception is Reason, and “it is solely and alone by the *proprium* of Reason that man is elevated above mere animal being.” “If we look away from this property, which essentially distinguishes the human species from the animal species, and which absolutely and exclusively belongs to the former, and if we assign to the human species only the reflective contemplation of one and the same sensible matter as is presented likewise to the more perfect animals through their senses, then man is really distinguished from the brute only in stage or degree, and not in nature or kind. Under that supposition the superiority of the human understanding over that of the lower animals, is but the superiority of an eye provided with a microscope or a telescope over another eye that is not furnished with this aid.” One of the chief merits of Jacobi lies in his having thus emphatically referred to this fact that had been overlooked by the previous philosophy, and had therefore not been explained by it, and in his having pointed out that man is not to be regarded as a higher species of animal; nor as a *modus*, that is, a member in the mechanical connection of nature, as Spinoza holds; nor as a monad, that is, a member in the graduated order of nature, as Leibniz holds; but that an absolutely differentiating characteristic belongs to him. This is Reason; and Reason is primarily the consciousness of the mind, or the self-consciousness by which the Understanding, which is inseparably connected with it, is illuminated and becomes conscious of itself. But it is, at the same time, the faculty of the supersensible and a source of the new sublime cognitions: God, Freedom, and Immortality.

Man thus possesses a special faculty of perception by which he becomes aware of things, or takes them to be real. But the question then arises, What convinces him that these things are real, and that this perceiving is not an illusion, but is a real process? This conviction, according to Jacobi, is entirely immediate; our certainty that our perceptions are not empty images of our imagination, but that objective reality corresponds to them, is founded upon belief. In fact, every immediate certainty is "belief."

Jacobi writes on this point to Mendelssohn as follows: "We are all born in belief and we must remain in belief, as we are all born in society and must remain in society. We may strive after certainty, if certainty is not already known to us beforehand; and how can it be known to us otherwise than by something which we already know with certainty? This leads to the conception of an immediate certainty which not only requires no demonstrations, but absolutely excludes all demonstrations; it is itself solely and alone the idea that corresponds to the thing it represents, and it therefore has its ground in itself. The conviction that is produced by demonstrations, is a certainty at second hand; it rests upon comparison, and can never be certain and perfect. Now, if every case of holding a thing to be true which does not arise from rational grounds, is to be called *Belief*, the conviction that springs from rational grounds must itself come from Belief and receive its power from Belief alone, that is, it must arise from the mere authority of Reason for which it gives the principle." All our objective knowledge, that is, all our certainty of the reality of what is immediately given to us merely as sensation, and which is therefore only in our own consciousness as a determination of it, rests upon Belief. In other words, it rests upon a unique and peculiar feeling of our soul, which marks one sensation as corresponding to objective reality, in distinction from another as an empty product of our imagination. "All reality, including both the corporeal reality which manifests itself to the senses and the spiritual reality which reveals itself to the reason, is only accredited to

man by feeling; there is no confirmation or verification of it out of or beyond this." This Feeling cannot be voluntarily called forth by us, but is inseparably connected with perception. Upon this immediate feeling Belief rests, and this belief is "the element of all human cognition and activity." "Belief is a primary light of reason. Eradicate original Belief, and all science becomes hollow and empty. It may indeed sough like the wind, but it cannot speak or answer. This Belief is a faith or firm confidence in what is not seen." With full right, Jacobi refers for the support of this view to Hume, who founds upon Belief even our conviction that there are objects external to our perceptions, and that a real relation of cause and effect corresponds to our inferences of causality.

This Belief is directed, first to our own Ego and its states; secondly, to external sensible things; and thirdly, to the supersensible.

The substantial Ego is a fact of consciousness and not a product of the understanding. The "is" of the reflecting understanding is always only a relative "is," and expresses no more than the mere identity of one thing with another in conception, and not the substantial "is" of Being. This real being—or Being as such—makes itself known only in feeling. In feeling, man is immediately conscious of his real being or his empirical particularity. "He finds himself as this Being, by a feeling of essentiality that is immediate and independent of the remembrance of past states; he knows he is this one and the same individual, who neither is nor can be another, because immediate certainty of mind is inseparable from the mind, from selfhood, from substantiality." This founding of the self-consciousness upon belief, does not relate merely to our mental being; the existence of our own body can likewise only be believed. This assertion Jacobi finds warranted by the authority of Descartes and some of the later philosophers. The reality of our own Ego thus rests upon belief or immediate feeling. The validity of this principle is so certain that it is applied not only to our own existence, but also to our states of existence, or to the qualitative peculi-



arities of our nature. I am in the state in which I perceive or feel myself.

In self-consciousness, or in the immediate feeling of ourselves, the feeling of Freedom prominently asserts itself. "Freedom does not consist in an absurd faculty or power of deciding oneself without reasons, nor even in the choice of what is better among useful things, or of rational desire." Jacobi expressly declares himself to this effect, and yet in his polemic against the determinism of Spinoza and Leibniz it is this conception of freedom that is presupposed. "This freedom essentially consists in the Will's independence of desire." We are conscious of our action and of its intention. We feel that our actions do not happen by necessity, or only as the result of co-operating natural powers, but that they are done with freedom. We call ourselves free in so far as a part of our being does not belong to nature, and has not sprung from it, nor has been received from it; but distinguishing ourselves from nature, we raise ourselves above it, use it and master it, tear ourselves away from it, subdue its mechanism by our free power, and make it serviceable to us. Production in nature is blind, reasonless, necessary, and mechanical; the mind alone invents and produces with intention. Hence the belief in human freedom is also closely connected with the truth of the human personality; nay more, the consciousness of personality stands and falls with that of freedom. Desire is grounded in nature; for desire and aversion are merely natural, mechanical expressions of the reaction of our living nature upon the impressions from without. The freewill, as pure self-activity born of the spirit or mind, is therefore will as independent of desire.—Freedom is certainly denied by the Philosophy of the Understanding. This philosophy asserts that human action rests entirely upon mechanical necessity, and that the feeling of freedom rests merely upon illusion, an illusion which has been called forth by the fact that our acting is always accompanied by thinking. This thinking is in truth only an accompaniment, and not, as we are so inclined to persuade ourselves, the original ground of the action. This



assertion cannot be refuted by the principles of the understanding, but an irrefutable immediate feeling testifies against it. Who, indeed, would really like to suppose that Homer, Sophocles, Pindar, and bards like Ossian and Klopstock, that Aristotle, Leibniz, Plato, Kant and Fichte—in short, all poets and philosophers of whatever name, and all legislators, artists, and heroes—had brought forth their works blindly and compulsorily; that in the last resort they produced these works in consequence of the natural mechanism and in the series of the necessary connections of cause and effect, while their intelligence had only acted throughout the part of an on-looker as an accompanying consciousness. Whoever asserts this, is beyond the reach of controversy. But our innermost feeling revolts against it; an insuppressible feeling tells us that our actions are free and original. There is no more solid conviction than that I do what I think, instead of that I think what I do; and in spite of all science we must and will persist in this belief. This feeling of freedom is the ground and fountain of the whole of the philosophy of Jacobi, as he himself says. “This must continue to be the root of philosophy. Human knowledge starts from revelation; reason, in fact, reveals freedom in revealing providence; and all the branches of science shoot up from this root.”

With this belief in freedom, several things are at once given to us. We feel ourselves free, that is, we feel ourselves in the spirit to be independent of the mechanism of nature; we therefore feel ourselves belonging to nature as well as to mind. “The union of natural necessity and freedom in one and the same being, is an absolutely inconceivable fact; it is a miracle and mystery like creation itself.” Nevertheless this union is a fact; it really exists whether it be conceivable or not. Man just constitutes this inconceivable but undeniable dualism. In connection with nature he is a nature-being, and is subject to the conditions of nature; in connection with God he is a God-being, and is elevated above nature. He is neither of these two alone, but both natures are united in him into an original and indis-

soluble synthesis. Man as this real unity of the divine and the natural, is a citizen of two worlds, a world of complete independence and a world of equal dependence. Hence man points by his proper being to something else, and in particular he has a twofold relation to what is without him, to a nature that is below him and a God who is above him. "The mind of man is certain in itself, but it needs to add to its consonant the vowel of nature and God, in order to express his existence;" or in other words, the belief in our freedom necessarily carries with it a belief in nature and in God, as realities existing out of us.

Hume had already grounded our conviction of the real existence of external things upon an immediate feeling, or upon Belief. Jacobi refers to him, but gives the thought a deeper foundation. He says: "It is by belief we know that we have a body, and that other bodies and other thinking beings are external to us." "All that we feel is only our body in such or such a state; and in feeling it affected in one way or other, we become aware, not only of its changes, but of something else which is quite different from these, and which is neither merely sensation nor thought, but other real things, and this with the same certainty as that by which we perceive or become aware of ourselves; for without 'Thou' the 'I' is impossible." In other words, in the process of sensation we have not a sense of ourselves in general only, but we always feel ourselves along with certain particular qualifications, or as determined in one way or other. This leads us to the immediate conviction that along with the changes of the Ego there is also given a real ground of these changes external to us. Hence the principle "without 'Thou' there is no 'I';" and hence, too, the assertion that "we become aware of other real things in perception with the same certainty as that with which we become aware of ourselves."

(c) It is with the very same belief that we also apprehend the reality of God. It has already been shown that, according to Jacobi, the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; for to demonstrate means to derive something from its conditions,

but God is the unconditioned. The Cosmological Argument is also rejected. "The inference from the unfathomableness of Nature to a cause outside of it which produces it and must have given it beginning, was, is, and remains a defective inference that cannot be justified philosophically." Nevertheless Jacobi advances a consideration that is entirely similar to it when he argues that every system, even the least, requires a spirit or mind to unite and move it, or a Lord and King of life; and hence the system of all systems, the universe of beings, must be moved and held together by a Spirit. "This spirit is Creator, and His creation is that He has constituted souls, founded finite life, and prepared immortality." The conviction of the existence of God is founded upon immediate certainty, or upon Belief. "Man finds God because he can only find himself along with God." "We know of God and His will because we are born of God, are created according to His image, and are of His kind and race. God lives in us, and our life is hidden in God." "Created after the image of God, God in us and above us—archetype and ectype—separated and yet in inseparable union,—this is the knowledge which we have of Him, and it is the only possible record; thus does God reveal Himself to man, livingly, progressively, and for all times." And hence it is also said that "the belief in God is not a science but a virtue."

The knowledge of God is thus a form of immediate knowledge grounded upon belief, and from this it follows what sort of knowledge it is. As in the case of external things, we are well convinced by belief that they are and that they produce sensations in us, but do not comprehend the *how* of this production, so it is with regard to God. We have no clear conception of God that exactly corresponds to Him; the understanding comprehends only the conditioned, and hence "a God who could be known would be no God at all." Nay more, God is not merely inconceivable, but a conception of Him is impossible; for the understanding strives to merge all that is particular and immediate in the undetermined identity that is formed by it.

There is only one determination of the conception of God which Jacobi dwells upon with emphasis again and again: it is that of *personality*. God alone is the One who is one only; He is the All-one; He is not an individual being conditioned by a preceding and concomitant existence, but He is the alone perfect Being, the only truly real Being. It is false, however, to assert that because God is not an individual of or under a species, that He is without personality; or in other words, that He is without self-consciousness and without reason, or even that He is as one who is not, that is, without life. "For a being without selfness, is utterly and universally impossible. But a selfness without consciousness, and again a consciousness without self-consciousness, without substantiality and at least the capacity of personality, is as completely impossible. The one as well as the other is but the sound of a word without a thought. Hence God, if He is not a spirit, is not; He would thus be the non-existent in the highest sense; and He has not a spirit if He is without the fundamental property of the spirit, which is self-consciousness, substantiality, and personality." A God who is not thought of according to the manner of men, is to Jacobi no God; and the denial of anthropomorphism amounts to atheism or fetichism. And notwithstanding the half-pantheistic sound of his expression, that "we are, we live, and it is impossible that there can be a mode of life and existence which would not be a mode of the life and existence of the highest Life itself," Jacobi continually insists upon thinking of God as a supra-natural, extra-mundane, and supra-mundane Being.—It is primarily the personal need that drives him to this view. The wants of his soul are not satisfied by a God who permeates the universe in the manner of an all-animating soul, or who, divested of all resemblance to man, cannot enter into any living relation to us. Such a God appears to him as the mere fiction of our mind; and with the reality of God the reality of the world, and, in short, all certainty, is likewise given up. He needs a God with whom he can enter into personal relationship as with a human friend, and exchange

thoughts and feelings ; and the demands of feeling are to him in themselves unassailable principles of knowledge.—Nevertheless he does not neglect to give a scientific grounding to the Personality of God in the connection of his system. The understanding cannot grasp the unconditioned, but in our consciousness of freedom we have an immediate feeling of the unconditioned. God is the unconditioned for all that is conditioned ; and hence God must also have freedom and foresight, partly because we only thus think the unconditioned, and partly because we are only able thereby to explain freedom and foresight in ourselves. We have freedom only as mind, as reason, but we have reason only in and with our personality. God is thus not for us, as for the philosophy of the understanding, merely that which is unconditioned, but as the unconditioned One, He is spirit, reason, person. “If reason can only be in a person, and the world is to be assigned to a rational Author, All-mover, and Ruler, this Being must be a personal Being. Such a Being may be apprehended under the form of human rationality and personality, and the properties which I recognise as the highest in man must be assigned to this Being, and these are love, self-consciousness, understanding, and freewill.” As a person, God has all the characteristics that belong to personality ; He creates according to ideas, acts with intelligence, and has created finite things with wisdom and freedom. As the natural can therefore proceed from the supernatural only in a supernatural way, Jacobi does not at all attempt to establish any determinations regarding God’s mode of working. As an artist stands in relation to his work, so does the personal God stand in a relation of freedom to the world, and He does miracles according to His will.

Belief in the reality of external things, as well as of the personal God, thus rests upon the immediate consciousness of our freedom. The feeling of Immortality and of Morality, is also closely connected with the same consciousness. “Immortality does not rest upon an idle postulate ; we feel it in our free acting and working.” With reference to Morals, Jacobi

takes an attitude of decided opposition to Kant. The good is not a law which stands cold and unattained out of and above man; the good rests upon an internal irresistible impulse of nature. Morality is immediately involved in freedom; it consists in exhibiting externally what is inmost in our own being, and the individual has specially to exhibit his own personal characteristics in his actions. Hence in his *Allwill*, emphasis is laid upon the fact that all the virtues were manifested in him "so entirely from the naked quality of his nature." Hence the virtues are not referred to commands and laws, but to "a special sense that is peculiar to man and a special impulse that is peculiar to him." Hence the high estimation laid by Jacobi upon the element of "moral genius." "By genius, nature gives the rule to art, both to the art of the good and to the art of the beautiful." Such pre-eminently endowed natures have even the privilege to put the immediate testimony of the conscience in the place of the universally valid rules of action.

The Beautiful is likewise associated with the good; it is of the same immediate nature. "The Beautiful has this in common with all that is immediate, that it is known without any distinguishing mark." "A man of taste is one who immediately feels the Beautiful, and who draws the feeling of the Beautiful from the Beautiful." An immediate impulse leads us with the power of irresistible evidence to the recognition of the Beautiful. Beauty rests merely in form, and the form is non-essential to the substance, and is produced by free action. Accordingly the Beautiful necessarily presupposes freedom.

We have thus seen that there is a threefold impulse in man directed to the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, and that it is combined with immediate certainty or belief. It is a threefold impulse, and not three distinct impulses; it is the one fundamental impulse of human nature. "Such an immediate positive truth, discovers itself to us in and with the feeling of an impulse that rises above every sensible, changeable, contingent interest, and which announces itself



irresistibly as the fundamental impulse of human nature." What this impulse strives after may be said to be generally divine things, and its first effects are virtuous sentiments. Hence it is sometimes called the Moral Feeling, and sometimes the Feeling of Truth. "What is true, good, and beautiful in itself is revealed in it unfathomably and unutterably, without intuition and without conception." "Truth, Beauty, and Virtue! With these we enter into the Kingdom of the Divine and of the imperishable; without them we enter into the kingdom of what is low, vanishing, common."

It is therefore belief or immediate certainty by which we are convinced of the reality of our perceptions, and by which we lay hold of reality. But we cannot stop at this belief as if it were ultimate. Belief necessarily presupposes a revelation or manifestation. Reflection can only make something manifest to us; all cognitions arise from immediate perception. The understanding is dependent on what our faculty of perception brings to it from the senses and the reason; for both of these are subservient to the communication of what is revealed as real.

As is the case with belief, so does revelation, as manifestation, relate primarily to the Existence of external things. "We have nothing upon which our judgment can take its stand but the thing itself, nothing but the fact that things are really before us. Can we express ourselves regarding this relation by a more appropriate word than the word 'revelation'? We have no proof at all for the existence in itself of a thing external to us, and yet we are convinced of it. On what is this conviction based? It is in fact founded on nothing but upon a revelation which we cannot but call truly *mirabile*."

Above all, however, revelation refers to the supersensible. God reveals Himself to us in reason or in the fundamental impulse of the good, the true, and the beautiful, as the really existent being. In our rational feelings we have God immediately with us; we are immediately one with Him and live a life in and with God; nay more, this highest culmination of our life, is the being and life of God in us. Jacobi

discourses in enthusiastic language of this divine life as the revelation of the Highest in us. The fundamental impulse in man, is the living and loving of God in man; without this we should be without any moral capacity, for it is only in so far as God wills and works in us that we really possess a moral freedom. In other words, it is only thus that we are capable of subordinating our sensuous desires, inclinations, and passions to the demands of the good. For the virtuous capacity by which alone we determine ourselves, is not self-acquired but innate. "With irresistible power, what is highest in me points to a Highest of all above and out of me; it compels me to believe the inconceivable, yea, what is impossible as conception, in myself and out of myself, from love and through love." Thus the good, true, and beautiful in myself points by necessity to an inexhaustible fountain and primal principle of the Good, True, and Beautiful, which produces the same in me, and in which I participate by these feelings and through them. Hence the more the Good, True, and Beautiful, or in a word the Divine, unfolds itself in us, so much the more does our knowledge of God and our communion with Him increase and ascend. For the one corresponds exactly to the other. "Where strong personality appears, the tendency towards the supernatural and the conviction of God is brought most decidedly to expression in and by it. Socrates, Christ, Fénelon prove to me by their personality the God whom I worship." "We will not philosophize up to this point, with and from our natural body; but if there is a certain knowledge of God possible to man, there must lie a faculty in his soul which can organize him up to it." This revelation is essentially immanent in man because of his participating in the divine nature, and it is thus the ground of all belief and of all knowledge. But as the internal revelation is thus put so high, the external revelation is put proportionally low. "If God were not present to us in this internal way, or immediately present by His image in our innermost self, what is there out of Him that could make Him known to us? Could it be done by

images, tones, signs, which only enable us to recognise what is already understood? What is the Spirit to the Spirit?"

"A revelation by external appearances or phenomena—let them be called what they may—can at the highest be related to the internal original revelation as speech is related to reason."

"As little as there can be a false God external to the human soul, just as little can the true God appear external to it."

"For us to have a God who became man in us and to know another God is not possible, not even by receiving better instruction; for how could we even understand this instruction." "God must be born in man himself if man is to have a living God."

Those who demand an external positive revelation are reckoned by Jacobi as belonging to "the class of those who are wholly outward."

They assert that they have nothing that has not come into them from without; they trust the senses only, and not the reason and the conscience; it is not the internal, but the external word that ought to decide regarding what is true and good. Men—they hold—would know nothing of God if He had not taught them by extraordinary ambassadors.

These representatives gave men instruction about the divine attributes, and represented God's omnipotence immediately before their eyes by miracles.

"This corporeal proof by miracles, is regarded by the outward class of thinkers as authoritative in respect of all the doctrines proclaimed by these ambassadors of God; and it is not only regarded as the highest proof, but as the only one that in principle is tenable."

If the reality of the miracles is authenticated, the contents of the doctrine are not to be examined before the reason and conscience; power has decided, and consequently unconditional blind subjection is a duty.

Without such subjection there would be no end of erroneous doctrines, and unity and permanence of faith would never arise.

As the way of inquiry will never lead to the universal acceptance of the true faith, there remains only the way of authority, and this compels faith by present, or sufficiently attested, miracles.

Whoever sets himself in opposition to this authority, and

asserts that there is in man a higher authority, such as that of Reason and Law, trusts more to himself than to God, and he is anathema !

These views already indicate the position which Jacobi takes up in reference to Religion. Religion as an inner life—what is called subjective religion in the terminology of the schools—is regarded by Jacobi as the highest blossom of his personal life, the element in which alone he finds his well-being. It is this Religion, as communion with God, which raises us in the feeling of freedom above the natural finite and sensible existence. It is the only living ground of our moral life; it is at the same time the foundation of our knowledge of truth. In short, without Religion life would not be worth the living, and as men we would hardly be raised above the brutes. Religion is the eternal divine life in us; it is the alliance of our immortal spirit with a personal living God, who makes Himself known to us in the fundamental impulse of our nature, or in those rational feelings which are directed towards the good, the true, and the beautiful.

Jacobi judges of the Positive Religions much less favourably. This did not arise from his having been in any way at one with the *Aufklärung* and its negative reduction of what was positive in religion to a so-called Religion of Reason. The violent polemic against the Philosophy of the Understanding is indeed specially directed against the so-called religion of reason, or the theism of the Enlighteners. How, then, can our understanding attain to the knowledge of God, Freedom, and Immortality? How can we speak of a religion and of a living conviction, where there is no inner indwelling of God, and no fellowship of life and of love? In order to escape from this desert of the pure Religion of Reason to the Promised Land of better views, or to living Religion, Jacobi himself would not shrink from the way over a *pons asinorum*; for an external revelation hardly appears to him to be anything better, as we have seen.

Some remarkable hints and indications are found in Jacobi

with reference to the historical development of Religion. The whole internal constitution of his nature leads man to religion, that is, to the knowledge of the Deity and to a certain worship of Him. The ground of this is not to be found in the worship of the dead, nor in fear of the powers of nature. The first expression of the moral organ consists in the stirrings of longing and devoutness which are called forth by the magnificent spectacle of the universe, the awe-inspiring appearance of the sun, of the starry heavens, of the rainbow, or similar things. As man directs his attention specially to the object that appears to him as the greatest, the fairest, and the most splendid, it becomes in his eyes what is highest. Thereby the impulse was likewise given to actions that indicated a sort of worship. This is the natural advance of man towards the knowledge of a sublime Being upon whom he feels himself dependent. When man attempts to transform his hitherto dim feeling of God into a distinct conception, by the aid of his understanding and imagination, he gives his God a shape and manners; in other words, man creates God in his own image. From this effort there then arises a plurality of gods, or Polytheism. On this stage superstitious belief arises; and from the condition of an undeveloped understanding—when there are still mixed up together knowing and believing, trust in the visible and trust in the invisible—all the surprising phenomena in the history of mankind are explained. Hence it is that we have crude and refined Fetichism, the worship of animals and of the stars, the innumerable species of idolatry and superstition, and the multitude of absurd and contradictory systems. Even in this superstitious belief there is divine truth although it is veiled. The savage who falls down before the waterfall has the true God before his eyes and in his heart, and he who kneels with full devotion before an idol is more than a philosopher with his abstract conception of God.—With the rise of Philosophy, man neglected his inner feelings and busied himself only with ideas. Following the universal impulse to discover the cause of things, man

endeavoured to explain the origin of the world by the hypothesis of a Matter, with which Motion is necessarily connected by the aid of a hidden Power. Thus the Deity became dispensable and superstition was expunged, but with it went also genuine belief, and utter and complete Atheism prevailed. For it is not till long after the worshipping of a Deity that Atheism arises; it presupposes a certain exercise of the understanding, and it is founded on reflection, or in a one-sided tendency and application of reflection to what is natural.

This Atheism, however, found its healing in human thinking itself. Socrates first pointed to the inner nature of man, and here he discovered another world far more rich in its contents than the sensible world,—a world in which man learns to know himself as bringing forth being. In Nature, Socrates beheld laws, and so he came to a highest Lawgiver who has created things and their laws, the conception of whom is occasioned by the physical world, but not given by it. Whoever, like Socrates, came to know the finiteness of the physical world and the infiniteness of the other world, and felt himself to be inwardly connected with the latter, reached true knowledge of God and rational worship of God, “as far as man is capable of them in the present state.”

The Popular Religion, however, was opposed to this philosophical religion. It had fallen a sacrifice to politics, which modifies gods and oracles, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, merely for its own purpose. By mingling some philosophy with it, a lasting authority was then to be procured for this religion and its worship; and thus there arose “that mixture which makes of the Deity a monster of so many contradictions that it annihilates itself, and generates a second atheism which has its foundation in a very natural Unbelief.”

This second Atheism finds healing in true philosophy. But there then steps a third Atheism to its side which arises out of the pretensions of a reason that has now become arrogant. It is that Atheism which Jacobi combats so



emphatically as the necessary consequence of the philosophy of the Understanding or Reflection. We can only escape from it by turning our back with Jacobi upon the science of the Understanding, and plunging resolutely with a *salto mortale* into the Philosophy of Feeling.

A distinction must therefore be made between what is external or positive, and what is internal, in Religion. All theologies and histories of Revelation are, as regards their external nature, equally fabulous and erroneous in their belief; and all interchange of the letter with the spirit, and all hanging on words, is but superstition and Lama-worship. As long as our priests preach anything else than the pure, holy, internal, true doctrine, and as long as they bid us look to the sky because it fertilizes the earth, thus lowering the spirit to the clay, so long will they be more hateful than the Atheist.—On the other hand, all theologies and histories of Revelation, as regards their inner substance and mystical part, are equally true; for the fear of God and virtue are the essentials of all religions. And so far the history of humanity is nothing but a history of Religion; as it is, in fact, a gradual advancing in the knowledge of the essential fellowship of life with God.

So long as the perceptions of the sensible world are not yet clearly distinguished from the apprehensions of the supersensible, God is viewed as a sensible and finite being. This is the period of Heathenism. As soon as man comes to the consciousness of that distinction, he turns himself to the invisible, to the purely internal truth, to the spirit; and this is the period of Christianity. This is also the period of the Philosophy of Feeling. But it hardly needs to be observed that the designations "Heathenism" and "Christianity," as thus used, do not cover completely, but only *a parte potiore*, the historical religions called by these names. In the historical Heathenism there is Christianity in its worship of the invisible, of the spirit, of what is inward; and in the historical Christianity there is Heathenism in the supremacy of the visible, of the letter, and of what is outward.—The

religion of the heathen, is worship of nature; the religion of Christianity, is worship of God; the former is pantheistic or naturalistic, the latter is anthropomorphistic. Hence Christianity is an essential constituent, and even a turning-point, in the universal history of the world.

Christianity is the living belief in the Might indwelling in man and superior to nature. Christianity is therefore worship of God and exercise of virtue; and morality is the characteristic mark which distinguishes Christianity from Heathenism, and the worship of God from the worship of Idols. Hence the essence of Christianity is inward regeneration by a higher power; it is the elevation of the finite nature to the divine. —The capacity for this elevation lies in our nature. Christ, "the purest among the mighty, and the mightiest among the pure," is the sublimest representative of this religious elevation to God. For God, the living God, can only manifest Himself in what lives. And hence, in order to remove the infinite misrelation of man to God, either man must become participative of a divine nature, or God must assume flesh and blood. Whoever follows the way to the higher life that has been shown by Christ, will, like Him, become conscious of the divine life and of the divine peace.

The scholars and adherents of Jacobi were not insignificant in number, yet none of them developed the thoughts of the master in any special way, nor did any of them gain such a wide influence as to make it necessary to take note of them here. We shall afterwards have to speak more particularly of the relation which Fries holds to Jacobi.

## INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

---

### A

ABELARD, 36-39.  
 Agricola, Rudolph, 50.  
 D'Ailly, Petrus, 35.  
 Alberti, J. Val., 394*n*, 526.  
 Albertus Magnus, 32.  
 Alciati, Gianpaolo, 195.  
 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 50.  
 Alstedt, J. H., 170, 173.  
 Amalricans, 31.  
 Amalrich, 43.  
 Ammon, 540*n*.  
 Ammonius Sakkas, 16.  
 Amyraut, 157.  
 Anabaptists, 191, 207-212.  
 Andreæ, Joh. Val., 243, 273.  
 Annet, Peter, 354.  
 Anselm, 29-30.  
 Anti-Trinitarians, 191.  
 Anton, Paul, 276.  
 Apologists, 7-9.  
 Aristotle (Aristotelianism), 19, 20, 28,  
     31, 168-178.  
 Arminius, 171, 269.  
 Arndt, Joh., 272-3.  
 Arnobius, 9.  
 Arnold, Gottfr., 279.  
 Arnold (Jesuit), 162.  
 Athenagoras, 9.  
 Augustin, 21-22, 27, 231.  
 Auvergne, Wil. of, 42.  
 Avenarius, 408.  
 Averroes (Ibn Roshd), 39, 50.  
 Avicenna, 222.

### B

Bacon, Lord, 286-8.  
 Bacon, Roger, 41.  
 Bahrdt, Karl Friedr., 546-550.  
 Baier, 142.  
 Barclay, Robert, 215.  
 Bartholomais, Alex., 119.  
 Basedow, 536.  
 Bauer, Bruno, 439*n*.  
 Baxter, Richard, 214.  
 Bayle, Pierre, 446-453.

Beckmann, 177.  
 Beghines and Beghards, 45.  
 Bekker, Balthasar, 399-401.  
 Bentley, 356.  
 Berengar of Tours, 36.  
 Berkeley, 360.  
 Bernhard of Clairvaux, 43.  
 Bernhard, 89.  
 Bessarion, 53.  
 Betkins, Joachim, 273.  
 Beurhusius, 170.  
 Beza, 169.  
 Biddle, John, 206.  
 Biel, Gabriel, 35.  
 Bilfinger, 515.  
 Blandrata, Giorgio, 195, 198.  
 Blount, Charles, 289, 291, 314.  
 Blyenburg, van, 434.  
 Boccaccio, 49.  
 Boethius, 22-23, 28, 231.  
 Böhme, Jacob, 193, 243-265.  
 Bolsec, 156.  
 Bonaventura, 43.  
 Bouillier, Fr., 394*n*.  
 Bovillus, Carl, 89.  
 Boyle, 118, 238.  
 Breckling, Friedr., 263.  
 Brescain, Joh. of, 40.  
 Brixen, 67, 89.  
 Brockes, Barth. Heinr., 539.  
 Brown, Robert, 212.  
 Browne, Sir Thomas, 291, 300-301.  
 Brucker, 169*n*.  
 Bruno, Giordano, 66, 93-101.  
 Buckle, 453.  
 Buddeus, 440.  
 Bullinger, 197, 208.  
 Bullock, 353.  
 Butler's Hudibras, 291.  
 Butler, Joseph, 358-9.  
 Buxtorf, 141.

### C

Cabanis, 461.  
 Calixtus, G., 163.  
 Calovius, 140, 141, 206.  
 Calvin, Joh., 155-158, 195, 198.

Camerer, Theod., 407*n.*  
 Camillo, Renato, 194.  
 Campanella, Thomas, 49, 66, 101-108.  
 Campanus, John, 210.  
 Campbell, 357.  
 Canz, Gottl., 530.  
 Capellus, 141.  
 Cardanus, 65, 91-93.  
 Carlstadt, 225, 231.  
 Carpov, 530-531.  
 Carrière, 66*n.*, 93*n.*  
 Cartesianism. *See* Descartes.  
 Caselius, Joh., 170, 178, 179.  
 Casmann, Otto, 170, 171, 172.  
 Cassiodorus, 22-23, 28.  
 Cathari, 39.  
 Chandler, 353.  
 Charles I., 264.  
 Charpentier, Jacques, 119.  
 Charron, 57.  
 Chemnitius, 160.  
 Chioccus, 91.  
 Chubb, 291, 342-345.  
 Chytræus, Dav., 170.  
 Claudius, Matthias, 562.  
 Clemens Alexandrinus, 15.  
 Coccejus, 270.  
 Collins, Anthony, 291, 329-330, 352, 354.  
 Comte, 454.  
 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, 460.  
 Congregationalism, 212.  
 Conybeare, 357.  
 Conyza, 198.  
 Cornhart, 269.  
 Cramer, Joh., 171.  
 Crell, Joh., 199, 205.  
 Crell, Sam., 206.  
 Cromwell, 213.  
 Cudworth, Ralph, 354-355.  
 Cuffelarius, 435.  
 Cusanus, Nic., 65-89, 93, 101, 219, 231.

## D

Dale, Antonius van, 399.  
 Damascenus, Joannes, 19, 22.  
 Damiani, Petrus, 29.  
 Dante, 49.  
 Darjes, 532.  
 Dasypodius, 170.  
 David, Dinant, 44.  
 Davidis, 199.  
 Deism, Engl., 284-388.  
 Denk, Joh., 209.  
 Descartes, 62, 389-393.  
 Deurhoff, Wilh., 398.  
 Diderot, Denis, 462.  
 Dionysius Areopagita, 17, 26.  
 Dippel, Joh. Konr., 279, 543.  
 Dodwell, H., sen., 351.  
 Dodwell, H., jun., 292.

Dresser, Mathæus, 170.  
 Dreydorff, 61*n.*

## E

Eberhard, 536*n.*  
 Eckhart, 45-47, 231.  
 Edelmann, 439-445, 543.  
 Eichhorn, 559.  
 Elisabeth of Schöna, 43.  
 Elsvich, Hermann, 169*n.*  
 Engel, 535*n.*  
 Engelbrecht, Hans, 242.  
 Eo, Wilh., 241.  
 Erasmus, 58.  
 Erdmann, Benno, 528*n.*  
 Ernesti, 560.  
 Eugenius IV., 67.  
 Evremont, Saint, 447.

## F

Faber Stapulensis, 89.  
 Fabricius, 170.  
 Fabricius, Joh. Jak., 273.  
 Falkenberg, 67.  
 Fechner, Herm. Ad., 243*n.*  
 Feder, G. H., 536*n.*  
 Feuerbach, Ludw., 448*n.*  
 Fischer, Kuno, 407*n.*, 480*n.*  
 Flacius Illyricus, 139.  
 Fock, 199*n.*  
 Fox, George, 214.  
 Francis I., 119.  
 Frank, G., 125*n.*, 394*n.*  
 Frank, Sebastian, 225-228, 231.  
 Franke, Aug. Herm., 276.  
 Frankenberg, Abraham v., 262.  
 Freidlieb, Ericus, 479.  
 Freigius, 170.  
 Fries, 563*n.*, 654.  
 Frischlin, Nikol., 170.  
 Frisius, Paul, 170.

## G

Gale, Theo., 354.  
 Galen, 222.  
 Gass, W., 61*n.*, 125*n.*  
 Gaunilo, 30.  
 Gellert, 562.  
 Gennadius, 50, 61*n.*  
 Genthe, 477*n.*  
 Gentile, Val., 196, 198.  
 Georg of Trapezunt, 50.  
 Gerbert, 28.  
 Gerhard, Joh., 140, 144, 158, 172.  
 Gerson, Joh., 35.  
 Gesner, Sal., 174.

Geulinx, Arnold, 402-404.  
 Gibson, Edmund, 356.  
 Gichtel, Georg, 263.  
 Gnosticism, 10-15.  
 Goelenius, Rud., 170, 171, 172, 178.  
 Göze, Joh. Melch., 573.  
 Gomarists, 270.  
 Gonterius, 162.  
 Goodwin, Th., 269.  
 Grauer, Albert, 181.  
 Gregory of Heimbürg, 89.  
 Gregory VII., 58.  
 Gregory IX., 31.  
 Gribaldo, Matteo, 195, 198.  
 Griesbach, 559.  
 Grotius, Hugo, 206, 525.  
 Grunius, Stephan, 241.  
 Gualther, 198.  
 Günther, Owen, 179, 182.  
 Guthmann, Aegidius, 230.

H

Hamann, 62, 563, 607-621.  
 Hamberger, Julius, 243*n*.  
 Heberle, 138*n*.  
 Hegel, 2, 245.  
 Heidanus, 398.  
 Helvetius, 462.  
 Heppe, H., 268*n*, 436*n*.  
 Heraclitus, 245.  
 Herbert of Cherbury, 289, 291, 292-299, 425.  
 Herder, 62, 563, 585-607.  
 Herrlinger, 131*n*.  
 Herrnhut Brotherhood, 280.  
 Hettner, H., 446*n*.  
 Hildegard of Bingen, 43.  
 Hobbes, 289, 291, 302-313, 435.  
 Hochhuth, 271*n*.  
 Hofmann, Daniel, 178-190.  
 Hofmann, Melchior, 209.  
 Hohburg, Chr., 264.  
 Holbach, 463-468.  
 Holkot, Robert, 35.  
 Hollaz, 140, 478.  
 Homagius, Heinr. Phil., 241.  
 Hooker, Thom., 269.  
 Hoornbeck, 206.  
 Hornejus, Conr., 163, 167.  
 Hossbach, W., 274*n*.  
 Huber, 61*n*.  
 Huët, Pierre Daniel, 447.  
 Hugo of St. Victor, 43.  
 Humanists, 49, 57.  
 Hume, David, 292, 359-388.  
 Huss, Joh., 60.  
 Hutten, Ulrich v., 58, 61*n*.  
 Hutter, 140.  
 Hypatia, 18.

I

Ibbot, Benjamin, 356.  
 Ibn Roshd, *see* Averroes.

Irving, Edward, 267.  
 Isidore of Seville, 22.

J

Jacobi, 62, 408, 436, 563, 621-654.  
 Jænichen, 436.  
 Jamblichus, 17.  
 Jeanmaire, 448*n*.  
 Jeffrey, 353.  
 Jerusalem, Joh. Friedr. Wilh., 542.  
 Joachim of Floris, 43, 44.  
 Jodl, 388*n*.  
 Johannes Damascenus, 19.  
 Johannes Philoponus, 19.  
 Joris, David, 210.  
 Justin Martyr, 8.  
 Justinian, 19.

K

Kabbala, 55, 58, 65, 221.  
 Kant, 2, 61, 62, 476.  
 Kappelier, 532.  
 Keckermann, 158, 170, 172.  
 Kempis, Thomas à, 60, 231.  
 Kepler, 48.  
 Klopstock, 562.  
 Klose, C. R. W., 439*n*.  
 Knutzen, Martin, 528*n*.  
 Knutzen, Matthias, 437, 442.  
 König, 140.  
 Köstlin, 125*n*.  
 Köthen, 530.  
 Kopernicus, 48.  
 Koran, 84.  
 Kosthold, Chr., 435.  
 Kuhlmann, Quirinus, 263.

L

Labadie, 274.  
 Lactantius, 9, 10.  
 Lampe, Friedr. Ad., 118, 271, 398.  
 Lange, Fr. Alb., 446.  
 Lange, Joachim, 280, 533*n*.  
 Lateran Council, 50, 51.  
 Lautensack, Paul, 230.  
 Lavater, Joh. Casp., 562.  
 Law, William, 264*n*.  
 Leade, Jean, 264.  
 Lechler, 292*n*.  
 Leibniz, 62, 101, 118, 173, 476-557.  
 Lentulus, 397*n*.  
 Less, 540*n*.  
 Lessing, 62, 436, 553*n*, 563, 564-585.  
 Levellers, 285.  
 Liddel, Duncan, 179.  
 Linde, Antonius van der, 434*n*.  
 Lipsius, Justus, 56, 171.  
 Lobstein, P., 119*n*.

Locke, John, 291, 315-321, 459, 460.  
 Löscher, Val. Ernst, 118, 280, 478.  
 Lubinus, Eilhard, 174.  
 Ludovici, 479*n*, 528, 533*n*.  
 Lütkeemann, Joachim, 273.  
 Lullus, Raymundus, 34.  
 Luther, Martin, 60, 125-131, 207.

## M

Macchiavelli, 49.  
 Macchiavellists, 105.  
 Malebranche, 404-407.  
 Marcianus Capella, 28.  
 Maresius, Sam., 394*n*.  
 Marsilius, Ficinus, 53-55.  
 Marta, Ant., 91.  
 Martini, Conrad, 176, 178, 183.  
 Martini, Jakob, 170, 175, 188.  
 Maastricht, Petrus van, 394*n*.  
 Maturo, Bartol., 194.  
 Maupertuis, Pierre Louis de, 453-454.  
 Maximus Confessor, 18.  
 Meisner, Balthasar, 144, 158, 176.  
 Melanchthon, Phil., 131-137, 169, 174.  
 Mendelssohn, Moses, 476, 537-539.  
 Menno, Simon, 212.  
 Mentzer, 158.  
 Meth, E., 242.  
 Methodists, 282-283.  
 Mettrie, De la, 446, 461.  
 Meyer, Ludw., 395*n*.  
 Meyfart, 274.  
 Michaelis, Joh. Dav., 559.  
 Milton, 212.  
 Minucius Felix, 9-10.  
 Montaigne, 56.  
 Moravians, 280-282.  
 More, Henry, 264, 354.  
 Morgan, Thomas, 289, 292, 345-351.  
 Mosheim, 351*n*.  
 Müller, H., 273.  
 Münzer, Thomas, 225.  
 Musæus, Joh., 159-167, 435.  
 Mutianus, 57.  
 Mylius, 179.

## N

Nagel, Paul, 242.  
 Neander, 271*n*.  
 Neoplatonism, 16.  
 Newton, 288, 459.  
 Niclas, Hans, 211.  
 Nicolai, 536.  
 Niemeyer, 540*n*.  
 Nihusius, Bartholdus, 162.  
 Noack, Ludw., 292*n*.

## O

Occam, Wilh. of, 31-32, 34.

Occhino, Bern., 196.  
 Olearius, Joh., 181.  
 Opel, 231*n*.  
 Origen, 15, 231.  
 Ortliberians, 44.  
 Osiander, Andr., 138, 241.  
 — Joh. Ad., 394*n*.  
 — Lucas, 161, 273.  
 Ostorodt, 199*n*, 205, 206.

## P

Paracelsus, 221-225.  
 Parmenides, 90.  
 Patritius, Franciscus, 66, 108-111.  
 Perkins, William, 268.  
 Perron, Cardinal du, 162.  
 Petersen, 279.  
 Petrarca, 49.  
 Pfaff, Christ. Matth., 167.  
 Pfaffrad, Casp., 170, 179.  
 Pfeleiderer, Edm., 388*n*.  
 — Otto, 563*n*.  
 Philippo-Ramists, 170.  
 Philoponis, Joannes, 19.  
 Pichler, A., 480*n*.  
 Pico of Mirandola, 55, 58, 145*n*.  
 Pietism, 268.  
 Pighius, 156.  
 Piscator, 170, 178.  
 Plato (Platonism), 28.  
 Pletho, Georgius Gemistus, 52, 61*n*.  
 Plotinus, 16, 231.  
 Pomponatius, Petrus, 50-52.  
 Pope, 566.  
 Pordage, Joh., 264.  
 Porphyry, 17, 20.  
 Pratje, 439*n*.  
 Proclus, 17.  
 Pufendorff, Sam., 525.  
 Puritanism, 268-269.

## Q

Quakers, 214-215.  
 Quenstedt, 118, 140.  
 Quistorp, 273.

## R

Rambach, Fr. Eb., 355.  
 Ramus, Petrus (Ramism), 50, 66, 118-123, 168-178.  
 Rappoltus, Fr., 434.  
 Raymund of Sabunde, 35.  
 Reimar, Herm. Sam., 550-557.  
 Reinbeck, 530, 532.  
 Renato, Camillo, 194.  
 Reuchlin, Joh., 57.  
 Reusch, 531-532.  
 Reuter, H., 61*n*.  
 Revis, Jak., 394*n*.



Ribow, 532.  
 Richard of St. Victor, 43.  
 Riem, Andr., 545.  
 Ritschl, A., 138*n*.  
 Rixner of Siber, 66*n*.  
 Robinson, John, 212.  
 Rock, Joh. Fr., 446.  
 Röell, Herm. Al., 398, 401-402.  
 Roscellinus, 28.  
 Rosicrucians, 242-243.  
 Rost, Georg, 241.  
 Roth, Joh., 262.  
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 446, 468-475.  
 Ruarius, Martin, 205.

## S

Sack, 542.  
 Sanchez, 57.  
 Scaliger, 171.  
 Schade, Casper, 276.  
 — Georg, 546.  
 Scharff, 175, 176.  
 Scharpff, 67*n*.  
 Scheffler, Joh., 264.  
 Schegk, Jak., 170.  
 Scheibler, Christ., 175.  
 Schelhammer, Joh., 241.  
 Schelling, 101, 245.  
 Scherbius, Phil., 118, 170.  
 Schilling, Wenceslaus, 187, 188.  
 Schlee, Ernst, 178*n*.  
 Schleiermacher, 408, 434*n*.  
 Schlichting, 200, 205.  
 Schlüter, Gottfr., 181.  
 Schmalz, Val., 205.  
 Schmid, Heinrich, 274*n*.  
 — Johann, 273.  
 — Xaver, 113*n*.  
 Schmidt, C., 131*n*.  
 — Joh. Lorenz, 543.  
 — Paul Wilhelm, 434*n*.  
 Scholastics, 26-41.  
 Schubert, Joh. Ernst, 3, 532.  
 Schultze, Fritz, 61*n*.  
 Schulz, Joh. Heinr., 544.  
 Schumann, 575.  
 Schuppins, Joh. Balth., 274.  
 Schweizer, Alex., 156*n*.  
 Schwenkfeldt, Casper, 228-230, 231.  
 Sclai, Barthol., 230.  
 Scotus, Joh. Duns, 33.  
 — Joh. Erigena, 26, 27.  
 Scribonius, 170.  
 Sriver, 273.  
 Semler, 560.  
 Seneca, 231.  
 Serena, 321*n*, 325.  
 Servetus, Mich., 139*n*, 217-221.  
 Shaftesbury, 291, 330-338.  
 Sigwart, 145*n*.  
 Silesius, Angelus, 264.  
 Simon of Tournay, 40.

Simon, Richard, 436.  
 Slevogt, Paul, 188-189.  
 Snell, Rud., 171.  
 Socinus, Faustus, 197-199, 205.  
 — Lelio, 197-199.  
 Socrates, 245.  
 Soner, 206.  
 Spalat, 207.  
 Spalding, Joh. Joach., 541.  
 Spangenberg, 282.  
 Sparrow, 264*n*.  
 Spener, Phil. Jak., 274-279, 478.  
 Spinoza, 62, 101, 326, 417-434.  
 Stancaro, 198.  
 Statorius, 199.  
 Stebbing, 357.  
 Stephen, Leslie, 292*n*.  
 Stiefel, Esaj., 242.  
 Stifel, 209.  
 Stilling, Jung-, 572.  
 Stosch (Stossius), 439.  
 Strauss, D. F., 61*n*, 553*n*.  
 Sturm, Joh., 170.  
 Suarez, 174.  
 Sulzer, 536.  
 Suso, Heinr., 47.  
 Swedenborg, 265-267.  
 Swift, 291.  
 Sykes, 353.  
 Sylvester II., 28.  
 Synesius, 18.

## T

Talon, Omer, 119.  
 Tatian, 8.  
 Tauler, Joh., 47, 225, 231.  
 Taurellus, Nic., 66, 113-118.  
 Taylor, E., 264*n*.  
 Teerstegen, Gerhard, 562.  
 Telesius, Bern., 65, 66, 89-91, 93.  
 Teller, Wilh. Abr., 541.  
 Tellinck, Wilh., 270.  
 Tertullian, 8, 9.  
 Tetens, Nic., 536*n*.  
 Thamer, Theobald, 271-272.  
 Theobald, Zach., 241.  
 Tholuck, 125*n*.  
 Thomas Aquinas, 32-33.  
 Thomasius, Christ., 526-528.  
 — G., 178*n*.  
 Tiedemann, 536*n*.  
 Tillotson, 379.  
 Tindal, 291, 338-341, 356.  
 Toland, 291, 321-329.  
 Trent, Council of, 60, 61.  
 Turretin, 167.

## U

Ueberfeld, 194, 264.  
 Urban VIII., 76.  
 Ursinus, Zach., 170.

## V

Valdez, Juan, 196.  
 Valla, Laurentius, 50.  
 Vanini, Julius Cæsar, 66, 111-113.  
 Vayer, François de la Mothe le, 447.  
 Vedelius, Nic., 159-167.  
 Velthuysen, Lambert, 436*n*.  
 Vench, 89.  
 Vergerio, Pierpaolo, 194.  
 Veronius, Franciscus, 162.  
 Verschoor, Jak., 436.  
 Vives, Ludw., 50.  
 Völkel, Joh., 205.  
 Voëtius, Gisbert, 270.  
 Voltaire, 446, 453-459.

## W

Waddington, Charles, 119*n*.  
 Walch, 479*n*.  
 Waldus, Petrus, 60.  
 Walther, Balth., 262.

Weigel, Erhard, 142.  
 ——— Valentin, 230, 231-243.  
 Weingarten, H., 285*n*.  
 Werdenhagen, Joh. Angelius V., 187.  
 Wessel, Joh., 60.  
 Wettstein, 559.  
 Whiston, William, 352.  
 Wickliffe, Joh., 60.  
 William III., 214.  
 Wissowatius, Andr., 199*n*, 200, 205.  
 Wittich, Christophe, 397-398, 436*n*.  
 Woidowski, 206.  
 Wolff, Christ., 480, 515-534.  
 Wolzogen, Ludw., 205.  
 Woolston, Th., 353.

## Z

Zeller, Ed., 480*n*.  
 Zimmermann, 241.  
 Zinzendorf, 280-282.  
 Zirngiebl, 621*n*.  
 Zwingli, 145-154.

107902  
 THEOLOGY LIBRARY  
 CLAREMONT, CALIF.











BL  
51  
P8

107902

Puenjer, Bernhard  
History of the Christi  
ian philosophy of re-  
ligion from the refo-  
rmation..

DATE DUE

SE 22 '70

JA 17 '74

BORROWER'S NAME

*J. V. Vahlgren*

12-22-71

6-1572

1-4-73

Puenjer

History

**THEOLOGY LIBRARY**  
**SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY AT CLAREMONT**  
**CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA**



PRINTED IN U.S.A.

